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Abstract 
 
This examination criticises some of the main textual efforts within the self-identified 
politiography of Algeria that have attempted to help make the last twenty years of violent 
conflict in Algeria intelligible to Western audiences. It attends to the way in which 
particular representations of Algerian violence were problematised within, and cross-
problematised with, prevailing international security discourses and practices, especially 
the concurrently emergent litterature on civil wars and armed humanitarian intervention. 
Unsatisfied with general international response to the conflict in Algeria in the 1990s, 
particularly the major massacres of 1997 and 1998, this study questions how certain 
problematisations were used to understand the violence and how those renderings 
contributed to the troubled relationship between the representation of mass violence in 
Algeria and international efforts to intervene against it.  
 
As a study in politiography, the primary object of analysis here is not the entire discursive 
field of Algerian violence but rather select yet influential scholarly texts within the genre 
of late Algerian violence. While these works helped co-constitute the broader discursive 
formations of Algerian violence that enabled its own representation as such, this 
examination does not necessarily address them vis-à-vis unique, superior or competing 
representations drawn from the traditionally privileged sites of initial discursive production 
of international security. The primary method of critique here is deconstructive in so far as 
it simply uses the texts — their arguments, their evidence and their archival logic — 
against themselves. Borrowing insights from currents in recent neopragmatist thought, this 
study seeks to reverse engineer some of the more dominant international problematisations 
of Algerian violence, so as to unearth the deeper politics of naming built into specific 
representations of Algeria and more generic frameworks of international security.  
 
After first exploring the conflict’s contested political and economic etiology (chapter 
three), as well as its disputed classification as a civil war (chapter four), this study closely 
examines the interpretations of the most intense civilian massacres, those that occurred 
between August 1997 and January 1998 (chapters five and six). How these representations 
resulted in the threat of (armed) humanitarian intervention are of particular concern 
(chapter seven), as are the ways in which foreign actors have attempted to historically 
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contextualise Algeria’s alleged tradition and culture of violence (chapter eight). The aim is 
not to produce — though it cannot but help contribute to — a new history or account of the 
politics of the Algerian conflict and its internationalisation. The intent is first to underscore 
the inherent yet potentially auspicious dangers within all problematisations of mass 
violence. Secondly, it is to advocate for ironic forms of politiography, given the politics 
always-already embedded within acts of naming, particularly when it comes to questions 
of mass violence. A politiography that is able to appreciate the contingency of 
representation and intervention, and so underscores the need for a more deliberately and 
deliberative ethical and democratic politics of representation in the face of atrocity. 
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Note on transliteration 
 
Transliteration 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Arabic 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in this study, whether standard (fuṣḥā) or Algerian dialect 
(dārijah), mainly follows the system used by the International Journal of Middle East 
Studies, except that tāʾ marbūṭah is kept in the -ah form and ʾiḍāfa constructions, along 
with other contractions, are not rendered (e.g., fī al-, not fī-l). This study uses the Jaghbub 
font for Latin text with diacritical marks. 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1. Introduction 
 
 
 
Supposing that this also is only interpretation — and you will be eager to 
make this objection? — well, so much the better.  
 
Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil (§22) 
 
 
 
This is not about Algeria. What follows are a series of critical readings of late Algerian 
violence as manifested within particular representational regimes. It is an exploration of, to 
use Edward Said’s (1994 [1978]) concept, imaginative geographies of Algerian violence, 
chiefly those produced within particular international security disciplines. It is not a 
critique of the entire discursive field that constituted the various representational terrains of 
Algerian violence nor does it privilege traditional sites — political officialdom, military 
and security apparatuses, international bodies, non-governmental organisations, the mass 
media, business, trade and finance — in the investigation of questions concerning 
international relations. It is rather a chain of focused deconstructions aimed at the academic 
politiography of Algerian violence. This study identifies and problematises some of the 
main textual efforts within political studies that have attempted to make the last twenty 
years of violence in Algeria intelligible to Western audiences. The task here is to unpack 
the hidden assumptions, theoretical over-determinations and empirical lapses in various 
securitisations and de-securitisations of the violence in Algeria, whether, among others, as 
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a problem of Islamist terrorism, identity conflict, economic collapse, failed 
democratisation, the inherently violent history and culture of the global South, transitional 
justice or as a candidate for foreign humanitarian intervention. By reverse engineering 
these international problematisations of violence, this study aims to understand the deeper 
politics of naming, which often functioned as productive silences, built into specific 
representations of Algerian violence and generic security frameworks. The goal is not to 
produce a new history of the Algerian conflict and its internationalisation. The aim is to 
underscore the inherent dangers of problematising mass violence and to advocate for a 
more ironic approach to questions of representation and intervention, one that can 
accommodate contingency while advancing a more ethical politics of democracy. 
 
Accounts of the Algerian ‘civil war’ — a deeply contested designation, as we will see in 
chapter four — often posit 1992 as the initial year of the armed conflict, though this is also 
a disputed claim, as chapter three makes clear. Where there seems to be widespread 
agreement is on the fact that Algeria experienced, as detailed and analysed in chapters five 
and six, some of the most atrocious and murderous violence of the 1990s, a decade 
frequently inscribed with unprecedented levels and kinds of violence. Appearing as it did 
during the 1990s, chapter seven makes it clear that the violence in Algeria quickly found 
its way into one of the leading international security regimes of the post-Cold War world, 
the discourse on armed humanitarian intervention. But the events of 11 September 2001, as 
chapter six notes, helped reformulate, hybridise, discard and fix competing readings of the 
violence in Algeria. The origins of the armed conflict in Algeria, whether the deep 
historical roots (see chapter eight) or the immediate trigger causes (see chapter three), have 
been as much a wellspring for the production of knowledge as a site for political and 
intellectual contestation. What is at least certain is that then Algerian President Chadli 
Bendjedid resigned in January 1992. The regime that replaced him decided to annul the 
electoral victories of the Front islamique du salut (FIS, Islamic Salvation Front), an 
Islamist party poised to take control of the national parliament, as it had numerous 
prefectures (wilāyāt) and municipalities (baladiyāt) in Algeria’s first multi-party elections 
in 1990. Precipitous events followed the outlawing of the FIS in February 1992, though 
arguably salient developments had also preceded these. Acts of violence, frequently 
presented or interpreted as political, seemed to increase. By the mid 1990s, the Algerian 
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Islamist movement. Yet the extent to which either side was so easily representable as 
competing monoliths came under implicit and explicit attack. On the one hand, the alleged 
unified interests of the government and the state, at all levels, found platforms of 
expression yet also found a number of critics. Even the regime itself was said to be 
fundamentally split into at least two camps, the anti-Islamist éradicateurs versus those 
favouring dialogue with the FIS, the conciliateurs. The allegedly pro-government roles of 
Algeria’s secular civil society and private business interests were as much over-determined 
by observers as undermined by others who suggested their opaque participation in the 
violence, whether to support the cause of a divided regime or to advance their own 
interests regardless of the political contest between the FIS and the state. Likewise, the 
formation of a significant number of pro-government militias — numbering several 
hundreds of thousands by the late 1990s — contributed to a particular discourse of the 
Algerian violence in which it had been ‘privatised’. Meanwhile, Algeria’s inchoate 
Islamist insurgency had quickly spawned an alphabet soup of competing groups:  
Mouvement (algérien) islamique armé (MIA/MAIA, [Algerian] Armed Islamic 
Movement), Front islamique du djihad armé (Islamic Front for Armed Jihad), the 
Groupement/Groupe(s) islamique(s) armé(s) (GIA, Armed Islamic Grouping/Group[s]), 
Mouvement pour l’état islamique (MEI, Islamic State Movement), Groupe salafiste pour 
la prédication et le combat (GSPC, Salafi Goup for Preaching and Combat) and now a 
branch of Al-Qa‘idah (Tanẓīm al-Qāʿidah bi Balād al-Maghrib al-Islāmī) that has been 
given the convenient yet inconsistent Latin abbreviations AQMI, AQIM, AQLIM, etc. The 
shifting and conflicting politics attributed to this rebellion, guerrilla movement or 
insurgency — another disputed set of designations — likewise provided an important 
condition of contestation and confusion to the international efforts to understand the 
violence in Algeria within the dominant epistemes of international security.  
 
This study reconstitutes and revisits the archives deployed in the various theoretical and 
topical studies of the violence in Algeria. To a large degree, this study also draws upon the 
internationalised version of Algeria’s Qui tue? (Who kills?) debate: the questions of 
identity, motive and political context surrounding intimate acts of violence, high profile 
assassinations and the most spectacular instances of mass slaughter. The culmination of 
these debates at the peak of Algeria’s violence — the massacre crisis of 1997 and 1998 — 
constitutes a significant portion of the analysis. After first exploring the conflict’s 
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ambiguous etiology (chapter three) and contested classification (chapter four), this study 
focuses on the major massacres that occurred in Algeria between August 1997 and January 
1998 (chapters five and six), and the international reaction to them. These cumulative 
representations of the violence and certain re-articulatory events (e.g., 11 September 2001) 
resulted in Algeria’s troubled appearance within, and quick disappearance from, 
contemporaneous discourses of armed humanitarian intervention (chapter seven). Lastly, 
this study looks at, within the context of debates about how Algeria should write the 
history of the 1990s, various efforts to endogenise the violence’s cultural and historical 
causes (chapter eight). Unsatisfied with the way in which the international community 
responded to the conflict in Algeria, this study seeks to understand how the problem is 
possibly somewhat rooted in the very problematisations used to understand Algeria’s 
violence in the first place. With this in mind, the purpose of this introduction is to set out 
the theoretical, philosophical and methodological contexts of this study, which is followed 
by a schematic description of each chapter. 
 
 
The politiography of international security 
 
Political studies lack a clearly defined space for meta-analysis. As with most scholarly 
traditions, meta-analysis has long been a part of political studies but its position within the 
disciplinary field is ambiguous. A longstanding division bifurcates the work of political 
studies into one of two camps. There is the empirical side (Political Science and 
International Relations) and then there is the philosophical side (Political or International 
Theory). Unlike the discipline of history with its subfield of historiography, there is no 
statement or institutional acceptance of a practice that might be termed politiography. This 
is, again, not to claim that politiography — more precisely, the study of politiography — 
has never been practiced; it is to claim that the analysis of politiography has rarely, if ever, 
framed itself as such.  
 
In terms of this study, the analogy with historiography is one way to understand my aims 
and methods. This study is a critical assessment of the politiography of late Algerian 
violence. It ruthlessly interrogates various scholarly texts within a particular genre; those 
that have attempted to understand the violence in Algeria, but also some texts that should 
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have included Algeria within their accounts but did not. My investigation begins and ends 
with a return to the original source material and a close reading of key arguments. As such, 
the approach here is not all that different from certain forms historiographical analysis. The 
difference — the warrant for the term politiography — issues from the fact that the 
majority of texts under scrutiny here identify themselves as works of political analysis 
rather than history. It is not because of any insufficiency with the theories or practices of 
historiography that this warrant is realised; it issues from the lack of a clearly defined 
space within political studies for a similar level of self-reflexive analysis as found in 
historiography vis-à-vis history. Still, the question naturally arises as to whether or not I 
am reifying a nonexistent division of labour between politiography and historiography — a 
distinction without a difference. This question, however, should first of all be posed to the 
disciplines themselves with their maintenance of intuitionally rigid yet functionally 
invisible boundaries between history and political studies. Though the demarcation of a 
practice calling itself politiography indeed carries with it the danger of reinforcing arbitrary 
disciplinary boundaries, this is rather an argument for an awareness of these effects rather 
than a rejection of the distinction. More importantly, politiography can also serve as new 
channel of communication between scholars of history and politics, to exchange ideas on 
methods and theories. 
 
Genealogies of politiography, even in the narrow field of international security studies, are 
not difficult to construct, particularly given the recent interest in discourse as an object of 
investigation and a method of analysis. Over the course of the past three decades, a number 
of international relations theorists have interrogated the foundations and practices of 
knowledge production in their discipline. The now widespread acceptance and adoption of 
so-called constructivist theories and methodologies is indicative of the extent to which 
ideas drawn from critical theory and post-structuralism have found a firm place within 
international political studies. When constructivism arrived on the scene in the 1980s, it 
often appeared as an attempt to question or undermine the dominant schools of 
international relations theory — (neo)realism, (neo)liberalism, political economy, world 
systems theory, the English school — and sometimes in the reflexive form of studies of the 
academic practice (Ashley 1986; Walker 1987; Onuf 1989; Walker 1993; Wendt 1999). By 
the end of the 1990s, however, constructivism’s more post-positivist or norm-based wing 
(e.g., Kratochwil 1989; Finnemore 1996; Katzenstein 1996; Fierke & Jørgensen 2001) saw 
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increasing mainstream acceptance within international relations — at least in so much as it 
was openly portrayed as the paradigm’s defining debate (e.g., Katzenstein et al. 1998; 
Fearon et al. 2002). Where there were still perceptions of danger came from the wing of 
constructivism regularly dismissed as being post-structuralist. The vectors of post-
structuralism into international relations and security studies ran parallel to those of 
constructivism’s foray. Indeed, similar names and studies are cited as foundational in the 
post-structuralist critique of dominant international political theories (Ashley 1981; Ashley 
1986; Walker 1987; Walker 1993; Ashley & Walker 1990), though new voices have been 
included in this cannon as well (Der Derian 1987; Shapiro 1988; Der Derian & Shapiro 
1989). Efforts to apply such insights drawn from the recent developments in continental 
philosophy — the statements of post-modernism of Jean-François Lyotard and Gilles 
Deleuze, the post-structuralism of Michel Foucault and Roland Barthes, Jacques Derrida’s 
deconstructive approach, Jean Baudrillard’s theories of simulation, Paul Virilio’s writings 
on speed and technology —  soon took the form of empirical case studies within the field 
of international politics (e.g., Campbell 1992; Campbell 1998a; Der Derian 1992; Doty 
1993; Klein 1994; Weber 1995; Debrix 1999; Weldes et al. 1999; Edkins 2002) and further 
theoretical critique (George 1994; Edkins 1999; Bleiker 2000; Albert et al. 2001). Given 
the degree to which some of the most dominant questions of international relations have 
been deeply inculcated with questions of international security, the development of a 
‘critical’ branch of security studies was well incubated in the emerging constructivist and 
post-structuralist literature. Arriving shortly after the outpouring of constructivist critique 
in international relations theory, the main texts of critical security studies soon began 
directing similar attacks on the study of international security (Lipschutz 1995; Dillon 
1996; Krause & Williams 1997; Buzan et al. 1998; Wyn Jones 1999; Booth 2005). Case 
studies — a label that would likely be rejected — had already arrived or were soon on the 
way (e.g., Waever et al. 1993; Katzenstein 1996; Campbell 1998a; Der Derian 2001; 
Dodds & Ingram 2009 and others cited above). Needless to say, this narrative, and the 
categories and debates it proposes, is as problematic as it is non-exhaustive. It merely 
serves as reminder that the practice of politiography — studying the studies — is not 
foreign to the analysis of international security questions. It also provides points of 
departure from which possible triangulations of this study’s position within the field might 
be made. 
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One tradition of scholars expressing particularly keen interest in the ‘writing’ of 
international politics has been the eclectic constellation of scholars labelled post-
colonialist. Possible traditions of post-colonialism are quite vast (see Loomba 1998 and 
Young 2001), though the work of such intellectuals as Frantz Fanon, Aimé Césaire, Albert 
Memmi, not to mention leaders in African, Asian and Latin American revolutions, often 
take centre stage. Precursors to post-colonial theory and clear statements of its precepts 
have been located in, among others, Talal Asad (1973), Said (1994 [1978]), Partha 
Chatterjee (1986), Gayatri Spivak (1988) and Homi Bhabha (1994), including, in the case 
of the Maghrib, Réda Bensmaïa (2003). While the primary terrains of post-colonial 
analysis have been literature, social theory and history, its application to international 
relations and security has nonetheless been attempted (see Doty 1996; Krishna 1999; 
Soguk 1999; Darby 2000; Philpott 2000; Chowdhry & Nair 2004; Grovogui 2006). In 
hailing this literature, it is not to suggest that these thinkers will necessarily find this study 
of significant import. Rather, this study, in a way that will possibly resonate with some 
post-colonial writings, similarly explores the nexus of historically and geographically 
conditioned practices of intervention and representation.  
 
Though many readers will situate this study within the disciplinary frameworks of 
international security studies, its relationship to these fields is an uneasy one. The problems 
addressed here are related to the study of international security but in a way that is 
antagonistic to the discipline itself. In other words, often the problem with Algeria in the 
1990s, as identified in this study, was it being cast as such — a problem. It is not that this 
problem is accepted as a given fact but it is given by the objective of this study: to 
understand some of the ways in which Algeria was conceived of as a problem for certain 
members of the international community, primarily as a security problem. By 
‘international community’ this study simply means the global network of structures and 
actors where membership is non-exclusive and often imposed, though effective 
participation is highly selective and hierarchically regimented by factors such as wealth, 
race, gender and geography. Like scholar Cynithia Enloe (2000), I believe that anyone can 
be both the subject and object of this network; there are those who claim to speak for it just 
as it, more often that not, speaks for others. The international community’s 
problematisations of Algeria are partially achieved through disciplinary frames erected by 
the study and practice of international security. Understanding these becomes central to 
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reverse-engineering the problematisations of Algeria and so exposing their malfunctions 
and insufficiencies.  
 
While the primary object of study here is scholarly texts, this is not to give the impression 
that politiography should be a considered just the production of self- or institutionally 
identified academic writing. I take it as given that politics, like history, can be written in 
almost any site imaginable, by almost any conceivable actor, taking any number of 
discursive forms. Academic interventions, I believe, are neither the most important, the 
most influential nor the most comprehensive form politiography can take. The impetus for 
this study rather begins with the observation that the politiography and international 
politics of Algerian violence both strike me as deficient. While the international 
community seemingly had little effect upon the conflict in Algeria from 1992 onward, 
academic observers have variously and conflictingly problematised that violence in ways 
that do not hold up to close scrutiny. To be clear, this study does not seek to test the causal 
claim that problematic academic representations of the violence in Algeria produced or 
helped contribute to the apparent incapacity of foreign actors to ameliorate the violence. 
Though such is certainly unintentionally implied throughout this study and particularly in 
its conclusion, the goal of these deconstructive exercises is to hold up the politiography of 
Algerian violence as a cautionary tale, a warning to those who will face the dangers of 
representing and intervening against mass violence today and in the future. 
 
 
Assumptions 
 
In so far as the primary form of critique deployed here can be termed deconstructive (i.e., 
using the text against itself), outlining the philosophical background to this study functions 
more as a caveat or confession than as the basis from which a theory will be grounded, 
hypotheses generated and abstract models constructed. However, this background offers us 
some insight into the basis of the methodological techniques used in the effort here to 
overhaul representations and problematisations of the violence in Algeria. The 
philosophical bias of this study owes to a specific group of late-twentieth century thinkers, 
primarily from the United States, who have situated themselves within the linguistic turn 
or, in some cases, constructed an intellectual lineage to underscore their break from it. The 
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linguistic turn refers to a discordant ensemble of thinkers and ideas that place language at 
the centre of analysis or very close to it. Depending on the disciplinary context or moment 
in time, the linguistic turn can signify a wide variety of claims and practices whose main 
theorists hold significant disagreements about fundamental philosophical precepts. The 
various intellectual personalities associated with the linguistic turn hint at the divided ranks 
of this ‘movement’. Taking Ferdinand de Saussure as just one starting point, various lines 
of descent can be quickly constructed (e.g., Claude Lévi-Strauss, Roland Barthes, Jacques 
Derrida, Jacques Lacan, Julia Kristeva, etc). In other settings, Ludwig Wittgenstein is often 
cast in the role of founding father based on the centrality of language in his later works. 
For others, the turn could refer to the ways in which many forms of Anglo-American 
analytic philosophy had already reconsidered language as essential, rather than 
instrumental, to inquiry — if it was not already to be understood a direct object of inquiry 
in itself. But for others, the linguistic turn took the form of a revolt against analytic 
philosophy generally and logical positivism specifically. In such cases (this study 
included), the linguistic turn is the turn away from realism or the idea that reality 
determines truth. 
 
This study mainly finds purchase within neo-pragmatist currents, especially the work of 
the late American philosopher Richard Rorty. This group of thinkers has included a wide 
variety of contemporary philosophers, all claiming different ancestors both inside and 
outside the US pragmatist tradition starting with Charles Sanders Peirce, William James 
and John Dewey. The revival of pragmatism in latter half of the twentieth century is often 
traced back to 1951, when Williard Quine attempted to dispatch the reductionist view that 
every true statement must be matched up to something in reality. Instead, Quine promoted 
the idea that the truth of individual claims depends upon the broader context in which they 
appear. Empirical verification, he believed, happens at the macro-level of theories and not 
the micro-level of isolated sentences. Additionally, Quine sought to take apart the 
distinction between analytic and synthetic statements where the former is considered true 
by definition and the latter is true based upon experience. Having already attacked 
reductionism and argued for holism, Quine (1963: 43) felt that, if meaning is not merely 
the sum of empirically verified statements, then analytic or synthetic truth tests no longer 
hold value. And so, by implication, ‘no statement is immune to revision’. 
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Not too long after Quine’s critique first appeared, Nelson Goodman (1960 [1955]) 
launched a more aggressive attack on the pillars of Realism. This consisted of an attempt 
to undermine the idea that there are objectively superior representations of reality 
independent of their own conventions. Cornel West (1989: 190) would later summarise 
this point as an attempt to highlight ‘the theory-laden character of observation and the 
value-laden character or theory’. Hypothesis and theory building, Goodman would later 
argue, is not based solely upon empirical feedback but other criteria (e.g., simplicity) 
whose role is often in the front end of science rather than the back end. Goodman seemed 
quite willing to own up to, and even embrace, the epistemological pluralism — what many 
philosophical realists would dismiss as relativism — his arguments seemed to advocate 
(ibid.: 190-1). 
 
Wilfrid Sellars contributed to this anti-foundationalist surge by suggesting that ‘the given’, 
an important premise of realism, is a ‘myth’. He believed that the conflation of sensory 
experience with the justification of claims is untenable. Sellars did not think awareness 
outside of language is possible because any expression of awareness must take the form of 
a language to be a candidate for public justification. Without denying the existence of 
extra-linguistic phenomena as the cause of some sensations, Sellars nevertheless thought 
that the justification for a specific knowledge claim can only take place within the context 
of a system of beliefs. The foundations of knowledge are not to be found in the empirical 
confirmation of isolated individual claims to reality. Echoing Quine, Sellars (1963: 177; 
quoted in Rorty 1979: 180) instead thought the rationality of science issued from its ability 
to ‘put any claim in jeopardy, though not all at once’. 
 
Roughly twenty years after Quine’s famous ‘Two Dogmas’ essay, Richard Rorty began to 
push these ideas further by suggesting that there is no theory free description of reality but 
rather competing theories of reality upon which descriptions are always based. Rorty 
(1989: 5) would eventually come to the conclusion that  
 
To say that truth is not out there is simply to say that where there are no sentences 
there is no truth, that sentences are elements of human languages, and that human 
languages are human creations. 
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Truth cannot be out there — cannot exist independent of the human mind — because 
sentences cannot so exist, or be out there. The world is out there, but descriptions of 
the world are not. Only descriptions of the world can be true or false. The world on its 
own — unaided by the describing activities of human beings — cannot. 
 
Under this account, language becomes central to practices of knowledge production 
because we have moved away from a Cartesian picture wherein knowledge is constituted 
in the relationship between subjects and objects. Instead, it is replaced by one in which 
knowledge is produced and mediated inter-subjectively. This, of course, is not to suggest 
that all philosophers agree with this line of argumentation, that all of the thinkers cited 
above call themselves pragmatists or that even all self-identified pragmatists agree with 
Rorty’s views. To run through all of the criticisms and rejoinders would, of course, neither 
do them justice nor serve the purposes of this study. The above has merely been offered to 
situate historically the epistemological assumptions guiding this study: anti-reductionist 
anti-realism, conventionalism, pluralism and historicism.  
 
To summarise so far, this study accepts the label post-modern or post-structural in as much 
as post-modernism and post-structuralism have attended to the conditions under which 
knowledge is generated and been pre-eminently concerned with the uses for which 
knowledge is deployed. This study accepts the labels post-positivist and post-analytical 
because it employs techniques of argumentation familiar to realism but it does not accept 
realism’s teleological ambitions or its assumption of superior representations. Lastly, this 
study welcomes the label post-colonial because it seeks to underscore the ways in which 
representations of the Other are always embedded within distributions and circulations of 
economic, political, social, historical and cultural power that are geographically 
asymmetrical. 
 
 
Methods 
 
Taking the linguistic turn seriously 
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In the last quarter of the twentieth century, the profile of discourse, as either an essential 
tool for analysis or a key ontological entity, has increased markedly in the study of 
international relations and security (Milliken 1999), though also generally in the social 
sciences and humanities (Torfing 1999). However, discourse has also undergone constant 
reformulation in the past three decades. Before post-structuralists and post-Marxists began 
reinventing the concept of discourse, it was generally seen as specifically related to 
language and the analysis of its use both directly (e.g., vocabularies) and indirectly (e.g., 
the context of speaking). The influential work of Michel Foucault attempted to expand the 
ways in which people thought about discourse by arguing against the view that discourse 
can be reduced to language or, in the structural sense, sign systems. Post-structuralism thus 
commences from the claim that ‘Of course, discourses are composed of signs; but what 
they do is more than use these signs to designate things. It is this more that renders them 
irreducible to language (langue) and to speech’. This move consists of not just ‘treating 
discourses as groups of signs’ but also ‘as practices that systematically form the objects of 
which they speak’ (Foucault 1972: 49). This has been interpreted to mean that discourse 
cannot be reduced to language (semiotics), thought (idealism) or a totality (realism). 
Instead, it presents a view that allows for the material but so long as we caveat that it must 
remain under the sovereignty of discourse (Kendall & Wickham 1999: 34-41). Pushing this 
even further, post-Marxist social theorists Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe have 
proposed that we think of a discourse as a ‘structured totality’ of ‘articulatory practice[s]’ 
that create differences of identity amongst its constituent elements. Among other points of 
affinity with Foucault, practices other than language are included, and so anti-reductionism 
is maintained (Laclau & Mouffe 2001: 105-6; see Howarth & Norval 2000: 7). In the case 
of one text scrutinised in this study (Malmvig 2006: 3), discourse is rendered as ‘an order, 
or a field, that makes specific being and practices intelligible and knowledgeable, and 
makes who we are and what we do and think’.  
 
Whether or not Malmvig’s representation of discourse reflects the conception held by most 
of its users, it nonetheless hints at the discomfort a neo-pragmatist might feel towards these 
re-conceptualisations. On one level, discourse has become so all encompassing that it no 
longer is a distinction that makes a difference. If everything is discourse, then there is no 
pragmatic difference between talking about the discourse of armed humanitarian 
intervention and talking about armed humanitarian intervention. This seems analogous to a 
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sentence that includes the redundant phrase ‘is a true sentence’ (e.g., Algeria was under 
threat of foreign intervention is a true sentence). The over-theorisation of discourse has 
drowned out its previously useful capacity to distinguish, on the one hand, between the 
language of things and practices and, on the other hand, the things and practices 
themselves, such that it was possible to suspend or evade the realist/idealist debate and 
focus on indelible linguistic articulations. That utility disappears when discourse is 
rendered tantamount to reality. This study maintains this distinction on the pragmatic 
grounds that effacing it, as we will see below, leads to untenable arguments against 
realism. Pragmatic evasion, on the other hand, allows us to walk past such old traps. 
 
Additionally, there seems to be a discomforting process of reification underway. A concept 
that is initially presented as a useful means to think about problems without having to 
commit to ontological claims has since obtained a powerful ontological status all its own, 
one that transcends the contingency of its former exigency. For example, in her study of 
Apartheid, Aletta Norval (1996: 3) reprimands her readers for assuming a naïve, pre-
Foucaultian conception of discourse as that through which reality is transparently 
conveyed. Norval is seeking to establish the historically constructed nature of Apartheid 
discourse but is unwilling to acknowledge the contingencies that produced her conception 
of discourse. Making the opposite mistake, Lene Hansen (2006: 1), in her post-structuralist 
analysis of the Bosnian war, claims, ‘Without theory there is nothing but description’. 
Hansen has quickly forgotten a fundamental insight shared by post-structuralists and neo-
pragmatists: description is already theory laden. As another example, the late critic Susan 
Sontag (see Sontag 2003) claimed that photographs merely depict rather than interpret 
reality, which has prompted Judith Butler (2009: 67-8) to highlight the elements of framing 
that shape the reception of photographs prior to or outside of production. Contrary to 
Mahmood Mamdani’s (2001: xiii) critique of area studies’ alleged fact fetishism, facts do 
speak for themselves. Theoretical context is as much embedded within concepts as it is 
necessary for concepts to function within a broader discourse. 
 
The unfolding reification process is plain enough. Foucault’s argument for a 
conceptualisation of discourse that goes beyond language is rooted in a reaction to the 
blind spots produced by structural linguistics’ reductionism. He attempts to convince us 
that all of the practices we might accept as discursive include some that are not merely 
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language. If we accept this premise, then we begin to accept the idea and engage in debates 
about a realm that is pre- or extra-discursive, the kind of postulation that neo-pragmatists 
are not interested in addressing. Neo-pragmatists might certainly agree with Foucault 
(1988: 154-5) that ‘critique is not a matter of saying that things are not right’ but instead 
critique ‘is a matter of pointing out on what kinds of assumptions, what kinds of familiar, 
unchallenged modes of thought the practices that we accept rest’. However, Foucault’s 
commitment to anti-realism comes into question when he follows this observation with 
claims such as this: ‘Thought exists independent of systems and structures of discourse’. 
Laclau and Mouffe’s dismissal of modern philosophy’s most tiresome epistemological 
impasse — the idealism/realism debate — is likewise indicative of this problem: 
 
The fact that every object is constituted as an object of discourse has nothing to do 
with whether there is a world external to thought, or with the realism/idealism 
opposition. An earthquake or the falling of a brick is an event that certainly exists [...] 
independently of my will. [...] What is denied is not that such objects exist externally 
to thought, but the rather different assertion that they could constitute themselves as 
objects outside any discursive condition of emergence. (Laclau & Mouffe 2001: 108) 
 
The problem with Laclau and Mouffe, and likely with those following their theories, is that 
they have ceded too much ground by accepting the vocabulary of the debate they claim to 
circumvent, notions like ‘a world’, ‘externally to thought’, ‘certainly exists’, ‘independent 
of my will’. For some neo-pragmatists, the main thrust and utility of the linguistic turn was 
to evade this problematique entirely by focusing on language alone. The risk run by 
Foucault, Laclau and Mouffe is that they have engaged in a process of theorisation that 
lacks reflexivity and irony, and so fails to insure itself against the contingency of its own 
actions. Instead of conceptualising discourse as a response to a particular moment (itself a 
contingency), discourse has been presented as something that transcends the context that 
has given birth to it. Recent discourse theory attempts to convince us that we need to 
expand our conception of discourse because it does not capture the ontology it claims. This 
is ironic (a different kind of irony) when we realise that discourse was promised as that 
which would transparently account for the way in which it constituted its own objects. 
Discourse has come to be used as an attempt to account ontologically for that which 
allegedly could not be captured by language alone, though discourse must eventually 
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submit, like Laclau and Mouffe’s bricks and earthquakes, to symbolic representation. A 
concept once premised in anti-foundationalism with a unique relativist capacity to 
accommodate recursivity (i.e., discourse of discourse, discourse of discourse discourse, 
etc) is now treated as an objective, if not transcendent and metaphysical, foundation for 
knowledge. 
 
The initial neo-pragmatist response to all of this conceptual work is not to ask the 
questions ‘Is it an accurate account of discourse?’, ‘Is the argument cogent?’ or ‘Does it 
match our intuitions?’ The first question for a neo-pragmatist is to ask ‘Why do we need a 
concept of discourse?’ or ‘What do we want it to accomplish?’ Indeed, to answer the latter 
is, for some neo-pragmatists, to answer the former. Responding to an intervention by 
Laclau on the subject of pragmatism, Rorty (1996: 71) posed this basic question in the 
form of an analogy: 
 
Although some mathematics is obviously very useful to engineers, there is a lot of 
mathematics that isn’t. Mathematics outruns engineering pretty quickly, and starts 
playing with itself. Philosophy, we might say, outruns politics (“social engineering,” as 
it is sometimes called) pretty quickly, and also starts playing with itself. [...] I suspect 
the notion of “condition of possibility and impossibility” is as useless to political 
deliberation as Cantorean diagonalization is to civil engineers.  Surely the burden is on 
those who, like Laclau, think the former useful to explain just how and where the 
utility appears, rather than taking it for granted? 
 
‘As a good pragmatist’, Rorty (1996: 74) later explains, ‘I think that theories are like tools: 
you only reach for them when there is a specific problem to be solved’.  
 
Problematising problematisations 
 
While this study offers no definitive solutions, the problem can at least be identified. It 
emerges out of an ethical concern and begins with two contentious observations. On the 
one hand, several thousand Algerian civilians were literally slaughtered over the course of 
several years in repeated massacres. In a handful of these episodes, mainly between August 
1997 and January 1998, it was reported that hundreds of victims were massacred in a 
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single night. On the other hand, the response of the international community to these 
atrocities apparently1 did not go beyond inconsistent moral condemnation, tepid European 
diplomatic initiatives and very short-lived calls for a UN investigation. To me, these 
atrocities and the international response are both intolerable. Indeed, the international 
response seems particularly deficient when compared to the kind of humanitarian rhetoric 
and action that defined the international security landscape at that time. After all, the 
Algerian massacres came amidst events that defined the 1990s as a decade of humanitarian 
concern, just on the heels of the 1994 Rwandan genocide and the July 1995 Srebrenica 
massacre in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and just before NATO’s military intervention against 
Serbia in Kosovo. Of course these are not neutral observations, empirically or ethically. 
There are certainly those who think these questions have either been settled or should be 
relegated to the past. Though it might cause pain, frustration and anger to see these matters 
addressed at length, particularly amongst many Algerians, one of the goals of this study is 
to attempt an engagement with these issues in a less polemical, less partisan manner than 
has been witnessed so far. Approaching the problem of atrocities — the representation of 
and intervention against — from the starting point of politiography allows us to claim 
some distance from the contentious debates surrounding the violence in Algeria. 
 
This is one of the ways in which this study owes an intellectual debt — mainly in the form 
of inspiration and some methodological techniques rather than total execution — to David 
Campbell’s National deconstruction: violence, identity, and justice in Bosnia. In setting up 
his study, Campbell first makes a distinction between Bosnia and, in his words, ‘meta-
Bosnia’, the Bosnia(s) that appears within concordant and conflicting representations of it. 
Then, borrowing from Foucault (see Foucault & Rabinow 1984: 388-90), Campbell 
address how various problematisations framed the violence in Bosnia as a problem-
solution dyad: ‘As such, [National deconstruction] can be read as the problematization of 
                                                
1 I do not rule out the possibility that the official public record of the events is woefully insufficient 
in terms of documenting all the actions taken by state actors in key sites such as Washington, 
London and Paris during the Algerian massacre crisis of 1997-98. However, in so far as such 
transcripts remain hidden, and given the extent to which existing accounts, especially those under 
scrutiny here, rely solely upon open-source content, this possibility must remain in the realm of 
speculation for now. New archival and declassification work could demonstrate a kind of covert 
diplomatic initiative against the massacres in Algeria, possible forms of non-state intervention 
(e.g., international oil companies) or it could just provide further evidence that the key officials in 
Europe and North America were as confused and apathetic about the massacres as the open-source 
record already suggests. 
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the problematizations that reduce Bosnia to a problem, thereby bringing to the fore the 
necessary concern with ethics, politics, and responsibility’. His ultimate purpose is to 
‘better appreciate our imbrication in the relationship to the other and invent better political 
responses attuned to the relationship to the other’ (Campbell 1998a: x-xi). 
 
Though an affinity with National deconstruction is deeply felt, this study nonetheless 
emerges as a unique response to the specificities of the way in which Algeria was 
problematised within, and cross-problematised with, some international security 
discourses. This study thus takes as its objects of analysis the various ways in which the 
violence in Algeria was represented as problematic within secondary accounts, whether as 
a function of the discourse of civil wars, Islamist terrorism, humanitarian intervention or 
Algeria-specific formulations. Also, the way in which this study approaches 
problematisation is not through an examination of the ways in which solutions and 
problems are mutually co-constitutive. Rather, this study is interested in the initial 
formulation of problems. When we examine these in detail, we often find that explanations 
are lacking, mechanisms are incomplete and arguments are in need of additional premises 
to reach their conclusion. Rather than simply note the insufficiency of accounts, another 
tack is taken here. One of the techniques of analysis deployed in this study is the effort to 
provide those missing pieces, to supplement. In the process of articulating otherwise 
immobile arguments we become more aware of what has to be assumed, the productivity 
of silence and the ‘dark matter’ of discourse.  
 
Like Said’s Orientalism, this study is indifferent to the distinction between primary, 
secondary and tertiary literature on the grounds that all discursive interventions are 
interventions and discourse nonetheless. As a work of politiography, the primary object of 
analysis here is not a discursive field or formation but rather select scholarly texts within 
the genre of late Algerian violence. Though a discursive formation is hailed by this genre 
and, to a certain extent, reproduced in this study, let it be clear that it is not my intent to 
represent or to pretend to analyse something on the order of, in the words of Foucault 
(1972: 26-7; quoted in Lloyd 1986: 260), a ‘totality of all effective statements (whether 
spoken or written)’ relating to the violence in Algeria since 1988. The much more modest 
aim of this study is to criticise certain texts grappling with questions and issue related to 
the violence in Algeria. Nor is the basis of critique in this study premised upon an attempt 
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to reconcile texts within the genre and the discursive formation they address. The approach 
is simpler than that. To problematise the ways in which Algeria’s violence was 
problematised, this study only uses the arguments, evidence and archival logic advanced 
within the texts under scrutiny. In this way, the method of critique might be considered 
deconstructive in so far as it attempts to use the texts against themselves.   
 
Neo-pragmatism offers a deconstructive method of analysis by way of three observations 
from the linguistic turn noted above: all claims can be subject to revision, facts are theory-
laden and theories are value-laden. There are, however, at least two limits to what might 
otherwise been seen as a recipe for semantic anarchy given the contestability of all claims. 
One might be called the ‘natural’ limit to which meaning can be altered vis-à-vis other 
definitions. As noted above, precursors to contemporary neo-pragmatism suggested that 
while all truths are susceptible to revision or abolition, this cannot happen all at once. For 
example, chapter four studies the ways in which the term civil war has been contested 
within its own discourse and in its application to the armed conflict in Algeria. Our ability 
to question the definition of civil war, however, is only possible when we refuse to 
question related concepts with equal vigour. In other words, to modify the meaning of civil 
war is to maintain meaning elsewhere; though its constituent concepts — e.g., nation, state, 
violence, rebellion — are equally contested, we cannot contest them all at once. More 
importantly, a deeper, more implicit politics of naming becomes visible within individual 
concepts when we unpack which terms are fixed, assumed, questioned and ignored in the 
process of reconfiguring or stabilising meaning. 
 
The other might be called a ‘historical’ limit. As Nietzsche (1992: 516) noted in a famous 
parenthesis: ‘only that which has no history is definable’. The idea here is that, even if we 
accept that any claim can be revised, an important condition of its revision will be the ways 
in which any alteration accepts, modifies or challenges how concepts have been used in the 
past. It is recognised, at least amongst anti-essentialists, that words gain new meanings and 
lose older definitions over time. But the process by which this happens is often one of 
contestation marked by a tension between evolving needs. A prime example is the ways in 
which the highly contested terms terrorism and terrorist has evolved within changing 
political environments (see Der Derian 2005). History represents a kind of pull or drag on 
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meaning whereas the post-11 September 2001 world acts as a force pushing it in new 
directions.  
 
The idea that ‘only that which has no history is definable’ also helps reveal a different kind 
of politics of naming. Politics of naming often refers to the ways in which terms — usually 
highly politicised terms, like terrorist (Bhatia 2005) or genocide (Mamdani 2007) — are 
applied inconsistently. This evokes a sense of the political in which politics is the 
organised hypocrisy manifest in exercises of power, whether as a tool of domination or 
resistance. An armed group can be simultaneously freedom fighters for some and terrorists 
for others (or even the same group in the case of the US government’s recent relations with 
Afghanistan). However, politics of naming in this sense assumes that the meaning of the 
epithet in question is fixed and so the problem resides in the (ab)user’s refusal to obey 
accepted definitions or recognise uncontested essential properties. 
 
This study is keenly interested in examining the politics of naming within secondary 
accounts of the Algeria conflict, terms such as coup d’état, trigger cause, civil war, jihād, 
insurgent, (state) terrorism, atrocity, humanitarian and Moudjahidin/Mujāhidīn. However, 
this study is not interested in analysing the organised hypocrisy of political naming in 
scholarship. By politics of naming, this study seeks to examine the ways in which politics 
are embedded within particular definitions irrespective of their (mis)application. To make 
a distinction (that is loaded with its own implicit value judgements), this study is not 
interested in the superficial politics of naming but rather a deep politics of naming. Getting 
at the political assumptions embedded within acts of naming requires a reverse engineering 
of sorts. As noted above, neo-pragmatists are only interested in concepts so long as they 
adequately address the problem assigned to them. This, however, does not mean that 
concepts are useless until they are given an explicit role. Indeed, neo-pragmatism implies 
that problematisations are embedded within terms and the ways in which they are being 
deployed. Where there are problematisations, there is politics. Uncovering the unspoken 
problematisations contained within the context of how concepts are applied discloses the 
deep politics inherent in all acts of naming, hypocritical or not. In many ways, this 
approach is similar to political theorist William Connolly’s (1995: 2) idea of the onto-
politics of critique: ‘Political interpretation is ontopolitical: its fundamental presumptions 
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fix possibilities, distribute explanatory elements, generate parameters within which an 
ethic is elaborated, and center (or decenter) assessments of identity, legitimacy, and 
responsibility’ (see also Campbell 2005). The only difference between this study and the 
texts under examination is this study’s ironic awareness of its ontological and political 
assumptions and effects, whereas the texts under scrutiny here are largely unaware such 
hidden machinery in their accounts. 
 
In terms of using the ‘archival logic’ of the text as a method of critique, this means, on the 
one hand, revisiting as much of the original source material as possible while, on the other 
hand, examining equally valid sources — validity as determined by the logic of the archive 
under scrutiny. Though it might seem that this study is based upon an analysis of mass 
media accounts of the violence in Algeria, that is not the intent here. Media representations 
of the violence in Algeria —particularly written accounts in the Francophone and 
Anglophone press — are important to this study because these formed the basis of many 
secondary accounts, including several under examination here. The deployment of this 
empirical mode of critique is obvious in two cases: the deconstructions of Kalyvas (1999) 
in chapter six and Malmvig (2006) in chapter seven. It is also abundantly apparent when 
we examine the appropriation of Algerian violence by new discourses on civil wars 
(chapters three and four) that international media accounts have been and remain an 
important primary source material. This mode of critique, however, becomes extremely 
difficult in the case of scholarly studies that use interviews, given that the archive cannot 
be reconstituted unless one is given access to raw transcripts or allowed to re-interview the 
same or similar subjects. Within the politiography of Algerian violence, such methods 
were actually quite rare given the ferocity of the violence within the research environment, 
especially towards foreigners. While there have been recent efforts to develop new field-
based data about the violence in Algeria in the last two decades (see Moussaoui 2006 and 
Belaala 2008), Martinez (1998) is the only extended account that brought significant new 
empirical knowledge to bear in the 1990s. Yet the critique of launched against Martinez in 
chapter eight is more analytical; it does not question the reliability of his source material, 
rather it questions the hypothesis that guided its collection and interpretation. 
 
Given the excessive attention paid to French and English media accounts within the 
secondary literature on Algerian violence, questions arise as to the exclusion of other 
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European media, Arabic language press and, of course, Algerian sources. As a critique of 
the existing literature on the violence in Algeria, this study is certainly in agreement, 
especially when it comes to the scarcity of Algerian sources within much of the secondary 
literature. It is worth noting, for example, that only one account of the Algerian massacres 
makes extensive use of Arabic sources (Hafez 2000 and 2004). However, as a critique of 
this study, some clarification is in order. This study’s various criticisms are not founded in 
a superior archive of primary sources. Indeed, the majority of attacks launched in this 
study are not empirical but rather analytical demonstrations of contradictions and 
insufficiencies within theories and hypotheses. To suggest that this study is based upon a 
paucity of source material is to misunderstand its approach and aims. If there is a strong 
criticism to be made of this study, it is its failure to incorporate a reading of relevant 
secondary works in other European languages (German, Spanish, Italian), Arabic (e.g., 
Ṭawīl 1998) and especially from Algeria. While there is a case to be made for a kind of 
slippery slope when it comes to the question of which European languages are most 
relevant (and then why not Turkish, Persian, Chinese, etc), the failure to engage Arabic 
and Algerian texts is a problem that must be flagged before moving on. One could argue 
that, when it comes to the politiography of Algerian violence by Algerian authors based in 
Algeria, there are few texts comparable to those produced by compatriots working abroad 
and which receive attention here. It will also become apparent in chapter eight that the 
questions addressed in this study are impeded by inconsistently applied constraints in 
Algeria, both formal (in terms of government censorship) and informal (in terms of socio-
political discourse). More importantly, though, this study seeks to maintain a distinction — 
however problematic, unstable and dangerous — between externally produced 
representations of Algeria and those internally produced. Given this study’s interest in the 
relationships between conditions of representability and conditions of intervenability, it is 
thus interested in the production of representations within the locations from which 
intervention would ostensibly be launched or disabled. That, therefore, gives us reason to 
attend to a limited number of sites of discursive production.  
 
To help supplement the empirical or ‘archival’ critique, this study thus draws upon a 
personal collection of over 800 news items, mainly retrieved from the Nexis database (see 
bibliography for details). These mostly consist of articles and transcripts (radio and 
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television) in English and French. Collection began in 2003 for a project that examined 
how the Algerian massacres were portrayed in the New York Times, contextualised in 
terms of all the articles related to Algeria produced between 1990 and 2003 (according to 
the New York Times index), and supplemented with other prominent US and UK news 
outlets for comparison. An analysis was produced for a conference in 2007 (see Mundy 
2007a) though never formally published so far. That summer, work began on a 
comprehensive database of all acts of political violence recorded on the Nexis database, 
coded for time, place, perpetrator, victim and kind of violence. Due to the quickly inflating 
time commitment that project required and subsequent changes in the design of this study, 
I was only able to complete the years 1991 through 1994. Nonetheless, it has served as a 
useful reference tool throughout the production of this study, particularly for chapters three 
and four. A more manageable database related specifically to Algerian massacre events, 
coded for time, place, number of victims and context, was constructed using data produced 
in the studies by Aït-Larbi et al. (1999), Kalyvas (1999) Sidhoum and Algeria Watch 
(2003a) and. It was supplemented with massacre lists produced in the media (see Table 2).  
 
Lastly, this study is deeply, though indirectly, informed by a nine-month research visit to 
Algeria originally premised on the intent to study Algeria’s foreign relations and national 
reconciliation during the first two terms of the current President, Abdelaziz Bouteflika. 
However, as my interests shifted to the more controversial issues of violence in the 1990s 
and my philosophical outlook became increasingly antagonistic towards the theoretical and 
methodological underpinning of my original research design, it became ethically untenable 
for me to use any of the primary data I collected. Indeed, it was my conflicted encounters 
with Algeria’s proud nationalist heritage and the non-governmental organisations that 
advocate for victims’ rights — whether victims of state terror or the terror of armed groups 
— that prompted me to rethink my attitude towards questions of violence and intervention, 
whether at the level of armed humanitarian invasion or my own intervention as a foreign 
researcher. This study, however, does make minor use of information — news clippings 
and photos — collected in the public archive of the Algeria’s largest circulation 
Francophone daily, El Watan.  
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Overview 
 
The organisation of this study is more topical than chronological. The way in which the 
following chapters are chronological is mostly in the fact that the first main chapter (three) 
deals with the escalation of armed violence in Algeria and the last chapter (eight) offers a 
bookend in the form of a brief discussion of Algeria’s recent national reconciliation efforts 
a decade later. Chapters five, six and seven address the international debate surrounding 
Algerian violence during the middle period, at the height of the massacres in late 1997 and 
early 1998. That leaves chapter four, which picks up the debate raised in chapter three but 
addresses the politics of naming Algeria’s violence a civil war across the entirety of the 
1990s and into the early 2000s. It is this loose chronological unfolding that largely governs 
the ordering of the chapters. Each chapter in this study could stand, more or less, 
autonomously from the others, in so far as they could be read in any given order, though 
keeping in mind that some chapters can form a couplet when read sequentially (i.e., 
chapters three and four, five and six). 
 
As the goal of this study is to deconstruct particular — though arguably the most dominant 
— problematisations of the violence in Algeria, the title of each chapter hints at the issue 
that will be addressed. Chapter three, however, is the most misleading in its title because it 
does not discuss the evolution of democratic practices in 1990s Algeria. Rather, it attends 
to the ways in which democracy, amongst other claims, was presented as an explanation 
for the outbreak of mass violence. More generally, chapter three examines the politics of 
naming and theorising causation, particularly the contentions surrounding the proximate 
causes and deeper conditions of the violence. It begins by questioning political 
problematisations of the violence, particularly those that locate the organising logic of the 
conflict’s trigger exclusively in issues of political grievances related to government and 
power sharing, and so posit the violence’s proximate causation in a specific political event 
or a delimited series of them. After excavating the inadequate accounts of the conflict’s 
activation and highlighting the apparent failure of political initiatives to end the conflict, 
this study then delves into efforts to locate the permissive conditions of Algeria’s violence 
in the bleak socio-economic picture in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Questioning the 
unstable boundary that separates political from economic causation, this study then 
highlights the limited effect economic initiatives also had when it came to the amelioration 
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of the violence. Delving more deeply into the generic literature on the economic causes of 
internal wars, we also find a paradoxical attitude towards the role of rebel agency and an 
inexplicable indifference towards the agency of the state. This chapter ends by noting the 
disparity between such macro-level accounts of civil war violence and the often opposed 
logics of violence at the micro-level. Resolving this agent-structure impasse, however, 
would require a prioritisation of the ethical and political over the historical and ontological, 
a theme that will be taken up again in the final conclusion. 
 
Chapter four initially frames the Algerian conflict in terms of the allegedly unprecedented 
proliferation of intra-national armed conflicts at the end of the Cold War, which were often 
described as being qualitatively different from previous episodes of civil war. Explicating 
the new discourse on civil wars and the New Wars discourse, briefly mentioned in chapter 
three, consumes the opening efforts of this chapter. The objective of this is to understand 
the ways in which the new science of civil wars constitute their object of study along the 
dimensions of space, time, identity and practice. The resultant construction of the conflict 
in Algeria as a civil war, generally viewed as unproblematic, is contrasted with the 
domestic and international politics of naming Algeria’s violence since 1992 a civil war, in 
which the use of that term was debated. This contestation is most acute when we consider 
the vehement rejection of this label by some of the most dedicated academic observers of 
Algerian politics. The point of this chapter, however, is not to reconcile these two camps; it 
is rather to show the ways in which concepts of civil war, whether explicit or implicit, 
determine their object of analysis. This chapter ends by considering whether or not the 
New Wars approach offers a way out, only to argue that such thinking should serve as a 
basis for a critique of rather than as a new ontology of war. In the final conclusion of this 
study, the problematiques and prospects for such a critique will be addressed. 
 
The next three chapters deal more specifically with the period of the Algerian conflict that 
saw the most intense and recurrent massacre activity, from roughly mid 1997 through 
1998. Though massacres had been witnessed in Algeria with increasing frequency in late 
1996 and continued through the early years of the Bouteflika Presidency, it was a handful 
of mass civilian killing episodes — Raïs, Béni Messous, Bentalha, Relizane, Sidi Hamed 
— over the course of six months (August 1997 to January 1998) that became a crisis point 
in international dealings with the Algerian conflict. Chapter five’s foray into this period 
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begins with a retelling of some of the horrific accounts to emerge from the massacres 
within major international press outlets in late 1997 and early 1998, so as to establish them 
as veritable atrocities. It then returns to the question of how to interpret acts of mass 
violence, especially when authorial intent is unclear or highly disputed. First, this chapter 
outlines the scope of the massacres — depending on the threshold used or implied — and 
then details the most prevalent hypotheses of the massacres’ political logic and agency. 
These disparate theses of the Algerian massacres located their rationale in Islamist 
(non)ideology, guerrilla strategy, intra-insurgent rivalry, the brute authoritarianism of the 
state, a non-traditional counter-insurgency strategy, internal divisions within the regime, 
localised and privatised disputes, cynical economic interests or the general fog of war at all 
social levels. While the massacres’ Qui tue? debate spawned a number of incompatible 
hypotheses, they nonetheless shared a tendency towards a reductionist view of the 
relationship between identity and violence (to know the killers or the rationale was to 
know the other), and also a tendency towards totalising logic (all massacres, by virtue of 
being a massacre, held the same rationale).  
 
Chapter six begins by foregrounding the ways in which the violence in 1990s Algeria was 
used to contextualise the events of 11 September 2001. Appropriations of the Algerian 
massacres within the discourses of the ‘war on terror’ and trans-national Islamism, whether 
at the level of quotidian media representation or more erudite academic studies, often laid 
claim to a definitive narrative of the atrocities in Algeria problematised in chapter five. 
This narrative claims that the GIA had been the sole author of the massacres, though, as 
noted in chapter five and shown in chapter eight, this has not been definitively established 
by either the media or scholarship before 11 September 2001 or afterwards. Noting the 
post-Cold War debates about the role of identity in the generation of violence (i.e., identity 
causes violence), chapter five examines the failure of any serious study to obtain its 
objectives of providing an account of the agents behind the major massacres and their 
motivation. This is mainly accomplished by unearthing the fatal presumptions within 
several accounts of the massacres, but chapter six also deploys a rigorous analysis of the 
most cited effort to establish insurgents as the agents of the massacres. In the end, chapter 
six concludes by wondering whether or not it is violence, rather than identity, that holds 
the balance of agency in our efforts to understand the practices of mass killing. Together, 
chapters five and six also provide important background to the international debates 
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surrounding the massacres and the calls for intervention they precipitated, which come into 
focus in chapter seven. 
 
Having exposed the insufficiencies in various efforts to account for the causes, conditions 
and proper categorisation of the violence in Algeria, as well as the failure to construct a 
viable understanding of the massacres, chapter seven examines the international response 
to the violence in Algeria at the height of the killing in 1997 and early 1998. First, it 
backgrounds the international practice of armed humanitarian intervention and related 
discourses, particularly those that seem ignorant of the potential role Algeria might play in 
their analysis. Second, it establishes the fact that Algeria was considered a major 
international humanitarian problem at the height of the massacres, whether in international 
media representations or in the rhetoric of foreign officials and politicians. Third, it 
examines the ‘interventions’ that took place in 1998 — the diplomatic initiatives and 
multilateral efforts that sought to understand the violence in Algeria. Lastly, chapter seven 
dissects the only sustained effort to make sense of the international response to the 
violence in Algeria. What presents itself as a demonstration of the spatial contingency of 
sovereignty can also be read as an argument for the contingency of intervention that makes 
neither reference to political will nor moral obligation but rather the contingency of 
representation. What we find is that humanitarian intervention was simultaneously enabled 
and disabled by the ‘unprecedented’ Algerian violence whose authorship was being 
represented as contradictory, contested, multifarious or undetermined. The theme of 
contingency, combined with a call for a more ironic politiography, is brought back into the 
final conclusion of this study to critique efforts to establish an abstract normative 
framework for armed humanitarian intervention. 
 
The final chapter in this study turns away from the specific debates surrounding the 
massacres and returns to the general question of violence in 1990s Algeria. The ways that 
history have been deployed in the pursuit of an understanding of Algeria’s recent violence 
is the topic of this chapter. It begins by offering a cursory look at the only public ‘inquiry’ 
into the violence and the massacres, one that highlights the historical and international 
terrains of later Algerian violence: a 2002 defamation trial held in a French court pitting 
former Algerian Defence Minister Major-général Khaled Nezzar against Habib Souaïdia, 
an Algerian officer who published a memoir of his military service during the 1990s that 
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detailed a number of abuses committed by the armed forces, including a massacre. This 
trial is worth describing because the outcome was inconclusive in terms of settling the Qui 
tue? debate; it thus raises serious questions about previous and subsequent efforts to 
construct authoritative accounts of the violence in Algeria based on the available evidence. 
Furthermore, the trial raised provocative questions about the role of history in the 
explanation of violence. During the Algerian conflict of the 1990s, the claim of historical 
precedent — mainly, Algeria’s violent colonization by France and the vicious war of 
decolonization — was often cited as the sole explanation for Algeria’s armed conflict. 
Rather than taking a position within this debate, this chapter instead examines the politics 
of naming, whether intentional or implied, in the historicisation — i.e., (de)colonization — 
of recent Algerian violence. Rather than treat historicisation as an unquestioned good, this 
chapter concludes by examining the way in which historicisation, as problematisation, is 
political before it can be descriptive and analytical. Given the convergence of history and 
politics in Algeria, and so historiography and politiography of late Algerian violence, the 
final conclusion to this study makes the case for more self-aware and more politically 
explicit discursive and practical interventions.   
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2. Literature Review 
 
 
 
The representation of violence 
 
New civil wars 
 
This study engages with two bodies of generic literature in the field of international 
security. The first can broadly be described as the new civil war literature, which mainly 
comes under scrutiny in chapters three and four. The study of civil war is traced as far back 
to Thucydides in the European tradition of political thought, though the recent surge of 
interest in this phenomenon is remarkable. The extent to which this literature is ‘new’ 
stems from two factors. First, the appropriation and deployment of rational choice theory 
and quantitative methodologies — techniques associated with the study of economic 
thought applied to conflict-oriented large sample datasets — has featured prominently 
within these new accounts of civil wars. Also, they result, in part, from the apparent spike 
in episodes of intra-national armed violence near the end of the Cold War. This new 
literature often traces its origins to a series of papers authored by Paul Collier and Anke 
Hoeffler (Collier & Hoeffler 1998; Collier & Hoeffler 1999; Collier & Hoeffler 2000), 
though there was already growing interest in the study of civil wars in the 1990s (Licklider 
1993b; Brown 1996). This literature largely came in response to the suggestion that the 
disappearance of Cold War constraints had unleashed a wave of intra-national conflicts 
based upon identity claims. Rather than post-Cold War religious or ethnic conflicts, the 
new civil war studies argued that economic conditions were far more determinant (Keen 
1998; Elbadawi & Sambanis 2000). Nor were some of these studies convinced that the 
civil wars of the 1990s represented an unprecedented wave; their results suggested the 
number of civil wars had been accumulating since at least the 1970s (Fearon & Laitin 
2003). The debated mechanisms driving civil war were likewise considered to be mainly 
economic rather than political, religious or ethnic; also known as the greed (loot-seeking) 
versus grievance (justice-seeking) debate (Berdal & Malone 2000; Collier 2000; Kalyvas 
2001; Ballentine & Sherman 2003; Sambanis 2004a; Arnson & Zartman 2005; Regan & 
Norton 2005). Other factors promoting the possibility of civil war were found in the kind 
 40 
and level of exports (Le Billon 2001; Fearon & Laitin 2003; Ross 2004; Fearon 2005; 
Collier & Hoeffler 2005; Humphreys 2005; Ron 2005; Brunnschweiler & Bulte 2009), 
particularly the question of ‘lootable’ — i.e., easy to circulate — resources like diamonds 
(Lujala et al. 2005). The conditions that prolonged, shortened or brought civil wars to an 
end have been researched (Licklider 1995; Collier, Hoeffler & Söderbom 2001; Ohlson 
2008), as have the kinds of political regimes that lend themselves to internal war 
(Henderson & Singer 2000; Lacina 2006; Vreeland 2008). However, only a small number 
of researchers have applied this approach to the study of the Algerian conflict: Abdelaziz 
Testas (2001; 2002c), Miriam Lowi (2005) and an unpublished paper by James Fearon and 
David Laitin (2006). 
 
At about roughly the same time as the emergence of the greed-and-grievance approach, 
another group of theorists took an alternative approach, positing the idea that the 
seemingly intra-national mass armed conflicts of the 1990s were in fact a new ontology of 
war. The most influential and controversial of these accounts has been Mary Kaldor’s 1999 
work New and old wars: organized violence in a global era (see Kaldor 2007; Kaldor & 
Vashee 1997). There were arguably close precursors to Kaldor (Edward 1988; Holsti 1996; 
Snow 1996; Gray 1997) and contemporaries working similar terrains (Duffield 1998; 
Duffield 2001; Shaw 2003). Elaborations and revisions soon followed (Jung 2003; 
Münkler 2005; Kaldor 2005) but the new war thesis seemed to prompt more criticism than 
model building (Kalyvas 2001; Henderson & Singer 2002; Hegre 2004; Newman 2004; 
Duyvesteyn & Angstrom 2005; Melander et al. 2009). 
 
Where are we to locate Algeria within these theories and debates? Both chapter three and 
four represent a deliberate departure from the traditional methods of civil war analysis; 
indeed, the goal is not to analyse Algeria as a civil war but to analyse how Algeria is 
analysed as a civil war. In chapter three, which deals with the politics of naming and the 
problematisation of causation, this study highlights some of the ways in which the new 
civil war studies produce their object of analysis through certain theoretical assumptions. 
In other words, it examines how accounts of causation put forward in the dominant 
econometric civil war models make possible their own exclusive interpretation of the 
conditions of mass armed political violence. This is juxtaposed against the more superficial 
politics of naming involved in the attempt to assign proximate causality to specific events, 
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in that they both must construct the causality they claim to find by de-contextualising the 
contingency of events. Similarly, in chapter four, the politics of naming Algeria a civil war 
is examined against a more extensive reading of the ways in which the new civil war 
studies are internally divided over the precise definition of the very phenomenon they 
claim to analyse. This lack of consistency within the paradigm’s organising concept is then 
mapped over discussion of how Algeria accepts, evades or denies the applicability of the 
various criteria used to identify civil wars as such. By way of conclusion, chapter four 
discusses whether or not the intellectual resources provided by new war theorists can 
address the lacunas and over-determinations of Neoliberal approaches. Given that the 
warrant for new war theories is observation based, rather than reflecting political or ethical 
concerns, this study is sceptical that any such approach will offer an alternative. 
 
The Islamification of violence 
 
As will be argued in chapter three, the violence in Algeria following the resignation of 
President Bendjedid in January 1992 was initially difficult to represent. The appearance of 
a ‘war’ in Algeria was not sudden or immediately obvious in the year 1992, a year many 
observers cite as the conflict’s first (‘back-coding’, in the terminology of the new civil war 
studies). Though there were increasing acts of political murder and violent state repression 
in 1992 and 1993 (not to mention 1991), the ‘crisis’ in Algeria — a common euphemism 
(e.g., Leca 1995) — often produced ambiguous and ambivalent readings. A specific 
discourse of an Algerian armed conflict was only able to mature as the mortality rates 
seemingly skyrocketed in 1994. It was not until 1995 that the violence, the widespread 
violence began to be addressed as a ‘war’ in some academic circles (e.g., Leveau 1995; 
Stora 1995). 
 
Various problematisations have been offered to account for the violence, from politics, to 
economics, to the socio-cultural, to history, to identity and religion. Indeed, representations 
of Islam were seen as inescapable in discussions of the Algerian conflict, even if attempts 
were made to argue against problematising the violence as such. Such efforts were, 
however, dwarfed by the post-11 September 2001 appropriation of Algerian violence 
within the new discourse on Islam and terrorism (e.g., Lewis 2003; Cook 2005; Gerges 
2005; Wiktorowicz 2005; Kepel 2006; Ayoob 2008; Tibi 2008). In more Algeria specific 
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accounts, significant attention has been given to the Islamist movement, whether in terms 
of accounting for conflict’s etiology, as a narrative framing device or as a perceived threat 
to European and North American interests (Phillips 1995; Labat 1995; Martinez 1995; 
Shirley 1995; Fuller 1996; Willis 1997; Ṭawīl 1998; Wiktorowicz 2001; Mokeddem 2002; 
Takeyh 2003; Boukra 2002; Chasdi 2002: chapter three; Martinez 2003; Boumezbar & 
Djamila 2002; Willis 2006; Martinez 2007; Ashour 2008; Belaala 2008; Boubeker 2008; 
Roberts 2008). Whether or not various observers blamed religion generally or Islam 
specifically for the armed conflict in Algeria, chapter six attempts to establish the 
conditions under which particular readings of the 1997-98 massacres, ones that assigned 
Islamist agency to those acts, were possible. Amongst several permissive conditions (e.g., 
contested narratives and inaccessible spaces of violence), chapter six also notes that the 
concept of identity was allowed, as is often the case, to overcompensate vis-à-vis 
indeterminacy and contention. Yet this chapter also shows how the horrific violence of the 
massacres obtained agency itself and so challenged many observers to inscribe it into some 
form of identity. 
 
Islam, of course, was not the only way in which the violence in Algeria was represented 
and problematised. Identity (Lloyd 2003; Hill 2009) and national culture (Carlier 1995; 
Carlier 1999; Martinez 1998; Martinez 2000a) often played central expository and 
explanatory roles; even a psycho-social account of the rebellion was attempted (Crenshaw 
1994). Without painting a picture of mutual exclusivity, there were also observers who 
tended towards the political over the economic and vice versa.  Economic 
problematisations of the violence (see chapter three), often explicitly related to claims of 
the Algerian state’s dependence upon hydrocarbons, found voice (Aïssaoui 2001; Sari 
2001; Testas 2001; Testas 2002a; Testas 2002b; Testas 2002c; Joffé 2002; Lowi 2004; 
Lowi 2005; Lowi 2009; Addi 2006; Sandbakken 2006; Dillman 2007). Others pointed to 
more specific socio-economic factors like demographics (Sutton 2001; Kouaouci 2004), 
unemployment (Testas 2004a) and food security (Zaimeche & Sutton 1998). The emphasis 
of more politically oriented interpretations of the violence’s etiology frequently deployed a 
narrative of a failed, stalled, uneven or evolving democratic transition in Algeria (Addi 
1995; Zoubir 1995; Quandt 1998; Volpi 2003; Martinez 2004; Heristchi 2004; Entelis 
2005; Hafez 2005; Zoubir 2005; Volpi 2006; Guumlney & Ccedilelenk 2007; Cavatorta 
2009). Others have approached the problem of Algerian violence from an analysis of the 
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regime’s internal politics (Addi 1998; Roberts 2003; Mortimer 2006; Werenfels 2007). 
The confluence of political and economic factors has also been seen in the application of 
the failed state discourse to Algeria (Zoubir 1994; Layachi 1995) or, in the words of Réda 
Bensmaïa (1997: 93) ‘a society that had lost all hierarchical social and political markers’, 
in the sense that political institutions had failed them. 
 
Some observers have taken the approach of using narrative political history to draw out the 
factors of violence behind the conflict in 1990s Algeria within the context of colonial 
and/or post-colonial Algeria (Malley 1996; Stone 1997; Derradji 2002; Evans & Phillips 
2008; Hill 2009); simply presented narrative political histories of Algeria that include the 
1990s (Stora 2001a; Ruedy 2005); or expressed scepticism towards such projects 
(McDougall 2005). Indeed, chapter eight, in the context of exploring Algeria’s ‘post-
conflict’ national reconciliation efforts, is primarily concerned with the ways in which 
Algeria’s history is used to explain Algeria’s violence. Some authors, but unfortunately 
very few, have looked at the conflict from a gendered perspective; mostly this has taken 
the form of attempts to analyse the effects of the violence upon Algerian women’s lives 
(Lazreg 1994: chapter eleven; Skilbeck 1995; Moghadam 2001; Turshen 2002; Turshen 
2004; Cheriet 2004). Though political, economic and historical factors might be salient, 
Moussaoui (1998; 2006) approaches the question of Algeria’s violence from a self-
described ‘anthropological’ point of view that takes ideational, spatial and practical issues 
as particularly informative. 
 
Much of this study’s critique of the new civil war literature is based upon the debates 
surrounding the large number of civilian massacres in Algeria. These massacres, 
particularly the largest ones between April 1997 and January 1998, are also at the centre of 
this study’s analysis of the heightened interventionary rhetoric surrounding Algeria at that 
time. Chapters five and six, in particular, discuss and analyse the various hypotheses put 
forward to account for these massacres as a distinct ontology within the general field of 
violence of the broader armed conflict. Among the most sustained attempts to understand 
the massacres, scholars Gilles Kepel (2006: chapter eleven), Mohammed Hafez (2000; 
2004), Lies Boukra (2002) and Salma Belaala (2008: chapter six) register as key 
interlocutors. Mainly their efforts offer an account through the religious aspects of the 
insurgency’s discourse and practice. These readings stand in contrast to the more secular 
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analysis of the massacres (Bedjaoui et al. 1999; Kalyvas 1999). These two accounts come 
to opposing conclusions as to the identity of the massacres’ perpetrators and logics driving 
them. Kalyvas (1999) analyses insurgent strategy, an approach that has been used 
elsewhere (Miller 2000). In a paper subsequent to his major monograph (Martinez 1998), 
Luis Martinez (2001) addressed the issue of the massacres head-on but refused to assign 
responsibility for the killings, instead opting to contextualise them domestically and 
internationally, and then analyse their political effects in both fields. In other words, 
Martinez maps out some of the terrain of the massacres’ Qui tue? debate but refrains from 
making a strong intervention towards an answer to that question. The massacres have also 
been the subject of provocative memoirs published in France (Yous & Mellah 2000; 
Souaïdia 2001) and reflections by Algerian journalists (Charef 1998; Belloula 2000). 
Anthropologist Tassadit Yacine explored some of the possible historical roots of the 
massacres (Yacine 1999). The persistent Qui tue? discourse of the massacres has even 
been studied as an aspect of a specific Algerian penchant for conspiracy theorising 
(Silverstein 2002). The insights and deficiencies of all these approaches are analysed in 
chapters five and six (see Mundy 2009 for a more thorough critique, particularly focused 
on Kalyvas 1999). 
 
 
The violence of representation 
 
The second body of generic literature this study engages is the recent literature on armed 
humanitarian intervention. This is mainly addressed in chapter seven, though chapters five 
and six provide substantive background to the story of the humanitarianisation of the 
Algerian conflict. Like the literature on civil wars, the study of humanitarian intervention 
claims substantial a pedigree; seventeenth century legal scholar Hugo Grotius is often cited 
as principle original theorist. Since 1990, literally hundreds of books, chapters, articles and 
reports have been published on this topic (for starters, see Chopra & Weiss 1992; Lyons & 
Mastanduno 1995; Bailey 1996; Weiss & Collins 2000; Wheeler 2000; Holzgrefe & 
Keohane 2003; Chandler 2006; Weiss 2007; Barnett & Weiss 2008; Bass 2008). One of 
most common problems addressed in these studies, including Helle Malmvig’s (2006) 
study of Algeria, is the alleged clash of norms inherent in the practice of armed 
humanitarian intervention: the norms of sovereignty versus humanitarian norms. Chapter 
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seven notes the overlap and cross-pollination between the literature on intervention and the 
literature on civil wars (Little 1975; Bull 1984; Regan 1996; Elbadawi, Sambanis 2000; 
Regan 2002; Balch-Lindsay et al. 2008; Misra 2008; Regan et al. 2009). The fact that 
Algeria is not considered in the literature on (humanitarian) intervention can be dismissed 
if we accept that we should only examine interventions when they take place. However, if 
we recognize that Algeria can be represented as a case of threatened intervention, then new 
possibilities arise.   
 
Rarely has the question of intervention been treated in studies of the international response 
to the conflict in Algeria. While there are numerous texts devoted to the questions of 
identity and violence in Algeria in the 1990s, there are fewer that examine the evolving 
reactions of foreign governments to the crisis following the events of early 1992. The 
extent to which the violence in Algeria was co-constitutive of the international reaction to 
it is apparent in the numerous efforts to understand the international reaction, whether from 
more descriptive and analytical points of view (do Céu Pinto 1998; Darbouche & Zoubir 
2009) or a policy-oriented normative outlooks (Gera 1995; Pierre & Quandt 1996). Other 
studies of international aspect of the Algerian conflict have taken the approach of 
analysing Algeria’s foreign policy (Zoubir 2004), the policies of the French government 
(Sadiki 1995; Provost 1996; Spencer 1998a; Abi-Mershed 1999; Morisse-Schilbach 1999; 
Bonora-Waisman 2003), the US government (Mortimer 1995; Dillman 2001; Zoubir 2002; 
Testas 2004b), the United Nations (Spencer 1998b) and the European Union (Rich 1998; 
Roberts 2002a). Framings include the international approach to the question of 
democratisation (Akacem 2005; Cavatorta 2009) and — as addressed in chapter eight — 
national reconciliation (Martinez 2000b; Hadj Moussa 2004; Aggad 2005; Arnould 2007; 
Moussaoui 2007; Joffé 2008). Comparable with this study, questions of representation 
generally (Stora 2001b, see chapter eight) or critiques of media representations specifically 
(Slisli 2000) have been raised elsewhere. However, Malmvig’s (2006) work is the most 
sustained attempt to understand the relationship between representations of Algeria’s 
violence and the international response to it (see below). 
 
Contemporary humanitarian framing, as will be discussed in chapter seven, often has the 
effect, if not the intent, of attempting to override the politics of a conflict in the name of 
alleviating the suffering of non-combatants or interrupting episodes of asymmetric mass 
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violence. Rather than the sometimes more urgent humanitarian framing, some chose the 
language of human rights to problematise the international response to the conflict in 
Algeria (Schwarz 2002; Zoubir & Bouandel 1998b). Not to mention the voluminous 
literature produced by human rights organisations such as Amnesty International, Human 
Rights Watch, Reporters sans frontières, Fédération internationale des droits de l’homme 
(see, e.g., Reporters sans frontières 1995; Reporters sans frontières et al. 1997) and other 
smaller human rights NGOs. Humanitarian framing, however, was actually quite rare in 
the studies of the Algerian conflict, even at the height of the massacres in 1997 and 1998. 
One reason for this is the brevity of the humanitarian window in Algeria, which lasted a 
mere six months, between the massacre of Raïs in August 1997 and Sidi Hamed in January 
1998. As the massacres quickly shrank in their intensity and frequency, so too did 
international interest and thus its willingness to get directly involved. The logistic 
constraints of academic publishing certainly retarded any rapid textual intervention during 
such a relatively small window (e.g., Meynier 2000), outside of the commentary of 
scholars in the mass media (see chapter five and six for examples). Or, volumes were 
coincidentally published at the height of the violence that had been written months or years 
before (e.g., Grandguillaume 1998). More importantly, though, was the refusal of many 
observers of the Algerian conflict to adopt a humanitarian framing, either because they 
(subconsciously) did not think it applied or because they saw it as counterproductive to 
ending Algeria’s violence. A 1998 collection of essays in the Cambridge review of 
international affairs (Bennison 1998; Zoubir & Bouandel 1998a; Rich 1998; Adamson 
1998; Rupesinghe 1998; Benyamina 1998; Roberts 1998) is an example of both. Though 
proposed at the height of the massacres in late 1997, the collection appeared too late to 
make a direct intervention into the humanitarianisation of the Algerian crisis, except 
perhaps to encourage its further recession. Indeed, the contribution of Hugh Roberts is 
quite clear in its rejection of the humanitarian framing (ibid.: 238). Roberts would later 
reaffirm his assessment that international intervention was ill advised because it would 
merely exacerbate the Algerian conflict (Roberts 2001). In a collection of essays published 
under the auspices of Médecins sans frontières, Chawki Amari (2004) likewise expressed 
concern about whether or not humanitarian action in Algeria will be helpful or even 
possible given the alleged depth of nationalist sentiment. Even Amnesty International 
(1997), one of the groups leading the calls for international action to stop the violence in 
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Algeria, remained within the human rights framing of the issue, suggested the extent to 
which exclusively or predominantly humanitarian representations were contested.  
 
As noted above, questions of representation and intervention have been most thoroughly 
addressed in Malmvig 2006. Malmvig’s approach to articulating the 
sovereignty/intervention problematique and the Algerian and Kosovo crises is draws from 
the work of R.B.J. Walker (1993), Jens Bartelson (1995) and, most importantly, Cynthia 
Weber (1995). Despite some philosophical and methodological affinities between 
Malmvig’s study and this one, her objectives are (1) to construct a narrative of the 
internationalisation of the Algerian conflict and, from it, (2) to demonstrate the spatial 
contingency of sovereignty by understanding the reasons for the non-intervention in 
Algeria versus the intervention in former Yugoslavia vis-à-vis the 1999 Kosovo crisis. This 
study, on the other hand, questions the theoretical assumptions of Malmvig’s study 
regarding the nature of sovereignty and also highlights her empirical over-dependence 
upon problematic and elite French representations of the conflict. Indeed, it is argued that 
Malmvig’s account has not so much demonstrated the spatial contingency of sovereignty 
but vividly demonstrated, within the logic of its own narrative and theoretical assumptions, 
the contingency of intervention given certain representations of atrocity and precedents of 
(in)action. 
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3. Democracy 
 
 
 
In the final quarter of the twentieth century, over two-dozen governments underwent 
reforms that allowed for more popular constraints to be placed upon state power. Algeria 
often appears — if it appears at all — as a tragic footnote in this narrative of democracy’s 
‘third wave’ (Huntington 1991: 12). Year zero in Algeria’s tale of failed democratisation is 
often begins in October 1988, when widespread riots were violently repressed by the 
Algerian military. The disturbances appeared to erupt on 4 October, widely reported in 
response to new government austerity measures; demonstrations continued for several days 
and spread from the capital throughout the country. On 8 October, soldiers from the 
national army fired on crowds in several major cities. Nearly a week later, the unofficial 
death toll was suspected to be 2001; over 3,700 had been detained.2 Reacting to the 
turmoil, President Bendjedid announced plans for reforms and won a third term that 
December. A new constitution secured passage by popular referendum in February 1989. 
Among the nearly fifty political parties that subsequently formed, the FIS quickly emerged 
in March 1989. Algeria also witnessed the return of exiles and the emergence of dozens of 
new media outlets. Social discontent, however, continued to express itself in reports of 
smaller scale demonstrations, strikes and riots in locations across the country.  
 
With sixty percent turnout, local elections on 12 June 1990 saw the FIS win over half (853) 
of Algeria’s 1,535 municipalities and two thirds (thirty two) of its forty eight prefectures. 
The former sole political party, the Front de libération nationale (FLN), came in second, 
winning 487 councils and fourteen prefectures.3 Elections for the national legislature were 
announced in April 1991 and scheduled for 27 June. Protesting new electoral laws 
instituted ahead of the national vote and the lack of a timetable for presidential elections, 
the FIS called for a general strike at the end of May. When confrontations with security 
forces resulted in the death of several protestors, the government postponed the elections 
and instituted a state of emergency on 5 June. After temporarily suspending the strike, the 
                                                
1 ‘Chronology July 16, 1988 – October 15, 1988’, Middle East Journal 43(1), Winter 1989: 87. 
2 ‘Chronology October 16, 1988 – January 15, 1989’, Middle East Journal 43(2), Spring 1989: 263. 
3 ‘Chronology April 16, 1990 – July 15, 1990’, Middle East Journal 44(4), Autumn 1990: 683. 
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FIS supported new demonstrations, demanding legislative and presidential elections. 
Scores died in the June clashes and several hundred were detained, though the FIS and 
rights groups claimed several thousand. The government began cracking down on the FIS 
leadership when Madani Abassi, then leader of the party, apparently raised the spectre of 
jihād during speech that month.4 Though the state of emergency was lifted in late 
September, government repression of the FIS continued (e.g., officials were arrested, 
publications shut down, offices raided). At the end of October, Bendjedid finally 
announced legislative elections, to take place on 26 December. Even with Abassi and his 
deputy, Ali Benhadj, still in jail, the FIS announced its participation in the elections on 15 
December and staged a rally of some 100,000 supporters a week later. A week after the 
vote, over 130,000 Algerians marched on 2 January to call on the government to protect 
democracy by cancelling the second round of elections.5 
 
As with the results of the 1990 municipal and provincial elections, the FIS dominated the 
December 1991 national elections, winning 188 seats out of 430 total. The Front des forces 
socialistes (FFS) and FLN came in second and third respectively. With official figures 
suggesting roughly sixty percent turnout, the FIS had garnered support from a quarter of 
the electorate. Yet reports of fraud and irregularities put as many as thirty percent of the 
seats in question.6 A runoff vote for the 199 undecided seats was scheduled for 16 January. 
President Bendjedid, however, resigned on 11 January. Having dissolved the legislature on 
4 January, Bendjedid’s replacement, as mandated by Algeria’s constitution, the Speaker of 
the Parliament, was a vacant post. Next in line, Abdelmalek Benhabilès, head of the 
Constitutional Council, did not take the post. Thus a six-member7 ad hoc body, the Haut 
Conseil de Sécurité (HCS) took the reins of government on 12 January and cancelled 
further elections, both legislative and presidential. The HCS gave way to the Haut Comité 
d’État (HCE) on 14 January, which would be chaired by Mohammed Boudiaf until the end 
                                                
4 Georges Marion, ‘Algérie : le retour au calme’, Le Monde, 8 July 1991. 
5 ‘Chronology October 16, 1991 – January 15, 1992, Middle East Journal 46(2), Spring 1992: 303. 
6 ‘Chronology October 16, 1991 – January 15, 1992, Middle East Journal 46(2), Spring 1992: 303. 
7 Prime Minister Sid Ahmed Ghozali, Defense Minister General Khaled Nezzar, Chief of Staff 
Abdelmalek Guenaïzia, Interior Minister General Larbi Belkhir, Foreign Minister Lakhdar Brahimi 
and Justice Minister Hamdani Benkhelil. Members of this group, particularly those in the militiary 
(Nezzar, Belkhir and Guenaïzia), would become known as the janvièristes. 
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of Bendjedid’s third mandate (i.e., December 1993).8 Algeria’s Supreme Court provided its 
imprimatur to the HCE two days later. When interim president Mohamed Boudiaf was 
assassinated that June, as many as one hundred civilians, security forces and armed 
opposition fighters had died in the violence. A year later, ten times as many were 
reportedly killed. At the end of the decade, the figure 100,000 had received widespread 
support, notably from President Bouteflika.9 
 
Contrary to its title, this chapter is not about democracy. Democracy, rather, was one of the 
more prominent themes within the discourse on the causes of the violence in Algeria, 
whether found in claims of democracy’s denial or claims of democracy’s safeguarding. 
The causes that led to the violence Algeria has endured since early 1992 have indeed been 
widely debated. At one level, this chapter describes some of the politics of naming the 
causes of Algeria’s violence, the various contingencies and conditions that have been put 
forward and denied in efforts to explain the armed conflict. At a deeper level, however, this 
chapter problematises various problematisations of Algeria’s violence, whether as the 
effect of specific trigger events or the possible outcome of underlying socio-economic 
factors. In both cases, the problem-solution dyad is put into question by the failure of 
policies that privileged either deterministic political or probabilistic economic 
understandings of violence’s cause. This chapter will also question the line often drawn 
between putatively economic and political causes by demonstrating the arbitrariness of 
such delineations. Looking more closely at economic models of civil war causation, we 
find that they are also internally undermined by two features: a contradictory attitude 
towards rebel motivation and an exclusive focus upon insurgents as the sole locus of causal 
agency at the expense of considering the actions of incumbents and the conditions of state 
repression. After identifying this series of destabilising features within the prevailing 
models of civil war causation, particularly the ways in which structures are arbitrarily 
conceived and overbearingly implemented, a bottom-up approach to understanding civil 
war violence is contemplated but suspended until the final conclusion of this study. 
 
                                                
8 Also on the Council was General Nezzar (Defence Minister), Ali Kafi (secretary-general of the 
Organisation nationale des Moudjahidine), Ali Haroun (recent Human Rights Minister) and 
Tedjini Haddam (rector of the Paris Mosque). 
9 See the following chapter for a discussion of these fatality statistics. 
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The politics of causation 
 
Years after the Algerian government declared a state of emergency, there is still 
widespread contestation amongst participants, victims, bystanders and observers — both 
foreign and domestic — as to the precise moment or sequence that sparked the conflict. 
Proposals sometimes suggest a singular event; others cite an ensemble of incidents, 
decisions, reactions, accidents and consequences, whether working independently, 
interactively or consecutively. Regardless of whatever cultural, social, economic and 
political conditions were underwriting the possibility of mass armed violence in the late 
1980s and early 1990s, the series of events in January 1992 has become a popular starting 
point in narratives of the conflict’s proximate causes . Designating the precise mechanisms 
that translate the specific events of January 1992 into armed conflict is, however, fraught 
with contestation. One route might suggest that we can identity the conflict’s trigger by 
noting that the levels of violence in Algeria increased considerably after the 14 January 
HCS ‘coup’. Therefore these actions triggered the conflict. Putting aside the question of 
fallacious argumentation (post hoc, ergo propter hoc), such a construction also has the 
burden of unpacking qualifiers such as ‘considerably’. First is the implicit comparison 
between pre-January 1992 levels of violence and those post-January 1992, which, in the 
case of the former, tended to come in the form of confrontations between protestors and 
security forces. While contemporary domestic and international news reports detail 
fatalities resulting from demonstrations and clashes (as many as 103 deaths by the end of 
February 199210), significant acts of anti-government violence were relatively rare in 1992 
when compared to 1993 and 1994. The two most infamous episodes in 1992 were a raid on 
the Port of Algiers (13 February), which allegedly signalled the birth of the insurgency, 
and a bombing at the Algiers airport (26 August), which indicated the rebellion’s apparent 
willingness to attack so called soft targets. Violent interactions between government forces 
and armed groups were otherwise sparse in 1992; on average, less than one per week. By 
the end of the year, estimates of the number of casualties ranged between 130 and 350. In 
no recorded episode had more than a dozen casualties — insurgents, security forces or 
civilians — been reported. Viewed as an intentional murder rate, even a total of 500 total 
                                                
10 AFP, ‘103 morts, 414 blessés et 6.786 détenus en Algérie depuis le début de l’année, selon un 
bilan officiel’, 12 March 1992. 
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casualties in 1992 would not put Algeria in the top twenty most murderous countries 
worldwide. For a state of Algeria’s capacity, though arguably degraded at that time, the 
levels of violence in 1992 should have nonetheless been manageable as a simple policing 
issue. More importantly, though, reported casualty figures increased dramatically in 1993 
and then skyrocketed in 1994 (see chapter four). This suggests that, if we are determined to 
locate a singular, necessary trigger point based upon drastic increases in the levels of 
violence, the events of January 1992 might not constitute that key event, unless the case 
could be made for a significant lag time in their effects.11 Though this argument does not 
rule out the possibility that some of the events of January 1992 contributed to the 
formation of the conflict, it suggests that levels of violence alone do not provide sufficient 
evidence to advance this claim. 
 
Another possible avenue of explanation is to propose that the events of January 1992 
definitively induced Islamist activists to take up arms.12 The immediate problem with this 
claim is that several of the Islamist organisations that would later take part in the violence 
had already formed, and were apparently carrying out acts of armed resistance, before 
January 1992. One group in particular, an Algerian al-Takfīr wa al-Hijrah, had reportedly 
been militating for armed Islamist rebellion since its inception in the mid 1970s and was 
portrayed as the natural home for Algerians returning from the battlefields of Afghanistan 
in the recently concluded war against the Soviet occupation. This group was also seen as a 
key instigator of the small acts of violence — murders, property destruction, riots — that 
marked the 1988-92 period, whether against the state, society or fellow Islamists. 
Additionally, members of the ill-fated 1982-87 Islamist rebellion of Mustapha Bouyali 
reconstituted their Mouvement (algérien) islamique armé (MAIA or MIA) as early as 
                                                
11 Possible lags could be located in rebellious Algerians waiting several months to a year before 
using violence to make sure the HCE was committed to its tack before committing to the maquis. 
Also, the detainment of significant numbers of suspected Islamists in the Saharan desert camps 
during most of 1992 might have retarded the formation the insurgency. 
12 For example, a former Egyptian ambassador to Algeria, Hussein Ahmed Amin, comparing each 
country’s armed Islamist movements, claimed that the violence in Algeria was more intense 
because the political grievance was more substantial:  ‘They were robbed of the fruits of their 
victory when the army cancelled the election. The Egyptian Islamists cannot make the same claim’ 
(Lara Marlowe, ‘Why once similar conflicts in Egypt and Algeria now differ’, Irish Times, 17 
March 1997: 13). 
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January 1991 (Willis 1997: 206, 269).13 In June 1991, the Algerian government claimed to 
have discovered arms caches in mosques around the country.14 Several months later in late 
November, an armed group attacked a military outpost near Guemar (El-Oued 
préfecture/wilāyah), killing three soldiers. Both the MIA and al-Takfīr wa al-Hijrah were 
blamed for the incident in media reports, though Nezzar, then Defence Minister, reportedly 
took the opportunity to link the incident to the FIS (Khelladi 2002: 109-10). Thus it is 
difficult to claim that the events of January 1992 created the insurgency ex nihilo, though it 
cannot be ruled out that the events of January helped amplify the insurgency. Whether or 
not this amplification was decisive would require an analysis of the insurgency’s capacity, 
bringing us back to the levels of violence and the low fatalities rates witnessed throughout 
in 1992. 
 
In many ways, the search for proximate causation is not to ask who fired the first shot but 
to identify the point of no return. Where and when did the Algerian regime or the 
insurgency cross the Rubicon? Just looking at the government’s actions, several events 
present themselves as obvious candidates. In addition to the HCE’s abortion of the 
electoral process, there was the subsequent arrest the remaining top FIS leadership, 
including its interim head, Abdelkader Hachani, and the head of its international 
representation, Rabah Kébir, in late January. The Algerian government also created prison 
camps in the Saharan interior to house FIS members and other detained Islamist activists; 
several thousand, perhaps nearly twenty thousand, would end up spending time in one of 
those detention centres. Following violent demonstrations in early February, the HCE 
enacted a state of emergency, which banned such public manifestations and instituted a 
curfew. In March and April, the Algerian government respectively outlawed the FIS and 
dissolved all the localities under its control from the 1990 elections. Then, in July, Abassi 
and Belhadj, arrested on 30 June 1991, received twelve-year prison sentences. All of these 
                                                
13 In 1982, under the leadership of Amīr Bouyali, the MAIA/MIA began carrying out sporadic 
attacks against Algerian security forces from bases in the mountains near Larba. The group 
allegedly planned to attack larger symbolic and human targets, but its insurgency was effectively 
ended in 1987 with an ambush that killed Bouyali (see Burgat 1997: 265-8). 
Martinez (Martinez 2000a: 69) claims that an Algerian Ḥizb Allāh formed in early 1990, 
though whether or not the objectives or intentions of this groups were similar to their Lebanese 
counterparts (in terms of armed militancy, Iranian inspiration or actual Shīʿah devotion), is not 
mentioned. Willis (1997: 143) actually claims that ‘Shi‘ite  Islamists’, called Sunnah wa Sharīʿah, 
attacked an Algerian courthouse in January 1990 but he provides no source. 
14 Georges Marion, ‘La traque des intégristes algériens’, Le Monde, 4 July 1991. 
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events, it should be noted, derive their saliency from occurring during or after January 
1992.  
 
When we expand the scope of possible trigger events to developments before January 
1992, the increasing number of candidates begins to complicate our efforts to pinpoint any 
decisive turning point. It is also important to consider this period in order to understand 
some of the motivations likely driving the actions of the HCE and those supporting them. 
During the thirty-eight months between October 1988 and January 1992, Algeria not only 
witnessed significant demonstrations relating to political tensions (e.g., the summer of 
1991), but also smaller, and sometimes violent, protests and riots across the country 
expressing cultural, social and economic frustrations by a number of actor types and 
interest groups. Tensions between the FIS and the regime reached their first peak in June 
1991. The former called for demonstrations against new electoral laws that seemed 
designed to hamstring the FIS in the upcoming national legislative elections. As these 
confrontations grew increasingly violent, the government initiated a four-month state of 
emergency and postponed the national elections indefinitely; several dozen to several 
hundred were killed and hundreds, perhaps thousands, were detained. A core FIS demand 
— a timetable for presidential elections — was apparently never addressed. Two days after 
Abassi reportedly threatened to call for jihād15 against the Algerian government, the 
military seized the party’s headquarters and arrested Abassi and Belhadj on 30 June, soon 
followed by Mohammed Saïd, FIS spokesperson. The government also shut down the 
French and Arabic FIS newspapers in August and arrested interim FIS head Hachani in 
September, releasing him a month later. A day after Saïd was released, several Algerian 
soldiers were killed and mutilated near Guemar. The government, in response to the 
December 1991 legislative elections, appeared to be wasting no time in taking measures to 
deny the FIS the seats it had won by claiming irregularities. Then, a fortnight after the 
                                                
15 Abassi reportedly said, in response to increased military deployments, ‘If the army does not 
return to its barracks, the FIS will have the right to call once again a Jihad, as in November 1954’ 
(Rachid Khiari, ‘Military Deploys Around Capital, Bendjedid Resigns as Party Chief’, Associated 
Press, 28 June 1991). One could certainly make the case that the analogy with November 1954, and 
the implicit comparison of the government to the colonial regime, would be received as more 
offensive than the use of the term jihād amongst some political leaders. 
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vote, reports indicated that the Algerian army was deploying throughout the country, at 
least three days ahead of Bendjedid’s resignation.16 
 
The only way to single out any of these events as the decisive proximate cause of the 
conflict in Algeria is to make a counterfactual inference. Regardless of the validity of 
counterfactual reasoning (for background, see Fearon 1991; Levy & Goertz 2007), no 
single development during the period of October 1988 to the Spring of 1992 presents itself 
as decisive prima facie. There is no Rubicon, there is no assassination of Archduke Franz 
Ferdinand. That is to say, only when the events of January 1992 are taken out of context 
and disarticulated from the chain of contingencies that produced and followed them, do 
these developments seem paramount. Furthermore, it is worth considering to extent to 
which, given the low levels of violence recorded in 1992, the conflict was neither 
inevitable nor inexorable following the installation of the HCE or the outlawing of the FIS. 
Future historians of the conflict should consider whether or not the decisive turning point 
was reached well before January 1992 or perhaps months or even years later.  January 
1992 only presents itself as the strongest explanatory candidate because of the discourse of 
the conflicts protagonists. It is not vindicated by rigorous counterfactual argument but 
rather by counterfactual assertions or assumptions, whether emanating from the conflict’s 
participants, their respective supporters or international observers.17 
 
What is obvious is the politics of naming causation and its role in the construction of 
problematisations of the violence in Algeria. A clear example is the debate over whether or 
not Bendjedid’s resignation constituted a ‘coup d’état’, a favoured construction of the 
conflict’s trigger, well evidenced in its memorialisation a decade after the fact.18 Framing 
these events as a coup not only attempts to de-legitimise the actions of the HCE juridically, 
it also provides moral legitimacy to the non-violent and armed resistance that followed. 
The denial of democracy provides the warrant for its restoration by any means. The 
                                                
16 ‘Chronology October 16, 1991 – January 15, 1992, Middle East Journal 46(2), Spring 1992: 303. 
17 In recognising the insufficiency of all these accounts of the violence, Robert Malley (1996: 248) 
was among the few to suggest the possibility of randomness and contingency: ‘In the end, the 
secret may well lie in the crass accidents of history [...]; or perhaps simply a wrong personality at 
the wrong place at the wrong time’. 
18 e.g., Arezki Aït-Larbi, ‘Algérie : Dix ans après le coup de force de l’armée contre le président 
Chadli [...]’, Le Figaro 11 January 2002; Le Monde, ‘Dix ans après l’interruption des élections, 
l’Algérie demeure dans l’impasse’, 12 January 1992. 
 56 
counter-narrative to this framing is the assertion that the intervention of the HCE was 
necessary to preserve democracy from extremism and fundamentalism. As will be seen 
later in this chapter, those involved in the seizure of power in January 1992 depicted their 
actions as the preservation of the Algerian state, if not the republic itself. This framing 
likewise attempted to legitimise the regime and supporting its actions. The events of 
January 1992 are thus imbued with causal significance by the discursive battlefield 
bounded by protagonists and international observers. 
 
The inherent danger in adopting or accepting such framings as indicative of the conflict’s 
causes is the tendency to infer an exclusively political problematisation. Here politicisation 
of the causes is not the same as partisanship, though partisan readings of the conflict’s 
causes, as shown above, were certainly present. In this sense, to say that the conflict was 
political often held that it resulted from an unwillingness to share power and so the 
ultimate site of contention and resolution was government and democracy. Without 
endorsing or rejecting this problematisation as adequate, contributory, accurate or 
misleading, it is important to note the danger in such political renderings of the conflict’s 
cause given their tendency to lend themselves to a simple problem/solution dyad. This 
danger is particularly acute when the problematisation is presented as exclusive and 
sufficient. The belief that the conflict in Algeria could be resolved through dialogue, power 
sharing, elections and reconciliation is itself problematised by the fact that all such 
initiatives between 1993 and 1995 corresponded with the intensification of violence.19 
Worst still, the election of General Liamine Zéroual to the Presidency in 1995, the 
adoption of a new constitution in 1996, and the holding of local and national elections in 
1997 came amidst the worst of the killing and massacres. Bouteflika’s 1999 amnesty 
measures, which formalised the 1997 ceasefire agreement between the AIS and the 
government, seemingly did little to hasten the agonisingly slow denouement of violence.20 
From these observations, we might conclude that these measures were insufficient or ill-
designed to address the root political causes of the conflict (e.g., the FIS was never allowed 
                                                
19 For example, the October 1993 Commission du dialogue nationale, which took over the HCE’s 
role of attempting to abate the brewing crisis; Zéroual’s dialogue with some political parties and a 
secret dialogue with Abbassi and Belhadj in 1994; and the January 1995 Rome Platform — signed 
by the major political parties who accepted the reinstatement of the FIS — outline of a path to 
return to multi-party elections (see Roberts 1995: 256-263). 
20 See the discussion on official fatality figures from the year 2000 in the following chapter. 
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back into the electoral game, reform never touched the real sources of political power in 
Algeria) or that the causes of the conflict have been entirely misdiagnosed or 
underestimated. While the former is still open to debate, the latter often found voice in 
socio-economic problematisations of the Algerian conflict, to which we turn to next. 
 
 
The metrics of Hogra21 
 
In addition to claims of proximate causation, an array of underlying conditions — 
historical, cultural, social and economic — have also been proposed to account for the 
violence in 1990s Algeria. Chief among these, economic accounts of the conflict have held 
a dominant position within the field of problematisations structuring the international 
discourse of Algerian violence. Central to these understandings is Algeria’s financial crisis 
                                                
21 Deploying an Algerian vocabulary, the term El-Hogra (al-ḥagrah) has circulated as shorthand 
for the ensemble of grievances that backgrounded the conflict. Hogra is often read as a sentiment of 
contempt expressed towards the general population by those with more social, economic and 
political power. Al-ḥagrah or al-ḥagrā comes from the root ḥaraqa, which denotes scorn and 
disdain. In formal Arabic, a closer equivalent to the Algerian meaning of Hogra is ẓulm: inequity, 
oppression or tyranny as expressed from a position of relative power. 
  Examples of Hogra in contemporaneous news accounts: ‘En 1973, on sentait déjà le mépris des 
citoyens pour le pouvoir, la hogra. Je me demandais quand ça éclaterait. Les premières émeutes 
remontent au début des années 80. Il suffisait d’une petite allumette pour que la violence se 
déchaîne à une grande échelle’ ([‘In 1973, we already felt the people’s contempt for the regime, the 
hogra. I was wondering when it would explode. The first riots started in the early 1980s. It only 
needed a little match for the violence to be released on a grand scale’.] Gilbert Grandguillaume in 
Jean Pierre Tuquoi, ‘Algérie : l’histoire est partie prenante dans la violence d’aujourd’hui’, Le 
Monde, 5 September 1997); ‘It was hogra that helped to account for the FIS’s success in the 1991 
election’ (The Economist, ‘Algeria. Just what the president ordered’, 14 June 1997: 48); ‘Young 
people were fed up with la hogra — the government’s contempt for them. Islam was their refuge’ 
(Ali Habib/Daniel Huguet quoted in Lara Marlowe, ‘The double life of Ali Habib’, The Irish 
Times, 13 August 1997: 13); ‘Rioting youths have denounced what they called the “hogra” of 
security forces, meaning contempt and injustice’ (AFP, ‘At least 15 dead in northeastern Algeria 
riots’, 27 April 2001). See also the use of concept or term Hogra in François d’Alançon, ‘Dans les 
banlieues d’Alger, les jeunes vivotent’, La Croix, 30 May 1997: 5; Dominique Le Guilledoux, 
‘Algérie, l’horreur et le doute’, Le Monde, 23 October 1997; Nadjia Bouzeghrane, ‘Jours 
ordinaires à Annaba’, Le Monde diplomatique, October 1997: 12-13.) 
 Hogra in academic and extended analyses: Adjerid 1992; Carlier 1998: 143; Evans & Phillips 
2008: 297; McDougall 2005: 125; Quandt 2004: 86; Roberts 2002b: 13; Tlemçani 2008: 1-2. 
Though often seen as a term deployed by youth, it can also refer to specific oppression, as against 
women (e.g., Lazreg 1998: 43), Kablyis (e.g., Bouandel 2002: 99; Alilat & Hadid 2002), Islamists 
(Martinez 2000a: 67), the mothers of the ‘disappeared’ (Collectif des familles de disparu(e)s en 
Algérie 2004: 51), etc. 
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in the mid to late 1980s brought on by the 1986 collapse of global hydrocarbon prices.22 
Following a peak in 1980, oil prices began to decline, hitting a plateau of roughly thirty 
dollars per barrel (unadjusted) between 1983 and 1985, then plummeting in 1986 to half its 
average price the previous year. The Algerian state, which had derived between half to 
two-thirds of its budget from petroleum exports since 1974, was faced with its most 
dominant revenue source being halved in 1986. Coupled with a weakened US dollar, the 
oil price collapse resulted in an eighty percent decline in foreign exchange earning for 
Algiers (see (Sereni 1992); cited in Quandt 1998: 177). To help make up for the loss, the 
government reduced imports and increased taxes and foreign borrowing. The ratio of 
export earnings to debt payments more than doubled between 1985 and 1993. At its 1988 
peak, the debt service ratio was eighty six percent. As a whole, Algeria experienced 
negative or marginal economic growth between 1986 and 1994; some areas outside the 
hydrocarbon sector continued to experience significant contraction through 1997 (Dillman 
2000b: 32-5). 
 
The next step in laying the economic foundations of conflict is to show how this financial 
crisis affected the daily lives of most Algerians by citing important indicators. According 
to one account, unemployment nearly quadrupled between 1985 and 1993 (Joffé 2002: 38). 
Another suggests that a third of the labour force found itself out of a job by 1991 (Testas 
2002b: 90-2). Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, unemployment failed to retreat to low 
point of 16.2 percent reached in early 1986. Across the board, wages decreased from the 
mid 1980s through the 1990s; the public sector, accounting for sixty four percent of the 
formal workforce, saw decreases in salaries, sometimes over thirty percent by 1996 
(Dillman 2000b: 20, 29). Fifteen percent of the population in 1992 was listed as having 
zero income (Kouaouci 2004: 36-7). Adding to this general stress on the population, 
inflation also rose from eleven percent in 1986 to thirty percent in 1992, the latter, one 
account noted (Testas 2001: 136-7), representing a rate 138 times higher than experienced 
in the United States during the great depression. Though some have rejected comparisons 
                                                
22 Certainly, no one has suggested that the 1986 oil price collapse is a sufficient starting point. But 
precisely which Algerian development policies (nationalisation, privatisation or both) and under 
what government (Boumedienne, Bendjedid or both) exacerbated the crisis is a wide-ranging 
debate that cannot be done justice here; see (Aïssaoui 2001). Nor is this study able to devote 
serious attention to contribution of 130 years of colonialism to these conditions either; a good 
starting point, however, would be Bennoune 1988. 
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between the October 1988 demonstrations and the ‘bread riots’ endemic to many countries 
undergoing International Monetary Fund structural adjustment programs (Roberts 1992: 
435; Khelladi & Virolle 1995 cited in Quandt 1998: 39; see below), one account claimed 
that, before the demonstrations broke out, food prices had increased forty percent since the 
beginning of 1988 (Swearingen 1990: 25).  
 
Further conditioning the possibility of conflict, it is also suspected that the economic crisis 
further eroded the legitimacy Algerian government and ruling elite. Borrowing resources 
from rentier theory23, regimes like Algeria obtain political legitimacy, or at least minimal 
acquiescence to authoritarianism, by providing a modicum of employment and public 
services without putting any significant demands upon general population such as taxes. 
Rentier regimes are able to accomplish this by generating revenue (‘rents’) from exports 
rather than through taxation and private sector development. As the theory goes, the ability 
of the Algerian regime to govern without democratic constraints was predicated upon its 
ability to appease the population through public spending to provide employment and 
services. However, with the oil price collapse, these techniques of rule were no longer 
sustainable and, making matters worse, the response of Bendjedid’s government was to 
place further burdens on the an already stressed population with increased taxes and 
restrictions on imports, which resulted in price inflation. If rule had been predicated on the 
ability to buy obedience with petrodollars, then that possibility no longer maintained after 
1986. And, to make matters worse, the government began adopting very unpopular policies 
that targeted the low- and zero-income masses rather than the top ten percent of Algerians 
by wealth who were consuming a third of GDP alone (Kouaouci 2004: 36-7). This line of 
argument concludes that armed conflict was made possible, in part, by the economic 
engendering of widespread dissatisfaction with the government and thus the motive for 
regime change became more popular.24 
                                                
23 For a general account of rentier theory, see Bablawi 1987; on rentierism and conflict, see Collier 
2000; Collier & Hoeffler 2005. For rentier theory and Algeria specifically, see, e.g., Anderson 
1997; Waterbury 1997; Zaimeche & Sutton 1998; Aïssaoui 2001; Murphy 2001; Werenfels 2002; 
Henry 2004; Hodd 2004; Lowi 2004; Keenan 2006; Sandbakken 2006. 
24 A related yet almost unexplored avenue of explanation for the (failed) Islamist rebellion is to 
borrow resources from James Davies (1962) seminal article on revolutions. Davies proposes that 
when periods of economic improvement are followed by sharp decreases, then the conditions for 
revolution can obtain. The problem is not poverty per se, but a sudden and radical change that 
affects general perceptions of economic standing relative to the period before the downturn. 
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A closely related and important effect of the economic downturn is the weakening of the 
state and the engendering of perceptions of regime (‘incumbent’) vulnerability amongst 
potential adversaries (‘rebels’). The most cited multi-country studies of civil war onset 
(Fearon & Laitin 2003; Collier et al. 2008) have found that low per capita GDP is the 
strongest predictor of significant intra-national armed conflicts. One way in which this 
indicator has been interpreted as contributing to the onset of civil wars, in addition to 
engendering widespread grievance and so the undermining of a regime’s political 
legitimacy, is the weakening of the state itself. Poverty, accordingly, not only produces the 
possibility for new insurrectionary allegiances based upon social, economic and political 
injustices, but it also suggests that the state is unable or less able to defend itself. The more 
impoverished the state, the better the chances of rebel victory or, at least, the perception of 
being able to overthrow putatively weak incumbents. Whether or not this is actually the 
way in which low per capita GDP translated into the outbreak of armed fighting in Algeria 
is debateable. Fearon and Laitin (2006: 27-30) argue that the Algerian state — at least the 
military, security and intelligence apparatus — was relatively strong in 1992 though 
apparently unprepared to fight either urban or rural guerrillas. On the one hand, the 
Algerian military’s budget was relatively low in 1992; only three percent of GDP, whereas 
Syria and Iraq spent ten to twenty percent. Compared to southwest Asian rentier states 
(e.g., Saudi Arabia), Algeria was relatively poor. On the other hand, amongst its Maghrib 
neighbours, who have yet to experience similar levels of conflict, Algeria was relatively 
prosperous economically, boasting one of the region’s largest armies of over 120,000 in 
1993 (though mostly conscripts) and a reportedly more robust infrastructure (ibid.: 2, 17; 
Testas 2001). 
 
The conjunction of poverty, state weakness and conflict onset has also been hypothesised 
in terms of periods of political uncertainty. The presence of ‘anocracy’ or ‘semi-
democracy’, when a government inhabits a zone between authoritarianism and democracy, 
is also a suggested factor behind the conditions of armed rebellion. The lack of reliable 
democratic means to express grievance non-violently and the diminished capacity of an 
                                                                                                                                              
Martinez (2000a: 2-3) rejects this account, along with other economic explanations, on the grounds 
that Algeria’s socio-economic crisis was already well in the making by the 1970s. For a discussion 
of Martinez’s approach, see chapter eight. 
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authoritarian regime to repress opposition effectively are the supposed mechanisms that 
contribute to opposition frustration and the resort to arms (Hegre et al. 2001). 
Alternatively, a move from authoritarianism to democracy might condition rebel 
perceptions of regime weakness if the transition is interpreted as capitulation to pressure, 
such as the initiation of democratic reforms in Algeria following the 1988 riots. More 
recently, however, a meta-analysis of the literature has proposed that the relationship 
between anocracy and internal armed conflict is specifically related to the use of violent 
repression and resistance during such periods (Vreeland 2008). The inauguration of 
Algeria’s anocracy is often located in aftermath of the October 1988 riots. After President 
Bendjedid secured a third term that December, the following months saw the institution of 
a multi-party constitution, the creation of dozens of new political parties (including the 
FIS), increased political freedoms (e.g., press, political association) and more moves 
towards economic privatisation. Yet following the FIS’s electoral victory in local elections 
(June 1990), tension between incumbent authorities and new challengers escalated, notably 
in the May-June 1991 demonstrations, the central government’s crackdowns on FIS 
governed municipalities and the detention of FIS leaders and activists. One analysis of this 
situation highlights the allegedly volatile combination of freedoms and repression at the 
zenith of Algeria’s transition around 1990-91 (Testas 2002b: 109-11). 
 
It has also been suggested that economic instability and poverty support the possibility of 
insurgency by opening new avenues for economic advancement for the dispossessed. As a 
rebel motivation, ‘greed’ in intra-national armed conflicts is thought to function at both a 
macro and micro level. Macro-level greed is the supposition that the ultimate prize of 
winning the state motivates insurgents, especially if the state derives most of its income 
from a valuable primary commodity export like hydrocarbons. At the micro-level, greed, 
as an incentive for rebellion, is construed as loot-seeking behaviour that sustains an 
insurgency. Though there appears to be a strong relationship between single-commodity 
export-dependent states and armed conflict, especially hydrocarbons (Fearon & Laitin 
2003: 85), the way in which this triggers or reinforces intra-national mass violence is 
debated.25 In the case of Algeria, the role of hydrocarbon exports seemingly could only 
function as an unstable foundation for the economy, the state and the regime, while also 
                                                
25 See Ross 2003, Ross 2004 and Brunnschweiler & Bulte 2009, as well as the collection following 
Ron 2005, especially Fearon 2005; Humphreys 2005; Collier & Hoeffler 2005. 
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presenting itself as the grand prize for those seeking to take control of the government. Yet 
hydrocarbons could also function as a massive disincentive for the entrenched elite to let 
go of power, thus reinforcing the impulse towards authoritarianism and repression, thus 
reinvigorating core grievances of the opposition. At the micro-level, however, Algeria’s 
hydrocarbons could not have played much of a role sustaining the conflict by financing the 
insurgency. Compared to other ‘lootable’ resources (e.g., small minerals) that help start 
and drive conflicts (see Lujala et al. 2005), Algeria’s hydrocarbons, predominantly natural 
gas, remained largely out of the grasp of armed opposition groups, both geographically and 
technologically.26 Though there were reports of armed groups — often unidentified — 
attempting to sabotage hydrocarbon related infrastructure, such attacks were surprisingly 
rare given the importance of this commodity to the Algerian government.27 
 
Another micro-economic factor considered possibly conducive to armed rebellion in 
Algeria is the extent to which black market activity was already prevalent in Algeria. 
While micro-level greed is not considered as important to the initiation of conflict as much 
as to its maintenance, how an armed rebellion finances itself is to be taken into account to 
understand a conflict’s durability. In the case of Algeria, the existence of informal, parallel 
and illegal markets were seen as signs of both the legacy of Algeria’s earlier experiments 
with socialism and Algeria’s failing economy in the late 1980s, a source of funding for 
clandestine political interests and, later, insurgent activities. Before January 1992, one 
study reported that fifteen percent of the GDP could be sourced to the black market and 
upwards of half of the country’s cash was circulating within it (Dillman 2000b: 26). 
Though other figures suggested that the Algerian black market accounted for as much as 
seventy percent of GDP by the late 1980s (see Lowi 2007: 135). Accounts of Islamist 
groups manipulating the black market to fund the insurgency are not difficult to find (e.g., 
Martinez 2000a: 137-46), as are insinuations that hybridised private-public ‘mafias’ have 
played an equal, if not greater, role in the evolution of the shadow economy (Joffé 2002). 
Though it is difficult to see how black-marketeering could constitute an incentive for 
                                                
26 Recent conflicts in Iraq (post-2003) and Nigeria’s Delta have demonstrated that hydrocarbons 
are more lootable by resource poor non-state actors than previously assumed. See Lujala 2010. 
27 El Watan (Algiers) only reported attacks against a gas distribution centre in Blida (reported on 11 
July 1995, No. 1429), a pipeline near Cap Djinet near Boumerdes (reported on 7 March 1996, No. 
1623) and a pipeline from Hassi R’mel field in M’Sila (reported on 22 May 1998, No, 2307). 
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armed rebellion, its contribution to a ‘conflict-poverty trap’, once armed fighting is 
initiated, is not difficult to sketch out.28  
 
Lastly, Algeria’s demographics, to some observers, have likewise been considered key to 
an understanding of the drift towards armed conflict. Though the population growth rate 
fell in the 1980s, between 1962 and 1982 Algerians nearly doubled their number to twenty 
million, driven by one of the world’s highest birth rates in the 1970s. An effect of this was 
a disproportionately large youth segment. A census conducted the year before the 1988 
riots indicated that over two thirds of Algerians were under age thirty (Lowi 2009: 114-5). 
Within this group, nearly ninety percent were unemployed in 1992. For some models of 
civil war, this suggested a large and motivated pool of potential recruits for armed 
rebellion. In combination with unemployment, young Algerian males were said to be 
experiencing other social frustrations. Just as Algeria’s youth segment was reportedly 
above average regionally, it was also one of the few Maghrib countries to experience an 
increase in household size, at three Algerians per bedroom on average in 1992.29 The 
gender balance of Algeria’s ‘youth bulge’ was tilted slightly towards males, who tended to 
favour younger spouses. Yet the birth rate peaked in 1970; so an eighteen-year-old male in 
1988 would be facing a diminishing pool of younger potential mates. His chances of 
finding a job and housing (often pre-requisites for marriage) were also significantly 
constrained (Kouaouci 2004: 38-9) by the crushing youth unemployment, price increases 
and the housing crisis. 
 
Given these developments in Algeria’s economic picture between 1986 and 1992, some 
have concluded that the real causes of the conflict had little or nothing to do with the most 
cited political factors. In the context of EU policy towards the conflict in Algeria, political 
scientist Abdelaziz Testas (2002a: 102) argued for an entirely economic problematisation: 
 
[...] the view that the conflict is an Islamist-military war that was the mere consequence 
of the interruption of the 1991 election process to keep the Islamists from power. The 
facts that the crisis is inherently economic and that the initial rise of Islamism, as well 
                                                
28 For an explication of the conflict trap, as applied to 1990s Algeria, see Testas (2002c: 164-5). 
29 Dillman (2000b: 127) claimed an increase in average household density from 7.2 to 7.7 between 
1987 and 1997, one of the highest in the world. 
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as the suspension of the political process, are themselves the result of economic 
collapse, has largely been ignored. This suggests that resolving Algeria’s crisis 
effectively requires new thinking and a new approach [...] 
 
Critics of such economic problematisations of the Algeria’s violent conflict have 
underscored several deficiencies, if not fatal flaws, in this approach. Allegations of 
‘economic determinism’ were already present before the outbreak of major armed 
violence30 and have since proposing that Algeria’s dim economic climate is not the sole 
basis of the crisis (e.g., Roberts 1995: 250-1; Quandt 1998: 122). The social and economic 
crisis of the late 1980s has even been dismissed as irrelevant to understanding the root 
causes of Algeria’s armed conflict when compared to the allegedly more powerful cultural 
and historical forces at work (Martinez 2000a: 2-5; see chapter eight for critique).  
 
Yet both proponents and critics of economic problematisations Algeria’s share untenable 
delineations of sovereignty between the spheres of the economic and the political, not to 
mention the terrains of the cultural, the social and the historical. What field is reserved for 
the political and what is reserved for the economic, particularly in a post-colonial state that 
has been understood to be intimately involved in the daily operations of its economy, is 
hardly a given distinction. More often than not, it is only passively explicated and based 
                                                
30 Attacking the claims that the October 1988 riots and the popularity of the Islamist movement 
resulted from poor economic conditions, Roberts (1992: 434-6) points out that the demonstrations 
ended on 10 October following promises of political reform but without Bendjedid making any 
economic concessions. Roberts also unpacks three chants used during the riots that seemingly 
espoused a desire for better government leaders over economic concerns. As Robert’s alleges, news 
accounts from that period indeed repeatedly — almost consistently — underscored the ostensibly 
economic nature of the riots, portraying them as the result of austerity measures, price increases, 
shortages of goods and unemployment. But what Robert’s narrative does not mention is the fact 
that, just hours before Bendjedid’s speech, the army shot into a crowd of demonstrators in 
downtown Algiers, reportedly killing several dozen. By the end of the protests, which lasted from 4 
to 10 October, the official death toll was about 150 though other official sources claimed as many 
as 500, most resulting from the army firing indiscriminately into crowds (Associated Press, ‘Death 
Toll Put At 159 From Algeria Uprising’, 22 October 1988). To imply that promises of reform, 
rather than the excessive and murderous use of state coercion to confront the riots, stopped the riots 
all by itself is unconvincing. Moreover, Robert’s effort to politicise the causes of the 
demonstrations (and so rule out an entirely economic account) is also problematic given the 
Algerian state’s heavy hand in the operations of its economy (i.e., whether or not, in the minds of 
Algerians, the economic and the political were really seen as distinct terrains). Whether or not 
Roberts’ argument holds up to empirical scrutiny, this example illustrates the two points about to 
be made: (1) the unstable distinction between economic and political causes of conflict and (2) the 
tension between agents and structures of conflict. 
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upon presupposition. That is to say, the political is constituted by claiming the economic or 
vice versa. Moreover, the claim that economic factors dominate the political is only 
possible given a distinction that must be maintained a priori. Proposing a holistic 
approach, while pragmatic, fails to appreciate the power of this critique. It is not just that 
the historical, cultural, social, economic and political need to be appreciated 
simultaneously. The problem is that concepts, such as the cultural, the political and the 
economic, must be asserted prior to investigation and analysis. They can never be arrived 
at synthetically without assuming them hypothetically or analytically. Such arbitrary 
delineations between these spheres are an important condition of possibility in the 
construction of causality, and thus the problematisation, of the Algerian conflict as either 
political or economic. 
 
As with the failures that met both domestic and international efforts to address the 
violence’s alleged political core (outlined above), the effect of economic interventions is 
difficult to read as well. Not only did an IMF loan in 1989 do little to stop the economic 
crisis from translating into armed conflict, Algeria later signed loan agreements with the 
IMF in 1994 and 1995, the latter lasting three years and proving Algeria with $1.8 billion 
in credit during the apex of the violence.31 Even as the fighting intensified between 1993 
and 1996, Algeria’s macroeconomic picture improved, allowing the government to 
reschedule its bilateral debt with seventeen creditor nations following a July 1995 meeting 
of the Paris Club. The European Community, which had stalled disbursements between 
1992 and 1994 of a significant loan to Algeria signed in late 1991 (Roberts 2002: 111-2), 
eventually extended Algeria $156 million to help government reform and privatisation 
efforts in late 1996, followed by $124 million to help Algeria with its debt burden. Amidst 
the bloodiest periods then witnessed in the fighting (Ramadan in early 1997), the 
                                                
31 Foreign oil companies seemed undeterred by the violence. With Algeria boasting new finds, 
British Petroleum signed a multi-billion dollar agreement with the Algerian government in late 
1995 to develop fields around In Salah. France’s Total and Spain’s Repsol signed a twenty-year 
$850 million contract with Algeria in January 1996, with engineering assistance of US firm Brown 
and Root and Japan’s JGC, to develop gas fields in the deep south-east (Economist Intelligence 
Unit, ‘Algeria: Country Report’, 9 February 1996).  
By 1997, new investments were launched or planned by the US companies Atlantic Richfield 
and Anadarko, Spain’s Compañía Española de Petróleos and Italy’s Azienda Generale Italiana 
Petroli, while governments in the United Kingdom, Canada, Belgium, Netherlands, Italy and 
Germany took steps to help cover investments in Algeria, particularly in the hydrocarbon sector 
(Economist Intelligence Unit, ‘Algeria: Country Report’, 7 February 1997: 8, 23-24). 
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Economist Intelligence Unit otherwise lauded ‘Algeria’s spectacular macroeconomic 
performance’, driven by increasing hydrocarbon prices.32 While massacres, bombings, 
assassinations and terrorism continued into the new millennium with less ferocity, Algeria 
continued to experience another decade of political violence, suggesting that the link 
between the macroeconomic picture and the microeconomics of violence remains poorly 
understood. Indeed, the disarticulation of the macro and the micro is not only a feature of 
the violence that puts into question economic problematisations of the conflict’s causes, it 
is a disarticulation that challenges our ability to theorise causation in the first place.  
 
 
Agents, structures and logics of violence 
 
The issue of agency is likewise a formidable problem in the effort to explicate either the 
decisive causal moment or the underlying conditions of Algeria’s violence, if not intra-
national armed conflict generally. As explicated above, the dominant models of civil war 
causation (Collier-Hoeffler, Fearon-Laitin) simultaneously deny the efficacy of expressed 
individual or aggregate motivations to explain the conditions of armed conflict, yet they 
nonetheless require agents to actualise their models. In their various forms, grievances — 
political, ethnic, religious, etc. — have been dismissed for being either contradictory or 
difficult to discern (Kalyvas 1999: 246; citing Tilly 1975); omnipresent in most polities 
though also inconspicuous to a small insurgency (Fearon & Laitin 2003: 76); or for being 
based on misperception, non-rational or irrational behaviours, in that few rebellion might 
have been a mistake, few rebels actually gain from civil war or rebels seem to use violence 
for violence’s sake (Collier et al. 2008: 4-5). In short, ‘Grievance can be the constitutive 
grammar of conflict or simply its discourse, with no more explanatory power as to the 
determinants of observing violence than either perception or opportunity’ (Collier & 
Sambanis 2002: 4).  
 
The metrics used for gauging grievance, however, are based upon the degree of 
fragmentation (in the case of religious or ethnic grievance) and the level of freedoms (in 
the case of political grievance) in any given country. In other words, these explanatory 
                                                
32 Economist Intelligence Unit, ‘Algeria: Country Report’, 7 February 1997: 9. 
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models of civil war measure only inter-religious — i.e., not intra-religious —heterogeneity 
at the national level.33 Thus the means by which religious grievance is gauged will be 
totally useless in a country that is reportedly almost homogeneously Sunni Muslims of the 
Mālikī madhhab. For an armed conflict whose putative master logics included a debate 
about the extent to which Algerian society should be governed by certain interpretations of 
Islamic norms, it is clear that prevailing econometric models of civil war etiology will fail 
to capture an allegedly paramount dimension of the Algerian conflict. This is not to 
suggest that the political violence in Algeria since, at least, 1992, can be sufficiently 
described or accounted for as an intra-religious conflict. It is simply to say that the conflict, 
whether at the level of day-to-day fighting or at the level of the clash between the regime 
and the FIS, involved Muslims fighting Muslims, often over competing claims to Islam. 
 
This dismissal of actor-level motivations stands in sharp contrast to the function of the 
agent within these econometric models. The expressed motives of rebels (and only rebels; 
more below) are dismissed for being possibly confused, conflicting or irrational. Yet it is 
assumed that rebels, potential or actual, whatever their claimed grievances, will ultimately 
behave in ways that are nonetheless ‘rational’ or predictable. Prevailing economic models 
of armed conflict regularly espouse the ‘Machiavelli Theorem’ (Hirshleifer 2001: 10-1), 
which suggest that ‘no profitable opportunity for violence would go unused’ (Collier et al. 
2008: 3).34 The way in which this articulates with an otherwise inchoate, multidimensional 
or self-undermining set of rebel motives is through the agency of rebel leaders, who 
perceive they have the most to gain from taking up arms. What rebel leaders say in public 
is propaganda, but what they ultimately do is exploit opportunities for economic, social 
and political advancement. This seemingly paradoxical state of affairs — some agency is 
requisite, other agencies are not — is symptomatic of the way in which this approach to 
understanding the conditions of armed intra-state conflict has been constructed. That is, it 
is reflective of the way in which the model is built around ‘economic’ factors that lend 
                                                
33 Even in a specific case study of Algeria (Testas 2002c: 162), this method of apprising religion’s 
contribution to conflict only in terms of inter-religious debates (framed in terms of the ‘clash of 
civilisations’) was adopted. 
34 Hirshleifer (2001: 10-1), however, does not endorse this view as wholeheartedly as Collier, et. 
al., seem to suggest. ‘Machiavelli Theorem standing alone is only a partial truth’. The other side of 
the coin is ‘[Ronald] Coase’s Theorem’, which is the claim that ‘people will never pass up an 
opportunity to cooperate by means of mutually advantageous exchange’. Hirshleifer suggests that 
‘our textbooks need to deal with both modes of economic activity’.  
 68 
themselves to quantification without being aware of the dangers of such reductionism.35 
Grievance, which does not lend itself to such easy measurements, has been insufficiently 
hypothesised as levels of freedom or inter-ethnic/religious dispute.36 
 
The problem with such constructions of the rational agent is that it is a tool that cuts both 
ways. Though these econometric models claim to address the phenomenon of intra-
national armed conflict, their approach is to address the issue of rebellion. The attempt to 
explain what causes intra-national conflict soon becomes the more specific tasks of 
discovering the conditions and motivations that push citizens to rebel against their 
government. An essential guiding assumption seems to be the idea that only rebels will see 
armed conflict as advantageous and so the model only needs to explain why national 
rebellion occurs. The model is structured in such a way that it is totally uninterested in the 
possibility that the other side of the coin — the incumbent authorities and state repression 
— is a contributing or overriding factor. This politics of naming rebellion, whether 
intentional or not, is problematic for two reasons. The term rebellion locates agency within 
the rebels, rather than co-locating agency in both the state and insurgents, or simply in the 
state itself. The fact that rebels often frame their violence as resistance, rather than 
rebellion, is often the counter-narrative of civil war onset. Rather than locating the agency 
of causation in the rebellion, the original causal location of agency is the state. In the 
minds of many, including the FIS, it is resistance to repression that causes rebellion. This 
leads to the second point. Prevailing econometric models of civil war are blind to these 
alternatives simply because the possibility of state agency being decisive or dominant is 
ruled out a priori.37 
 
In the case of Algeria, there are certainly claims within the broader discourse, particularly 
with FIS activists and their supporters, who interpreted the actions of the regime as 
beckoning armed confrontation, creating the conditions for the violence. As will be seen in 
the following chapter, which presents the conflicted use of the term civil war vis-à-vis the 
armed conflict in Algeria, the idea was often expressed that it was not the rebels but the 
                                                
35 This is without even addressing the reliability of most economic data in the first place (see 
Nathan 2005).  
36 This is similar to a critique raised by Cramer (2002). 
37 Regan (2005) explores the role of the governments in the generation of civil wars but wisely 
does not consider state repression as the defining problematique of civil war. 
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regime that saw violence to its advantage. Indeed, if we flip the econometric model upside-
down but maintain the Machiavelli Theorem, it is not difficult to construct an alternative 
account of the causes of the Algerian conflict in which it is the conditions for state 
repression, not rebellion, that seem most ripe in 1992. The discursive resources for such a 
counter-hypothesis are easy enough to assemble. Within the regime’s elite, the threat posed 
by the FIS following the December 1991 elections was viewed as existential. As much was 
claimed by Nezzar during his testimony in a French court in 2002 defending the actions of 
HCE, in which he describes himself as a leading figure of the events of January 1992 (see 
chapter eight).38 Nezzar’s lawyer during that trial defended his client’s actions in these 
terms: ‘It was that or Afghanistan. The Islamist savages put the republic in danger’.39 
Former Prime Minister Sid Ahmed Ghozali, who joined the HCE, likewise testified in 
2002 ‘that to allow the Islamists to take power was to allow the fall of Algeria’.40 In May 
1992, then head of counter-intelligence, Colonel Smaïn Lamari, reportedly told his 
deputies, ‘I am ready and determined to eliminate three million Algerians if necessary to 
maintain the order that the Islamists threaten’ (as reported by Samraoui 2003: 162).41 Luis 
Martinez (2000a: 16), who penned the most detailed study of the early insurgency, 
nevertheless concluded that ‘the choice of civil war’ was ‘made by the military leadership 
in January 1992’. 
 
Did not the calls to Jihad and small acts of terrorism attributed to Islamists throughout 
1992 provide the Algerian regime — then under threat from a multi-sided coalition 
demanding significant economic and political reform — with a ‘profitable opportunity for 
violence’? Indeed, it would not be difficult to expand this narrative to demonstrate the 
ways in which the crisis of armed violence in Algeria allowed the regime to carry out 
                                                
38 See also the interview with Nezzar in Hamadouche (2004: 38-9). 
39 Lara Marlowe, ‘Algeria a test case for war on terrorism’, Irish Times, 14 August 2002: 14. 
 In his testimony in 2002, Nezzar had claimed that the FIS was pushing for the ‘Afghanisation’ 
of Algeria, ‘in one word, a Taliban State’ (Raphael Hermano, ‘Un Algérien accable l’armée de son 
pays face à un ex-ministre de la Défense’, AFP, 1 July 2002). Nezzar had likewise deployed the 
spectre of Afghanistan in his account of 1999 Algeria(see Nezzar 2001). 
40 AFP, ‘Former Algerian PM defends cancellation of polls at Paris trial’, 2 July 2002. 
41 Three million being roughly the number of Algerians who voted for the FIS in December 1991.  
 In his testimony during the Souaïdia-Nezzar trial in 2002, Samraoui claimed that high officers 
within the security elite were already planning ‘total war’ against the Islamists in the late 1980s and 
worked to create the conditions for the violent confrontation that followed (Florence Beaugé et 
Jean-Pierre Tuquoi, ‘Un ancien du contre-espionnage algérien livre ses souvenirs’, Le Monde, 25 
September 2003). 
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otherwise difficult domestic reforms (e.g., further privatisation) while receiving 
international financial and diplomatic support that helped stabilise the power structure that 
had been under serious threat between 1988 and 1992. The armed conflict also allowed the 
state to create a massive security/social assistance program in the form of civilian militias, 
reportedly numbering between a quarter- to half a million by 2000 (Sidhoum ̣& Algeria 
Watch 2003b: 8). Though it might be claimed that it would be irrational for a state to 
welcome or instigate armed conflict, the same has been said of motivations for rebellion — 
that they are irrational. If we take civil war as our problem, rather than rebellion, and we 
are willing to suspend an analysis of motivation in favour of an analysis of permissive 
conditions based upon the logic of utility maximisation, then there is reason to consider the 
war’s profitability to incumbents and insurgents alike. 
 
Suspending an analysis of explicit motivation, whether in terms of insurgent or state 
actions, remains problematic precisely because the disarticulation of a conflict’s structure 
and agents results in the determination of motivation by structure. The ambivalent way in 
which in economic models of civil war suspend, dismiss or poorly hypothesise grievance, 
while requiring a totalising, abstract and subconscious theory of motivation, is indicative 
of this problem. This is not the same as the accusations of economic determinism noted 
above; there the issue was framed in terms of the causes of the conflict. Here economic 
determinism is being problematised as the determination of agency; more precisely, the 
production of rebel subjectivities by the theoretical apparatus that seeks to understand their 
actions. Which is to say, prevailing models of civil war studies co-constitute their very 
object of analysis. 
 
If we decide that the motivations for violence at the grassroots level of a conflict are worth 
taking seriously, then a different problem arises. The logics of intimate violence in armed 
conflicts are often understood to be indirectly related or entirely unrelated to a conflict’s 
putative structure (Kalyvas 2006: 364-5). In the case of 1990s Algeria, observers 
frequently advanced, and anecdotal evidence sometimes supported, claims that the 
violence on the ground was divorced from the larger questions supposedly driving the 
conflict. Chapters five and six of this study provide examples, which were presented under 
various guises though often as the problem of ‘privatised violence’. This disarticulation 
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have been made in other instances of intra-national mass violence. More generally, the 
problem of structural determinism has precipitated a debate within political studies, often 
treated as the agent-structure, micro-macro, parts-whole or levels of analysis problem. 
Whether as a legacy of Marxist analysis in comparative political economy or the 
structuralist turn in International Relations, accusations of top-down or bottom-up 
determinism have fuelled a lively debate for several decades42 and inspired attempts to 
escape this frame trap.43  
 
When it comes to the study of intra-state wars, the agent-structure impasse allegedly arises 
from reports that identities, intentions and practices at the micro- or agent-level do not 
match up with the alleged macro-level understanding of a conflict’s politics. Put another 
way, the politics of violence at the grassroots level can, and often does, bear little 
resemblance to the politics of the conflict at the national level. Working through these 
problems, Kalyvas (2006: 371) suggests we redefine ‘civil wars’ as ‘imperfect, 
multilayered, and fluid aggregations of highly complex, partially overlapping, diverse, and 
localized civil wars with pronounced differences form region to region and valley to 
valley, reflecting the rupture of authority’. In the following chapter, this study examines 
more closely the problematiques and politics of naming civil wars. For now, what is 
interesting about Kalyvas’ approach to the agent-structure  — politics of conflict, logics of 
violence — impasse is its espousal of a bottom-up approach. The agent-structure paradox 
has not been resolved but inverted. While the historical or empirical rationale for this re-
conceptualisation is made clear, its ultimate pragmatic rationale is left un-stated. As will be 
seen in the following chapter, throughout this work and ultimately addressed in the 
conclusion, the politics of conceptualisation should become key to our assessment of mass 
violence and intervention. 
 
 
                                                
42 See, Singer 1961; Wendt 1987; Dessler 1989; Carlsnaes 1992; Hay & Wincott 1998; Gould 
1998; Bieler & Morton 2001; Klotz 2006; Wight 2006. 
43 E.g., Giddens 1979; Migdal 1988; Doty 1997. 
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Conclusion 
 
So far this study has examined the politics of naming the causes of the armed violence in 
Algeria that seemingly broke out following the events of January 1992. However, it was 
noted that threats and acts of armed violence, whether seen as Islamist resistance or state 
repression, preceded this date by months. Meanwhile, it was also acknowledged that the 
levels and acts of violence throughout 1992 were of a far smaller scale than the years that 
followed, making it even more difficult to identify the proximate cause of the armed 
violence in Algeria. Looking at the broader context of violent interaction in Algeria, it was 
even more difficult to locate the precise trigger of the conflict without engaging in acts of 
naming that would be essentially political (read: partisan) in its act of framing. The only 
way to establish the ultimate significance of a particular event as the trigger is to adopt a 
framing that is as contested as it is contingent.  
 
Looking at the potential roots or permissive conditions of the violence in Algeria, several 
abstract models of intra-national armed conflict generally tended to favour economic 
factors over political causes. These models, based upon significant cross-comparative 
studies of other conflicts, seemed to reveal important underlying conditions of the Algerian 
violence, particularly in the economic crisis of the late 1980s and its putative socio-
political effects. Critics of this approach, however, often alleged that such economic 
determinism had obfuscated the ensemble of causes behind the Algerian conflict. Such 
criticisms and the targets of that criticism both engaged in a set of contested delineations 
between the spheres of the economic and the political (as well as the historical, the cultural 
and the social). To privilege the economic or to denounce economic determinism is 
predicated on the maintenance of such distinctions that are not only given, but regularly 
trespassed in a variety of discourses and practices.  
 
While this chapter has likewise been concerned by the problem of economic determinism, 
it suggested another way in which economics was playing an over-determinant role in the 
framing of the Algerian conflict. Rather than economics being seen as an unjustified 
privileging of certain arbitrary factors (considered economic, or not political, a priori), this 
study focused on the paradoxical way in which self-described economic approaches to civil 
war simultaneously dismissed or denied the efficacy of certain expressed motivations 
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(grievance) while requiring others at a subconscious or abstract level (rational self-
interest). In this way, econometric models of civil war produce the very rebel subjectivities 
they seeks to understand. The ‘real’ insurgent is displaced to accommodate the insurgency 
in the abstract. 
 
This focus upon rebel motivations points towards a larger, more debilitating feature within 
contemporary civil war studies. The key problematisation is not the causes of civil war but 
the causes of rebellion. What is initially troublesome with this bait-and-switch approach is 
the ruling out of the possibility of state-initiated intra-national armed conflict. In the case 
of Algeria, it was argued that one could construct a viable account in which it is not the 
rebels who wanted civil war but rather the regime. Though a full narrative of such an 
account would certainly receive severe criticism, the point is to suggest plausibility rather 
than actuality. The possibility of a state wanting to initiate armed internal conflict 
undermines the problematisation of rebellion as a sufficient substitute for a complete 
problematisation of civil war.  
 
Finally, were we to capitalise upon these insights, we would nonetheless run into a series 
of difficulties in the construction of an alternative problematisation of internal war. Those 
who study the dynamics of armed conflicts at the local level often report a severe 
disjuncture between their findings and the alleged logic of the conflict at the national level. 
As they apply to Algeria, these issues are explored more thoroughly in chapters five and 
six. One solution to this impasse within the field of civil war studies proposed a re-
definition of civil war based upon the idea that the micro is the macro. Or, in other words, 
the apparent incommensurability between the local and the national should be considered 
the essence of civil wars. How we conceptualise the structure is being shaped by our 
observations of the local, and so we have bottom-up rather than top-down determinism. 
 
On what basis should we decide between these approaches: determinism by structure or by 
agent? Or should we consider alternative formulations?44 But in keeping with the core aim 
of this study (the problematisation of problematisations), the goal is not to provide ultimate 
arbitration but rather to suggest that politics, rather than truth, should hold sway. The 
                                                
44 E.g., see the discussion of Kaldor’s ‘New Wars’ in the following chapter. 
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question will not be so much a choice between the lex parsimoniae of the Collier-Hoeffler 
approach or the historically nuanced anti-reductionism of Kalyvas, but rather a question of 
what we want to do with these conceptualisations and models in the first place. This, of 
course, is not a shortcut to consensus; indeed, it will raise different, and possibly more 
thorny, problems than it solves. It simply demands that agendas, often hiding behind the 
mantle of history and science in theoretical representations of civil wars, account for 
themselves.  
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4. Civil War 
 
 
 
The 1990s seemed to lack a master narrative to give it the same sense of meaning and 
purpose that had animated the previous four and a half decades of global politics. Various 
candidates were proposed — a Clash of Civilisations (Huntington 1992), a New World 
Order1, an End of History (Fukuyama 1992), a Coming Anarchy (Kaplan 1994)  — but 
none obtained dominance. Conflicting forces and contrary developments were shaping the 
new international environment, rendering a coherent reading of the world after the Cold 
War problematic. Optimists could point to trends indicating that an increasing number of 
countries were adopting political and economic reforms under the general rubric of 
Neoliberalism. Pessimists, however, could just as easily point to other indicators. The 
interstice between the end of the US-Soviet rivalry and 9/11 saw the outbreak of dozens of 
violent conflicts, some ‘shocking the conscience’ of the international community as much 
as anything witnessed during the previous ninety years of the twentieth century. While 
some of these conflicts were short lived, others simmered into the new millennium. The 
year the Berlin Wall fell, 1989, saw the emergence of two new armed conflicts in Africa 
(Liberia and Mali), compounding the conflict burden already born by that continent — 
e.g., Angola, Ethiopia-Eritrea, Morocco-Western Sahara, Mozambique, Somalia and 
Sudan. Moreover, the following year saw the eruption of a war in Rwanda, whose terminus 
led to the 1994 genocide and contributed to Africa’s ‘World War’ in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo four years later. Conflicts also arose in Yemen and Yugoslavia in 
1990s, the latter becoming an iconic image of war in the 1990s as that country violently 
collapsed into five new states. Sierra Leone, Haiti and Indonesia joined the fray in 1991, 
followed by Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Tajikistan in 1992. Africa 
saw new conflicts surface in Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Guinea Bissau, Senegal, Sierra 
Leone and Uganda between 1993 and 1998. The Chechen-Russia wars, Turkey’s 
repression of Kurdish rebels and fighting between the Nepalese government and Maoist 
                                                
1 Heralded by US president George W Bush in a January 1991 televised speech, just as military 
operations began against Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait.  
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insurgents also marked the 1990s as a decade of violence.2 According to one study, nearly 
a quarter of UN member-states were experiencing significant internal armed conflict in 
1994 (Fearon 2004: 275). Another study claimed that the average length of such wars had 
tripled since 1944 (Hironaka 2005). 
 
Algeria, likewise, had become a site of mass violence in the 1990s. And like most of the 
places listed above, Algeria was said to be in the throes of a civil war. Algerians were 
killing each other, and so a variety of observers, whether journalists, academics, politicians 
or activists, as well as participants in the conflict, applied the label civil war without 
hesitation.3 Other observers and participants, however, vehemently rejected the idea that 
Algeria had become a situation of civil war. From Algerian political actors to long time 
observers of Algerian affairs, this camp asserted that the armed violence in Algeria had 
little in common with past civil wars. This disparity certainly prompts several questions. 
First and foremost: how could some observers unproblematically label the Algerian 
conflict a civil war while others found the term ill suited? 
 
It is not the goal of this chapter to resolve this debate — to adjudicate between competing 
definitions of civil war. Rather, this chapter takes as its starting point this contest and, from 
it, elucidates the deep politics of naming involved in the designation (or de-listing) of 
certain episodes of mass violence as civil wars. While it is well recognised that political 
actors engage in the hypocritical use of the term civil war (recognising its positive and 
negative connotations), it is virtually unrecognised in the burgeoning literature on civil 
wars what effects are produced and what politics are implied in the use of the term civil 
war. Though the new school of civil war studies has achieved a consensus that Algeria 
reached a state of civil war in the 1990s (contrary to the opinions of many Algeria experts), 
this school has yet to achieve a consensus definition of civil war itself. The various criteria 
used to determine civil war status, when applied to the Algerian conflict’s widely divergent 
                                                
2 Drawn from Fearon & Laitin 2001 (39) and Collier et al. 2004 (270). 
3 E.g., Leveau 1995; Phillips 1995; Martinez 1996; Mortimer 1996; Callies de Salies 1997; 
Reporters sans frontières 1997; Brahimi 1998; Lazreg 1998; Rich 1998; Yacoubian, Deeb 1999; 
Wiktorowicz 2001; Ellyas-Belkaïd & Peyroulou 2002; Cavatorta 2002; Turshen 2002; Lloyd 2003; 
Takeyh 2003; Volpi 2003; Hadj Moussa 2004; Henry 2004; Heristchi 2004; Smaïn 2004; Tessler et 
al. 2004; Le Sueur 2005; Lowi 2005; Szmolka 2006; Weinstein 2007; Werenfels 2007; Ashour 
2008; Joffé 2008; Tlemçani 2008). Anthropologist Judith Scheele (2006) put civil war in inverted 
commas. 
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representations, fail to maintain purchase. The limits of space, time, identity and practice 
that are thought to make civil wars knowable instead over-determine Algeria as a civil war. 
Picking up on a major theme of this study, this chapter examines the disparity between the 
fuzzy ‘realities’ of the Algerian conflict at the macro-level (as determined by civil war 
theorists) and the very plausible scenarios of violence at the micro-level (as proposed by 
the competing representations of the violence in Algeria). This incompatibility — over-
determination and indeterminacy — not only affects our ability to call the Algerian conflict 
a civil war under any definition, but it calls into question the utility of prevailing thinking 
about civil wars. Not only do recent studies of civil wars tend to over-determine their 
object of analysis, but they play a role in the (re)production of the very phenomenon they 
claim to study. Algeria does not exclusively provide an exemplar of a (new) civil war; it 
can be just as much read as model for the de-construction of ‘civil wars’. 
 
 
The new science of civil wars 
 
The emergence of civil wars as a renewed problem for the international community in the 
1990s brought with it a wave of novel research into this phenomenon. This school was 
quick to point out that intra-state wars — mass armed violence occurring primarily within 
a single territorial state — had already overtaken inter-state armed conflict as the dominant 
species of warfare since the end of World War II. According to one survey, three times as 
many states were involved in internal wars as had been participants in international wars 
by 1999; five times as many people had died in intra-state wars as inter-state wars during 
the same period; and civil wars had tended to last twenty four times longer than 
international wars (Fearon & Laitin 2003: 75). Another set of studies estimated that, during 
roughly the same period, civil wars accounted for twenty million deaths and sixty-seven 
million refugees (Collier et al. 2005: xiii). In fact, this school argued, the 1990s were not 
unique in their level of intra-national armed violence. While there was an upsurge in civil 
war outbreaks at the end of the Cold War, and a notable number of terminations, the 
number of ongoing civil wars in the mid 1980s was far higher (Fearon 2004: 275, 276; 
Hegre 2004). For the World Bank, one of the main benefactors behind the new school of 
civil war studies, the problem is clear enough. Civil wars have become ‘development in 
reverse’. They represent as much a ‘failure of development’ as ‘problem for development’, 
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in that ‘development can be an effective instrument for conflict prevention’ (Stern 2002: 
ix, emphasis in original; see also Collier & Sambanis 2002: 3). 
 
Not long into its career, this school began to claim a degree of ‘consensus’ among the 
various models used to determine the trigger causes, sustaining conditions and intensifying 
factors of civil wars (Lacina 2004). A lack of consensus, however, can be detected among 
the various definitions of civil war being deployed. One of the more noticeable effects of 
these differing standards is wide range of civil war cases that have been generated by 
different definitions. The proposed number of civil wars between 1960 and 1993, 
according one count, ranges from fifty-eight to 116 depending on the criteria followed by 
the study (Sambanis 2004b: 835).4 This lack of rigorously enforced criteria is matched by a 
lack of semantic consensus on the meaning of civil war. In some cases, distinctions 
between civil war and other forms of international armed conflict and mass violence are 
maintained; in other studies, they are conflated. For example, a group of Nordic 
researchers (Gleditsch et al. 2002) has proposed a distinction between war (civil or 
international) and less violent armed conflicts, hinged on the widely accepted battle death 
thresholds (respectively, one thousand versus twenty-five). Another study, however, uses 
the terms civil war and intrastate conflict interchangeably, adopting a far lower combat 
death criterion of 200 over the course of a conflict (Regan 1996: 338). 
 
To a significant degree, the definition of civil war deployed by the new school was 
inherited from a pre-existing effort to analyse war quantitatively. The first of the new civil 
war studies in the late 1990s (e.g., Collier & Hoeffler 1998) relied almost exclusively upon 
data collected by the long-standing Correlates of War (COW) project. The four basic COW 
criteria for a civil war are (1) internal military action, (2) at least one thousand battle deaths 
during the war, (3) the involvement of the national government and (4) the ability of 
participants to inflict casualties. Additionally, it is assumed that the site of a civil war must 
be an internationally recognized sovereign state with a minimum population of at least a 
half-million persons (Singer & Small 1994; Sarkees 2000: 129). Previously, the minimum 
                                                
4 How numbers are generated should be differentiated from how numbers are used. For example, in 
an effort to problematise international conflicts, one recent study claims civil wars have increased 
four times since the late 1990s (Misra 2008). While this is accurate, another study (Harbom et al. 
2008) framed recent civil wars in an entirely different way. The year 2003 witnessed the lowest 
recorded number of armed conflicts since the 1970s.  
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threshold for a civil war had mirrored that of an inter-state war: one thousand or more 
battle-related deaths per year on average (Small & Singer 1982: 210-4; Sarkees 2000: 126). 
One researcher thought this criterion was reflective of civil wars necessarily involving 
‘large scale violence’ (Licklider 1995: 682, emphasis in original), though another study 
felt this rule had to be ‘relaxed’ (Regan 2000: 20). Yet even with such clear standards, 
exceptions were often made for ‘civil wars’ that did not meet these baseline criteria, such 
as the Basque and Northern Ireland conflicts (noted in Gleditsch et al. 2002: 617).  
 
Across these studies, the lowest common denominators tend to be the spatial and practical 
aspects of civil wars. Spatially, civil wars occur within a single territory. However, there is 
a lack of agreement as to what kinds of territories — from internationally recognized 
sovereign states to non-self-governing territories — can host a civil war. Questions have 
been raised about the classification of historical and contemporary wars in former 
European colonies and disputed territories. A special yet contentious category for such 
wars as ‘extra-systemic’ (i.e., outside the international system of states) or ‘extra-state’ 
(i.e., outside the state’s territory but not an international war) has attempted to bridge the 
arguments for and against them as constituting either international wars or civil wars. One 
study, however, saw ‘no reason in principle to exclude [from their list of civil wars] 
anticolonial wars, such as the French versus the National Liberation Front (FLN) in 
Algeria’ (Fearon & Laitin 2003: 76). A less frequently voiced spatial concern is the extent 
to which foreign aid and fighters can be rendered to participants or the extent to which 
violence must be contained within a single geographic entity before the war risks being 
tipped into the international or extra-territorial category. 
 
The question of territoriality, in turn, is closely linked to the questions of political identity 
and practice in civil wars. In the literature, the direct involvement of agents of a sovereign 
state, or some kind of governmental authority claming control over the territory of 
contestation, is considered a necessary condition; for others, this requirement is too strict, 
only that a civil war must take place within a sovereign state. Disagreement also exists 
over the necessary level of institutional and ideological coherence exhibited by opposition 
forces. While it is often assumed that state actors belong to a sizable organisation with an 
intelligible, publicly articulated political agenda in the conflict, there is no agreement as to 
whether or not this should be the case with armed opposition groups too. Certain 
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‘conventional’ (Licklider 1993a: 9) definitions of civil war holds that it is an armed 
conflict between at least two sovereign entities within the same territorial state. Civil wars 
should be a form of symmetrical armed conflict between rivals possessing relatively 
equivalent degrees of political, military, social and geographical organization. This notion 
of civil war has mostly been displaced to accommodate more asymmetrical forms of 
warfare; indeed, asymmetry is now built into some conceptions of civil war but baseline 
organisational benchmarks for the armed opposition — political, military and geographical 
— remain ill defined.5 One study has assumed that participants in a civil war must be 
militarily organised before the fighting even starts (ibid.: 9). Otherwise, the assumption 
seems to be that the ability to engage in ‘military action’ and to inflict casualties are 
indication of sufficient organisational capacity (e.g., Sarkees 2000: 129). Indeed, the 
‘doing’ of civil wars is often equated with killing generally or combatants specifically. In 
some cases, though, a high level of fatalities stemming from armed violence is considered 
only an indication of civil war; battle deaths merely stand as a proxy measurement for the 
overall devastation caused by civil war (Sambanis 2004b: 820).6 Meanwhile, violence done 
to the natural or built environment during the course of a civil war, whether belonging to 
participants or not, remains a virtual silence within the literature. 
 
As with many concepts, our ability to grasp its meaning often comes not from its positive 
attributes but more from its negative qualities. What a civil war is can be as important as 
                                                
5 In the world after 11 September 2001, it now seems possible for a group of individuals, if not a 
single person, to inflict mass casualties upon an opponent above and beyond the thousand-death 
threshold. However, effective resistance criteria might correct for this possibility. Most coding 
rules propose that there must be at least one hundred deaths suffered on either side, suggesting that 
an armed opposition group must be able to sustain at least one hundred losses to remain active in a 
civil war. Nevertheless, this still would not satisfy critics who believe civil wars necessarily 
involve large armies of several thousand formal soldiers and not guerrilla groups of several 
hundred informal fighters. 
6 Whether or not battle fatalities are a reasonable proxy for destruction (for critique, see Ghobarah 
et al. 2003), it also has to be asked whether or not it is sustainable. Advances and diffusion of 
medical technology might make it possible to minimize deaths while the overall level of human 
and environmental violence remains relatively the same. The notable decrease in the rate of injury 
related fatalities sustained by US soldiers between Vietnam (twenty four percent) and the Iraq-
Afghanistan wars (ten percent) is suggestive of this possibility (Gawande 2004). Similarly, at-a-
distance fighting technology (e.g., land, air and sea drones) or weaponry that inflicts massive 
amounts of military damage without killing (e.g., cyber or electromagnetic attacks) could have a 
similar effect. By measuring combat fatalities alone, we could be deceived into believing that wars 
are becoming less destructive, if not less frequent. Elaine Scarry’s (1985: 63) argument that war is 
competitive injuring rather than simply killing seems all the more durable in this light. 
 81 
what it is not. Civil wars are assumed to be distinct from other forms of mass intra-
territorial violence: terrorism, insurrection, regional conflicts, communal violence, 
revolution, strife, insurgency, riots and uprisings. Nor are they one-sided slaughter — state 
and non-state terror, genocide — because violence is mutually inflicted (i.e., the effective 
resistance criterion). For others, however, the term civil war stands for an intensely violent 
form conflict occurring at the national level and is easily interchangeable with other terms. 
Some researchers also readily allow for the possibility that the typology deployed in the 
COW project is not ‘sacrosanct’ (Henderson & Singer 2002: 187). Others, however, assert 
as an article of faith that civil or internal wars exist as a unique form of violence (Sambanis 
2004b: 815); a phenomenon whose essential properties transcend each instance (Kalyvas 
2006: 17). Indeed, the existence of civil wars must be assumed a priori. Any empirical 
investigation that attempts to establish their existence a posteriori will only beg the 
question by assuming a historically conditioned hypothesis of civil wars in the first place. 
 
Although the new school of civil war studies have yet to obtain a rigorously enforced 
definition of civil war, one with clearly delineated spatial, temporal, political and practical 
boundaries, it has never been in doubt, according to most of these studies, that Algeria 
experienced a civil war in the 1990s. Where disagreement exists, it mostly pertains to 
establishing the precise start and end dates.7 After two years of armed fighting, Algeria had 
                                                
7 Algeria is not listed in the 1994 version of the COW but is included in the 1997 version. 
Attempting to explain this disparity, Sambanis (2004b: 818) argues,  
 
Perhaps the war had not caused more than 1,000 deaths in 1992 (it actually had), but the 
revised COW data set, which goes up to 1997 [...], includes the Algerian war with a 1992 start 
date. Because the coding rules were the same in the two COW data sets, unless this was a 
coding error in the 1994 version, the coded start of the war in the new version suggests that the 
war reached the 1,000 death mark only after 1992, and the start of the war was then back-coded 
to the start of the violence in 1992. 
 
However, it is disputable whether or not the Algerian conflict had actually obtained the threshold 
of 1,000 war-related deaths by the end of 1992. None of the available estimates suggested that 
more than 600 people had died in acts of political violence — ‘battle’ deaths or not — a year after 
Bendjedid left office (Radio France Internationale, 6 February 1992; The Guardian, 31 January 
1992; Associated Press, 6 February 1993). In March 1993, Amnesty International (1993: 1) 
reported a cumulative death toll since February 1992 of 600. Insurgents had killed twenty civilians 
and 270 security forces; the government had killed a total of 300 insurgents and, as collateral 
damage, civilians. Only by mid 1993 were foreign news agencies reporting more than 1,000 
fatalities (Associated Press, 10 July 1993, claiming 1,200 killed; Agence France Press, 20 
September 1993, claiming 2,000 killed). 
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easily met all the basic criteria outlined in these studies to qualify. A thousand battle-
related deaths had quickly been reported in Algeria; if not surpassing the average of one 
thousand such fatalities per year by 1994 (Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute 1995: 33). The Algerian state engaged in combat action against insurgents, who 
had articulated political goals, seemed militarily organised and, most of all, were able to 
inflict casualties upon government forces. Though episodes of violence allegedly related to 
the Algerian conflict occurred in Morocco and France, and all sides received support from 
non-Algerian sources, those acts failed to internationalise participation in the violence. By 
these standards, the Algerian conflict in the 1990s more than meets the basic criteria to be 
called civil war. And yet a survey of the domestic and international discourse of the 
conflict shows that the term civil war was often treated as a highly problematic description 
of what was happening in Algeria. Just as there were many participants and observers who 
were eager to call the situation a civil war (some even before armed violence began), 
others were reluctant to apply the label without qualification. Where the new science of 
civil wars has treated its object of study as an unproblematic concept, the case of Algeria 
suggests that this is not the case. Not only is the concept of civil war highly contested, 
suggesting that its ontological given-ness is not so obvious, there is also a deep politics of 
naming involved in its application.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                              
Collier and Hoeffler (2004) give the dates May 1991 to the present (as of 1999) for the conflict. 
While the latter might not disturb too many observers, the May 1991 start date (which only 
coincides with FIS calls for a general strike) is at odds with the more popular period of January-
February 1992 (coinciding with Bendjedid’s replacement by the HCE, the cancellation of elections, 
and the outlawing of the FIS). Fearon and Laitin (2003) give the widely accepted 1992 to ‘present’ 
(as of 20 August 2001) period. The COW project (Sarkees 2000) gives 7 February 1992 as the start 
date, yet there is no significant violent event on that date, apart from ongoing, and sometimes 
deadly, clashes between demonstrators and security forces that started in January. Sambanis gives 
the start date 1992 and only follows the conflict through 1999; no end is given, though some of the 
civil wars in his list are up to date through 2002. 
The more recent data set on armed conflicts produced by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program 
(UCDP) the Oslo International Peace Research Institute’s (PRIO) Centre for the Study of Civil 
Wars(see Lacina & Gleditsch 2005) gives a start date of 1 June 1991 when the first battle-related 
death allegedly occurred and gives the date 1 December 1991 when twenty-five conflict related 
deaths had accumulated. The June date is likely a reference to deaths during that month’s 
demonstrations. The December date is a reference to a series of attacks near Guemmar starting on 
29 November 1991, in which reports indicated that three members of the Algerian security forces 
died in the initial ambush and roughly one- to two-dozen alleged Islamist guerrillas were killed in 
response. The UCDP-PRIO list considers the armed conflict in Algeria ongoing as of 2005. 
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War without a name 
 
Whether or not one believes the violence in Algeria obtained civil war status, civil war talk 
pervaded the conflict from the very start. Algeria’s tense interregnum, between the riots of 
October 1988 and the events of January 1992, brought with it occasional references to the 
possibility of a civil war. Indeed, only a week after the 1988 demonstrations had been 
crushed by the Algerian military, Bendjedid justified the harsh crackdown as the only 
alternative to ‘chaos and, subsequently, civil war’.8 Defending his calls for a general strike 
in May 1991, Abassi cautioned against seeing the act as precipitous of, in the words of 
AFP, civil war.9 At the end of the strike, a reporter commented, ‘It appears that the 
powerful FIS is not willing — or perhaps ready — to accept responsibility for setting 
Algeria on the road to civil war’.10 But with the FIS’s victory in the first round of the 
December 1991 parliamentary elections, the stakes became higher. Following the 
termination of the electoral process in January 1992, fears of a civil war began to 
crystallise. The leader of the Kabyle-dominated FFS party, Hocine Aït Ahmed, called on 
both the authorities and the FIS to ‘prevent civil war’.11 A reporter with US National 
Public Radio saw ‘the specter of civil war in Algeria looming ever larger’.12 
 
While the denial of victory to the FIS was frequently cited as a possible trigger for a civil 
war, one Algerian saw it the opposite way. ‘If the FIS came to power, there would be a 
civil war in Algeria’, a government functionary told to a British journalist. ‘A civil war!’13 
Algerian lawyer and human rights campaigner Abdennour Ali-Yahia located the possible 
trigger for a civil war not in the denial of democracy but in the Islamists’ failure to obey its 
rules vis-à-vis Algeria’s 1989 constitution. ‘[T]hen it’s civil war, the army will move in’, 
he told a reporter.14 Even a year after the FIS had been outlawed, the situation still seemed 
                                                
8 Reuters and Washington Post, ‘Chadli pledges political reform’, Sydney Morning Herald, 12 
October 1988: 18. 
9 AFP, ‘Moslem fundamentalists call for general strike’, 23 May 1991. 
10 John Hooper, ‘Militants back down to avoid civil war in Algeria’, The Guardian, 8 June 1991. 
11 AFP, ‘Le pouvoir algérien cherche à mettre en place une direction collégiale’, 14 January 1992. 
12 Jackie Rowland, ‘Algeria Cancels Elections, Upsets Opposition’, Morning Edition, National 
Public Radio, 14 January 1992, transcript. 
13 Robert Fisk, ‘The battle for Algiers’, The Independent, 19 January 1992: 17. 
14 Elaine Ganley, ‘Specter of Islamic State in Algeria Provokes Dreams, Nightmares’, Associated 
Press, 1 January 1992. 
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ambiguous, fraught with dangerous possibilities. ‘We fear a civil war is coming’, a FIS 
supporter complained to a foreign reporter at that time.15 
 
Even with the intensification of violence in 1993 and 1994, international opinions were 
still divided on the question of whether not the situation in Algeria qualified as a civil war. 
Towards the end of 1993, Le Quotidien de Paris expressed concern that the ‘worsening 
civil war in Algeria’ might spill over into France.16 Likewise for the New York Times, 
there was little doubt what the situation constituted. An April 1994 editorial claimed the 
events of January 1992 had ‘plunged [Algeria] into an abyss of terrorism and civil war 
with no end yet in sight’.17 One of that paper’s journalists even proposed that this was the 
second civil war Algeria had seen in the twentieth century, the French-Algerian war being 
the first.18 Yet for the London Guardian, only by early 1997 had the fighting ‘assumed the 
character of a civil war’.19 During the early years of the armed conflict, and sometimes 
well into the height of killing in 1997 and 1998, qualifiers were frequently added to the 
term civil war, as if in deference to its contested status or the ambiguous relationship 
between violence and politics in Algeria. The Algerian civil war was ‘low-grade’20, ‘de 
facto’21, ‘latent’22, ‘virtual’23. Algeria was ‘sliding toward civil war’24, in ‘the shadow of 
                                                
15 Nora Boustany, ‘Muslim Right Presses Battle For Algeria’, Washington Post, 5 January 1993: 
A10. 
16 Quoted in Emmanuel Serot, ‘Les événements en Algérie dans la presse parisienne’, AFP, 5 
November 1993. 
17 New York Times, ‘Algeria: Descent Into the Abyss’, 5 April 1994: A20. 
18 Craig R Whitney, ‘History’s fetters entangling France on Algeria’, New York Times, 21 October 
1995: I3. 
19 The Guardian, ‘Vietnam on the Mediterranean’, 23 January 1997: 16. 
20 Robert Fisk, ‘Assassination of Boudiaf a strike at secular Algeria’, Toronto Star, 30 June 1992: 
A3. 
21 Julian Nundy, ‘Priests killed in Algeria after hijack rescue’, The Independent, 28 December 
1994: 1.  
22 Jean-Pierre Tuquoi, ‘Blow to Algeria as France cuts back aid’, Manchester Guardian Weekly, 7 
July 1996: 19; Jean-Pierre Tuquoi ‘L’Algérie entrouvre ses portes à une mission des Nations 
unies’, Le Monde, 23 July 1998. 
23 Frank Sesno, ‘Algeria Appears Poised for Islamic Revolution’, CNN, 1 March 1994, transcript; 
Charles Bremner and Michael Binyon, ‘British entry will be barred to key Algeria militant’, The 
Times, 1 September 1994; Anna Husarska, ‘The mean streets of Algeria’, The New Republic, 29 
July 1996: 19; The Guardian, ‘Algeria condemned for “human rights disaster”’, 4 January 1994: 9; 
AFP, ‘22 more slain in Algeria at outset of bloody Ramadan: press’, 5 January 1998. See also 
International Crisis Group (2001b). 
24 Andrew J. Pierre and William B. Quandt, ‘The “Contract” With Algeria’, Washington Post, 22 
January 1995: C1. 
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civil war’25, in an ‘undeclared civil war’26, near ‘the brink of all-out civil war’27 or on ‘the 
brink of open civil war’28. The violence was ‘something like a civil war’29, ‘something 
approaching civil war’30; an ‘essentially civil war situation’31, a ‘climate of civil war’ 
(Stora 2001a: 216). ‘[A] civil war that does not speak its name’.32 For others, Algeria was 
undoubtedly in a state of civil war. Qualifiers attempted to match the intensity, horror and 
opacity of the violence. The Algerian civil war was ‘ruthless’33, ‘deadly’ (meurtrière)34, 
‘raging’35, ‘brutal’36, ‘desperate’37, ‘barbarous’38 and ‘gruesome’39. A civil war was 
‘ravaging Algeria’40, ‘bloodying the Algerian land’41 and ‘tearing apart Algeria’42. 
 
The opinions of foreign governments were as mixed. In December 1993, French Minister 
of Defence François Léotard spoke openly of the ‘the ongoing civil war in Algeria’ as ‘a 
                                                
25 The Irish Times, ‘Algeria’s Ills’, 30 June 1992: 11. 
26 John Phillips, ‘SAS veterans benefit from Algeria panic’, The Times, 28 January 1994; Mike 
Shuster, ‘United States Takes Wait and See Stance in Algeria’, All Things Considered, National 
Public Radio, 4 April 1995, transcript; Andrew Gumbel, ‘Algeria on verge of first talks with FIS’, 
The Guardian, 6 September 1994: 8. 
27 Howard LaFranchi, ‘Algeria’s New Leader Calls On Islamists and Army to Negotiate’, Christian 
Science Monitor, 4 February 1994: 6. 
28 International Herald Tribune, ‘Watching Algeria Explode’, 8 February 1995. 
29 Susan Morgan, ‘The terror that is preying on Algeria’, The Independent, 20 February 1994: 11. 
30 Washington Post, ‘Algeria’s Choice’, 24 November 1995: A28. 
31 Bob Edwards, ‘Violence in Algeria’, Morning Edition, National Public Radio, 2 January 1998, 
transcript. 
32‘[...] une guerre civile qui ne dit pas son nom’ (Bruno Frappat, ‘Algérie. Le sang d’un peuple’, La 
Croix, 9 January 1997: 1). Frappat noted, ‘[I]n Algeria, wars never say their name’, in reference to 
the undeclared Algerian war of independence as ‘La guerre sans nom’ (The war without a name). 
33 Martin Regg Cohn, ‘Priest lives as marked man’, Toronto Star, 15 June 1997: A12. 
34 Le Point, ‘Algérie : l’armée au fond des urnes’, 10 April 1999. 
35 Le Point, ‘Algérie : le sang du ramadan’, 1 February 1997; Pierre de Boisdeffre, ‘L’Algérie de 
nos remords et de notre espérance’, Le Figaro, 14 February 1997. 
36 The Times, ‘Algeria’s brave voters’, 30 November 1996; Christopher P. Winner, ‘Debate erupts 
in France over media’s priorities’, USA Today, 8 September 1997: 5A. 
37 Roger Cohen, ‘Algeria’s Main Rebel Faction Takes Risk and Calls Truce’, New York Times, 25 
September 1997: A8.  
38 David Hirst, ‘Algeria drowning in an orgy of bloodletting’, Manchester Guardian Weekly, 5 
October 1997: 12. 
39 David Hirst, ‘Fear as Algeria’s leader quits’, Manchester Guardian Weekly, 20 September 1998: 
4. 
40 ‘[...] la guerre civile qui ravage l’Algérie’. Le Figaro, ‘Algérie : 70 000 morts depuis 1992’, 31 
January 1998; Alain Frachon, ‘Deux témoignages éprouvants sur l’itinéraire des membres du GIA 
en Algérie’, Le Monde, 8 March 1999. 
41 ‘[...] ensanglante la terre algérienne’. Le Point, ‘Algérie : La stratégie de la terreur’, 26 April 
1997. 
42 ‘[...] la guerre civile qui déchire l’Algérie’. Michel Massenet, ‘L’engrenage algérien’, Le Figaro, 
13 January 1998. 
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challenge for the Mediterranean basin, France and the European community’.43 And by 
early 1994, then French President François Mitterrand saw Algeria in ‘the beginnings of a 
civil war’44 and described it months later as unambiguously a civil war.45 A year later, 
Washington insider Peter Rodman, in a critique of the Clinton administration’s allegedly 
Quixotic search for ‘moderate’ Islamists worldwide, warned that ‘Algeria stands on the 
precipice of civil war’, suggesting that the conflict had not, but might soon, cross that line 
unless a new policy tack was taken.46 Bruce Riedel, then Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Defence, cautioned the US congress in 1995 that a deterioration of the Algerian situation 
into a ‘full-scale civil war’ would seriously affect US strategic interests.47 A 1996 report 
commissioned by the US army described Algeria as both in a state of ‘virtual civil war’ 
and ‘ongoing civil war’ (Fuller 1996: x, 64). Other observers bridging the academic-policy 
divide reflected this ambiguity. Robert Malley (1996: 204-5) saw 1994 Algeria ‘on the 
edge of civil war’ but also ‘in the midst of a war that is civil in name only’. Algeria was 
‘hesitating between military rule and civil war’ (ibid.: 1) and yet had undeniably suffered a 
‘bleak degeneration into civil war’ (ibid.: 11). But for William Quandt, Algeria — even in 
early 1998 — had most certainly not yet crossed the unmarked boundary into civil war: 
‘Algeria is going through a severe internal crisis, but not a civil war’ (Quandt 1998: 162). 
 
Whatever torments Algeria had suffered during the initial four years of the conflict, the 
ambiguous civil war threshold was held out as something constituting an order of 
magnitude far worse than what had already come to pass. Yet even as the violence 
                                                
43 Jacques Charmelot, ‘M. Leotard : «la guerre civile en Algerie est un defi pour la communaute 
europeenne»’, AFP, 15 December 1993. 
44 Roy Towers, ‘Europe is accused of inaction as Algeria teeters on brink of disaster’, Glasgow 
Herald, 10 January 1994: 18. 
45 Le Monde, ‘L’intervention télévisée du président de la République à l’occasion du 14 juillet M. 
Mitterrand’, 16 juillet 1994. Cited in Roberts 1999: 390. 
46 Peter W. Rodman, ‘The Time Bomb in Algeria’, Washington Post, 1 January 1995: C1. 
47 Thomas W. Lippman, ‘U.S. Stakes Are High, Expectations Low, in Algeria’s Impending 
Election’, Washington Post, 1 November 1995: A26. 
Though the period of August 1997 to January 1998 was the bloodiest in the Algerian conflict 
and precipitated the strongest foreign interventionary language, the Algerian crisis generated just as 
much attention three years prior, though much of it was indirect. Based on one simple metric, the 
disparity is noticeable. The total word count for New York Times articles relating to the Algerian 
conflict (as listed in New York Times index) is roughly 51,000 for 1995 but 47,500 for 1997 and 
1998 combined (i.e., the two years that saw the massacre of thousands). The difference is largely a 
result of the coverage generated by the hijacking of an Air France flight in Algeria in the final days 
of 1994 and, more significantly, the series of bombings in Paris attributed to the GIA in 1995 in 
which eight people died. 
 87 
appeared to worsen from late 1996 through early 1998, the most concerned European 
powers and the United States48 seemed reluctant to call the conflict in Algeria a civil war. 
As late as the spring of 1998, shortly after the violence had peaked, then UN under-
secretary-general for Peacekeeping Operations, Bernard Miyet, would only call the 
Algerian crisis ‘a situation of quasi-civil war’.49 And he of course received a strong rebuke 
from the Algerian government.  
 
Indeed, not everyone saw the armed conflict in Algeria as a civil war, least of all the 
Algerian regime. Shortly after coming to power as the head of Algeria’s interim governing 
body (HCE) in early 1992, Mohamed Boudiaf assured viewers of Algerian television that, 
had it not been for the intervention of the army into the elections, ‘Algeria would face a 
civil war and become an area of foreign intervention’.50 Even following Bouadiaf’s 
assassination in June 1992, and amidst multiplying episodes of armed violence (notably, a 
bombing in Algiers’ airport on 26 August), former President Ahmed Ben Bella insisted 
that the Algerian public would not accept a civil war.51 ‘There is no civil war in Algeria as 
some people claim’, insisted then Interior Minister Salim Saadi at the end of 1993; he 
instead contextualised the turmoil as one of the most serious crises that the post-
independent Algerian state had faced.52 Then Prime Minister Mokdad Sifi also assured his 
ambassador corps in 1994 that ‘there is no civil war in our country’. Instead, Sifi spoke of 
a serious ‘crisis’ and a problem of ‘terrorism’ affecting Algerian society.53 Declaring 
Algeria’s ‘victory’ over terrorism in early 1997, then Prime Minister Ahmed Ouyahia 
chastised foreign observers, calling on them to ‘refrain from calling terrorism in Algeria 
political violence and a violence by all sides, and from seeing terrorism in Algeria as a 
                                                
48 For example, the term civil war was not used during US State Department daily press briefings 
throughout 1997 and 1998 (i.e., either by the spokesperson or by the journalists in attendence). 
49 ‘[U]ne situation de quasi-guerre civile’. Dominique Simonnet, ‘Bernard Miyet «N’en demandons 
pas trop aux Casques bleus»’, L’Express, 6 April 1998. 
50 In the same interview, Boudiaf added, ‘If we want to destroy ourselves, we will descend into 
civil war’. BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ‘Algeria interview with Boudiaf on his role and 
that of Higher State Council’, 6 February 1992.  
51 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ‘Algeria: Former President Ben Bella Rules out Possibility 
of Civil War’, 11 September 1992. 
52 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ‘Interior minister: present crisis "one of the most serious" 
since independence’, 3 December 1993. 
53 Wolfgang Schweitzer, ‘«Il n’y a pas de guerre civile» en Algerie, declare le Premier ministre’, 
AFP, 10 octobre 1994. 
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civil war’.54 Algeria’s then Ambassador to the United Nations, Abdallah Baali, likewise 
insisted, ‘We do not have a situation of civil war in Algeria’, which would warrant foreign 
intervention.55 Defending his government’s position in an academic journal, Algeria’s 
ambassador to the United Kingdom, Ahmed Benyamina, paraphrasing French philosopher 
André Glucksmann, said ‘there is not a civil war in Algeria but a war against civilians’ 
(Benyamina 1998: 186).56 A change of tone seemingly occurred under President 
Bouteflika. In an apparent effort to distance himself from his predecessors, he suggested 
that they had led Algeria ‘to a civil war, and we are not afraid of using this expression, 
which led to the death of at least 100,000 Algerians. Every drop of blood adds to Algeria’s 
strength’.57 Nevertheless, official Algerian documents, such as the 2005 Charter for 
National Reconciliation, adopt the euphemism ‘national tragedy’ instead. 
 
Civil society and opposition members convey just as much contention and hesitancy in 
their deployment or exclusion of the term civil war. ‘Algeria on the brink of civil war’, 
warned L’Evenement, a now defunct Algerian paper, the day after Chadli’s resignation. 
‘When shall we witness the militias? Yugoslavia is at our door’, it warned.58 By then, Ali-
Yahia also believed, ‘All the ingredients of a civil war are there’.59 But in an interview 
touching on the FIS’s first round victory in the December 1991 elections, Rachid 
Mimouni, an Algerian author, said, ‘I think that civil war is not a real possibility’. Though 
he could not speak for the Islamists, Mimouni felt democrats would stick to non-violent 
                                                
54 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ‘PM tells Transitional National Council Algeria has 
triumphed over terrorism’, 7 January 1997. 
55 AFP, ‘Algeria gives conditional green light to EU mission’, 8 January 1998. 
56 Khalida ‘Messaoudi’ Toumi likewise voiced support for Glucksmann’s turn of phrase 
(Messaoudi & Schemla 1998: 144). 
An official with the US human rights monitoring group Freedom House echoed this sentiment: 
‘call it a civil war or more precisely a war against civilians’ (Roger Kaplan, Prepared Statement, 
Heaings on Algeria, US Congress, House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on 
Africa, 11 October 1995). Carlier (1998: 135) likewise showed preference for the phrase ‘war 
against civilians’ over civil war (see also Tahon 1998). Highlighting accusations of the 
government’s complicity in the violence, one journalist commented: ‘The label civil war fails to 
capture the random viciousness of the violence. It would be better to call it mutual terror’ (Alan 
Sipress, ‘A most uncivil war’, The Philadelphia Inquirer, 26 January 1997: E04). Jacques Derrida 
(2003: 121) noted the gendered aspect of the war: ‘This civil war is for the most part a war of men. 
In many ways, not limited to Algeria, this civil war is also a virile war. It is thus also, laterally, in 
an unspoken repression, a mute war against women’. 
57 BBC Monitoring, ‘Algeria: President Bouteflika interviewed on internal situation, ties with 
West, Mideast’, 11 November 1999. 
58 Qutoed in David Hirst, ‘Between Plague and Cholera’, The Guardian, 13 January 1992: 19. 
59 St. Petersburg Times (Florida), ‘Rights leader predicts war in Algeria’, 15 January 1992: 7A. 
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measures.60 For some, the sense of steep asymmetry in the political violence also 
undermined the feeling of a civil war. At the end of 1993, Said Saadi, a leader in the 
Kabylia-based secular opposition, argued on France Inter radio,  
 
Are we going to come to civil war? I hope not. All hypotheses are possible in Algeria 
today; nevertheless, we have not come to it. A civil war is when part of a society fights 
against another part of society. For the time being, one part is attacking a society which 
does not defend itself with arms.61 
 
Similarly, but for different reasons, slain union leader Abdelhak Benhamouda, secretary-
general of the Union générale des travailleurs algériens, Algeria’s main trade union, 
explained in mid 1994 that, 
 
[...] the issue is not between Algerians, contrary to what is said by those who call for a 
civil war or predict civil war in Algeria, because when we say civil war this means that 
there is a group, social groups or social classes against other social classes, Algerian 
regions against other regions. This is the meaning of a civil war and we are not in a 
civil war 
 
Benhamouda then explained that the source of the violence was ‘implanted and corrupt 
politicians who are pushing terrorists to kill Algerians’.62 Around the same time, a letter 
from a young Algerian woman to friends in France began circulating in the French press. 
In it, the woman expressed fear that Algerian conflict ‘will soon be a full-scale Lebanese-
style civil war’.63 The fears of a veteran of the Algerian war of independence found their 
way into the pages of Le Monde: ‘The day is coming that will see the disintegration of the 
                                                
60 Eldad Beck, ‘Algeria’s Prophet of Doom’, The Jerusalem Report, 16 January 1992: 32. 
61 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ‘RCD leader dismisses dialogue with FIS “moderates”, 
regime “discredited”’, 31 December 1993. See (Tahi 1995: 206-7). 
62 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ‘Trade union leader says Algeria suffering “assassination” 
by violence’, 24 March 1994. 
63 Anonymous, ‘Veiled and Afraid in Besieged Algeria’, International Herald Tribune, 2 April 
1994. 
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army. And at that moment, the true civil war will start. The real butchery’.64 The Rome 
Platform, signed by several Algerian political parties, including the FLN and FIS, in 
January 1995, sought to bring the crisis to an end. The final document spoke of the risks of 
a civil war, as if the intensity of violence or popular participation in the fighting had not 
yet crossed that threshold. The fact that the Algerian daily Le Matin had ventured a 
comparison with political violence in Lebanon following a truck bombing in the Algiers 
suburb of Meftah in September 1995 was considered notable: ‘a first in the Algerian press, 
which rejects the term civil war’, commented one wire report.65 For Louisa Hannoune, 
head of Algeria’s Parti des Travailleurs (Workers’ Party or Ḥizb al-ʿUmāl) the conflict 
was ‘not as they say, a civil war but a war of decomposition, disintegration of our 
country’.66 Even during the darkening period of early 1997, though shortly before the 
massive Bougara massacre, one exiled opposition leader with the FIS, Kamar Eddine 
Kherbane, was hesitant to say that the situation had crossed into one of civil war. ‘War has 
been forced on us, and we have to fight’, he said in response to a question about the 
government’s encouragement of civilians to form self-defence militias. ‘That’s what I 
mean by being on the brink of civil war. The regime wants a civil war’.67 
 
The fact that the term civil war had become politicised within the political discourse of the 
Algerian conflict is perhaps not surprising. For some, this lack of consensus is as easy to 
explain as it is to dismiss. One need only posit a distinction between rhetoric and reality, 
propaganda and truth, partisanship and objectivity. In his massive study of civil war 
violence, Kalyvas (2006: 17) notes at the outset,  
 
Civil war often refuses to speak its name. [...] Indeed, civil war is often the object of 
serious semantic contestation. The very use of the term is part of the conflict itself, 
conferring or denying legitimacy (or status equality) to the parties in the conflict. [...] 
During the war, the term is usually sought out by insurgents in search of legitimacy, 
and denied by incumbents. 
                                                
64‘Le jour approche qui verra l’éclatement de l’armée. Et c’est à ce moment-là que la vraie guerre 
civile commencera. La vraie boucherie’. Catherine Simon, ‘Algérie : l’introuvable « troisième voie 
»’, Le Monde, 22 October 1994. 
65 AFP, ‘Un islamiste modère candidat a la présidence, l’Algérie sous le choc’, 3 September 1995. 
66 Julia Ficatier, ‘Algérie. « On ne sait plus qui tue qui et pourquoi » Louisa Hanoune’, La Croix, 9 
October 1996: 24. 
67 Mark Dennis, ‘Algeria on the brink’, Newsweek, 14 April 1997: 60.
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To some degree, this observation fits with the Algerian case, especially the way in which 
the Algerian regime, above all others, rejected the label civil war until the violence had 
significantly died down. War is, after all, in some contexts, considered legitimate violence. 
Terrorism, on the other hand is always illegitimate. However, the FIS never seemed to 
embrace the term civil war wholeheartedly either, perhaps for the same reason (i.e., it 
would bestow too much legitimacy on the regime or suggest the mobilisation of society) or 
because the armed Islamist opposition had its own vocabulary, where jihād is often 
preferred (Moussaoui 2006: 436). More importantly, though, there is also a lack of 
consensus among foreign observers, especially the small academic community that 
followed Algerian affairs closely throughout the conflict. As noted above, some academic 
— along with media and activist — representations of the conflict deployed the term civil 
war without so much as a second thought, though some expressed ambivalence. Others, 
including some prominent Algerian specialists, have explicitly rejected the term. It is too 
self-serving to dismiss such arguments as a mere ‘spill over effect’ (Kalyvas 2006: 17) of 
the politics of naming practiced by civil war participants. Even if definitions are not stated 
overtly, they are nevertheless implied in speech acts that hail the term civil war. A refusal 
to engage alternative definitions, because of an a priori belief about the true nature of civil 
wars, asserts much but proves little. 
 
The most forceful rejection of the application of the term civil war to Algeria has come 
from Hugh Roberts (1999) in his critique of Luis Martinez’s (1998) La guerre civile en 
Algérie, 1990-1998.68 Apart from navigating the partisan use of the term civil war and 
some problematic features of defining them temporally (Martinez 1998: 14-6), Martinez 
otherwise thinks there are objective benchmarks. The three key and interrelated aspects are 
the occurrence of violence within one state, the intensity of that violence and the extent to 
which that violence is a function of opposing groups obtaining control over territory (ibid.: 
12-3). While few would question the claim that the violence in Algeria had reached 
significant levels, Roberts doubts whether or not the rebel groups ever controlled any large 
                                                
68 Martinez’s argument for calling the Algerian conflict a civil war inexplicably does not appear in 
the introduction of the English version (Martinez 2000a) where it does in the original; there seems 
to be no explanation from the author or the translator as to why this is the case. Roberts’ review is 
based upon the French original. 
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spaces. Martinez’s example — the centrepiece of his field research study and the epicentre 
of the major massacres in 1997 and 1998: the urban and semi-rural periphery of Algiers — 
is actually, according to Roberts, the exception. It is the only significant space of rebel 
control during the entire conflict. Furthermore, Roberts suggests other considerations that 
might prompt us to reconsider applying the term civil war to the Algerian conflict: the 
fragmentation of the insurgency, its lack of either a coherent ideology or clear political 
objectives to distinguish it from the regime; the related failure of the insurgency to win the 
support of the millions of FIS voters and to expand and mobilize that base; the relative 
neutrality of the majority of the population in the conflict, unless coerced to do so 
otherwise; the lack of significant rebel spaces and thus the lack of formal combat fronts 
(Roberts 1999: 391). What Roberts clearly has in mind is a more constrained view of civil 
wars where the political, military, geographical and social frontiers of international war are 
transposed to an intra-national context. Indeed, he explicitly distinguishes the conflict in 
Algeria from several other cases that are, for him, exemplars of civil war (England, France, 
the United States, Ireland, Spain and Greece). 
 
In terms of the geographical element, Roberts’ assessment of the Algerian conflict has 
recently been supported by Moussaoui (2006: 436-7), Evans and Phillips (2008: 225) and 
Darbouche and Zoubir (Darbouche & Zoubir 2009: 22). Moussaoui (2006: 13), for 
example, argues that the term civil war cannot be applied to the violence in Algeria 
because of its ‘localisation’ (his quotes) and the limited forms it assumed. To this ‘war 
without a front’ (guerre sans front), we might add, in the words of Stora (2001b: 59-60), 
‘war without faces’ (une guerre sans visage) — the idea that the armed opposition lacked a 
coherent representation or politics. Further supplementing Roberts’ evaluation of the 
insurgency, historian John Ruedy (2005: 257) agreed that the rebels’ relatively small 
number (estimated at 25,000) and their lack of significant popular support undermined the 
case for civil war. Willis, anticipating Roberts somewhat, noted that the number of 
fatalities related to the conflict in 1994 suggested the possibility of ‘full civil war’. Except, 
he argues, ‘there remained no evidence to suggest that the armed groups were near winning 
the active support of the general population’ (Willis 1997: 376). Quandt, likewise, 
highlighted this aspect of the conflict: ‘Most Algerians have remained on the sidelines’ 
(Quandt 1998: 162). One possible exception among country experts is Abdelaziz Testas, 
whose studies on the Algerian conflict have worked within the World Bank framework. 
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Yet Testas, for no clear reason, seemingly cannot bring himself to call the conflict in 
Algeria an unqualified civil war. It is rather a case of ‘virtual’ civil war (Testas 2002a: 83; 
Testas 2002c: 178), an unexplained qualification adopted by Bradford Dillman (2000a: 
213, 214) as well.  
 
Whether or not we believe a civil war includes these demanded or implied properties (e.g., 
an armed opposition with a coherent structure and political ideology, formal armies, 
massive popular support and significant territorial purchase for all sides within a sovereign 
state), it is interesting to note that conflicting definitions still have widespread currency 
among scholars. To dismiss alternative definitions as simply misguided or partisan is not 
only unreasonable, it is to engage in a politics of naming not unlike the one that has been 
rejected in the first place. The attitude of the new civil war studies seems to be this: There 
is one meaning of civil war whether you like it or not. Those who disagree are either 
engaged in a politics of naming practiced by civil war participants or the victims of it. 
There is the real meaning of civil war and then there are those who either naively misuse 
the term or use it rhetorically, possibly hypocritically for political gain. The task of real 
science is to ignore the propaganda and focus on reality regardless of its perceived political 
intent or possible consequences. However, Roberts raises a relevant point in his critique of 
those who use the term civil war to describe and analyse the Algerian conflict. Mis-
conceptualising the Algerian situation in such a way, he argues, will have disastrous results 
for those seeking to have a positive influence on the course of the conflict. Not only does 
the label civil war mask the real nature of the conflict, Roberts believes, but it also serves 
to de-legitimate the view of the Algerian regime and so disable helpful foreign 
intervention.69 Here we have a similar ‘whether you like it or not’ sentiment. ‘Of course 
                                                
69 Another example of the political callousness of the new civil war studies, already cited above, 
touches on the politics of naming the Algerian war of 1954-62: 
 
We see no reason in principle to exclude anticolonial wars [from our list of civil wars], such as 
the French versus the National Liberation Front (FLN) in Algeria. [...] to drop such cases 
would be like dropping the current conflict in Chechnya as a civil war in Russia if the 
Chechens succeed in gaining independence. Alternatively, it would make even less sense to 
include them as wars within “states” that did not exist (such as “Algeria” in 1954). (Fearon & 
Laitin 2003: 76) 
 
To say that Algeria did not exist before 1962 might earn Fearon and Laitin several enemies in 
Algeria, just as calling the 1954-62 conflict a civil war will likely provoke rebuke from Algerians 
and French alike. Journalist Robert Fisk experienced the former first hand: ‘Whenever I refer to 
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observers are free to describe the violence in Algeria as a civil war if they really want to’, 
Roberts (1999: 391) argues. ‘But, unless their purpose is to irritate Algiers by subverting 
its propaganda, what is to be gained from doing so?’ Regardless of scientific intent, using 
the term civil war has political effects, not unlike other contentious violence-related 
concepts like genocide (Mamdani 2007) and terrorism (Bhatia 2005). In this way, the most 
objective and neutral academic observes of civil wars are implicated in a series of practices 
that can be deeply political (as well as historical) in their consequences. Not just in terms 
of playing into or rejecting the discourse of civil war participants, but also in terms of 
shaping international attitudes and responses. The difference between a civil war and other 
forms of intra-national armed conflict is not semantics alone. It is a distinction that now 
makes a world of difference in terms of both political (de)legitimation, writing history and 
marshalling the diplomatic, financial and intellectual resources of the international 
community. 
 
 
A question of violence (in general): civil war, from centre to margin 
 
Beyond elucidating this refusal to acknowledge the politics of naming inherent in the 
practices of coding and analysing civil wars, the ambiguity of Algerian case (qua civil war) 
presents a significant challenge to the prevailing theory of civil wars. Within the new civil 
war studies, certain aspects of civil wars are treated as fundamental. Civil wars are 
assumed to have political, spatial, practical and temporal boundaries that make them 
knowable and distinguish them from other forms of mass armed violence. Algeria 
reportedly meets all of the standard baseline criteria (Sarkees 2000; Fearon & Laitin 2003) 
and even seems to conform to the most refined coding rules (Sambanis 2004b: 829-30). 
                                                                                                                                              
“civil war” in a report from Algeria for the Independent, an official of the foreign ministry or the 
ministry of communications or the ministry of interior chastises me for my exaggeration’ (Robert 
Fisk, ‘Scenes from an unholy war’, Independent, 16 April 1995: 4). The case of the 1954-62 war, 
interestingly, opens way to the conflicting accounts as to what kinds of identities can be involved in 
a civil war. Is civil war a war between fellow citizens, members of the same ethnos or merely 
cohabitants of the same territory? More importantly, though, we can also see the slight of hand that 
makes much of the new civil war studies co-constitutive of the very object of its analysis: the subtle 
transformation of hypothetical conjectures into ontological givens. Where UN recognition is 
initially treated as an operational assumption or a provisional coding rule for the sake of model 
building (in this case, Algeria’s ontological status prior to 1962), it quickly becomes a reified fact. 
Metric becomes object.  
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Despite these findings, several academic experts most familiar with the Algerian conflict 
have vehemently rejected categorising Algeria as a civil war. For them, the political, 
geographical and social dimensions of the conflict do not cohere with the meaning of civil 
war.70 For two sets of observers claiming to describe and analyse the same phenomenon, 
the contrast could not be sharper. The simplest explanation for these divergent readings 
rests with the differences in their respective conceptions of civil war, whether implied or 
made explicit. However, this explanation only works if one assumes a degree of empirical 
consensus. A closer examination of the competing representations of identity, politics and 
violence in the Algerian conflict suggests three important facts: proposed casualty figures 
for Algeria are wide ranging and highly contested; these statistics are one dimensional 
aggregates lacking either demographic indicators or basic conflict distinctions (state, 
insurgency and civilian); and, in the majority of cases, the context of death (who, why and 
how) is unknown. 
 
‘Juking the stats’ 
 
In his recent study of political violence, Jeremy Weinstein (2007: 316) states that the 
conflict in Algeria claimed roughly 85,000 people between 1992 and 2000, ‘a number 
about which there is little disagreement in the source literature’. On what basis he can 
claim such a consensus, apart from assertion or ignorance, is not clear. Not only are most 
fatality figures in the Algerian conflict wide ranging and grossly imprecise, they also do 
not differentiate between fatalities that are directly or indirectly related — if not totally 
unrelated — to combat. The most recent update of the COW project (Sarkees 2000) oddly 
claims 80,000 state losses as of 1997 but does not provide a total casualty figure. The 
source of this total is likely the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIRPI), 
which provides a similar figure for the year 1997 (1998: 28). The UCDP-PRIO dataset 
likewise relies on SIPRI’s figures but augments them with data from, or related to, Project 
                                                
70 In response to these Algeria specialists, it would be reasonable to ask for some clarifications. 
How much popular support should both sides have in a civil war? How much military capacity, 
how much politico-ideological coherence, and how much (quasi-)sovereign territorial control 
should the rebels have in a civil war? Yet given that their conceptions of civil war are mostly 
implied, we can know that, according to these experts, Algeria did not meet these levels. We are 
unable to extrapolate what these levels are; not, at least, without creating a theory of civil war 
extracted from the classic European and American examples cited or seemingly implied by some of 
these observers. 
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Ploughshares, a Canadian faith-based organisation that monitors armed violence 
worldwide (see Table 1).71 
 
Table 1 
Estimates of annual fatalities in Algeria (1991-2001) 
 UCDP-PRIO SIPRI Yearbook 
 Yearly Fatalities Running total since 1992 
Year Low High Low High 
1991 100 100   
1992 600 600   
1993 2,400 6,000 1,700 3,000 
1994 10,000 30,000 10,000 25,000 
1995 6,000 12,000 25,000 45,000 
1996 4,000 12,000 30,000 50,000 
1997 6,000 12,000 40,000  80,000 
1998 7,000 10,000 40,000 100,000 
1999 3,000 3,000 40,000 100,000 
2000 2,500 2,500 40,000  100,000 
2001 1,650 1,650  
Total  
1993-2001 42,750 89,150  
Sources: (Lacina & Gleditsch 2005) and SIRPI Yearbooks 1994-2001 
 
Using a different source, Sambanis (2004b) provides a rate of 1,200 deaths per month 
between 1994 and 1998 based upon figures provided by the International Crisis Group 
(2000a: i). The Crisis Group, which actually applies this rate to the entire period of 1992 
through 199872, derives this average from a total figure first provided by President 
Bouteflika in 1999 (see below). That is, the rate of 1,200 deaths per month neatly puts the 
Algerian conflict over 100,000 fatalities in 1998. 
                                                
71 These include Eckhardt (1996), who provides the well rounded figure of 50,000 killed between 
1992 and 1995; Leitenberg (2003: 79-80), who arrives at the figure 100,000 for the period 1993-
2000 based on his ‘private archives’; and see also 
http://www.ploughshares.ca/libraries/ACRText/ACR-Algeria.html, accessed March 2010. 
 The UCDP-PRIO arrived at its yearly data by first assuming the popular figure of ‘battle 
deaths’ 100,000 and trending yearly data (i.e., arbitrarily doubling or tripling SIPRI figures) so as 
to give ‘preference to the estimate that totals nearly 90,000 battle deaths’. 
72 Sambanis likely means Miriam Lowi, who claims less than 1,200 deaths per month for 1992-
1994 and 1,200 deaths per month for 1994-1998 (see Lowi 2005: 239). 
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Not only are most casualty figures for Algeria estimates, these are largely assumed, 
without supporting evidence, to indicate combat deaths. Even the most fundamental 
distinction between civilian, government and insurgent fatalities is nowhere to be found in 
these accounts, never mind basic demographic information (e.g., gender, age, geographical 
distribution). Based upon a simple threshold of one thousand combat deaths since the start 
or per year, a range of 40,000 to 100,000 does not affect the possible classification of the 
armed conflict in Algeria as a civil war unless it could be empirically demonstrated 
otherwise. For example, if we accept the lower figure of 40,000 for the first eight years of 
the conflict, battle deaths would, on average, have to account for less than twenty percent 
of deaths. However, if we take the higher figure of 100,000 for the same period, combat 
deaths could only account for less than eight percent of casualties on average. Considering 
the fact that insurgent losses are well over 10,000, according to the Algerian government, it 
is unlikely that Algeria would fail to clear this threshold whatever the total. Reconciling 
these wide ranging figures matters more in terms of constructing comparative studies 
where more precise statistics matter (e.g., the intensity of civil wars; see Lacina 2006). 
What is important to note here, in the Algerian case, is the inaccurate and arbitrary nature 
of casualty figures, the misleading assumption that these are all battle deaths and the 
corresponding lack of basic distinctions between victim groups and types of fatalities. As 
will be seen below, the context of violence, as well as victim and perpetrator identity, will 
certainly factor into a consideration of how to categorise and understand the Algerian 
conflict. 
 
Another striking aspect of the various internationally generated death tolls for the Algerian 
conflict is their propensity either to ignore official Algerian figures73 or to multiply them 
two to three times. Part of the problem is the Algerian government’s reluctance to meet 
international demands for fatality figures, thus engendering suspicion that the violence has 
been worse than Algiers was willing to admit. So naturally, when numbers were released, 
elements of the international community launched objections that the scale of violence was 
being downplayed, especially in the case of the major massacres.74 A case in point was 
                                                
73 Clodfelter (2002: 618; cited by Lacina & Gleditsch 2005) is an exception. 
74 In 2000, Amnesty International complained,  
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President Zéroual’s disclosure on 6 September 1994 that there had been 10,000 conflict 
deaths since February 1992.75 This was more than a twofold increase on the previous 
official figure (4,00076) but still half what some foreign human rights groups were 
maintaining. A reportedly secret Algerian army audit, published in the French daily Le 
Parisien at the end of 1994, carried a staggering tally of 48,530 total conflict-related 
fatalities during the first ten months of 1994 alone.77 However, the Algerian government’s 
human rights monitor, L’Observatoire national des droits de l’homme (ONDH), released 
official figures in June 1996 based upon a survey of official government statements carried 
in the Algerian press. These indicated that, between 1994 and 1995, 1,400 civilians had 
been killed and security forces had eliminated 5,029 insurgents.78 Incredulous, Amnesty 
International (1996: 11-2) contrasted the latter figure with a tally of 20,000 slain insurgents 
offered by Algeria’s Interior Ministry at the end 1994. A year and a half later, the Algerian 
government — then under intense international pressure — again offered updated figures 
in January 1998. Between 1992 and the end of 1997, 26,536 Algerian civilians and 
members of the security forces had died and 21,137 had been injured in acts of violence; a 
new figure for rebel fatalities, however, was not disclosed at that time.79 
                                                                                                                                              
Throughout the worst years of the conflict, up to the middle of 1999, the Algerian authorities 
systematically censured the information about the real number of victims, giving artificially 
low figures — less than half — and accusing those who provided accurate figures of 
deliberately exaggerating the seriousness of the situation. (Amnesty International 2000: 15-6)  
 
Yet the basis on which Amnesty International can judge official Algerian statistics to be artificial is 
not clear. As readily acknowledged in its reports, neither the Algerian government nor domestic or 
international human rights organisations have been able to verify any figures, whether internally or 
externally generated. 
75 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ‘Official death toll since February 1992 reaches 10,000’, 8 
September 1994 (Source: Radio France Internationale).  
76 AFP, ‘Two more FIS leaders to be freed: reports’, 8 September 1994. 
77 According to a Radio France Internationale broadcast, the report in Le Parisien indicated 38,500 
civilian deaths (12,700 in Blida), 2,733 casualties among the security forces and 7,297 losses 
among the ‘Islamists’ for the January-October 1994 period. See BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, ‘Parisian paper publishes secret Algerian report on death toll’, 30 December 1994 
(Source: Radio France Internationale). 
The London Times, however, reported slightly different figures from the same source (‘25,000 
civilians, 7,000 alleged terrorists and 2,700 members of the security forces’); Retuers too: ‘35,000 
people killed in fighting’ during the first ten months of 1994. See Reuters, ‘61 militants killed, 
Algeria says’, The Globe and Mail, 30 December 1994; Adam Sage, ‘Algiers admits air security 
lapses’, The Times, 30 December 1994. 
78 AFP, ‘More than 5,000 fundamentalists killed in year: report’, 12 June 1996. 
79 AFP, ‘Bombes et faux barrage les jours de l’Aid’, 31 January 1998; AFP, ‘Algeria PM defends 
actions, gives first global toll since 1992’, 22 January 1998. 
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If the Algerian government had been minimizing or hiding casualty figures, this seemed to 
change under President Bouteflika, though not without controversy. On 26 June 1999, 
while in Switzerland for the Crans Montana political-economic forum, Bouteflika stated 
that 100,000 Algerians had died and one million had been touched by the violence.80 It was 
widely noted that, up to that point, the official government figure had been one-quarter81 to 
one-third82 as much. The ‘Islamic opposition’, on the other hand, had reportedly already 
endorsed an estimate of 120,000 casualties83 and one of Algeria’s leading human rights 
activists, Ali-Yahia, had been claiming 190,000 as early as December 1996.84 In early 
2001, another alleged secret report of the Algerian military again found its way into the 
French press, covering just the year 2000. It reported 9,006 total casualties, including 
1,025 insurgents, 603 government forces and 117 civilian militia members. If true, the year 
2000 — that is, the first full year after the adoption of Bouteflika’s Concorde civile — had 
perhaps been one of the most violent of the conflict.85 
 
The following year, General Abderrezak Maïza, then commander of the first military 
region, seemingly contradicted Bouteflika’s 1999 claim of 100,000 dead. In front of an 
international symposium on terrorism in Algiers, the General disclosed several new official 
statistics. Most importantly, he stated that the conflict had taken 37,000 lives between 1992 
and 2000.86 Of those, more than 15,200 had been insurgents.87 Looking to the Algerian 
                                                                                                                                              
 Human Rights Watch (1999) and some media reports presented the 26,536 figure as 
encompassing all conflict-related deaths. See Clodfelter (2002: 618). 
80 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ‘President on peace, referendum, prisoners’ release, OPEC, 
France’, 28 June 1999. 
81 Charles Trueheart, ‘Ignoring Army and His Own Iffy Election, Algerian Chases Peace’, 
Washington Post, 30 June 1999: A25. 
82 AFP, ‘Algerian president to set out terms with armed foes’, 4 June 1999. 
83 Rachid Khiari, ‘Amnesty plan moves toward Parliament’, Associated Press, 28 June 1999. 
84 Francis David, ‘«Les dimensions d’un génocide»’, Sud Ouest, 16 December 1996. 
85 Florence Aubenas, ‘Plus de 9 000 morts cette année en Algérie’, Libération, 5 January 2001: 12. 
86 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ‘Algeria: Army general says there are 650 terrorists “all 
groups included”’, 27 October 2002 (source Liberté web site). 
87 AFP, ‘Fewer than 650 Islamic extremists active in Algeria: general’, 27 October 2002. 
Explaining the discrepancy between his figures and those of Bouteflika, Maïza said, ‘100,000 
dead, that’s a political number. [...] Me, I have the names’ (quoted in Hugeux Vincent and Baya 
Gacemi Baya, ‘Algérie: les généraux sabre au clair’, L’Express, 7 November 2002: 38). 
In October 2001, Algerian officials claimed that 20,000 ‘terrorists’ had been ‘neutralised’ but 
did not indicate what percentage of these had been killed, captured or amnestied. Quoted in 
Amnesty International, ‘Algeria’ chapter in Report 2002 (London: Amnesty International, 2002). 
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government’s national reconciliation measures does little to clarify the situation. In March 
2006, Farouk Ksentini, head of the Commission nationale consultative de promotion et de 
protection des droits de l’homme (CNCPPDH), a human rights advisory body attached to 
the presidency and successor to the ONDH, announced that 150,000 to 200,000 Algerians 
had died in the conflict.88 Of those, the implementation commission for Algeria’s 2005 
national reconciliation charter revealed in 2008 that the state had recognised its 
responsibility for only 17,000 deaths of so called terrorists.89 These accounted for the 
majority of claims made to the government for compensation by late 2009; the remainder 
came from families victimised by state-sponsored ‘disappearance’ (6,154 claims) and 
persons dismissed from work for their political affiliations (roughly 5,000 cases).90 While 
this suggests a number for insurgent losses that is somewhat consistent with General 
Maïza’s 2002 figures, it is possible that many families who had relatives in armed groups, 
for a number of imaginable reasons, decided not to pursue or were unable to claim state 
compensation (e.g., in the case of the latter, deaths resulting from insurgent-on-insurgent 
violence). Whereas government and civilian casualties, apart from persons allegedly 
‘disappeared’ by state agents, have never been publicly declared, as such groups are not 
seen as key stakeholders in Algeria’s national reconciliation process. What interest either 
side — the Algerian presidency versus the security, military and intelligence apparatus —
 has in either inflating or downplaying casualty figures is easy to hypothesise but it is 
speculation nonetheless. Minimally, such disparate numbers warrant caution as they might 
not correspond to real bodies at all. Rather, this politics of numbers might be indicative of 
ongoing factional struggles where the international community’s sympathies — as Roberts 
(1998) has argued — are as much the real battlefield as the ultimate prize. 
 
                                                
88 AFP, ‘Algérie: entre 150.000 et 200.000 morts depuis 1992 dans les violences (Ksentini)’, 18 
March 2006. 
89 Salima Tlemçani, ‘Application de la charte pour la réconciliation nationale: 300 dossiers de 
terroristes ont été rejetés’, El Watan, 11 May 2008: 
http://www.elwatan.com/archives/article.php?id=93925, accessed September 2010. 
90 Nazim Fethi, ‘25,000 victims of terrorism addressed’, Magharebia, 1 October 2009: 
http://www.magharebia.com/cocoon/awi/xhtml1/en_GB/features/awi/features/2009/10/01/feature-
01, accessed October 2010. 
 While the government has offered financial incentives to insurgents that surrender, it has not 
yet offered compensation to the victims of armed opposition groups or those who died in acts of 
social violence (e.g., vendettas). 
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Human rights groups are an obvious alternative place to look for non-partisan facts and 
figures. Yet, as the conflict progressed, these outlets became less a source for primary 
information and more an echo chamber for the wide-ranging claims already circulating 
internationally. Only in the early years did any organisations or governments attempt to 
offer statistics broken down by victim population. However, establishing the context of 
violence in each case (e.g., its political, social or economic rationale) was deemed 
impossible from the start. According to Human Rights Watch’s (1992) world report for 
1992, the Algerian government claimed to have lost 200 members of its security forces in 
armed attacks between January and November. To this, Amnesty International (1993: 1) 
provided a figure of 600 conflict related deaths (270 agents of the security forces and 20 
civilians killed by armed groups; 300 killed by state agents) a year into the state of 
emergency (i.e., February 1993). For the following year, Human Rights Watch (1994) 
tallied some 100 civilian, 100 security forces and 500 insurgent deaths between January 
and September 1993 based upon press accounts. As gross fatality numbers ballooned to 
20,000 to 30,000 over the course of 1994 according to ‘unofficial’ sources (Amnesty 
International 1994: 1; see also Human Rights Watch 1994), such figures ceased to carry 
distinctions between armed participants and civilians. Three years into the conflict, Human 
Rights Watch (1996) claimed 30,000-50,000 casualties and more than 50,000 by 1997 
(Human Rights Watch 1997). For a time, Human Rights Watch even stopped providing its 
own figures and only noted the claims others. For example, one of its reports (1999) noted 
the death toll 70,000 for 1992-1997 ‘cited’ by the US State Department (1998). Even 
though it was attempting to put pressure on Algeria at that time over the issue of the 
massacres, the State Department had still been careful to attribute such figures to others. 
The report used language like ‘there were estimates’ but without providing a source. The 
same pattern was neatly used the following year: ‘estimates that as many as 7,000 
civilians, terrorists, and security forces died during the year in domestic turmoil, and that 
as many as 77,000 persons have been killed during the past 7 years’ (US Department of 
State 1999). Despite the fact that the Algerian government has actually provided widely 
conflicting statistics and has explicitly refused to create a truth commission, the range of 
100,000 to 200,000 fatalities has become, since Bouteflika uttered it in 1999, commonly 
accepted as an official death toll for the years 1992 to 1999 (e.g., US Department of State 
2003; Amnesty International 2009: 6; Human Rights Watch 2010: 482). 
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A major aspect of the violence in Algeria that has inhibited consistent description is the 
pervasive opacity that has surrounded it. Certainly, the wide range of basic casualty figures 
is symptomatic of this confusion. As is the fact that there still is no clear sense as to what 
portion of these totals can be accounted for by civilian casualties. As Human Rights Watch 
(Human Rights Watch 1996: 268) lamented four years into the conflict, ‘Precise data was 
notoriously elusive on how many persons were killed, by whom and why they were 
targeted, owing to strict government censorship and the hazards of investigating the 
violence’. If we accept the government figure of 17,000 insurgent casualties, and estimate 
a one-to-one kill ratio (i.e., an equivalent number of government losses), that still leaves 
tens of thousands, if not over a hundred and fifty thousand, unaccounted for. These 
government figures could certainly be false or highly inaccurate. Yet domestic and foreign 
estimates for insurgent strength (i.e., active fighters) never rose past 30,000. Moreover, the 
highest kill ratio of insurgents to security forces ever reported was five-to-one by Human 
Rights Watch for 1993, followed by 2.66-to-one in 1994 according to an alleged secret 
Algerian government audit. From insurgent casualties, we would have to subtract cases 
where the state agents deliberately or unintentionally killed civilians only to brand them 
terrorists retroactively to justify their execution. However, we would have to add to 
insurgent losses those rebels killed during fighting episodes between armed opposition 
groups. Internecine insurgent fighting could be one of the most significant contributors to 
Algeria’s death toll both in terms of combatants and civilians. Yet such intra-insurgency 
killing has also been one of the most obscure aspects of the violence in Algeria, whether it 
is Algeria 1997 or Algeria 1957 (see chapter eight). 
 
Barring a significant government cover-up of its losses, there is little warrant to assume an 
equivalent insurgent-government kill ratio to help account for Algeria’s massive casualty 
deficit. Internecine fighting between insurgents (e.g., the AIS versus the GIA91) might help 
bridge this gap, yet no one has attempted to estimate its scope. Likewise, fighting between 
paramilitary militias could possibly contribute to government losses, yet no figures exist 
for this possibility either. Clearly, non-combatants would have to make up a large part of 
the difference, yet civilian casualties were often reported as being less than insurgent 
                                                
91 Groupement/Groupe(s) islamique(s) armé(s), an armed insurgent group (or groups) founded 
earlier than the AIS and independent of the FIS; widely depicted as a rival of the AIS. 
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losses. A notable exception is the secret government report of 1994, which suggested a 
non-combatant to combatant casualty ratio of 3.83-to-one. 
 
Furthermore, civilian deaths are perhaps the most difficult to tally. The government’s 
incentive to monitor and report civilian casualties accurately depends on war’s fortune. A 
large number of civilian deaths can either de-legitimate the armed opposition or undermine 
a government’s claim to provide real security. Though it seems that civilians are the bulk 
of casualties in the Algerian conflict, it is difficult to account for the vast majority of them, 
especially if we accept the 100,000 to 200,000 range. The highest figure ever reported for 
civilian deaths is 38,500, and that was in 1994. Subsequent government figures have either 
downplayed or implicitly multiplied this figure. Looking to other sources provides little 
comfort. Even the most inclusive, non-discriminating and contestable list of civilian 
massacres (Aït-Larbi et al. 1999) can only account for roughly 8,000 casualties between 
December 1993 and December 1998. Algeria Watch’s slightly more conservative list of 
massacres, covering January 1994 to December 2002, likewise only speaks to some 7,500 
deaths. The highest official estimate for civilians who were ‘disappeared’ by security 
forces and allied militias is 12,000 (Human Rights Watch 2003: 15), though the Algerian 
government’s ad hoc commission on disappearances only recognized only 6,154 claims at 
the end of its mandate in 2005 (see International Center for Transitional Justice 2005: 
30;Joffé 2008: 217). As for persons abducted by insurgents who still remain unaccounted 
for, equivalent numbers have been suggested but no government agency or human rights 
organisation has attempted to compile an authoritative list. 
 
The context of death  
 
When it comes to classifying episodes of mass violence as a civil war, it is not just that 
people are dying. It is also a matter of answering the questions ‘Who dies?’, ‘Who is 
killing them?’, ‘How are they dying?’ and ‘Why are they being killed’. In the case of the 
Algerian conflict, providing a precise answer to the first two basic questions was as 
difficult as answering the latter two difficult ones. It is only assumed that the 40,000 to 
200,000 reported deaths in Algeria were actual combat fatalities. Yet the questions ‘How’ 
and ‘Why’ are critical in the identification battles and combat, which are key to 
categorising casualties properly and so affect the coding of civil wars. 
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As with other aspects of defining civil wars in the recent literature, combat and battle have 
different and inconsistent interpretations. Whether or not the deliberate targeting of 
civilians (rather than indirect civilian deaths as ‘collateral damage’) constitutes combat is a 
key aspect of this lacuna. Fearon (2004: 278), as an example, allows insurgent violence 
directed at civilians to count as resistance against the state though not vice versa. This is 
presented as a simple coding rule rather than a claim about the nature of civil wars, but it is 
still a questionable bias that lacks any clear rationale. This stipulation assumes a disputed 
ontology of civil wars where they are inherently asymmetric conflicts based upon guerrilla 
warfare in which insurgents and the state do not share the same interests vis-à-vis civilian 
populations. Yet even if we accept steeply asymmetric conflicts as civil wars, Fearon’s rule 
still runs counter to most understandings of how states often conduct anti-guerrilla 
campaigns. Fearon allows insurgents to inflict damage on the state by committing acts of 
terrorism against civilians (resisting or not, allied to the state or not), yet he inexplicably 
does not allow acts of state terrorism against an insurgency’s civilian supporters to count 
as damage done to a rebellion. This seems strange given the fact that engaging in the latter 
— sometimes called dirty wars — is a well recognised counter-insurgency technique. 
Draining the sea to kill the fish. Indeed, such actions might be more indicative of a 
significant armed conflict than anti-state terrorism against civilians. Looking at the 
consequences of this rule highlights its shortcomings. A biased view towards civilian 
casualties would rule out civil wars where insurgencies were defeated with massive state 
terror before they were able to mount effective resistance. Political violence in Syria in the 
1970s and 1980s, for example, involved armed groups who inflicted casualties on the 
government. Thousands of civilians, allegedly allied with the armed opposition, were 
eventually killed but overwhelmingly in acts of state terror.  
 
Hoping to obtain a better understanding of the devastation wreaked by war, Lacina and 
Gleditsch (2005) propose a distinction between battle deaths (soldiers and civilians killed 
in combat) and total war deaths (the sum of all direct and indirect fatalities related to an 
armed conflict). Their more graduated approach to the question of civilian casualties 
suggests that the essence of combat is the possibility of immediate violent resistance. A 
combat situation obtains if an act of violence could be met with counter-violence. One-
sided violence, on the other hand, is situations where resistance is not possible, where 
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violence is inflicted with impunity and without fear of immediate reprisal (ibid.: 150-1). 
While these distinctions seem justified, their functionality is predicated upon a robustness 
of information that does not yet exist in the Algerian case. Given the low resolution of the 
data available for Algeria, it is impossible to determine whether or not many government 
and insurgent losses, as well as civilians, occurred in situations where effective resistance 
was feasible. This problem likewise applies to any effort to determine the extent or 
efficacy of state terror (e.g., Valentino et al. 2004), as the context of killing is key. 
 
The broad indeterminacy of the violence in Algeria — the opacity of its agency and its 
logic — points towards a disturbing possibility. It is no longer impossible to imagine a 
violent conflict, in Algeria or elsewhere, where direct confrontations between incumbent 
forces and armed groups rarely take place, where there is no threat of immediate retaliation 
or fear of resistance. A conflict based upon the mutual infliction of casualties on non-
resisting or captured populations, whether civilian or combatant. A conflict where the state 
fights insurgents by killing suspected rebel supporters and insurgents simply massacre 
civilians seemingly allied to the state.92 Furthermore, a significant number of violent 
deaths could occur inside the temporal and spatial boundaries of a civil war yet whose 
rationale rests outside the conflict’s putative political limits — violent crime, banditry and 
other forms of wartime opportunism. In most cases, the basic context of death is actually 
unknown: whether the victims were violently resisting their killers at the time of death; 
whether the motive of the killing was religious, political, economic, inter-personal; 
whether the identity of perpetrators was necessarily disparate to the victims. From a macro-
level perspective, like the one normally assumed by the new civil war studies, Algeria 
appears as if it is a civil war because both insurgents and the state were able to inflict 
casualties upon each other. However, from a possible micro-level perspective, the situation 
could be one in which there is mainly violence but little ‘war’. In other words, Algeria 
might not have been a civil war, in so far as anything resembling combat is unable to 
account for the majority of violent deaths. 
 
                                                
92 Samabanis (2004b: 823) certainly recognises the possibility of massive one-sided violence 
overtaking combat as the dominant form of killing, though he reserves this concern towards well 
known cases of state authored violence (e.g., Argentina, Cambodia). The possibility that an armed 
conflict could be composed of acts of reciprocated atrocities against non-resisting populations 
escapes him. 
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Identity 
 
The questions of agency and politics surrounding the Algerian violence, and the massacres 
in particular, further exacerbate this irreconcilable macro/micro dissonance. As established 
in chapter five and six, and reinforced in chapter eight, the Algerian massacres have been, 
and remain, subject to debate — both domestic and international — about the identity and 
motive of the perpetrators. What was perhaps most striking about the massacres, beginning 
in late 1996, was that they came despite the increasing routinisation of electoral processes 
and the advancement of peacemaking overtures between the regime and the FIS. In other 
words, the intensity of the violence displayed manifold increases yet the politics of the 
conflict at the national level suggested de-escalation. While the regime, government and 
state seemed to be stabilising, and the FIS-AIS capitulating, grassroots violence spiralled 
out of control. If an intense level of violence is the sole criterion for terming an intra-
national armed conflict a civil war, then Algeria had certainly reached those levels before 
the massacre upsurge in late 1996.93 But if a civil war requires the articulation of violence 
and (1) a clear political cleavage with (2) easily identifiable participants in the fighting, 
then the Algerian conflict had only become more ambiguous. The withdrawal of the AIS 
from the battlefield on 1 October 1997, following a three-month ceasefire94, only added to 
the lack of coherence in the violence. Indeed, it was the increasing disarticulation of 
politics from the violence that gave the Algerian conflict its most unique, most disturbing 
and most challenging characteristic for the international community in terms of 
representation and intervention. 
 
Given the extent to which the fighting in Algeria seemed deliberately obfuscatory (e.g., the 
alleged psychological warfare and counter-insurgency techniques of the intelligence 
agencies and the military; the apparent wide use of ‘faux’ attacks by insurgents, militias 
and criminal gangs), reliable information might be impossible to find, if it exists anymore. 
As Lacina and Gleditsch (2005: 148) noted,  
                                                
93 Whether or not the peak massacre period of November 1996 through January 1998 was the most 
deadly of the conflict is debatable. Liess Boukra (Boukra 2002: 265) claims that terrorist activity, 
and resulting casualties, actually peaked in 1994-95. This is not, however, an overall measurement 
of conflict intensity, as it does not include terrorist deaths. Nor is it very clear what are the sources 
of his data. 
94 El Watan, ‘Opacité autour d’une « trêve »’, No. 2107, 23 October 1997.  
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In today’s dominant forms of conflict — civil wars, wars of insurgency, and 
asymmetric conflicts — the distinction between combatants and non-combatants may 
be very unclear or even entirely fluid, in sharp contrast to an idealised model of a 
conflict fought between formally organised state militaries. 
 
While it is recognised that identities in a civil war can be heterogeneous and dynamic 
(Kalyvas 2008), this does not go far enough to account for either the intentional use of 
false identities during episodes of violence or the display of manifold identities by some 
participants in the fighting. In some cases, Algerian identities were purposefully masked to 
misdirect victims and participants, as well as domestic and foreign observers. In other 
cases, drawing the line between security forces, insurgents, militia members, criminal 
gangs was reportedly impossible on a day to day basis. While the evidence for such 
practices is anecdotal, suspect and contested, so is most of the information surrounding 
much of the violence in 1990s Algeria. But if we accept the idea that perpetrator identities 
and the motives of violence can be simultaneously multifarious, contradictory, hybrid and 
evolving, in each episode and across all of them, then another condition of possibility for 
essentially indeterminate violence is present.  
 
 
Conclusion: from civil war to ‘new’ war ? 
 
The idea that mass political violence could manifest such opacity in terms of its practical 
and spatial logic, as well as its participant identity, is not new. In response to similar 
concerns, though resulting from the experience and exploration of different conflict 
environments, a group of scholars have suggested that the conditions and practices of mass 
violence have evolved to such an extent that our concept of war needs to adapt with them. 
Mary Kaldor’s (2007) New Wars thesis represents one of the most concerted efforts to 
articulate a novel vision of contemporary mass violence.95 According to Kaldor, New Wars 
emerged as a distinct ontology of mass violence in the final two decades of the twentieth 
century. Contrasting New Wars with what she calls Old Wars helps engender the 
                                                
95 See also Kaldor & Vashee 1997; Shaw 2000 & 2003; and Münkler 2005. Alleged precursors of 
new war thinking include Edward 1988; Holsti 1996; Snow 1996; and Gray 1997 
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uniqueness of this new phenomenon. Where war — civil or international — once featured 
conventional forces fighting for national, geopolitical or ideological goals, New Wars are 
dominated by informal armed groups and localised logics of violence based on identity 
conflict. The hallmarks of New Wars are civilian directed violence and organised crime. 
The techniques of New Wars are a hybrid form of guerrilla, insurgent and terrorist tactics; 
these have been adapted from traditional warfare without retaining their original political 
logic. The violence of New Wars is intimately local yet the financing, whether for security 
forces or armed groups, is globalised. The politics of New Wars is likewise complex; 
distinguishing between private, economic and political agendas is impossible as they are 
often one and the same. As such wars are identity based, bodies, rather than space, have 
become the primary terrain of warfare.96 A core aspect of New Wars is the de-centring of 
the state — an effect of globality — within the contemporary practice of mass violence. 
Where the state is essential to old wars (whether internal or international), New Wars 
evade the state practically as well as conceptually. As Mark Duffield (2001: 14) argues, 
‘Rather than expressions of breakdown or chaos [i.e., the discourse on ‘failed states’], the 
new wars can be understood as a form of non-territorial network war that works through 
and around states’ (emphasis in original). This displacement respects both the 
organisational sense of the term ‘the state’ as much as the territorial aspect. The state is 
often present, both in terms of practice and space, but the state is no longer necessary. 
 
On the face of it, new war thinking seems to offer a number of resources to help us think 
through the problems of (representing) violence in the Algerian conflict. Unfortunately, the 
new war thesis has gained little traction. Instead of sparking a wave of novel empirical 
research, the new war thesis has mostly prompted a theoretical debate about whether or not 
armed conflicts have changed in such a fundamental way as to warrant conceptual 
reformulation. The most common critique claims that the allegedly novel characteristics of 
                                                
96 One aspect of this argument for the new terrain of wars being civilian bodies is a claim that the 
combatant/civilian ratio has gone from eight-to-one before World War I to one-to-eight in the 
1990s (Kaldor 2007: 9). Critics have leapt upon this claim, noting the weakness of its sources and 
conflicting evidence (Lacina & Gleditsch 2005: 146; see also Melander et al. 2006). The reality, 
however, will be heavily determined not so much by the accuracy of statistics but the means of 
identifying non-combatant fatalities in wars where armed groups are highly informal, identities are 
deliberately obscured and turncoats abound. Indeed, it would seem more fitting with the New Wars 
model to note that the maintenance of these rigid categories — civilian versus combatant — has a 
tendency to determine observation. 
 109 
New Wars are, in fact, not new at all (Newman 2004). Before and after the Cold War, 
many civil wars, one response noted, contained most of the features that distinguish New 
Wars from old wars (e.g., the privatisation of violence, degenerate warfare). The tendency 
to view old wars as homogeneously formal enterprises and New Wars as informal, one 
critique argued, likely stems from the tendency during the Cold War to view all 
international political phenomena through a bifurcating macro-level perspective (Kalyvas 
2001). This distinction without a difference, advocated by new war theorists, also extends 
to the etiology of New Wars. According to a different critique, new war thinking does not 
produce distinctly different testable hypotheses, and so the purportedly different causes of 
New Wars are already accounted for under prevailing understandings of war; for example, 
as outlined in the COW project (Henderson & Singer 2002). Indeed, a group of researchers 
have recently tested some of the main empirical claims of New Wars and found them 
lacking (Melander et al. 2009). 
 
This chapter, in its critique of certain representations of the Algerian conflict as a civil war, 
suggests an alternative shortcoming to new war thinking. In short, new war theorists have 
not gone far enough in their efforts to deconstruct the dominant paradigm of contemporary 
civil war studies. Such a project might begin, to paraphrase Judith Butler (2006: 34), with 
the premise that there is no civil war behind expressions of civil war. Civil war is 
performatively constituted by the very expressions that are said to be its results. To be fair, 
such a deconstruction does not count among even the secondary goals of new war 
theorists. Their objective, rather, was to argue for conceptions of war based upon 
observations of an allegedly new ontology of mass violence. Assuming the persuasiveness 
of their insights, new war theorists failed to articulate a clear pragmatic rationale to 
necessitate the deployment of their proposed concepts over older, more entrenched views. 
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5. Violence 
 
 
 
The horror  
 
On 29 August 1997, various international news agencies began issuing reports of a 
massacre less than thirty kilometres from Algiers. This was not the first massacre in 
Algeria since 1992, but it was quickly pronounced the largest yet. An early dispatch 
indicated that 200 to 300 people had been shot, butchered, dismembered, disembowelled or 
burned to death in the small farming village of Raïs (or Sidi Raïs) in the Sidi Moussa sous-
préfecture (dāʿirah) of Algiers.1 Survivors, emergency workers and hospital personnel 
floated even higher figures.2 The Algerian government had quickly provided an official 
death toll of ninety-eight, plus over a hundred wounded. Attempting to account for such 
discrepancies, an Algerian paper wrote that, in the case of those burned alive, one coffin 
was being used for several bodies.3 An early outside witnesses to the scene, a photographer 
with AFP, described seeing dozens of bodies covered with blankets.4 One survivor, a 
schoolteacher, claimed that the massacre had started around ten in the evening on 28 
August and lasted four to five hours, though others said that the killing started early in the 
morning, lasting from one to six. Reports of the number of attackers ranged from dozens to 
three hundred. The Associate Press interviewed a survivor, ‘Amar’, who said, ‘They took 
their time to cut throats and to burn the bodies’.5 A villager who survived by barricading 
himself in his house had to listen to his neighbours die by fire; ‘Burn them like rats’, he 
reported an attacker saying, ordering his subalterns to lob Molotov cocktails through the 
windows.6 
 
                                                
1 AFP, ‘Terrible carnage près d’Alger: entre 98 et 300 civils égorges’, 29 August 1997. 
2 Hassane Zerrouky claimed ‘other sources’ had vouched for 375 casualties (‘La barbarie intégriste 
s’abat sur le petit village de Raïs’, L’Humanité, 30 August 1997). 
3 Deutsche Presse-Agentur, ‘Algerian Islamic leader appeals for truce in wake of massacres’, 30 
August 1997. 
4 Boubker Belkadi, ‘Hundreds feared dead in Algerian massacre’, AFP, 29 August 1997. 
5 Rachid Khiari, ‘300 killed in Algeria massacre, witnesses and hospital workers say’, Associated 
Press, 29 August 1997. 
6Jean Hatzfeld, ‘Près d’Alger, des villageois égorgés et brûlés’, Libération, 30 August 1997. 
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Another survivor reported seeing one of the attackers slit the throats of thirteen of his 
neighbours. Dispatches described a house that appeared to have been in the midst of a 
wedding party when the door was blown off and the attendees all slaughtered.7 Another 
family had been celebrating a circumcision.8 After being decapitated, some of the 
villagers’ heads were placed in front of their doors, survivors recounted.9 One said,  
 
My baby son Mohamed was five and they cut his throat and threw him out of the upper 
window [...]. Then they cut the throat of my eldest son Rabeh and then my brother’s 
throat because he saw they were kidnapping his wife and tried to stop them. They took 
some of the other girls. [...] They cut my throat and I felt the knife in my neck but I 
tried to shield myself and the man sliced me on the arm. My wife was so brave. She 
tried to help, to fight them, to save me. So they dragged her to the door where I was 
lying and slit her throat in front of me.10 
 
The Algerian Medical Union later told a reporter, ‘Even the fetuses have been taken from 
their disemboweled mothers to be mutilated and massacred’.11 One witness claimed a child 
of two had been baked in an oven after having his throat slit.12 Another survivor recalled 
several weeks later, ‘I could hear a young woman begging to be shot in the courtyard 
below my house. [...] She began screaming but the noise suddenly stopped. Yet, there was 
no sound of a shot’.13 The perpetrators, according to other testimonies, had also abducted 
some of Raïs’ young women, taking as many as one hundred with them. The Raïs 
massacre was not an isolated incident. Two days before, sixty-four people had met a 
similar fate in the mountain town of Beni Ali; the night after, a massacre of three- to four-
dozen occurred in Djelfa prefecture, three hundred kilometres south of Algiers. Five days 
                                                
7 Rachid Khiari, ‘Government assures it’s boosting security, but exodus continues’, Associated 
Press, 30 August 1997. See also Amine Kadi, ‘Algérie. “Moi, Messaoud qui étais à Raïs lors du 
massacre”’, La Croix, 26 September 1997, p.24. 
8 Elaine Ganley, ‘Algerian Survivor Rebuilds Life’, Associated Press, 27 November 1997. 
9 Barry Hugill, ‘Algeria Slides Deeper into Bloody Morass’, The Observer, 31 August 1997: 9. 
10 Robert Fisk, ‘Algeria, this autumn: a people in agony’, The Independent, 22 October 1997: 1. 
11 The Houston Chronicle, ‘Scores await burial as survivors describe massacres in Algeria’, 31 
August 1997: A32. 
12 John Lancaster, ‘As Algeria’s Savagery Grows, So Does Mystery Shrouding It’, Washington 
Post, 18 October 1997: A1.  
13 Anthony Loyd, ‘Algerian terror victims plead for death by bullet’, The Times, 23 October 1997. 
 112 
after Raïs, an editorial in the New York Times would declare the past week ‘the most 
violent in Algeria’s nearly six-year civil war’.14 
 
At nine in the morning (GMT) on Monday, 8 September, Radio France Internationale 
carried a report of back-to-back massacres, both in the same district of Algiers, Béni 
Messous.15 The first massacre had taken place on the night of 5-6 September. Early wire 
reports on 6 September indicated that between sixty and ninety people had perished, 
though two opposition parties — the secular-leftist FFS and Islamist MSP — claimed there 
were well over one hundred dead in the ‘shantytown’ of Sidi Youcef. The killers, 
reportedly numbering fifty and ‘howling like jackals’, used axes and other sharp objects, 
along with guns, during the killings. Reports from hospitals indicated that many victims 
had been mutilated, primarily by throat cuttings. One survivor recounted seeing a nursing 
mother’s breast cut off after her child was decapitated.16 Another, who escaped into trees 
nearby, told a reporter, ‘They kicked the door in, took the men, forced them outside, slit 
their throats [...] They came back, took out my aunt and slit her throat, after slashing open 
her stomach’.17 Though the attackers apparently fled when security sources arrived after 
several hours of killing, the very next night, 6-7 September, there was another massacre in 
the same area, claiming forty-five lives.18 After the two massacres of Béni Messous, 
Algeria experienced what one international press agency called two weeks of ‘relative 
calm’.19 Of the three massacres recorded during those fifteen days, the death counts were 
all less than two-dozen. 
 
On September 23, Algeria awoke to news of another massive killing spree from the 
previous evening. Almost a month after Raïs, and coming on the heels of the slaughter of 
some fifty residents of Beni Slimane (Médéa) on 20 September, the Mitidja plain once 
again played host to a massacre of several hundred. From the site of the killing, the Haï 
                                                
14 New York Times, ‘Algeria’s Agony’, 3 September 1997: A22. 
15 Radio France Internationale, ‘Forty-five killed in second massacre in two days in Beni Messous’, 
BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 9 September 1997; see also Radio France Internationale, 
‘Toll of 63 people dead in Beni Messous massacre’, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 8 
September 1997. 
16 AFP, ‘63 civilians massacred in Algeria’, 6 September 1997. 
17 Rachid Khiari, ‘Algeria Massacre Kills at Least 87’, Associated Press, 6 September 1997. 
18 Rachid Khiari, ‘Algerians Barricade, Arm Themselves’, Associated Press, 7 September 1997. 
19 AFP, 21 September 1997; also, ‘deux semaines d’accalmie’ in Figaro, 22 September 1997. 
 113 
Djilali/Djillali and Boudoumi neighbourhoods in the Bentalha quarter of Algiers’ Baraki 
commune, an early report indicated that crews had already filled eight rows of eighteen 
graves (144) in the nearby Sidi Rezine cemetery. More coffins were still arriving.20 While 
the Algerian government backed a figure of eighty-five dead, survivors, medical and relief 
workers spoke of at least two hundred.21 During the killing, which lasted for several hours, 
victims either had their throats slit, were burned alive or shot. Several children were 
reportedly thrown to their death from rooftops, pregnant women were disembowelled, 
homes were bombed with Molotov cocktails while others were ransacked or looted. Said 
one survivor, ‘It’s an unimaginable butchery’.22 In the week following the Bentalha 
massacre, very few eyewitness survivor accounts appeared in the international press. 
However, as the Algerian government prepared for local and provincial elections in mid 
October 1997, foreign journalists were granted visas and allowed to visit the Raïs and 
Bentalha massacre sites. The Guardian23 and La Croix24 both interviewed the same 
Bantalha survivor, who pointed to the spot in his kitchen where his wife had been shot, his 
daughter hacked to death with an axe and his son stabbed to death with knives. In all, 
forty-one people — including neighbours seeking shelter — died in his house. The Irish 
Times published an account from the Algerian press in which one of the massacre’s 
participants allegedly made bets on the gender of unborn foetuses before cutting them out 
of their mothers.25 One resident recalled, ‘I stood here at the window and I could hear those 
poor people screaming and crying. When I looked out of my window, I could see them 
axing the women on the roof’.26 The attackers allegedly burned alive a mentally impaired 
man. 27 
                                                
20 Boubker Belkadi, ‘Des dizaines de victimes enterrees pres de Bentalha’, AFP 23 September 
1997. 
21 AFP, ‘200 à 250 personnes massacrées à Bentalha, selon deux quotidiens’, 24 September 1997. 
22 M.D., ‘L’escalade de l’horreur’, Le Point, 27 September 1997. 
23 David Hirst, ‘The mystery of Algeria’s murder squads: “This is where they shot my wife”’, 
Guardian, 20 October 1997: 1. 
24 François d’Alançon, ‘Algérie. A trois jours des élections municipales, Bentalhâa continue de 
panser ses plaies’, La Croix, 21 October 1997: 10. 
25 Lara Marlowe, ‘Families hid and listened to dying neighbours’ screams’, Irish Times, 21 October 
1997: 11. 
26 Robert Fisk, ‘Stench of death in Algeria’s perfumed killing fields’, The Independent, 23 October 
1997: 16. 
Other late October 1997 reportage from Bentalha includes Alain Bommenel, ‘Suspicion and 
hatred stalk the streets of massacre village’, AFP, 22 October 1997; Jean Pierre Tuquoi, ‘Bentalha, 
ville martyre, ville fantôme d’Algérie’, Le Monde, 22 Octobre 1997; Anthony Loyd, ‘Villagers 
relive terror of night massacres’, The Times (London), 22 October 1997; Florence Aubenas, 
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A second ‘relative calm’28 following Bentalha ended when the Algerian government 
announced two massacres on Christmas Eve 1997. This time the killing happened well 
south and west of the capital, localised in several villages on the border of the Tiaret and 
Tissemsilt prefectures. Reuters reported that, amongst the twenty-seven victims in the 
Zouabria village, one was a decapitated baby of twelve days, found still clutching his slain 
mother. At the same time, the Associated Press reported a smaller massacre of eleven 
civilians just west of Algiers, in which ‘Their corpses were decapitated and dismembered, 
and the heads were attached to hooks that were hung from the walls of houses in the 
area’.29 By the end of the ten days preceding Ramadan, over 300 killings had been 
reported, including the Tiaret-Tissemsilt massacres. ‘Even after five years of slaughter 
some of the acts manage to shock’, a reporter suggested, noting that ‘the hacked-up and 
gutted bodies of 11 men, women and children were found strewn around a forest next to 
Algiers’.30 Then, on the first day of Ramadan, reports began to circulate of a series of 
massacres in the western Ouarsenis mountains. Algerian state radio claimed that several 
villages in the prefecture of Relizane had been targeted on the night of 30-31 December, 
resulting in seventy-eight dead.31 Yet subsequent reports in the independent Algerian press 
offered figures three to five times higher. The Algerian daily Liberté interviewed survivors 
who reported witnessing infants smashed against walls, bodies being dismembered and 
decapitated. For the most part, the killers had used rudimentary weapons: knives, hoes, 
shovels, hatchets. The village of Kherarba (or Khourba) was purportedly decimated; one 
report indicated that, of the 200 families living there, 176 had been killed; another 
suggested that, out of 260 residents, only two survived. One survivor claimed he had 
                                                                                                                                              
‘Bentalha, le récit de dix heures de tuerie’, Libération, 23 October 1997; Youssef M. Ibrahim, 
‘Algeria Votes, Recalling Fateful Election of 1992’, New York Times, 24 October 1997: A8; 
Youssef M. Ibrahim, ‘As Algerian Civil War Drags On, Atrocities Grow’, New York Times, 28 
December 1997: I1. 
27 John Lancaster, ‘As Algeria’s Savagery Grows, So Does Mystery Shrouding It’, Washington 
Post, 18 October 1997: A1.  
28 Of the two- (Algeria Watch website) to four-dozen (Aït-Larbi et al. 1999) mass killing episodes 
recorded between 28 September (Si Serhane, near Blida, forty-seven killed) and the 23-24 
December Tiaret-Tissemsilt massacres, all reportedly claimed less than fifty casualties. 
29 Associated Press, ‘Attackers kill 59 people in Algeria, government says’, 24 December 1997. 
30 Alain Bommenel, ‘Fasting and bloodshed: Algeria ushers in Ramadan’, AFP, 30 December 
1997. 
31 AFP, ‘78 civils assassines dans l’ouest algérien’, 31 December 1997; Rachid Khiari, ‘Algerian 
government says 78 massacred in Ramadan attacks’, Associated Press, 31 December 1997. 
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helped remove eighty bodies from two different houses; ‘I leave you to imagine the extent 
of the catastrophe in four hamlets’.32 Another resident of the area recounted the death of 
his wife and three children by having their throats slashed. A young woman alleged 
surviving an axe blow to the stomach; several other women were seen abducted by the 
attackers.33 The killing had started shortly after sunset and only ended the following dawn. 
Two police officers interviewed by the Algeria daily L’Authentique claimed that they had 
respectively collected seventy-five and 115 bodies from two different villages.34 
 
While international attention and condemnation began to focus more intensely on the 
massacres in Algeria, the killing in Relizane had not yet reached its zenith. On 6 January, 
the international press announced a new wave of massacres. Citing several Algerian 
dailies, one early report claimed over one hundred murdered in the village of Meknassa 
and that a village near Had Chekala had been ‘razed’ during the weekend of 3-4 January.35 
Subsequent reports, again based on the Algerian press, offered figures between 150 and 
500 killed. ‘The village is completely destroyed, burned to the ground and all its residents 
shot dead, slaughtered or burnt alive’, recalled one witness from a neighbouring area. 
‘Bodies of men, women and children still litter the area’.36 Another witness, this one at the 
scene of the Meknassa, said, ‘The bodies were mutilated, and many disfigured by axes’. 37 
                                                
32 Rachid Khiari, ‘“Guerrillas” with walkie-talkies herded Algerians to slaughter’, The Observer, 4 
January 1998: 4. 
33 AFP, ‘New bloodbath in Algeria: 412 massacred’, 3 January 1998. 
34 Alain Bommenel, ‘Les autorités et l’armée confrontées a l’escalade de la terreur’, AFP, 3 
January 1998. 
See also, Associated Press ‘Report: Ramadan massacres killed more than 400 in Western 
Algeria’, 2 January 1998; Associated Press ‘Muslim militants hack 412 villagers to death in 
Algeria’s worst massacre’, 3 January 1998; Reuters, 4 January 1998; AFP ‘22 more slain in Algeria 
at outset of bloody Ramadan: Press’ 5 January 1998. 
35 AFP, ‘Algerian newspapers report 172 killed in latest massacres’, 6 January 1998. 
 While the Algerian government did not acknowledge these larger massacres, three smaller ones 
in the same area — Sidi Mammar (twenty nine killed), Ouled Bounif (twelve) and Ihdjaidia 
(twenty one killed) — were officially disclosed, having occurred on the nights between 5-7 
January. See AFP,’More massacres hit Algeria as pressure mounts for inquiry’,7 January 1998; 
Reuters in ‘Massacres claim 62 more Algerians: Pressure grows for outside investigation’, Calgary 
Herald (Alberta), 8 January 1998: A5. Other spellings included: Sidi Maamar/Oued Mâamar, 
Hedjailia and Kalaat Ouled Bounif. 
In 2006, a high government official said that one of the Relizane massacres had reached one 
thousand deaths. See F.M., ‘Massacre de Ramka: 1000 morts!’, El Watan, 22 March 2006. 
36 Reuters, ‘Algerian massacre victims too many to bury’, 10 January 1998. 
37 Associated Press, ‘Algerian massacres kill at least 392 - including 200 in one village’, 6 January 
1998. 
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Others spoke of seeing people burned alive, pregnant women eviscerated and a baby killed 
with a hatchet. A donkey’s head was allegedly placed on the body of a decapitated 
villager.38 Confirming such accounts, however, proved difficult. Algerian journalists had 
difficulty reaching these sites; some were located hours from main roads, lacked phone 
lines and were accessible only by foot. By 8 January, Algerian government-run radio 
channel had reported three additional massacres in the same area, totalling, according to 
official sources, sixty-two deaths.39 
 
The last of the major massacres of the Algerian conflict, the slaughter at Sidi Hamed on 
11-12 January, brought the focus back to the outskirts of Algiers. Initially, news reports 
claimed that ‘dozens of families’ had perished, including children, women and the 
elderly.40 The killing began in the evening after the residents had broken their fast. The 
Algerian government circulated an official death toll of 103 (along with seventy 
wounded)41 shortly afterwards, while the some elements of the Algerian press put forward 
figures from 256 (La Tribune) to 400 (Liberté and El Watan).42 Writing from the site of the 
killing, a foreign reporter saw, ‘In one corner of the village, a crowd suddenly parted as 
four men emerged from one torched home, carrying the grisly blackened remains of yet 
another victim’. He added, ‘Nearby, one pale villager scraped a gory mixture of flesh and 
bone off the side of a hut’. A survivor told the reporter, ‘Look, on the other side of the 
road, you can see where they shot people and cut their throats’. Another said, ‘My cousin 
also managed to keep them back, but only until his ammunition ran out. Then they killed 
him and cut off his hands’.43 Two Algerian papers published a photo showing the body of a 
burned child, skin charred away to reveal a bare skull.44 As the foreign press repeatedly 
underlined, the Sidi Hamed massacre brought the death toll during the first fortnight of 
Ramadan to over one thousand in Algeria. 
                                                
38 AFP, ‘“The dead are the lucky ones”, says Algerian massacre survivor’, 7 January 1998. 
39 Reuters, ‘Massacres claim 62 more Algerians: Pressure grows for outside investigation’, Calgary 
Herald, 8 January 1998: A5. 
See also Associated Press, ‘Algerians flee horror, government rejects inquiry, West seeks 
solutions’, 6 January 1998; AFP, ‘More than 170 slain in latest Algerian massacres: Papers’ 7 
January 1998; Associated Press, ‘Government rejects international inquiry into violence, Algerians 
flee’, 7 January 1998; AFP, ‘EU grapples for response to Algeria blood-letting’, 8 January 1998. 
40 AFP, ‘“Dozens of families” wiped out in new Algerian massacre’, 12 January 1998. 
41 AFP, ‘103 morts et 70 blesses a Sidi Hammed, selon un premier bilan officiel’, 12 January 1998. 
42 AFP, ‘Algerian government denies death toll of 400’, 13 January 1998. 
43 AFP, ‘Bloodbath at Sidi Hamed brings new horror in Algeria’, 12 January 1998. 
44 AFP, ‘Graphic accounts of latest Algeria massacre as EU to send team’, 13 January 1998. 
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The massacres 
 
The above sampling is just some of the accounts to come out of the largest reported 
massacres in 1990s Algeria. This wave of massacres, which brought widespread 
international attention to the violence in Algeria, began in late 1996 and peaked in January 
1998. Civilian massacres continued past a popular referendum on national reconciliation in 
1999 and were reported through 2002, though at levels far below the zenith of August 
1997 to January 1998. There are also allegations of massacre activity before 1996. 
Algerian historian Mohamed Harbi, citing an alleged high-level source, said that state 
agents had massacred ‘hundreds’ of civilians in Ouled Asker (Jijel prefecture) in 1992 
(Harbi et al. 1998: 169), a claim that is not supported by any other account. Dissident 
Algerian human rights activists have recorded allegations of state-authored massacres as 
early as 1993, though these have likewise never been independently confirmed and were 
not reported by mainstream sources at the time.45 In his memoir of life in the Algerian 
special forces, Souaïdia (2001: 149-51; see chapter eight) recalls unwittingly taking part in 
a state-authored civilian massacre in March 1993 in a place called Douar Ez-Zaatria (or 
Zaâtria), which was allegedly blamed on Islamists in the Algerian press. However, a 
leading Algerian newspaper editor denied that such a story has ever been reported46 and 
                                                
45 The most significant allegation concerns reports of a possible large massacre of 173 persons in 
the region of Tenes (Chlef) in May of 1994. However, the context provided by Algeria Watch’s list 
of massacres indicates that 173 bodies were found, suggesting the possibility of mass grave or body 
dump, rather than a single mass killing episode. The two original sources for these claims (seen as 
close to the FIS) are out of print and could not be obtained by the author. They are Comité Algérien 
des Militants Libres de la Dignité humaine et des Droits de l’Homme, Livre Blanc Sur La 
Répression En Algérie (1991-1994). Tome 1 (Geneva, Switzerland: Hoggar, 1994); and Comité 
Algérien des Militants Libres de la Dignité humaine et des Droits de l’Homme, Livre Blanc Sur La 
Répression En Algérie (1991-1995). Les Vérités Sur Une Guerre Cachée. Tome 2 (Geneva, 
Switzerland: Hoggar, 1995). The French Interior Ministry blocked the distribution of the first 
volume in France on the grounds that it contained hate speech and sought to affect government 
policy. See AFP, ‘Un «Livre blanc sur la repression en Algerie» interdit en France’, 13 September 
1995. 
46 Nadjia Bouzeghrane, ‘Les fausses vérités de Souaïdia’, El Watan, 20 February 2001. See chapter 
eight dealing with Souaïdia’s response.  
The debate surrounding a massacre in or near Douar Ez-Zaâtria, however, raises the possibility 
of some massacre episodes being lost to history. While it might not seem possible for a massacre to 
go unrecorded or unwitnessed, anthropologist Carolyn Nordstrom (Nordstrom 1997: 44) recalls 
circling over a decimated village in Mozambique in an aircraft. The killing, she estimated, must 
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when two French journalists were allowed to visit the putative site of the massacre, 
villagers denied that there had ever been any such thing.47 In short, most massacres reports 
between 1992 and mid 1996 are highly contentious, apart from the Berrouaghia prison 
massacre of November 1994 (figures ranging between twelve and 500 prisoners killed) and 
the Serkadji prison massacre of February 1995 (109 prisoners reportedly killed). 
 
Indisputable is the fact that public bombings caused a significant number of single-episode 
fatalities before 1996, and still remain a facet of Algeria’s political violence through 2010. 
Whether or not to consider bombings as a kind of massacre is a question raised by some of 
the literature. Though both bombings and massacres cause a great number injuries and 
deaths, most studies of the Algerian massacres have either explicitly (Aït-Larbi et al. 1999) 
or implicitly (Kalyvas 1999; Hafez 2004) distinguished between bombings and other forms 
of mass killing. The Aït Larbi, et al., (1999: 16-7) study codes bombings as ‘random’ and 
massacres as ‘selective’. Yet even in the case of Algeria, this distinction does not always 
hold. Impersonal — as opposed to ‘suicide’ — bombings might have less of a chance of 
being as selective as face-to-face killing. But at-a-distance public bombings in Algeria 
frequently appeared to have specific targets, from civilian to military, and therefore 
specific victim populations. As will be examined in the following chapter, it has not been 
well established that each and every one of the hundreds, possibly thousands, of victims of 
the major massacres — e.g., Bougara, Raïs, Béni Messous, Bentalha, Relizane, Sidi 
Hamed (see map 1) — were specifically selected for murder. Just like a bombing, precision 
seems heavily determined by spatial location. It is also seems problematic to describe, as 
selective, massacres at ‘false checkpoints’ (faux barrages), where armed actors would 
establish barricades on roads, pretending to be either security forces or insurgents in order 
to engage in terror, racketeering or both. Moreover, the term massacre is often used to 
imply the collective murder of non-resisting persons, whether civilian or armed, which 
could easily apply to victims of both bombings and face-to-face killings equally.  
 
                                                                                                                                              
have figured at least a thousand. When she inquired with local officials about the fate of the village, 
they knew nothing about it though they seemed unsurprised and indifferent. 
47 Blaise Robinson and Olivier Joulie, ‘La version des habitants de Zaâtria: «Il n’y a jamais eu de 
massacre ici...»’, Le Nouvel Observateur Nº1899, 29 March 2001. 
 119 
Map 1 
Approximate location of the largest Algerian massacres, 1997-98 
 
Note: See Map 2 for an explanation of the prefecture shading. 
 
 
Just as the qualitative elements of the term massacre have been implicitly and explicitly 
debated within the literature on Algerian violence, so have the quantitative aspects. As 
with the analytical discussions about how many deaths are required for an intra-national 
armed conflict to make the leap to ‘civil war’ status (see chapter four), similar questions 
could certainly be raised as to the exact lower limits of a massacre. When does mass killing 
become a massacre? However, in the discourse on the Algerian massacres, no debate really 
existed on this question. In various media representations, the implicit baseline for a 
massacre appears to have been roughly nine or ten victims, though with possibly 
significant downward deviation (see Table 2). More rigorous studies of the massacres have 
used thresholds from four (Sidhoum & Algeria Watch 2003a; Kalyvas 1999) to fifteen 
(Hafez 2004: 54). While this debate might seem too pedantic, the consequences of 
adopting different massacre thresholds are plain enough. A threshold of fifteen fatalities, 
for example, eliminates over one hundred potential massacre episodes and roughly 1,100 
victims from the Algeria Watch list between November 1996 and August 2001. On the 
other hand, no reason is given as to why the threshold was neither three nor two. What is 
the distinction between a massacre and other forms of targeted killing involving two or 
more victims? Depending on what answer is provided, and for whatever political, scientific 
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or pragmatic reasons, our understanding of the basic scope of the massacre phenomenon in 
Algeria will be heavily determined by it. Yet labelling the murder of four, fourteen, forty 
and four hundred people as a massacre also had the effect, at least in the case of Algeria, of 
amalgamating a wide variety of violent episodes into a single category. As will be argued 
in the conclusion of this chapter, this tendency to over-determine brought with it a 
predisposition to assign a single logic to every constituent act of the category. 
 
Keeping this in mind, there have been four concerted attempts to measure the basic 
dimensions of the massacres in Algeria: Aït-Larbi et al. 1999; Kalyvas 1999; Hafez 2004 
and the website of the dissident exile group Algeria Watch (Sidhoum & Algeria Watch 
2003a) based in Germany. Within these studies, the number of massacre events ranges 
from a low of seventy-six between November 1996 and August 2001 using a threshold of 
fifteen deaths (Hafez 2004: 54), to a high of 335 massacres between December 1993 and 
December 1998 using a threshold of five deaths (Aït-Larbi et al. 1999). The latter study 
produces a figure of 7,931 massacre-related fatalities, though it must be stressed that 
claims of massacres before 1996 are highly contentious. The less controversial massacre 
period of late 1996 through the end of 1998 produces a total of 6,449 deaths from 295 
massacre episodes in the Aït Larbi, et al., study. Kalyvas, using a threshold of four deaths, 
counts eighty-six massacres for the same period; the result is a range of 3,147 to 3,865 
fatalities. Algeria Watch and Sidhoum (2003a), also using a threshold of four victims, 
recorded 5,183 deaths from 182 massacres during this peak period (late 1996 to December 
1998). The Algeria Watch list has also gone on to record massacres: nineteen in 1999 (297 
killed), thirteen in 2000 (174 killed), thirty-two in 2001 (356 killed) and thirty-three in 
2002 (375 killed).48 Compared to the total number killed in acts of armed violence since 
1992, with estimates ranging between 50,000 to 200,000 (see chapter four), it would 
appear that the number of massacre victims accounts for a relatively small fraction of total 
war-related fatalities. 
 
                                                
48 Algeria Watch has also recorded massacres as late as 2003 and 2004. 
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Table 2 
Non-exhaustive list of widely reported massacre episodes in Algeria (1996-2002) 
 
Approx.  
End Date 
(d/m/y) 
Min. 
# 
killed 
Max. 
# 
killed 
Locality (Sometimes 
Approximate) or Context 
Wilaya Notes 
17/8/96  63 Faux barrage road attack 
(contested) 
Msila - Batna  
4/9/96  18 Faux barrage attack on road 
near Tunisian border 
Batna  
6/9/96  12 Faux barrage attack on road Ghardaia  
5/11/96  31 Sidi Kebir Blida  
12/1/97  14 Tabainat Blida  
19/1/97 30 49 Beni Slimane, Sidi Abdelaziz Medea  
1/2/97  21 Medea Medea  
17/2/97  31 El Karrech Blida  
4/3/97  52 Thalit Medea  
19/3/97  32 Ouled Antar Medea  
14/4/97  30 Boufarik Blida  
22/4/97 47 93 Bougara Blida  
23/4/97  42 Omaria Medea  
15/5/97 30 32 Chebli Blida  
14/6/97  13  Alger  
16/6/97  50 Dairet Lebguer Msila  
13/7/97  44 Ksar El-Boukhari Medea  
23/7/97 37 56 Yemma M'ghita and Benachour Blida  
25/7/97 28 38 Hadjout Tipaza  
28/7/97 50 51 Larbaa Blida  
30/7/97  41 Ain Defla Ain Defla  
21/8/97  63 Souhane Blida  
26/8/97  64 Beni Ali Blida  
29/8/97 98 300 Sidi Raïs Alger Officially 98 
30/8/97  42 Maalba Djelfa Often dated 28 Aug 
6/9/97  63 Algiers (Beni Messous) Alger  
20/9/97  53 Beni Slimane, Tablat Medea  
23/9/97  250 Bentalha Alger  
27/9/97  30 Sfisef Sidi Bel Abbes  
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13/10/97 43 54 Sig (attack on bus) Mascara - 
Oran 
 
18/12/97  31 Djiboulo, near Larbaa Blida  
21/12/97  30 El Bordj Tlemcen  
24/12/97 48 120  Tiaret Two attacks 
26/12/97  27  Tiaret  
27/12/97 25 30 Safsaf Mascara  
31/12/97 78 412 Souk El Had (3-4 villages) Relizane Multiple villages 
attacked 
3/1/98  117 Meknessa Relizane  
4/1/98 153 500 Had Chekala (area) Relizane  
5/1/98  62  Relizane Several attacks 
reported 
11/1/98 103 400 Sidi Hamed Blida  
27/3/98  47 Oued Bouaicha Djelfa  
28/4/98  28 Arzew Oran  
8/12/98 55 81  Chlef  
15/8/99  29 Beni Ounif Bechar  
24/12/99  30 Faux barrage attack near 
Khémis Meliana 
Ain Defla  
28/2/00  24  El Bayadh  
4/5/00  23 Faux barrage attack Medea  
18/1/01  23  Chlef  
28/1/01  25  Chlef  
11/2/01  27 Berrouaghia Medea  
27/9/01  22 Larbaa Blida  
30/5/02  23  Chlef  
      
Sources:  AFP, ‘Les principaux massacres en Algérie depuis le début des troubles en 1992’, 19 August 
1996; Reuters/The Globe and Mail (Canada), ‘Bombs shatter safety of big cities Muslim fundamentalists 
in Algeria take violence to urban areas in heightening conflict’, 23 January 1997;  Le Monde, ‘Plus de 700 
morts depuis juillet’, 1 September 1997; Sud Ouest, ‘Un terrible bilan’, 24 September 1997; 
Reuters/Toronto Star, ‘Algerian rebels kill 54 in night of bloodshed’, 15 October 1997: A12; AFP, 
‘Following is a chronology of some of the worst known massacres of 1997’, 31 December 1997; AFP, 
‘Les massacres les plus meurtriers en Algérie depuis le début de l’année’, 31 December 1997; Associated 
Press, ‘Major massacres of Algerian insurgency’, 3 January 1998; AFP, ‘Worst massacres in Algeria in 
the past year’, 7 January 1998; La Croix, ‘Algérie. Deux ans de violences sans précédent’, 12 December 
1998; AFP, ‘Dix ans de violence en Algérie’, 9 January 2002; AFP, Les attentats les plus meurtriers en 
Algérie depuis trois ans, 5 July 2002. 
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Geographically, massacres were reported in a large number of prefectures (wilayat), 
though very few in the Saharan areas or, before 1999, in the eastern prefectures (see map 
2). According to the Aït Larbi, et al. (1999: 51-6), study, which has performed the most 
detailed geographical analysis, the highest concentration of massacres was in the central 
north: Algiers and the adjacent prefectures of Blida, Médéa, Tipaza and Aïn Defla. 
Together these account for nearly two thirds of massacre events in their database; the 
second highest concentration was in the northwestern prefectures. Moreover, two observed 
features of the massacres, which prompted much speculation about their political 
motivation, are apparently born out in the Aït Larbi, et al., study. First, massacres tended to 
strike Islamist electoral strongholds in the elections of 1990 and 1991 (ibid.: 56-71) and, 
second, massacre activity greatly decreased, almost to zero, during voting periods (ibid.: 
121-5). Indeed, the Aït Larbi, et al., study develops a number of other indicators and 
performs a number of analyses on the political geography of the massacres. While there is 
reason to question the data, methodology and analysis of the Aït Larbi, et al., study, it is 
more important, given the goals of this chapter and this study in general, to focus on the 
question of the massacres’ political agency and logic. 
 
While questions regarding the massacres’ threshold, magnitude, frequency, distribution 
and intensity were all facets of the international debate, two closely related issues 
dominated all others: the identity of the perpetrators and their politics. Speculation was 
particularly charged and of heightened international political import during the period of 
the ‘major’ massacres of 1997 and 1998. This was especially the case between the Raïs 
massacre in late August 1997 and the Relizane massacres of early January 1998. This is 
not to suggest that speculation was not already detectable before or persisted afterwards. 
The Bougara and Sidi Hamed massacres form bookends to our analysis only in so far as 
they apparently represent the first and the last of the massacres to have reportedly obtained, 
albeit with some contention, at least one hundred casualties.  Given that the intensity of the 
internationalised politics of naming Algerian violence tracked almost perfectly with the 
increasing and decreasing lethality of the massacres (as described in chapter seven), it is 
worth examining the debates as they occurring during this period to understand the 
relationship between representation and intervention at the core of this study. In other 
words, it is during this relatively brief window — September 1997 to January 1998 — that 
the Algerian conflict obtained its highest profile in international affairs. This is thus the 
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moment when preceding and contemporary discursive interventions could have the greatest 
affect on the unfolding internationalised crisis. 
 
Map 2  
Massacre activity in Algeria by prefecture (August 1996 - May 2002)  
based on Table 2 
 
Key: #. Prefecture (Massacres): 1. Alger (4), 2. Blida (13), 3 Medea (9), 4 Tipaza (1), 5 Aïn Defla 
(2), 6 Chlef (4), 7 Relizane (4), 8 Batna (2), 9 Msila (2), 10 Djelfa (2), 11 Tiaret (2), 12 Mascara 
(2), 13 Oran (2), 14 Tlemçen (1), 15 Sidi Bel Abbes (1), 16 El Bayadh (1), 17 Ghardaia (1), 18 
Bechar (1). 
Note: This map should only be treated as a cartographic version of Table 2 and not as a 
comprehensive or accurate representation of the actual geographical distribution of massacre 
activity by prefecture. It merely depicts the general location some of the most widely reported 
massacres. 
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The task at hand is to look at the most prominent theses regarding the identity of the 
massacres’ perpetrators and the suspected motives for engaging in these mass atrocities. 
The scope of the inquiry in this chapter is limited to those theses mainly advanced by 
foreigners, whether journalists, academics, activists, officials, politicians or other 
international observer types. The following chapter examines more Algerian views of the 
massacres, though in terms of how they were represented. That is, how some were 
deployed — others curiously ignored — in the service of attempts to write the identity and 
logic of the massacres’ authors. In no way should the effort here be read as an attempt to 
argue for or against any particular account of the forces driving the massacres. Rather, the 
aim is to compare these various theses of the massacres and draw out their differences and 
commonalities. It is hoped that the analysis here will go some way towards our 
understanding of the vexed relationship between writing mass violence and acting against 
it. 
 
 
A question of violence (in particular): the massacres 
 
As will be seen below, there were a number of theses offered to explain the massacres, to 
attribute an identity to the perpetrators and to explicate the reasons these atrocities. Not all 
of these were mutually exclusive; some overlapped, some were clearly discordant. Though 
there were likely several drivers behind the internationalised Qui tue? debate surrounding 
the massacres, two specific questions, frequently reiterated, significantly affected the 
framing of the discussion. First was the claim that the Algerian government had failed to 
stop any of the major massacres. ‘The authorities have never been known to intervene in 
the four or five hours it takes to wipe out a village’, Libération’s José Garçon noted.49 For 
French journalist Jean Hatzfeld, writing after the Raïs massacre, the ‘determinant issue’ of 
the massacres had become, ‘How two to three hundred killers can operate in an area 
normally under tight police and military surveillance on the outskirts of the capital’?50 The 
second issue was the alleged observation that the major massacres were occurring in areas 
                                                
49 Quoted in The San Francisco Chronicle (Staff and Wire Reports), ‘Algeria’s Agony Only Grows 
Worse: Uncertainty Over Who Is Behind Civil War’s Brutal Slaughter’, 23 October 1997: C2. 
50 Comment deux à trois cents tueurs peuvent-ils agir dans une zone normalement sous haute 
surveillance militaire et policière, en périphérie de la capitale, devient une question déterminante 
(Jean Hatzfeld, ‘Près d’Alger, des villageois égorgés et brûlés’, Libération, 30 August 1997). 
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assumed to be sympathetic towards the insurgency. ‘Why would Muslim rebels attack in 
an Islamist area?’, the Economist demanded following the Bentalha massacre.51  
 
Both questions, however, only obtained warrant in the context of the official narrative of 
the massacres maintained by the Algerian government and internationally endorsed by a 
variety of actors and institutions. That is, the claim that the massacres were the work of the 
Islamist rebels, mainly the GIA. Accounts of the GIA’s motivation for carrying out these 
massacres, as we will see shortly, varied and seemingly did little to alleviate the scepticism 
towards the official narrative. If the GIA was carrying out the massacres, why would they 
kill their supporters and why did the Algerian state not do more to stop them? But, as will 
be seen below, these two claims should not be treated as given facts. Neither (1) the 
suspected political geography of the massacres nor (2) the alleged categorical failure of the 
Algerian security forces to stop them was rigorously established, then or now. 
Nevertheless, various theses of the massacres were launched in response to these putatively 
nagging questions as well as other factors highlighted below. Though this list is not 
exhaustive, it treats the most prominent theses of the massacres.  
 
Angry against God 
 
Among the various efforts to explain the massacres, particularly at the height of the killing 
in 1997 and 1998, the most widely circulated contention held that Islamist insurgents were 
conducting this campaign of mass slaughter.  A superficial examination of contemporary 
press accounts shows that this was the default assumption for many observers. Following 
the Bougara massacre of April 1997 a spokesperson for the US State Department flatly 
said, ‘It is hard to remember a more vicious terrorist insurgency, a more cynical group than 
these Islamic terrorists’.52 At the other end of the tunnel in February 1998, historian, and 
then MEP, Hélène Carrère d’Encausse visited Algeria as a member of an EU parliamentary 
                                                
51 The Economist, ‘Algeria. Bloodstained’, 27 September 1997: 48. 
 Rene Hardin, identified as a French specialist on Algeria, also felt the official version did not 
add up: ‘Why would the extremists attack people who back the idea of an Islamic state and alienate 
much of the population?’ (Bernard D. Kaplan, ‘West losing faith in Algerian regime’, Rocky 
Mountain News, 8 January 1998: 41A). 
52 AFP, ‘Washington condemns massacre in Algeria’, 23 April 1997. 
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exchange (see chapter seven). Afterwards she broached the question of government 
complicity in the massacres in the pages of Le Figaro:  
 
All interlocutors we met (that is to say all legal political parties, civil society 
associations), with one exception, say loudly that this is false. It is clear that the 
question ‘qui tue qui’ should never be asked. Everyone in Algeria knows who kills.53  
 
In her view, the GIA — encouraged by religious fanatics in Algeria and supporters abroad 
— was solely responsible.  How this became the default assumption owes somewhat to the 
same general conditions that spawned the numerous Qui tue? theses in the first place; for 
example, the physical inaccessibility and unbelievable horror of the violence. 
 
More important, though, were the Algerian government’s emphatic assertions that armed 
opposition groups were behind the massacres. The Algerian state’s strict controls over the 
production and circulation of knowledge during the conflict, and the fact that the 
government had become a dominant source of information for the domestic and foreign 
media (see the next chapter), arguably contributed to the wide transmission and acceptable 
of this thesis. In the government’s parlance, the perpetrators of the massacres, as with all 
other insurgent groups, were simply ‘terrorists’ or ‘criminal gangs’54, as if to deny their 
relation to Islam or the political legitimacy of terms like rebel. Following the Raïs 
massacre, for example, an official statement carried on national radio assured the 
population that ‘The state will continue to fight mercilessly against the barbarian criminals 
until their eradication’.55  
 
One of the challenges facing any of the hypotheses of the perpetrator’s identity was the 
apparent paucity of documentary evidence to highlight the possible culprits. One early 
exception, which perhaps proves the rule, is a report of a cardboard sign left at the scene of 
the massacre of thirty-one family members in Sidi Kebir in November 1996. “[A] rare 
                                                
53 Le Figaro, ‘La terreur islamiste’, 16 February 1998. 
The ‘one exception’ was likely Ali-Yahia’s Ligue Algérienne de Défense des Droits de 
l’Homme, Algeria’s most prominent independent human rights organisation. 
54 E.g., AFP, ‘Terrible carnage près d’Alger : entre 98 et 300 civils egorges’, 29 August 1997. 
55 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ‘Radio reports “massacre” of 98 south of Algiers’, 1 
September 1997.
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responsibility claim,” noted the dispatch.56 The sign carried a slogan associated with the 
GIA: blood and destruction. This is not to suggest that there was no documentary support 
for the hypothesis that rebels were perpetrating out the massacres. Indeed, this camp 
received a boost with the appearance document apparently linking the GIA to the recent 
atrocities. Communiqué 51 of the GIA, signed by then national amīr Antar Zoubri, 
appeared on 26 September in Al-Ansār, a GIA newsletter then published in London by the 
Egyptian-born activist Mustapha Kamel (Abu Hamza al-Masri). The Communiqué, dated 
21 September (i.e., the day before the Bentalha massacre), seemingly offered a definitive 
claim of responsibility and a statement of intent. In part, it read, ‘The world must 
understand that all the killings, the massacres, the burnings, the displacement of 
populations, the kidnappings of women, are an offering to God’.57 The GIA justified these 
actions, and warned they would continue, on the basis that anyone supporting the regime, 
civilian or not, was an infidel.58 Communiqué 51 also denounced the truce unilaterally 
proclaimed by the AIS on the same day, 21 September, to take effect on 1 October. In the 
wake of Bentalha, Al-Ansār, which reportedly hesitated to publish Communiqué 51, finally 
cut off ties with the GIA. ‘We declare before Allah not being associated with this group’, 
Kamel explained, ‘its thinking and its actions which are all shameful’.59 Given the general 
atmosphere of incredulity surrounding the information about the massacres, questions were 
                                                
56 Rachid Khiari, ‘Macabre Syndrome of Violence Gains Momentum Ahead of Referendum’, 
Associated Press, 17 November 1996. 
Similarly, a photo in the archive of the Algerian daily El Watan shows a sign left at the scene 
of an attack on a family in Oued El Alleug (Blida) on 12 November 1996. These words were 
written by hand on a piece of cardboard left at the scene: 
 
hadhā ḥukum tārik al-ṣalāh 
« al-jamāʿah al-islāmiyah al-musallaḥah » 
dam dam, hadim hadim 
[This is the punishment for those who abandon prayer 
‘Armed Islamic Group’ 
blood blood, destruction destruction] 
 
What appears to be a small bloodstain is just right of the words. If authentic, this sign would offer a 
claim of responsibility and a statement of intent, though one apparently tailored to local 
circumstances. (See El Watan archive, Photo box: ‘TERRORISM-MASSACRES/Bentalha - Sidi 
El Kebir - Rais - Chebli - Sidi Youcef’; File: ‘Carnage de Oued El-Alleug (12/11/96)’; Title: 
‘Famille assassinée par by terroristes a Oued El Alaegue’. Maison de la Presse (Tahar Djaout), 
Algiers, Algeria). 
57 Quoted in AFP, ‘Radical GIA group claims Algerian massacres’, 26 September 1997. 
58 Elaine Ganley, ‘Algerian Group Vows More Massacres’, Associated Press, 27 September 1997. 
59 AFP, ‘Underground Algerian newsletter withdraws support for GIA’, 30 September 1997. 
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raised about the authenticity of Communiqué 51. The French Interior Ministry had vetted 
the document as ‘seemingly authentic’ (semble authentique).60 Likewise, following 
military operations in Ouled Allel (an alleged insurgent stronghold in the Mitidja), the 
Algerian military claimed that it had found the GIA’s blueprint for the Bentalha attack, 
sketched out of six pages of notebook paper.61 
 
With the reported migration of the massacres westward in late 1997 and early 1998, it also 
became imperative to understand the new geographical logic of the insurgency’s atrocities.  
In this context, AFP, citing a report in Le Matin, noted that a letter signed by a GIA leader, 
‘Abou Djamil’, and found on the body of a slain rebel, had ordered the western massacres 
to draw government pressure away from the Mitidja.62 To explain the massacres in 
Relizane, Tiaret and Tissemsilt, it was also proposed that the GIA, squeezed out of the 
Algiers-Mitidja region, was seeking to establish itself in the west with rear bases in 
Morocco. A GIA leaflet had reportedly warned the residents of western Algeria: ‘We shall 
come here soon; we breakfasted in Algiers, we shall sup in Oran’.63 One problem with this 
account is that armed activity and massacres in the Algiers-Blida-Médéa region continued 
while the world’s gaze was drawn to the Ouarsensis.64 
 
Besides documentary evidence implicating the GIA in the massacres, the Algerian 
government also produced captured rebels for the domestic and international media. For 
                                                
60 See AFP’s photo of Communiqué 51, dated 27 September 1997, and accompanying caption 
(Document Reference: SAPA970927846740), available at http://www.imageforum-
diffusion.afp.com, accessed August 2010. See also Lara Marlowe, ‘Continuing campaign of 
violence claims lives of 11 women teachers’, Irish Times, 30 September 1997: 9. 
 Sceptics of the communiqué’s authenticity, are not difficult to find. Paris Match’s Patrick 
Forestier wrote that, according to British intelligence services monitoring Kamel’s phone, calls 
allegedly from the GIA were coming from an Algerian army facility (Patrick Forestier, ‘Derrière 
les tueries, de sordides intérêts immobiliers et fonciers?’, Paris-Match, 9 October1997: 93). 
61 Salima Tlemcani, ‘Massacre de Bentalha: Un plan minutieux préparé par Laâzraoui’, El Watan, 
No, 2096, 11 October 1997 (Folder: Terrorisme, File: Les GIA, El Watan archive, Algiers). 
According to this account, the mastermind of the Bentalha massacre was the amīr of the Baraki 
commune, Salmi ‘Laâzraoui’ Mohamed, who enlisted approximately one hundred other GIA 
fighters from surrounding areas for the attack. The event that apparently triggered the massacre was 
apparently both personal and political: Bentalha’s residents had kicked Laâzraoui’s family out of 
the district, signalling the district’s seemingly wholesale rejection of the GIA. 
62 AFP, ‘New bloodbath in Algeria: 412 massacred’ 3 January 1998 
63 David Hirst, ‘Algerian slaughter claims 1,000 lives’, Manchester Guardian Weekly, 11 January 
1998: 1. 
64 See AFP, ‘22 more slain in Algeria at outset of bloody Ramadan’, 5 January 1998. 
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example, Zohra (Nacéra) Ould Hamrane, alleged participant in the Bentalha massacre and 
sister of a slain local amīr, was brought before the Algerian press and television to describe 
the GIA’s role. Her stated job during the massacre, helped by her mother, was to identify 
those to be killed and to loot houses and bodies.65 In one of the foreign news outlets to pick 
up this story, La Croix’s François d’Alançon interviewed a captured ‘terrorist’ (his quotes) 
who corroborated a similar account of the massacre.66 Algerian security forces had also 
broadcast the capture of GIA leader Antar Zouabri’s sister: Nacera (Khadidja) Zouabri. In 
one of the more macabre stories to emerge from the Algerian massacres, it was said that 
Khadidja and her fellow assailants admitted to placing bets on the gender of unborn 
foetuses and then slashed them out of their mothers’ wombs.67  
 
Explanations of such horrifically inexplicable behaviour on the part of the insurgency took 
on a variety of forms. Providing an answer to this question was of utmost importance: why 
would the rebels attack their apparent base of civilian support? As the insurgency was 
putatively Islamist, it was only natural for some observers to search for a corresponding 
Islamic logic behind these seemingly irrational massacres. To explain the violence of the 
insurgency, the ideas of Islamist thinkers, such as the Egyptian Sayyid Qutb, and Islamist 
movements, such as al-Takfīr wa al-Hijrah, were cited in conjunction with the GIA’s 
alleged authorship of the massacres.68 Speculation that the GIA had become a Neo-
Khawārij sect also appeared. When asked by Le Monde if there was any commonality 
between the ‘methods’ of the GIA and Shi‘ah Ismāʿīli of over eight hundred years ago, 
Egyptian author Gamal Ghitany replied, ‘I would rather say there is an affinity with the 
                                                
65 Salima Tlemcani, ‘Massacre de Bentalha: Un plan minutieux préparé par Laâzraoui’, El Watan, 
No. 2096, 11 October 1997 (Folder: Terrorisme, File: Les GIA, El Watan archive, Algiers). 
 Another strange aspect of Zohra’s story was her claim that a number of the attackers allegedly 
spoke Arabic with Moroccan, Tunisian and Libyan accents (see Robert Fisk, ‘Brutal killers without 
faces’, Independent, 26 October 1997: 1). 
66 François d’Alançon, ‘Algérie. A trois jours des élections municipales, Bentalhâa continue de 
panser ses plaies’, La Croix, 21 Octobre 1997: 10.  
See also Robert Fisk, ‘Brutal killers without faces’, Independent, 26 October 1997: 1. 
67 Lara Marlowe, ‘Families hid and listened to dying neighbours’ screams’, Irish Times 
21 October 1997: 11. See also AFP, ‘Troops discover mass grave in Algerian battle zone’, 9 
October 1997. 
68 For example, Jane’s Intelligence Review (1 September 1997), cited by Kazuhiko Fujiwara, 
‘Algerian radicals change killer ideals’, The Daily Yomiuri, 11 September 1997: 6. 
 131 
movement of the Kharijites’. The simple reason being, ‘The Kharijites resorted to 
collective massacres’.69 
 
However, to explain the nihilistic excesses revealed in the massacres, other accounts were 
proposed. For example, ‘islamistes du troisième type’, who used violence for neither the 
goal of reform nor the ends of revolution but simply for violence itself. 70 As noted above, 
media accounts highlighted a favoured GIA slogan: ‘dam dam, hadim hadim’ (blood 
blood, destruction destruction).71 Also noted was the appearance, just before the Raïs 
massacre, of a GIA faction reportedly calling itself al-Ghāḍibūn ʿalā Allāh. The extremism 
of this breakaway faction was allegedly revealed in two features: the headbands that bore 
their name — frequently translated as those ‘angry’ or ‘revolting against Allah’72 — and 
their missing right index finger. The latter signified their alleged rejection of al-Shahādah 
because Allah had forsaken the insurgency in favour of the ‘Ṭāghūt’ in the government.73 
When conducting massacres, it was reported that attackers, their eyelashes and eyebrows 
plucked out, had howled like wolves. These ‘dhabbāḥin’ — butchers — committed the 
                                                
69 Boutros Hani, ‘Les personnalités culturelles influentes et crédibles doivent se mobiliser’, Le 
Monde, 10 November 1997. See also Boutros Hani, ‘Les kharidjites, précurseurs de la violence 
sectaire en terre d’islam’, Le Monde, 10 November 1997. 
 Such accusations were unrelated to the Berber-speaking Ibāḍī populations of Algeria’s Mzab 
region in the Sahara. 
70 Quoted in José Garçon, ‘Terreur et psychose aux portes d’Alger. Nouveau carnage sans 
intervention des forces de sécurité’, Libération, 8 September 1997. 
71 Boubker Belkadi, ‘51 morts a Larbaa’, AFP, 29 Jully 1997; Lara Marlowe, ‘Axemen rule in 
Islam’s killing fields’, Observer, 8 December 1996: 18; Rachid Khiari, ‘School massacre: militants 
kill 12 teachers; 19 other civilians killed’, Associated Press, 29 September 1997. 
72 For example, ‘fâchés contre Allah’ in La Croix (10 September 1997) or ‘Révoltés contre Dieu’ in 
Libétration (8 September 1997); and then the ‘madmen of Allah’ (Washington Times, 14 
September 1997).  
The original source for this claim was also Le Matin (27 August 1997), a fiercely secular paper 
representing the former communist tendency in Algeria. Whether or not the report is based in any 
fact, there is the possibility of a mistranslation. In some dialects, the preposition ʿalā can mean 
alongside and, in some medieval settings, ‘on the authority/strength of’. Indeed, the only precedent 
for something similar is in the Hadith, which speaks of the ghāḍibūn li-llāh, those who are angry 
for God. Le Matin (27 August 1997) 
73 Reuters report in Hamilton Spectator [Ontario], ‘Blood stains village after “night of hell”: 
Survivors describe massacre that killed 64 Algerian villagers’, 28 August 1997: C5. 
 Literally, Ṭāghūt means false god/idol, tempter or Satan, the negative connotations of which, 
within an Islamic context, are clear enough. In international press accounts, Ṭāghūt was often 
translated as tyrant (ṭāghiyah), which has a similar root. 
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otherwise incomprehensible practice of cutting foetuses from pregnant women’s stomachs 
because they allegedly intended to stop more Muslims from being born.74  
 
Given such horrific stories, it is understandable why there was even a thesis that the 
violence of the massacres in Algeria was being practiced just for the sake of murder and 
destruction. For example, conservative US journalist Roger Kaplan (1998: 22), following a 
visit to Algiera, came to the conclusion that 
 
The emirs and their drugged acolytes — drugged on evil brews of false religion and 
politics, and on every stimulant available, as autopsies of killed terrorists have 
repeatedly shown (I was told this by Algerian doctors assigned to hospital 
morgues) — had lost their bid to overthrow the Algerian state and were determined 
to bring down as many people with them as they could.  
 
In the wake of Raïs, the official paper of the Vatican, L’Osservatore Romano, decried the 
‘blind and barbaric havoc wreaked by the Islamic extremists’.75 
 
A rational slaughter 
 
Accounting for the insurgency’s massacres within Islamic or apocalyptic frameworks was 
not the only approach taken. It is possible to identify hypotheses that attempted to advance 
more ‘secular’ or strategic logics to make the allegedly counterintuitive behaviour of the 
rebels understandable. For example, one report suggested the goal of the massacres, and 
their astounding lethality, was simply a ploy to get domestic attention. Reporting on the 
massacre of over sixty persons in Beni Ali just days before the Raïs massacre, a Reuters 
dispatch claimed that ‘analysts believe they are carried out to create such horror that even 
                                                
74 Lara Marlowe, ‘Left to suffer and die in silence’, Irish Times, 30 August 1997: 13; AFP, ‘Les 
habitants d’Alger continuent a s’armer, la psychose s’etend’, 8 September 1997. 
 Le Point (‘Alger: la terreur au jour le jour’, 4 October 1997) contextualised the ‘Ghadiboun’ in 
terms of the rampant and unchecked production of rumours in Algeria during the most intense 
wave of massacres. Marlowe defined dhabbāḥin (‘Dhebbahine’) as ‘egorgeurs: Literally, throat-
slashers’. See ‘Understanding the key words of war’, Irish Times, 30 October 1997: 9. 
75 Deutsche Presse-Agentur, ‘Pope condemns “barbaric atrocities” in Algeria’, 31 August 1997. 
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Algeria’s heavily censored press would have to carry reports on them’.76 Another account 
proposed that armed opposition groups were committing massacres in the suburbs of 
Algiers to create a wave of internally displaced persons to flood the capital. This would 
result in a ‘social explosion’ in Algiers that would destabilise the government and bring 
down the regime.77 The coincidence of massacre activity and elections suggested for others 
that the rebels were attempting to dissuade voters from going to the polls. For example, in 
the context of the Bougara massacre’s apparent lack of either clear authorship or 
unambiguous intent, along with the upcoming parliamentary polls in the summer, this 
inference was made.78 The massacres of Raïs and Bentalha likewise preceded local and 
provincial elections in October 1997. 
 
A possibly related though slightly different hypothesis held that the massacres sought 
either to deter further civilian disloyalty (e.g., as evidenced in electoral behaviour) or to 
punish those that had joined the government’s initiative to sponsor self-defence civilian 
militias. In some instances, these two goals were portrayed as one and the same.79 
Following the Bougara massacre, some survivors reportedly claimed that ‘Islamic 
guerrillas [...] began killing villagers because they refused to “collaborate”’.80 ‘There 
seems to be no logic to the carnage’, wrote a US journalist in a dateline from Paris, ‘the 
villages targeted by the extremists of the Armed Islamic Groups have included traditional 
fundamentalist strongholds’.81 Yet that was precisely the ‘logic’, as another wire report 
                                                
76 Reuters in The Guardian, ‘64 Algerian villagers murdered in “night of hell”’, 28 August 1997: 
11. 
77 Ray Moseley, ‘Fanatics’ war grips Algeria as death toll climbs into the tends of thousands’, 
Chicago Tribune, 12 October 1997: 1. 
Whether or not there was any program to flood and overwhelm the urban centres with rural 
populations, a commonly mentioned figure for the number of internally displaced population in 
Algeria during the 1990s is 1.5 million (Joffé 2005). 
78 That is, the first national parliamentary elections since the FIS won the first round in December 
1991. Le Figaro (23 April 1997) duly noted, ‘Ce massacre intervient à six semaines d’un scrutin 
législatif décisif’. The Houston Chronicles’ readers learned that the ‘massacre was the latest 
violence in a campaign of terror by Muslim insurgents in advance of June 5 parliamentary 
elections, in which they are banned from running’ (Houston Chronicle, ‘World briefs’, 23 April 
1997: 17; based on Associated Press reports). 
79 For example, the case was made for Bentalha: Jean-Pierre Tuquoi, ‘Algérie, autopsie d’un 
massacre’, Le Monde, 11 November 1997.  
80 Rachid Khiari, ‘93 dead in biggest massacre of five-year Algeria insurgency’, Associated Press, 
22 April 1997. 
81 Andrew Borowiec, ‘Carnage without logic dominates life in Algeria’, Washington Times, 14 
September 1997: A6. 
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argued in early 1998: ‘the GIA, weakened by an army offensive and a burgeoning of 
village self-defense forces, has reacted with what has been called a “genocidal logic” of 
reprisals against the general population’.82 The purpose of the massacres, wrote a US 
academic in the pages of Le Monde, was ‘to dissuade its allies from defecting by making 
betrayal very expensive. The easiest way is terror. From the perspective of the guerrillas, it 
is a rational approach, which has nothing to do with Islam or religion in general’.83 
Following the Raïs massacre, one wire report pointed out, ‘Many villagers are killed 
because the militants want to take revenge on those who have joined government-armed 
self-defense groups’.84 Though the same journalist would later report that Raïs had not 
formed a militia, instead trusting the nearby barracks for protection.85 
 
Nested civil wars 
 
Betrayal and revenge were also motives citied in a slightly different thesis of the 
massacres. Some accounts suggested that the massive bloodshed of 1997 and 1998 was an 
effect of an escalating war between the GIA and the AIS. The basic narrative advanced by 
this thesis held that the GIA was perpetrating the massacres to take vengeance upon 
supporters of their rival, the AIS, because of the latter’s ceasefire agreement with the 
Algerian regime. Indeed, the early 1998 massacres seemed peculiar to some because the 
Ouarsenis had traditionally been seen as a stronghold of the AIS and MIA, not the GIA.86 
Following the Tiaret, Tissemsilt and Relizane massacres of late 1997 and early 1998, an 
RFI correspondent in Oran concluded,  
 
It is also now fairly clear that the population targeted were in the grip of the AIS [...] 
Since the armed wing of the FIS declared its cease-fire which came into effect on 1st 
                                                
82 AFP, ‘New bloodbath in Algeria: 412 massacred’, 3 January 1998. 
83 Stathis N Kalyvas, ‘Comprendre les massacres’, Le Monde, 4 February 1998. 
 In this article, Kalyvas presented the basic framework detailed in his 1999 paper on the 
massacres (see chapter six for a critique). 
84 Rachid Khiari, ‘300 killed in Algeria massacre, witnesses and hospital workers say’, Associated 
Press, 29 August 1997.  
85 Rachid Khiari, ‘Government assures it’s boosting security, but exodus continues’, Associated 
Press, 30 August 1997. 
86 Alain Bommenel, ‘Carnages a répétition: la violence se déplace vers l’Ouest de l’Algérie’, AFP, 
1 January 1998; Alain Bommenel, ‘Les autorités et l’armée confrontées a l’escalade de la terreur’, 
AFP, 3 January 1998; AFP, ‘New bloodbath in Algeria: 412 massacred’ 3 January 1998; El Watan, 
No. 2183, 21 January 1998. 
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October 1997 these populations have become a little too exposed, having refused either 
to arm themselves or to leave their homes. They were, therefore, probably exterminated 
as a collective reprisal.87 
 
Two reporters with L’Express reached a similar conclusion regarding88 and even a 
publication sympathetic to the FIS in Germany claimed that the GIA’s al-Ahuāl — 
‘Horrors’ — faction (katībah) was carrying out such revenge attacks.89 Indeed, it was with 
something like this in mind that, after the Béni Messous massacre, then French Foreign 
Minister Hubert Vedrine stated, ‘The resurgence of violence in Algeria appears to be the 
response of Islamists opposed to any compromise with the Algerian government’. He 
added, ‘We are not therefore talking about blind violence’, but rather an attempt to 
sabotage ‘dialogue between the Algerian government and certain legal Islamists which is 
bearing fruit’.90 One alleged GIA defector, however, suggested a much more primitive 
logic: ‘Some armed Islamists, hearing of the massacre of their own families, have gone to 
take revenge on the families of other armed Islamists’.91 
 
A noted advantage of this thesis was its ability to explain one of the most troubling 
features of the massacres: the apparent failure of the Algerian state to prevent or stop any 
of the major massacres. As was repeatedly noted, some of the Mitidja massacres were 
happening within visual or aural range of police and military installations. More generally, 
these massacres were located in the First Military Region (Centre or Blida), the most 
heavily militarised zone in the entire country.92 Press accounts cited circumstantial 
evidence of alleged state indifference, such as the denials that the army was on ‘high alert’ 
                                                
87 Radio France Internationale, ‘Algeria: Recent massacres said to be reprisal against FIS 
Islamists’, BBC Monitoring, 9 January 1998.  
88 Baki Mina and Baïla Karim, ‘Ce sont nos enfants qui nous égorgent’, L’Express 22 January 
1998. 
89 AFP, ‘Algeria gives conditional green light to EU mission’, 8 January 1998. 
 Though often translated as ‘the horrors’, ʾahuāl (plural for hawl), also has the meanings terror, 
fright, alarm, shock, horror or dismay, possibly power. 
 In 1995, an AFP dispatch noted that the GIA slogan was ‘No truce, no dialog, no 
reconciliation’ (AFP, ‘Le GIA, le «Djihad» jusqu’a la victoire’, 4 March 1995). See also El Watan 
No. 2083, 25 September 1997 (Folder: Terrorisme / l’AIS - Accord Pouvoir -AIS - Trêve de AIS). 
90 AFP, ‘Algerian upsurge aimed at stopping dialogue: French FM’, 11 September 1997. 
91 AFP, ‘GIA claims responsibility for recent massacres: newspaper’, 22 February 1997 
92 Amine Kadi, ‘Algérie. Une armée suréquipée’, La Croix, 10 September 1997: 4. 
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following the Béni Messous massacre93 and reports that Chief of Staff General Mohammed 
Lamari had issued an order in early August prohibiting any troop movements after dark 
without his permission.94 Yet there were also reports that reportedly showed the 
government was taking steps to address its failures following Bentalha, such as the 
uprooting of an alleged GIA stronghold in the Mitidja (Ouled Allel)95 and the removal of 
General Said Bey as the commander of the First Military Region.96 
 
Though the Algerian government would never admit so publicly, it was suggested that the 
state was playing an indirect and passive role. The massacres were allowed because they 
were seen as part of an intra-Islamist civil war. As most of the victims of the massacres 
were reportedly Islamist sympathisers, it was only to the government’s benefit to let the 
GIA and AIS fighters kill each other and their constituents. Scholar Mary Jane Deeb, then 
with the Middle East Institute in Washington, DC, speculated, ‘[T]he Islamic movement in 
Algeria has become fragmented and that certain groups are fighting other groups for 
leadership’. The regime’s role in the massacres was thus indirect: ‘The government is not 
interfering or protecting people because ... they’re washing their hands of the intra-Islamic 
conflict’.97 The Algerian government naturally denied accusations of cynical indifference 
to the massacres. In some cases, officials said that insurgents had placed mines around 
massacre sites to prevent security forces from intervening (e.g., Bougara98 and Bentalha99). 
It was also said that using heavy weapons to stop the killing (e.g., tanks) would have 
caused more civilian deaths. 100 Algerian officials once asserted that they were unable to 
                                                
93 Al-Hayat (8 September 1997) in BBC Monitoring, ‘Army said to be on “high alert” after Beni 
Messous killings’, 10 September 1997; AFP, Over 127 Islamists killed by Algeria’s armed forces’, 
9 September 1997. 
94 Julia Ficatier and Amine Kadi, ‘Algérie. La nouvelle bataille d’Alger’, La Croix, 10 September 
1997: 3. 
95 The Economist, ‘Algeria. A change of French tone?’, 11 October 1997: 50 
96 He was replaced by General-Major Boughaba Rabah of the fifth region (East or Constantine). 
AFP, ‘Le chef de la 1ere région militaire remplace’, 29 October 1997. 
97 Daniela Deane, ‘Algeria strife linked to religious rivalries’, USA Today, 25 September 1997: 
12A, ellipsis in original. The other two options Deeb offered were either government or insurgent 
complicity. 
98 Boubker Belkadi, ‘Government calls for mobilisation in wake of brutal massacre’, AFP, 23 April 
1997. 
99 François d’Alançon, ‘Algérie. A trois jours des élections municipales, Bentalhâa continue de 
panser ses plaies’, La Croix, 21 Octobre 1997: 10.  
See also Robert Fisk, ‘Brutal killers without faces’, Independent, 26 October 1997: 1. 
100 François d’Alançon, ‘Algérie. A trois jours des élections municipales, Bentalhâa continue de 
panser ses plaies’, La Croix, 21 Octobre 1997: 10. 
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defend the general population because of the unprecedented ‘brutality’ of the insurgency. 
‘They simply have no idea how to fight it’, a US television reporter claimed.101 
 
The western massacres of New Years 1997-98 complicated the geography of these 
narratives of state incompetence and indifference. Where the Mitidja attacks had taken 
place within minutes of downtown Algiers and close to security installations, the new 
killing sites in the Ouarsenis were extraordinarily remote. One of the villages targeted in 
these attacks reportedly lacked phone lines and roads.102 Even the Algerian press, 
according to another account, initially could not visit the Relizane massacre sites of 30-31 
December 1997 for similar reasons.103 With the expansion of significant massacre activity 
to the west, Algeria’s vast size was brought into the argument. A dispatch from AFP noted 
that Algeria’s landmass is five times that of France while its army, mainly conscripts, 
numbered roughly 130,000.104 Explaining the apparent impunity of the perpetrators, a 
regional military commander in the west simply stated that he could not guard every 
house.105 For a US audience, the Algerian ambassador in Washington ‘reminded’ a 
Congressional hearing that protecting civilians was difficult because ‘Algeria is about four 
times the size of the State of Texas’ (US Congress 1998: 33).  
 
As with most aspects of the massacres, it is difficult to construct a consistent picture from 
the information available then, and this includes claims of state non-intervention. 
Throughout the wave of massacres in 1997 and 1998, the security forces failure to stop any 
of the massacres was treated as systematic. In the case of Béni Messous, for example, two 
reports claimed that the massacre came to an end at one in the morning on 6 September 
                                                
101 Lisa Ling, World News Tonight, ABC News, 12 October 1997, transcript. 
102 Rachid Khiari, ‘Algerians flee horror, gov’t rejects inquiry, West seeks solutions’, Associated 
Press, 6 January 1998. 
103 Rachid Khiari, ‘Algerian Killings Claim 78 Lives’, Associated Press, 31 December 1997; 
Reuters, 4 January 1998. 
 The 30-31 December killing sites, according to second-hand reports via the Algerian 
francophone press (e.g., L’Authentique, Liberté, El Watan, La Tribune, Le Matin), were reportedly 
clustered around the baladiyah/commune of Oued Rhiou: the dawār/villages of (Ouled) 
Kherarba/Khourba, (Ouled) Sahnoun/Sahnine, El-Abadel and (Ouled) Taieb/Tayeb, often with the 
latter two conjoined. 
104 Alain Bommenel, ‘Carnages a répétition: la violence se déplace vers l’Ouest de l’Algérie’, AFP, 
1 janvier 1998. 
105 Le Point, ‘Algérie; Une élection de plus pour Zéroual’, 3 janvier 1998. 
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when security forces arrived.106 Le Monde, however, highlighted two survivors’ accounts, 
originally in El Watan, in which they attempted to phone for help from the security forces 
‘in vain’.107 Following the Bougara massacre, a statement of the Algerian Interior Ministry 
indicated that security forces had intervened once they were notified, killing several of the 
attackers.108 Following the Sidi Hamed massacre, accounts conflicted as to whether the 
local state-armed militia was present or absent during the attack, which lasted for several 
hours. A statement from the Algerian government claimed that the militia had helped 
defend the village while the ‘swift intervention’ of state security forces had prevented more 
from being killed.109 But residents later pointed out to UK ambassador Francois Gordon, 
during his visit to the site on 14 January, that ‘We had been asking for weapons for three 
months; we had a list of 200 names’. Another told the ambassador that he had alerted the 
local security officials when the attack started but they had failed to respond quickly 
enough.110 
 
A dirty war? 
 
While blame for the massacres has tended to fall on the shoulders of armed opposition 
groups (both then and now), there were those who suspected a more active direct or 
indirect state role. Given the two questions driving the debate (Why kill your supporters? 
and Why has the government done nothing to stop the massacres?), along with other 
factors (e.g., the general opacity surrounding the conflict), it should come as little surprise 
that alternative theses of the massacres appeared. Though not leading the charge, human 
rights organisations certainly helped fuel the incredulity towards the official story. In late 
1997, Amnesty International laid out its case for questioning the Algerian government’s 
narrative of the massacres. The three most disturbing facts, according to Amnesty, were the 
                                                
106 Deutsche Presse-Agentur, ‘At least 80 people said slaughtered in fresh massacre in Algeria’, 6 
September 1997; Rachid Khiari, ‘Algerians Barricade, Arm Themselves’, Associated Press, 7 
September 1997. 
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apparent impunity and freedom of movement enjoyed by perpetrators of the massacres; the 
geographical coincidence of pro-FIS voter sympathies and the recent massacres; and the 
potential value of vacated property in and around the Mitidja massacre sites that could be 
privatised (more on this last point below). Additionally, Amnesty noted the government’s 
ability to protect the country against massacres during elections and its ability to secure 
hydrocarbon production and distribution centres coming from the vast Saharan south, 
which had rarely, if ever, been attacked.111 Amidst the Ouarsenis massacres, Human Rights 
Watch’s Joe Stork stated bluntly, ‘The government is involved, definitely. The question is: 
How is the government involved?’112  
 
Accusations that the Algerian government was directly, indirectly and secretly involved in 
atrocities had been around since the beginning of the conflict. One of the sources for such 
claims came from the outlawed Islamist opposition and its allied armed groups. Though 
FIS officials often indicted the GIA for the massacres, they also accused the government of 
either engaging in state terror or cynically allowing it (as others cited above also 
suspected). Following a spate of killings during Ramadan in early 1997, Kamar Eddine 
Kherbane, a founding member of the FIS, then in London, told a US magazine that these 
had been the work of the ‘security services’. He explained, ‘Just before any election they 
do the same thing. They kill, and then blame it on the mujahedin’.113 Several months later 
and following ten days of killing in which 173 deaths were reported, a FIS activist in 
Brussels, Abdelkrim Ould Adda, described the GIA as ‘made up of extremists, criminals 
and people from (Algerian government) military security who manipulate them’.114 A 
newsletter associated with the FIS likewise claimed in early 1997 that the escalating killing 
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was ‘the work of the secret service and the militias whose recruits are paranoid drug 
addicts’.115 After Raïs, a FIS newsletter published in Germany, El-Ribat, blamed ‘armed 
groups created by the regime [le pouvoir], either as militias or death squads, formed at the 
beginning of 1994’. Yet some of these groups, the bulletin alleged, ‘partially or totally 
escape the control of the regime’ — e.g., ‘mafia groups, clan or tribal groups, or 
organisations headed by secularists or communists’.116 In a similar vein, the AIS statement 
that announced the truce with the government indicated that the motivation was ‘so that the 
enemy hiding behind abominable massacres can be unveiled, as well as the GIA criminals 
and those hiding behind it’.117 While this statement was read as an AIS condemnation of 
the GIA118, it was actually more reflective of the thesis that the GIA had been infiltrated 
by, and so was acting on behalf of, other interests. Still, the FIS-AIS placed ultimate blame 
at the feet of the incumbent authorities: ‘One way or another it’s the regime in place in 
Algiers which is responsible for these massacres’, read a FIS statement issued amidst the 
Relizane massacres.119 
 
Similar allegations of state complicity were also voiced from other sectors of Algerian 
politics and society. As early as 1995, former Prime Minister Abdelhamid Brahimi, exiled 
in London, had suggested that the Algerian government was waging a kind of dirty war; he 
later even blamed its security forces for the massacre of thirty-one members of his family 
in Médéa (‘because they voted for the FIS’).120 Brahimi later appeared on 60 Minutes, then 
the most watched US news program, in early 1998, amidst the internationalised massacre 
crisis. There he squarely accused the government of orchestrating the massacres.121 
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Likewise, Mohammed Larbi Zitout, a former member of the Algerian foreign service, 
came forward in late 1997 to claim, ‘It’s evident that the majority, if not all, of these 
massacres are the work of the Algerian secret service’.122 Similarly, albeit somewhat more 
ambiguously, exiled former President Ahmed Ben Bella, ousted in 1965, told El País in 
late 1997, ‘Algeria has many para-police organizations set up during the war for 
independence which have been transformed into infernal killing machines and turned 
against the people’.123 The authority of such voices lent credence to claims of government 
complicity in the massacres and helped propel forward calls for an international inquiry. 
Yet their perceived distance from the mechanisms of power, in terms of time and space, 
meant that a first-hand narrative of government involvement was still lacking.  
 
More generally, the thesis of state complicity in the massacres benefited from pre-existing 
allegations about the Algerian government’s human rights abuses and criticisms of its 
counter-insurgency policies. For example, in mid 1996 a report of the French Defence 
Ministry was quoted as stating bluntly: ‘The strategy of counter-guerrilla warfare utilized 
by the [Algerian] armed forces is the fairly simple technique of terrorizing the 
population’.124 ‘Terrified civilians’, wrote Lara Marlow in Time magazine in early 1995, 
‘whisper of special execution brigades, dressed in civilian clothes, that roam the country 
hunting down and murdering Islamists’.125 In September 1994, a recently exiled DRS 
officer told Le Monde, 
 
[...] when the terrorists started to massacre young conscripts, repression moved up a 
level. Fearing desertions, the hierarchy decided to strike blow for blow. It was then that 
the reprisals became systematic: combing a district as soon as an offence was 
committed, summary execution of three, four or five young people selected at 
random.126 
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Following Raïs, one account, citing unnamed ‘human rights groups’, noted that ‘many of 
the killings, estimated to be at least 1,500 since June, are carried out by security service 
police squads’.127 There was, however, a problem with this thesis. If the Algerian 
government was conducting a secret undercover campaign of massacres, it would be 
extremely difficult to prove. By design, a successful strategy of misdirection, confusion 
and terror should have been nearly impossible to confirm without corroborating documents 
or participant accounts. 
 
The latter — or what was presented as such — began to appear in late 1997. As Algerians 
were going to local polls on 23 October, Libération ran an interview with ‘Omar’, a young 
Algerian conscript seeking asylum in London. A week later, the Irish Times published a 
strikingly similar account from a man calling himself ‘Reda’.128 On French and British 
television, Reda/Omar had already admitted to participating in a massacre that June, albeit 
indirectly.129 He had stood guard on the periphery of a village while another group of 
soldiers apparently massacred thirty civilians. Omar claims he did not see the killing but 
the government commandos allegedly returned wearing fake beards and ‘typical Islamist’ 
dress stained with blood.130 The Independent’s Robert Fisk then published an interview 
with an exiled Algerian police officer in London, on record as Inspector Abdessalam. He 
recounted acts of torture and internal police hit squads that murdered fellow officers 
suspected of Islamist sympathies or a lack of trustworthiness. Though this informant did 
not claim that security forces were behind the recent massacres, he recalled a massacre-like 
episode in Sidi Moussa where an anti-terrorist operation led to the death of ninety persons 
when police units bombarded the settlement in 1994.131 Similarly, Germany’s Der Spiegel 
ran an interview in January 1998 with a deserting intelligence officer, who recounted 
small-scale collective killings carried out by undercover DRS units, dressed as Islamists, in 
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the suburbs of Algiers in 1994 and 1995. The recent massacres, he proposed, had in fact 
been the indirect fault of the government. Intending to disrupt Islamist maquis, the security 
services had deliberately released hundreds of criminals from prisons who naturally 
gravitated to the GIA.132 
 
Soon after Libération , the London Observer interviewed a former member of Algeria’s 
main intelligence body, the Département du Renseignement et de la Sécurité (DRS). This 
man, calling himself ‘Yussuf’ or ‘Joseph’, had fled to Britain over two years prior, well 
before the upsurge in massacres. However, he reportedly saw documents discussing how 
the DRS had ‘infiltrated and manipulated’ the GIA. He also claimed first hand knowledge 
of special ‘death squads’ established by the DRS’s counter-intelligence directorate, which, 
among its various alleged murderous activities, was massacres.133 Le Monde’s Jean Pierre 
Tuquoi upped the ante two days later, interviewing a serving ‘senior officer’ in the DRS. 
Using the pseudonym ‘Hakim’, this insider seemed to confirm some of the allegations of 
Yussuf/Joseph, especially the claims that the GIA had been heavily infiltrated by ‘turned’ 
Islamists and that some massacres (e.g., Béni Messous) were the direct handiwork of ‘les 
services’. Raïs and Bentalha, on the other hand, were the product of GIA pseudo-
insurgents run amok.134 Finally, in January 1998 the Observer interviewed two former 
Algerian policemen who stated that they had participated in more recent massacres. Like 
Omar/Reda and Yussuf/Joseph, ‘Robert’ and ‘Andrew’ were also seeking asylum in the 
United Kingdom. And they, too, claimed to have helped elite units of the ‘military 
security’ (DRS) — ‘wearing the costume of the Islamists: false beards, baggy trousers’ — 
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carry out massacres, as recently as October 1997.135 Thus, one thesis seemed to be that the 
Algerian government was using undercover or ‘false flag’ units to perpetrate the 
massacres. The other thesis suggested a more ambiguous or oblique state role in the 
killing.  
 
Voodoo counter-insurgency 
 
In addition to the claim that elements of the Algerian security, military and intelligence 
apparatus were directly conducting the massacres, there was also the thesis — as voiced by 
‘Hakim’, ‘Yussuf’ and the FIS above — that the Algerian government was involved in the 
massacres by proxy. This picture of complicity painted an active yet indirect government 
role; the Algerian state was perpetrating the massacres by manipulating the insurgency. As 
seen above, it was widely suspect that the government’s hand in the killing had been 
through the GIA, as a kind of ‘Groupe infiltré armé’136 or a pseudo-insurgency force of the 
Algerian military. For example, an early 1998 Financial Times editorial noted, ‘The 
shadowy “armed Islamic groups” [...] are widely assumed to have been infiltrated, if not 
created, by the regime’s military security apparatus’.137 Created, infiltrated and controlled, 
however, are all different things. One version of this thesis held that the those tasked with 
infiltrating the Islamist maquis had slipped out of the control of Algeria’s security, military 
and/or intelligence agencies. Yassir Benmiloud, Algerian commentator for the daily El 
Watan, sarcastically opined, 
 
The plan may have been to infiltrate the rebel groups in order to track them and better 
fight them. But the “infiltrators” were quickly seduced by the rustic and decadent 
lifestyle of the terrorists: raping of women, theft of money and jewelry, pedophilia 
followed by mutilation and free food. In short, life with the rebels was much better than 
what the Algerian Army could offer.138 
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The GIA as an out-of-control counter-insurgency Frankenstein was essentially the picture 
‘Hakim’ and ‘Joseph’ had painted in the French and British media.  Others, however, 
backed the idea that the GIA, or at least segments of it, remained under the control of the 
security services. For example, some Algerians reportedly told the Observer’s John 
Sweeney in mid 1997 that ‘the junta [...] is using and controlling the GIA to kill moderate 
Islamicists and anyone who gets in the way’.139  
 
As noted earlier, there were suspicions that the Algerian government was indirectly and 
passive complicit in the massacres by not stopping them. The reasons given for this related 
to hypotheses of an internecine conflict within the insurgency and suppositions that the 
population victimised by the massacres was the base of rebel support. Whether cynical 
indifference or passive complicity, the political end, and thus the state’s motive, was clear 
enough for some. Al-Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadl-Allah, a popular Shi‘a religious 
figure based in Lebanon, gave voice to the thesis of active and direct state complicity for 
obvious political goals: ‘The information confirms the participation of the authorities in 
[the massacres], along with armed groups, to implement policies aimed at tarnishing the 
image of the Islamic current’.140 Though describing a more passive and indirect state role, 
Saïd Saadi, leader of a secular-Left party, Rassemblement pour la Culture et la Démocratie, 
suggested that the Algerian government was allowing the massacres to be carried out by 
insurgents so as ‘to immunise society from religious extremism’.141 ‘[M]any Algerians’, 
wrote a reporter from Algiers, accuse ‘security forces of abetting the violence — or at least 
tolerating it — to discredit the militants’.142 Likewise, an Algerian claiming to have been a 
member of the ALN during the war against France, told the London Times, 
 
The Government aids this present conflict. The GIA [...] terrorists are a weapon used 
by the authorities to justify the absolute power of the army here, as well as discrediting 
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the opposition Islamic parties. They do not perpetrate the massacres themselves, but 
they do little to stop them and use them as a reason to oppress any voice of criticism.143 
 
Following the first revelations from Relizane in early 1998, a front page story in 
Washington Post noted, ‘The government also faces fresh accusations that its own security 
forces are sometimes involved in the killing or, when terrorists kill, that they look the other 
way to whip up anti-guerrilla sentiment among the people’.144  
 
A regime divided 
 
Amongst those suspecting the state’s hand in the massacres, whether directly or by proxy, 
not all suspected that the motive was simply to discredit the insurgency or to benefit from 
intra-rebel fighting by remaining indifferent to mass murders. An alternative thesis of the 
massacres proposed that particular groups within the state were either perpetrating or 
allowing the massacres in order to leverage or undermine opponents within the regime. 
The precise motive was frequently seen as an effort on the part of regime ‘hardliners’ to 
derail the peace making efforts of the government vis-à-vis the FIS. Following Raïs, 
French politologue Bruno Étienne explained why he thought seventy-five percent of the 
massacre: ‘these latest attacks appear to be the work of one faction of the military junta 
that refuses, contrary to another faction, to negotiate with the [FIS]’.145 More concretely, 
Lahouari Addi, a political sociologist based in France, suggested that the ‘army chiefs’ had 
sought to undermine President Zéroual by going behind his back (i.e., circumventing the 
President’s dialogue with the FIS leadership) to secure a truce with the AIS directly, thus 
robbing Zéroual of sole title as Algeria’s ‘artisan de la paix’. The massacres, Addi then 
proposed, could be related to various divisions within the military, supporting either the 
Presidency or the General Staff.146 This view, however, was not only shared by elite 
intellectuals and journalists; ‘In Algiers’, two reporters with Libération claimed 
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immediately following Bentalha, ‘any cigarette vendor will tell you it is all a sign of the 
internecine struggle within the circle of power’.147  
 
Often this alleged split within the regime was articulated in terms of a dichotomy — 
conciliators versus eradicators — that had governed thinking on Algerian politics for 
several years. Definitions varied but normally pivoted on the question of dialogue with, or 
even rehabilitation of, the FIS (i.e., conciliateur or dialoguiste) versus those arguing for a 
tougher or repressive stance towards either the FIS or Islamism in general (éradicateur). 
The éradicateur/conciliateur discourse had traces dating back to, at least, the first months 
of the conflict in 1992.148 Woven into this thesis, as the massacres were increasing in 
tempo and volume in 1997, were contemporary reports of ongoing negotiations between 
the elements of the government and the FIS-AIS.149 Likewise, an even older Algerian 
discourse of ‘clans’ — geographical, familial, political, military or financial interest groups 
— also surfaced within writing on the Algerian conflict and the massacres.150 Following 
the Raïs massacre, journalist José Garçon surmised: ‘civilians are also the principal victims 
of the violence exercised by the paramilitary groups linked to different regime clans, 
violence which is as uncontrollable as that of the killers claiming Islam’.151 In one story, 
the contest between the two sides, at the height of the massacres, had even resulted in 
screaming matches between their alleged leaders: President Zéroual (leading the 
dialoguistes or conciliateurs) and his Chief of Staff, General Mohamed Lamari (leading the 
hardline éradicateurs).152 Yet instead of a binary contest, others postulated a tripartite 
system between the Presidency and the Military, moderated by a ‘third clan’ composed of 
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the intelligence services, headed by DRS chief Mohamed ‘Tewfik’ Mediene.153 Scholar 
and North Africanist Lisa Anderson even saw a symmetry of interests between extreme 
elements of the regime and the insurgency: ‘The recent upsurge in murders so vicious as to 
guarantee international media attention is part of efforts to derail such a process by hard-
liners on both sides’.154 
 
The privatisation of violence 
 
Though the internationalized debate surrounding the massacres tended to focus on theses 
of either state or insurgent culpability, and the possible motives driving either side to kill, it 
was also insinuated that other actor groups and other rationales could elucidate the logic of 
the massacres. This alternative cluster of explanations sometimes fed into claims that the 
violence in Algeria had become ‘privatised’, a term that had several meanings. In some 
contexts, privatisation meant de-politicisation, in the sense that some of the war’s violence 
no longer bore any relation to the conflict’s putative raison d’être (e.g., the legal status of 
the FIS or the establishment of an Islamic state).  Following the Raïs massacre, French 
anthropologist Gilbert Grandguillaume proposed a number of ‘intermediate scenarios’ 
between the two options of state and insurgent terror, including mafia activity, 
manipulation of armed groups by various actors and vendettas dating back to the war of 
independence.155 Chief among these was the supposition that grudges dating back to the 
war of independence, especially concerning Algerians who supported or fought on the side 
of France (e.g., the Harkis), were bubbling to the surface.156  
 
Just as Islamist violence was construed as either nihilistic or strategic, the view that 
Algeria was consumed by ‘privatised’ violence was also given rational and irrational 
motives. For some, like Grandguillaume, there were discernable logics to the violence, and 
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these alternative logics, some argued, might be operating in tandem. A journalist with Le 
Point speculated a multi-faceted armed conflict driving the massacres: an insurgency 
strategy to sow fear and panic in Algiers with internally displaced persons from the 
countryside; internecine fighting between guerrillas; fighting between armed groups and 
paramilitary militias; plus land appropriation and privatisation schemes. In short, the war 
had become — explicitly borrowing from the French historian of Algeria, Benjamin Stora 
— ‘privatised’.157  But for others, the patterns of violence suggested incoherence. ‘In 1993 
and 1994, there was an ideological foundation for the violence’, a Western diplomat told a 
US news magazine in mid1997. ‘Now there is only barbarism’.158 
 
In some settings, the privatisation thesis clearly meant that violence was no longer public 
(read: political). Algerian violence had become private — intimate, personal, familial, 
communal. Revenge was a common thread in this discourse. Providing a litany of possible 
factors behind the massacres, one acute observer of the conflict believed that ‘there is hate 
and desire for revenge that fuels the cycle of attack-revenge-attack, notably between 
Islamists and militias armed by the regime’.159 Following the Raïs massacre, Ronald 
Neumann, who had just left the post of US ambassador to Algiers, also felt that, even if 
GIA was responsible for the mass killings, one still had to take into account the ‘many 
blood feuds out there’.160 John Entelis, a US academic specialist in Algerian affairs, 
likewise suggested, in the wake of the Relizane, that the recent wave of massacres was 
possibly a confluence of vendettas and ‘mafia-style gangsterism’.161 Grudges between 
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story’, Philadelphia Inquirer, 8 January 1998: A1. 
 Attempting to account for the violence, though before the Bougara massacre, famed London 
Times journalist Jon Swain similarly told a US radio program, ‘But this — this civil war almost has 
gone on now for so many years that, of course, what has happened is that there’s a lot of tit- for-tat 
killings, that people who’d been slaughtered in villages by the GIA now take revenge on families 
who they know have GIA members amongst them’. He added, ‘There are vendettas which go back 
many decades in Algeria, going back even to the French-Algerian War’ (Linda Wertheimer, 
‘Algeria’, All Things Considered, National Public Radio, 9 April 1997, transcript). 
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Algerians incurred during the recent years of fighting and during the war of independence 
from France (and immediately afterwards) were cited as possible vendettas motivating the 
massacres.162 The slaying of over forty persons in El Omaria (Médéa prefecture) was 
reported as a possible revenge attack carried out by ‘death squads’ composed of civilian 
militia members and elements of the security forces seeking retaliation for the Bougara 
massacre perpetrated the day before.163 Following the massacre of Si Serhane (29-30 
September 1997; forty eight killed), Libération’s José Garçon wondered whether or not — 
given the fact that a single family had been targeted and it had taken place close to another 
recent massacre — ‘this locality has been the victim of a terrible cycle of killing/reprisals 
that has covered the Mitidja in blood?’164  
 
Such claims of ‘de-politicisation’ of Algerian violence were also articulated as the de-
governmentalisation of war-fighting capacity, mainly through the (auto-) formation, 
deputisation or legalisation of self-defence militias as proxies of the state. Different 
accounts painted a picture of these militias acting in concert on behalf of the state whereas 
others suggested a more disaggregated view where the Algerian counter-insurgency had 
been hijacked to serve local interests. Stora, who helped popularise the notion of privatised 
violence in Algeria, pointed towards the latter, implicating Algeria’s ‘peasant militias’ in 
the cycles of violence pitting ‘village against village, family against family’.165 In May 
1997, Pierre Sané, then Secretary-General of Amnesty International, blamed the escalating 
massacres on the state’s ‘deliberate strategy’ of creating civilian militias. When combined 
with the fragmentation of the armed opposition groups, he argued, this had created a 
volatile mix resulting in the increasing bloodshed.166 The Hadj Fergane incident167 in 
                                                
162 José Garçon, ‘Quatre questions sur une tragédie’, Libération, 30 August 1997. 
163 Francis David, ‘Nouveau massacre en Algérie : 42 civils tués’, Sud Ouest, 25 April 1997. 
 The Associated Press, however, reported, ‘Witnesses identified the attackers [at Omaria] as 
Muslim insurgents’, suggesting either bad reporting (on the part of AP or Sud Ouest), confused 
witnesses or both (Rachid Khiari, ‘Muslim militants reported to kill 47 in new massacres in 
Algeria’, Associated Press, 24 April 1997). 
164 José Garçon, ‘Pression internationale sur Alger. Les demandes de commission d'enquête se 
multiplient’, Libération, 1 October 1997. 
165 Quoted in Charles Trueheart, ‘Hundreds Die In Massacre Near Algiers’, Washington Post, 30 
August 1997: A21. 
 By the end of the 1990s, pro-government or self-defence civilian militias reportedly constituted 
the largest fighting force in the country, with estimates ranging between 200,000 and 500,000 
(Sidhoum & Algeria Watch 2003b: 8). 
166 José Garçon, ‘Algérie: «Qui profite de cette situation?»’, Libération, 7 May 1997. 
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Relizane brought renewed international attention to the possible role of these militias in the 
atrocities, compounding earlier suspicions.168 
 
Using another meaning of privatisation, some proposed the ‘commercialisation’ of 
Algerian violence, in that public and private business interests, whether legal, informal or 
‘black’, were believed to be motivating or participating in the killing, both directly and 
indirectly. For some, the conflict in Algeria had even been hijacked by a hybrid class of 
                                                                                                                                              
167 The most well known case of militia abuse in Algeria was reportedly perpetrated by two mayors 
in Relizane, Hadj Fergane (Relizane municipality) and Hadj Abed (Jdouia/Oued El Djemaa 
municipality). On 14 April 1998, as the UN Commission on Human Rights was considering the 
Algerian crisis, the Algerian daily Liberté reported that these two mayors had been arrested and 
charged with murder. The accusations levelled at them and their allied militias included abductions, 
torture and executions; several mass graves were also attributed to them. One contemporary source 
reported, ‘Those arrested were said to have killed 17 civilians in Sidi M’Hamed Benaouda — the 
scene of killings blamed on the GIA in the November-January period — and the deaths of 62 
people buried in a mass grave in Relizane’ (Middle East Economic Digest, ‘Political Outlook: 
Algeria’, MEED Quarterly Report — Maghreb, March 1998: 15). According to the Algerian daily 
El Watan, this was not an isolated incident; at that time, Algerian courts had 128 cases registered 
against security and militia officials for fifty four civilian murders (Robert Fisk, ‘Militias 
implicated in Algeria's reign of terror’, Independent, 23 April 1998: 13, citing El Watan; Le 
Monde, ‘Algérie : des patriotes faisaient régner la terreur’, 16 April 1998). 
The original Liberté report suggested that some of the violence in Relizane could be related to 
an ‘old rivalry’ between two ‘tribes’, the Chouala and Bouabdelli (BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, ‘Paper says tribal feud may have led to massacre in Relizane’, 16 April 1998). Four 
days after the story broke, the two mayors were freed and never faced charges since (Human Rights 
Watch 2003: 27-28). In February 2002, the human rights activist who helped build the case against 
them was sentenced to a short prison stay for making false accusations. The activist, Mohamed 
Smaïn, claimed that he was just reporting the statements he had collected from ‘dozens’ of 
witnesses (Amnesty International 2002). Following heavy rains in November 2003, Smaïn was 
alerted to the unearthing of a mass grave in the ‘Sidi Mohamed-Benaouda’ municipality, made a 
video of the scene and showed it to the Algerian press (BBC Monitoring, ‘Algeria: Rights activist 
accuses state militia of carrying out massacres’, 28 December 2003, from Liberté). The grave was 
soon destroyed by local security officials before an investigation could be carried out (Giles 
Tremlett, ‘Algerian massacre site “erased by police”’, The Guardian, 26 January 2004: 12; Jean-
Pierre Tuquoi, ‘La gendarmerie est accusée de faire disparaître des charniers à Relizane’, Le 
Monde, 13 February 2004). See also Smaïn 2004. 
One of Fergane’s assistants, Hocine Adda Mohamed, along with his brother, Abdelkader 
Mohamed (i.e., ‘les frères Mohamed’) had settled in France in 1998, using their wives’ names on 
official documents to remain hidden. When the two men were arrested in Nîmes, France, in March 
2004, the disclosed list of crimes attributed to Fergane and his militia amounted to over one 
hundred executions, dozens of unidentified bodies, two mass graves (found in 1998) and 200 
‘disappearances’, as well as torture (see José Garçon, ‘La «sale guerre» algérienne rebondit en 
France’, Libération, 31 March 2004: 14). 
168 E.g., according to an article in Courrier International, an alleged 1997 report of the Algerian 
army’s internal security apparently found that half of the faux barrage incidents ritually blamed on 
insurgents were actually being operated by civilian militias (Courrier International, ‘Algérie : Les 
négociations secrètes’, N. 361, 2 October 1997; cited in Martinez 2001: 56). 
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terrorists, private business interests and political figures who behind a number of the 
massacres, a ‘mafia politico-financiere’.169 One such view held that the primary actors in 
the conflict had been co-opted by moneyed interests. ‘This is a war for land and wealth’, 
suggested scholar Luis Martinez as the violence was increasing in mid 1997. Martinez 
speculated that both state and insurgent actors had become mercenaries, doing the dirty 
work of Algeria’s elite, especially the task of vacating of land for commercial 
development.170 Another view proposed that the incoherence of the situation had created 
the space ‘for manipulation by powerful people using armed groups for their own ends’, as 
entertained by British academic Michael Willis. One of those ends being ‘to control and 
benefit from the abandonment of valuable land’.171 Indeed, given the concentration of 
massacres in the Mitidja plain and the west, Algeria’s most fertile farming areas, it was 
widely suspected that private land and agriculture interests were possibly behind some of 
the atrocities. Interviewed in Canada’s Globe and Mail, journalist Jamal Khashoggi of Al-
Hayat suggested that the purpose of the massacres was to push poor land tenants off 
nationalised or collectivised farmland so that the government could expropriate it for 
private interests.172  
 
 
                                                
169 La Tribune, ‘Maghreb. Un terrorisme mafieux lie aux privatisations sévit en Algérie’, 17 
septembre 1997: 8. 
170 Newsweek, ‘Land Clashes?’, 7 July 1997: 5; see also Christopher Dickey, ‘The Slaughter Goes 
On’, Newsweek, 8 September 1997: 40. 
 In 1995, Martinez’ assessment of the violence seemed closer to Grandguillaume, albeit in a 
time before the major massacres: ‘In the majority of cases, we no longer know who kills who. 
There is the feeling of an immense settling of scores at the national level’ (‘Dans la majorité des 
cas, on ne sait plus qui tue qui. On a le sentiment d’un immense règlement de comptes, à l’échelle 
nationale, ajoute Luis Martinez’. Simon Catherine, ‘Vertiges meurtriers en Algérie’, Le Monde, 14 
September 1995). Martinez, it should be recalled, published the only monograph on Algeria during 
the 1990s, which was based upon extended field research(Martinez 2000a). That he came to this 
conclusion after interviewing several actor types (e.g., participants and profiteers) is highly 
indicative of the opacity of the violence, even for those working on the ground. 
171 Michael Willis, ‘Atrocities in Algeria: Why butcher your own people?’, The Observer, 11 
January 1998: 14. 
172 Marcus Gee, ‘World treads softly around Algeria’, Globe and Mail (Toronto), 8 January 1998: 
A12. 
 This suspicion was based on a 1995 law that attempted to roll back Algeria’s 1971 Agrarian 
Revolution by de-nationalising farm land (see Dillman 2000b: 126).  
 Another possible factor in the general violence that received some attention was the economic 
space created by the privatisation of government enterprises and holding companies, along with the 
creation of over 25,000 import/export companies, during the 1990s (International Crisis Group 
2001b: 13-5). 
 153 
Conclusion 
 
Encoded onto the bodies of the massacre victims was a message that some foreign 
observers found difficult, if not impossible, to decipher. What was the message and who 
was sending it? The most brute, undeniable fact to come out of the major massacres — at 
least in their international representation — is their shared horror. No other characteristic 
seems to carry as strongly across the set. While narratives of the vast majority of massacres 
are not available (and could be lost to history and politics), survivor accounts from the 
major massacres, like those presented in the beginning of this chapter, indicate a high 
degree of systematic brutality. It was not enough for the massacre perpetrators to kill; 
efficiency, it seems, was often not the priority. The implements of murder were reportedly 
crude; farming equipment and tools of everyday life repurposed. The archives of major 
international photo agencies demonstrate the ubiquity of slashed throats as a favoured 
technique of killing. When applied to the Algerian massacres, the term slaughter fulfilled 
two of its meanings. But perhaps the most agonising horror of the major massacres was 
their duration, lasting several hours. Time instrumentalised for terror.  
 
But apart from horror, it is difficult to locate consensus on any other facet of these mass 
killing episodes, primarily the questions of perpetrator identity and their motivations for 
carrying out these attacks. There appears to be, however, an implicit consensus within 
these various theses on the massacres. A fixed relationship between identity and motive 
seemed to be in play. That is, if one could determine the perpetrators of the massacres, one 
could easily infer their logic, or vice versa. If Islamists were carrying out the massacres, 
the possible motives were religious duty, deterrence, revenge, nihilism, etc. If it was the 
state, the purpose ranged between punitive and commercial. Supposing private interests 
had a hand in the massacres entailed specific hypotheses, as did the possibility of localised 
politics playing into them. Very few accounts of the Algerian massacres were willing to 
admit the possibility of more than one explanation. Fewer still were willing to suggest that 
two or more explanations could account for them concurrently.173  
                                                
173 Following Bentalha in September 1997, Roula Khalaf of the Financial Times made a rare claim: 
‘Most observers believe that there is no single explanation for the atrocities in Algeria’. While this 
stands in contrast to the observations of this study, especially concerning foreign views on the 
massacres, her statement raises two possibilities: either she reached this conclusion by observing 
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To his credit, Bedjaoui (1999) stands out as the only author to make a sustained effort to 
reconcile several theses of the massacre with the aggregate data in a companion study (i.e., 
Aït-Larbi, et al., 1999). Yet Bedjaoui only considers five possible agent-motive 
combinations: an insurgent punishment campaign, a covert state counter-insurgency 
campaign, intra-regime fighting, land grabs and social vendettas. Given the actual number 
of theses voiced, like those detailed in this chapter, these five options already filter out too 
much. For example, private or public business actors can only take part in massacres where 
land issues are present, civilian militias can only play a role in the massacres if it is a state 
counter-insurgency campaign and local level politics will only manifest in the massacres if 
vendettas are being pursued. Having pre-screened the explanatory possibilities in this way, 
Bedjaoui argues that certain macro-level indicators, especially patterns of intensity and 
frequency across all classes of massacres between late 1996 and the end of 1998 (as 
established in Aït-Larbi, et al., 1999), suggest coordination and logic. If the massacres are 
the expression of a rational policy, then Bedjaoui claims that he can rule out the land grab 
and social vendetta thesis. He then rules out the possibility of Islamist agency, a 
problematic argument that will be addressed in the following chapter. This, of course, 
leaves the counter-insurgency and intra-regime theses as the default winners. The fact that 
Bedjaoui eliminates the possibility of local level politics and alternative agencies from 
factoring into the massacres is indicative of a belief that such violence could not be 
anything but, at best, totally divorced from national level politics or, at worst, entirely 
irrational. To be generous, Bedjaoui’s argument is that localised or micro-level violence, 
no matter how logical, would not manifest rational patterns at the national or macro-level. 
Yet one counter-argument that has not been addressed is the possibility that the appearance 
of waves in the combined frequency and intensity of massacres results from the dampening 
effect of state security measures taken to help organise elections. What appears to be a 
macro-level pattern of escalating cycles of massacre activity could in fact be the 
accumulation of micro-level violence periodically limited government initiatives to secure 
polling sites and protect voters.  
                                                                                                                                              
the wide proliferation of theories or media representations of the conflict tended to reduce multiple 
options to exclusive choices. Considering the fact that even scholarly representations of the conflict 
have tended towards a reductionist view of the violence, it is likely the former (Roula Khalaf, 
‘Panic and confusion over Algiers killings’, Financial Times, 24 September 1997: 4). 
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More important than the plausibility of this counter-argument is the underlying assumption 
of a single logic. Almost entirely absent is any suggestion of an all-of-the-above approach. 
Instead, explanatory options were heavily conditioned by certain views about the nature of 
the conflict in the first place. The tendency to bifurcate identity and politics in accounts of 
the armed conflict in Algeria, like those identified in the previous two chapters easily 
transposed itself onto description and analyses of the massacres. Just as the perceived 
politics of the violence in Algeria was constrained by its international reception as a 
conflict between the state and Islamists, this rigid framework likewise filtered foreign 
interpretations of the Algerian massacres. 
 
Another impediment to the theorisation of multiple agencies and logics to the massacres 
can be located in the act of categorization itself. Above, the issue of massacre threshold 
was briefly broached, where it was noted that, to count an episode of mass violence as a 
massacre, various observers have maintained baseline fatality rates of four to fifteen 
persons. Other proposed or implied conditions — none found to be convincingly necessary 
— included the methodology of killing, the selectivity of the murders (or lack thereof) and 
the behaviour of the victim population (i.e., whether or not it was in a state of active 
resistance to the violence). The question of threshold itself is not critical, but it does 
highlight a problematic feature of the discourse on the massacres, whether found in the 
media or more critical examinations. Once an episode of mass violence was tagged with 
the label massacre, that association implied much more than shared attributes of violence. 
Individual massacre events were stripped of their contingency and de-territorialised. In the 
discourse on mass violence in Algeria, all massacres, by virtue of being called a massacre, 
could be explained by a single logic. 
 
This assumption of shared rationality then called into question the rational capacity of 
various actor types. It is interesting to note that there was never a suggestion that the state 
— or even rogue actors within it — was carrying out the massacres for irrational reasons 
of bloodlust or mindless revenge. Theses of state terror always carried with them apparent 
or implied strategic utility, as if there is always a one-to-one correspondence between the 
actions of government actors and the needs of the state they represent. Even accounts of 
the government’s failure to intervene never suggested the possibility of an irrational 
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motive for such passive complicity in the massacres. Submerged violence — localised 
violence operating below the national-level political contest — was often rendered the 
most irrational because its strategic utility, within the logic of the national level conflict or 
the logic of massacres qua massacre, was not apparent. Most interestingly of all, the 
strongest defence of GIA culpability in the massacres, which will be examined in the 
following chapter, seeks to demonstrate why the massacres could be rational given the 
widely held presumption that they were a manifestation of barbaric senselessness on the 
part of the Islamists.  
 
At this point, what should be apparent is that certain assumptions about, one, the politics of 
the Algerian conflict at the macro-level and, two, the possibilities of rational violence at 
the micro-level, created a perilous discursive environment in which the massacres were 
read and responded to. One of the troubling outcomes of which has been the vindication of 
certain narratives of the massacres by default. As will be detailed in the following chapter, 
the account of the massacres that has arguably gained a degree of hegemony within the 
discourse is the one that attributes these atrocities to Islamist agency and rationality alone. 
Yet the weakness of this account, vis-à-vis the very data it marshals to its cause, should not 
only trouble those that believe these questions have been resolved, it further problematises 
the international response to the Algerian massacres analysed in chapter seven.  
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6. Identity 
 
 
 
From ideology to identity: armed conflict in the new world order 
 
Not long after the events of 11 September 2001, the recent violence in Algeria was 
discursively redeployed to help frame the attacks in New York and Washington, DC. In an 
interview published three days after the events, philosopher André Glucksmann — who 
had left his own mark on the Algerian conflict three years prior (see chapter seven) — 
argued that it was Muslims, first and foremost, who needed to defend themselves against 
the ‘fascisme vert’ (green fascism) instantiated in 11 September. Why? ‘Above all, the first 
victims of the Islamists are women and children, in Afghanistan as in Algeria’.1 Author 
and newspaper editor James Haught had no problem blaming ‘Islamic militants’ entirely 
for having ‘killed nearly 100,000 civilians in a nine-year struggle to create a theocracy’ in 
Algeria.2 Le Figaro’s Max Clos wanted to believe that Islam is a religion of peace but this 
was apparently not the case, ‘neither in Algeria, neither in Afghanistan, neither the past 
week in New York and Washington’.3 Others agreed. Professor Walid Phares, ‘an expert in 
Islamic radicalism’, reminded his interviewer, ‘In Algeria, for instance, jihad forces linked 
to bin Laden perpetrated massacres against Muslims, killing whole families’.4 Before US 
congressional hearings a week after the attacks, ‘terrorism scholar’ Professor Christopher 
C. Harmon shortlisted the GIA second only to Osama Bin Laden and the Palestinian 
HAMAS in terms of shared ‘willingness of these groups to kill a large number of civilians’ 
(US Congress 2001: 112). Providing an ‘Arab Perspective’, writer Marwan Bishara 
explained 11 September in terms of the phenomenon of Arab veterans of the Soviet-
Afghan war ‘deserted and betrayed by America’. Returning to their home countries, ‘They 
exercised their violence through Islamist groups [...]. Thousands of civilians have been 
slaughtered in Egypt, Algeria, and elsewhere in the Arab world’. He added, ‘Not a week 
                                                
1 Alexis Lacroix, ‘Terrorisme. Les conséquences du quadruple attentat aux Etats-Unis’, Le Figaro, 
14 September 2001. 
2 James Haught, ‘What causes “true believers” to kill?’, Charleston Gazette, 12 September 2001: 
P4A 
3 Le Figaro, ‘Le Bloc-Notes de Max Clos’, 21 September 2001. 
4 Andrew Duffy, ‘New “superterrorism” may produce huge casualties’, Ottawa Citizen, 14 
September 2001: C3. 
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goes by without yet another massacre being committed against Algerian civilians’.5 
Compounding this narrative, the Globe and Mail recalled that the Arab Afghan veterans of 
the GIA, ‘carried out a series of gruesome civilian massacres, wiping out whole villages’.6 
A commentary from Algiers noted that the events of 11 September 2001 confirmed the 
‘thesis’ of the Algerian government regarding terrorism. The Algerian daily El Nasr 
snidely wrote that it was now United States’ turn to ask itself the question Qui tue qui? 
(Who kills who?)7 But for Ali Tounsi, head of Algeria’s national police force, there was no 
question: ‘After [11 September], the world now knows who kills whom’.8 
 
Algeria’s recent and ongoing experience with mass violence was also put to use in the 
immense volume of scholarly literature on Islamism provoked by 11 September 2001. 
Algeria of the 1990s had been the site of the ‘most appalling example of violent Islamist 
activity’ (Ayoob 2008: 18), a place where ‘Emirs of differing extremist persuasions and 
various regions hunted and butchered one another and committed hideous massacres 
against civilians, government officials, and foreign nationals’ (Gerges 2005: 101). 
Algeria’s location in the ‘genealogy of radical Islam’ has become infamously bloody yet 
ominous in hindsight: a 1997 ‘fatwa shifted GIA operations away from the state and 
toward softer targets in society, eventually leading to widespread civilian massacres’. 
Furthermore, ‘The underlying justification for the massacres portended the later Al-Qaeda 
justification for 11 September and purposeful civilian targeting’ (Wiktorowicz 2005: 88). 
Algeria became inducted into new categories, interpretations and vocabularies of violent 
                                                
5 Marwan Bishara, ‘Bush Versus Bin Laden: An Arab Perspective’, International Herald Tribune, 
21 September 2001: 11. 
6 Marcus Gee, ‘The hydra’s 10 biggest heads’, Globe and Mail, 29 September 2001: F8. 
7 Amer Ouali, ‘L’Algérie se sent confortée dans ses thèses’, AFP, 13 September 2001. 
 This thesis — essentially that Algeria had been fighting its own war on terror since 1992 — 
was summarised by former Defence Minister Khaled Nezzar a week after 11 September 2001: ‘It is 
in the interest of modern societies and those who wish to become modern societies, to join together 
to combat this evil of the third millennium’ (AFP, ‘Algerian aide who thwarted Islamic party 
decries terrorism’, 22 September 2001). Over a year after 11 September, the US government had 
picked up on this motif. Then Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs, William Burns, 
during a December 2002 visit to Algiers, suggested, ‘Washington has much to learn from Algeria 
on ways to fight terrorism’ (quoted in Giles Tremlett, ‘US arms Algeria for fight against Islamic 
terror’, The Guardian, 10 December 2002: 13). Several months earlier, one journalist had 
commented, ‘For the past decade, Algeria has served as a horrific test tube for a “war on 
terrorism”’ (Lara Marlowe, ‘Algeria a test case for war on terrorism’, Irish Times, 14 August 2002: 
14). 
8 José Garçon, ‘Une aubaine pour Alger’, Libération, 22 September 2001: 15.  
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conflict: ‘In Iraq — and earlier in Algeria — jihadists were primarily killing fellow 
Muslims, accusing them of collaboration with the “infidels” these are crimes committed in 
the name of jihad’ (Tibi 2008: 51). Algeria appears or functions as contextualising point, a 
reminder, a key element in the increasing preoccupation with Islam and terrorism as 
objects of security: ‘While in Egypt and Algeria and other locales in the Leveant the full 
thrust of the radical Islamists movements had reached their apex in the mid to late 1990s’ 
(Milton-Edwards 2006: 104). The conflict in Algeria now holds a prominent role in the 
narrative of Jihad failure against the ‘near enemy’ — governments of the Middle East — 
and the resultant trans-nationalisation of the Islamist movement against the ‘far enemy’ of 
West — primarily the United States (e.g., Ayoob 2008: 36; Cook 2005: 140; Gerges 2005: 
130; Kepel 2006: 256; Wiktorowicz 2005: 94).  
 
Perhaps the most prominent global narratives to emerge out of the 11 September 2001 
attacks had already appeared years prior. In 1992, US scholar Samuel Huntington 
famously declared that the ‘fundamental source of conflict in this new world’, after the 
Cold War, ‘will be cultural’. By that, Huntington meant ‘the principle conflicts of global 
politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations’ (Huntington 1992: 
22). The debate triggered by Huntington’s thesis was enormous and vigorous, to say the 
least.9 Yet his grand master narrative of the New World Order — a challenge to Neoliberal 
triumphalism (e.g., Fukuyama 1992) — did not initially seem to correspond with reality. 
The immediate post-Cold War reality was more riddled with intra-national conflicts, a 
proliferation of violence seemingly rooted in ethnicity and sub-national communities rather 
than grand inter-civilization strife. Soon after the clash of civilizations was declared, US 
journalist Robert Kaplan (1994), in a kind of riposte, offered a much more bleak picture of 
world in which things at the micro-level would matter much more than at the macro-level. 
‘Loose and shadowy organisms such as Islamic terrorist organizations’, Kaplan claimed, 
‘suggest why borders will mean increasingly little and sedimentary layers of tribalistic 
identity and control will mean more’. After 11 September 2001, both accounts seemed to 
still have merit yet the invocation of a clash of civilizations after 11 September — a 
fundamental, intractable conflict between Islam and the West — was quick, and 
                                                
9 Google Scholar, for example, suggests that Huntington’s original essay and subsequent book have 
been cited over 8,000 times by 2009. Kaplan’s ‘Coming Anarchy’ article has been referenced over 
one thousand times. 
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Huntington’s thesis won a new lease on life. Belated critiques finally arrived from figures 
such as the late Edward Said and Mahmood Mamdani. Where Said (2001) challenged the 
stability and impenetrability of identities at the personal and civilizational level, Mamdani 
(2004) confronted the attempt to reduce all political matters to questions of a purportedly 
static culture. Wherever one falls within this field of debate, one thing is certain: Identity 
has played, and will continue to play, an important role in the discursive constitution of 
politics, whether as a contributing factor or as a contested concept under permanent 
erasure. Identity evidently is so important, that scholars Shibley Telhami and Michael 
Barnett boldly claimed, ‘No student of Middle Eastern international politics can begin to 
understand the region without taking into account the ebb and flow of identity politics’ 
(2002: 2). Stuart Hall, explicitly borrowing from Derrida, likewise admitted, ‘Identity is 
[...] an idea which cannot be thought in the old way, but without which certain key 
questions cannot be thought at all’ (1996: 2).  
 
One of those ‘key questions’ is certainly the relationship between identity and mass 
violence. For some, identity constitutes a sufficient condition for violence. Lebanese 
novelist Amin Maalouf (2003: 30) surmised that identity ‘encourages people to adopt an 
attitude that is partial, sectarian, intolerant, domineering, sometimes suicidal, and 
frequently even changes them into killers or supports of killers’. Likewise, Nobel Prize 
winning economist Amartya Sen (2006: xv) proposed,  
 
[... ] many of the conflicts and barbarities in the world are sustained through the 
illusion of a unique and choiceless identity. The art of constructing hatred takes the 
form of invoking the magical power of some allegedly predominant identity that 
drowns other affiliations, and in a conveniently bellicose form can also overpower any 
human sympathy or natural kindness that we may normally have. The result can be 
homespun elemental violence, or globally artful violence and terrorism. 
 
In fact, a major source of potential conflict in the contemporary world is the 
presumption that people can be uniquely categorized based on religion or culture. 
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Here, in Maalouf and Sen, if not Huntington before them, we can see that the relationship 
between identity and violent conflict is direct. Violence flows out of identity. Identity is 
the cause of so many deadly conflicts and so it is in identity that a solution must be found. 
 
While it was difficult to see how the Algerian conflict was a manifestation of a clash of 
civilisations, Algeria nonetheless seemed to provide further evidence of the enormous 
violent potential of identity unleashed after the end of the US-Soviet rivalry. Hugh 
Roberts, perhaps the most careful and sympathetic Anglophone observer of Algerian 
affairs, who has tended to eschew almost all reductionist tendencies, nevertheless 
described the period of 1989 to 1999 as one of ‘ferocious identity politics’ in Algeria 
(Roberts 2007: 16). Putting a historical veneer on this approach, scholar James Le Sueur 
(2005: 326) remarked that the ‘civil war in the 1990s’ saw efforts to ‘recycle’ the ‘identity 
politics’ seen in the war of independence. Few would claim that identity, all by itself, could 
sufficiently explain the outbreak, escalation, perpetuation or long denouement of violence 
in Algeria since 1992. Yet it now seems impossible to describe the conflict in Algeria 
without making some reference to the tension between differing claims to identity — what 
it means to be an Algerian citizen, a youth, a Moudjahid, a Berber, an Arab, a man, a 
woman and, most importantly of all, a Muslim. 
 
While it would be a worthwhile project to interrogate claims that the last two decades of 
violence in Algeria represent a manifestation of something called ‘identity politics’, this 
chapter has a much more modest goal. As noted above and in the previous chapter, the 
organising logic of the Algerian massacres has frequently been attributed to the Islamic 
identity of the insurgency. While the issues of identity and motive surrounding the 
massacres remain alive for many Algerians and foreign observers, it is now commonly 
accepted among many others that elements of the insurgency, mainly the GIA, were the 
authors of the major massacres in 1997 and 1998. That this reading of the massacres has 
achieved hegemonic status might seem difficult to believe, given the debate that 
surrounded the massacres (outlined in the previous chapter) and the fact that neither the 
Algerian government nor any foreign body has carried out a formal inquiry into these 
events (see chapter eight). Yet the belief that the Algerian massacres were perpetrated 
solely or mainly by the insurgency now has the status of accepted truth among respected 
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scholars of Islam (cited above), other social scientists10 and, of course, major international 
news outlets. What is also troubling about the dominant position of this thesis within the 
politiography of Algerian violence is the fact that its best arguments are either mere 
assertion or are undermined by their own evidence.  
 
 
Problematic Constructions 
 
While the atrocities in Algeria produced a vigorous internationalised debate, particularly 
between August 1997 and February 1998, very few works have attempted to address the 
questions raised by the massacres in a systematic manner.11 The most ambitious is 
certainly the volume An inquiry into the Algerian massacres (Bedjaoui et al. 1999), a 
collection of articles and studies published by an independent Algerian dissident press 
based in Switzerland. In the previous chapter, we noted that the book’s two central 
contributions are Aït-Larbi et al. (1999), which presents a substantial amount of data 
collected on the Algerian massacres from various sources (mainly mass media and NGO 
reports), and Bedjaoui (1999), which tests this data against five theses of the massacres. 
Both deploy a methodology and vocabulary highly reminiscent of sociological, 
criminological and epidemiological studies of mass violence. Yet for all their intensive 
data collection efforts and multi-dimensional analysis, Bedjaoui’s (1999) attempt to derive 
the massacres’ political motivation from their macro-level indicators suffers from a serious 
flaw. It concludes that elements of the insurgency could not be responsible for the 
massacres because the AIS had formally withdrawn from the conflict on 1 October 1997, 
                                                
10 E.g., Charles Tilly (2003: 105-6). 
An exception worth noting is David Cook’s (2005: 119-21) study of Jihad, which 
acknowledges that the massacres in Algeria in the 1990s ‘were often difficult for outside observers 
to interpret. Were they conducted by the radical Muslim rebels in an attempt to solidify their rule or 
by the government trying to extirpate and terrorize populations sympathetic to the rebels? The 
question remains unresolved’. On the other hand, Bernard Lewis (2003: 106), attempting to 
demonstrate the West’s hypocritical attitude towards Israeli state terror and the terrorism of Arab 
regimes, seemingly gives the impression that the Algerian conflict was entirely one-sided. The 
Algerian government carried out the ‘slaughter tens of thousands’ of its citizens with little protest 
in the West. 
11 Two other noteworthy efforts to address massacres and the Qui tue? questions take the 
alternative approach of either explicitly refusing to buy into this framework (Roberts 1998) or 
analyzing everything except the question of culpability (Martinez 2001). Even more indirectly, 
anthropologist Paul Silverstein (2002) examines the massacre debate in terms of Algeria’s culture 
of conspiracy theorising. 
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well before some of the major massacres. As for the GIA, Bedjoui already believes, 
primarily citing another contribution to the same volume (Izel et al. 1999), that it is a 
pseudo-insurgent force operated or manipulated by the Algerian government. The claims 
that the AIS represented the entirety of the insurgency and that the GIA was entirely under 
the control of the Algeria government is enough reason to place serious doubt over the 
Inquiry’s findings. 
 
Backing the converse thesis, scholars Gilles Kepel (2006: 254-75) and Mohammed Hafez 
(2000; 2004) have offered accounts attempting to explain why Islamist insurgents carried 
out the massacres through an analysis of GIA discourse and practices. However, both 
largely work from the premise that rebels carried out the massacres without offering any 
arguments against claims of state culpability, let alone claims of privatised violence. 
Kepel, at least, repeatedly caveats the existence of other explanations for the massacres but 
he is never able to resolve, nor does he really attempt to dispel, the tension between his 
effort to explain the insurgency’s ‘drift towards aimless violence’ (Kepel 2006: 255) and 
his acknowledgement that ‘we have no reliable way of knowing exactly which groups were 
responsible’ for the major massacres in the latter half of 1997 (ibid.: 274).12 A similar 
tension exists in Hafez. In his original 2000 article, Hafez admitted, ‘One cannot affirm or 
discount all these arguments [i.e., alternative complicities] without a thorough 
investigation of all the facts surrounding the massacres’. This certainly buys him some 
insurance against his assertion that ‘the evidence does not support the claim that security 
forces were the principal culprits behind the massacres’. But the only evidence Hafez 
examines are GIA statements, whose sufficiency to account for the massacres is pre-
determined by the already operational assumption that the GIA is responsible for them. 
There is no argument or weighing of evidence. Hafez’s 2004 chapter, a theoretically 
enhanced version of his 2000 article, is even more ambivalent, as it merely footnotes the 
                                                
12 Another indication of Kepel’s (2006: 273) lack of rigour is revealed in his claim that 1997 is the 
zenith of the conflict; he cites Raïs, Beni Messous and Bentalha but fails to mention the massacres 
that proved just as lethal — those in Relizane and Sidi Hamed. This is clearly not a simple mistake 
because he compounds the error: ‘The month of Ramadan (January-February) in 1997’, Kepel 
(2006: 272) falsely claims, ‘was the bloodiest of the entire war, with horrific massacres of 
civilians’. Though he acknowledges that ‘the massacres continued unabated throughout 1998’ 
(2006: 274), the elision over the Relizane and Sidi Hammed massacres, not to mention massacre 
activity past 2000, is disconcerting. Likewise, he claims that the GIA ‘disappeared’ (ibid.: 274) in 
1998, though it in fact continued well past 2000. 
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existence of contrary hypotheses of the massacres — the claims of former Prime Minister 
Abdelhamid Brahimi, as well as Yous (2000) and Souaïdia (2001) — yet does not engage 
them (see Hafez 2004: 54). 
 
Arguably the most influential publication to address the massacres in Algeria is Stathis 
Kalyvas award winning 1999 article.13 Though Kalyvas shares the belief that the massacres 
were carried out by the insurgency, specifically the GIA, he provides theorising, 
argumentation and evidence to back up his position and makes a case against state 
culpability. Since publication, even the best of scholars have uncritically adopted its 
findings.14 There are, however, serious problems with Kalyvas’ paper. Unlike other 
treatments of the massacres, which tend to be undermined by fatal assumptions, ‘Wanton 
and Senseless’ suffers death by a thousand cuts. While there are some salvageable 
problems with the argument at the analytic level, the evidence Kalyvas marshals to his 
cause lacks reliability and comprehensiveness, as well as proper representation, 
interpretation and contextualisation. Given the extent to which Kalyvas’ article has widely 
circulated yet received no critical interrogation, a careful examination is certainly in order.  
 
The main thrust of Kalyvas’ argument is to counter assessments of the Algerian massacres 
as acts of mindless terrorism on the part of the insurgency against its support base. He does 
so by building a hypothesis wherein massive yet selective violence against civilian 
populations formerly or contentedly under rebel control is deployed in order to raise the 
costs of defection to the side of the state. In brief, Kalyvas’ develops a sophisticated 
version of the strategic or rationalist insurgent retribution thesis. Understanding that the 
available evidence is still thin, he simply tests the plausibility of his hypothesis against the 
available record. Yet he also defends his account from the counter-hypothesis of state 
complicity in the massacres (both the active and passive variants) by arguing against that 
                                                
13 Cited in over 125 other publications according to Google Scholar (as of 19 October 2009); 
ranked the most read article and the eleventh most cited in Rationality and Society (as of 1 
December 2009); winner of the Gregory Luebbert Best Article Award of the Comparative Politics 
Section of the American Political Science Association, given to the best professional article in 
comparative politics published in the prior year. 
14 E.g., Weinstein (2007: 316-7). 
In an enormously popular article, Fearon and Laitin (2003: 80) cite Kalyvas (1999) as 
providing evidence for the claim that ‘ethnic insurgents’ benefit from local knowledge. This seems 
odd, as there was nothing ‘ethnic’ about Kalyvas’ analysis or the insurgency in 1990s Algeria, 
whether in terms of grievance or participant identity. 
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possibility. While an obvious weakness in Kalyvas’ argument is the failure to confront the 
full scope of possible agencies behind the massacres, the most important shortcoming in 
his treatment of the massacres is it over-reliance upon fragile data and its complete 
disregard of confounding information in the same sources or equally available ones. Not 
only is the available evidence significant under-represented, the viability of this hypothesis 
rests upon a problematic representations of geography and consensus. 
 
Conditions of representability 
 
Before addressing the arguments, it is important to first note a disturbing silence in these 
analyses of the massacres: the lack of consideration given to issues of source reliability.15 
The foremost archive for these studies has been reports in Algerian and foreign 
newspapers, whether reports generated inside Algeria or abroad.16 First of all, the 
circumscribed manner in which domestic and foreign journalists were forced to operate in 
Algeria should be acknowledged. When deploying press accounts as primary sources of 
information, it should first be noted that, in the 1990s, Algeria was widely recognized as 
one of the deadliest places in the world for journalists to operate. By the time of the major 
massacres in 1998, seventy Algerian journalists had been assassinated, along with dozens 
of foreign citizens. In February 1996, a car bomb targeted the Maison de la Press in 
Algiers, killing three journalists and over a dozen others.17 Though as of 1997, Amnesty 
International reported that not a single person had been held accountable for any of these 
slayings, a fact that likely added to an atmosphere of terror and impunity felt by media 
workers. Though rebels were widely blamed for these attacks, some Algerian journalists 
expressed fears of being killed or ‘disappeared’ by state agents (Amnesty International 
1997: 26-9). Zeineddine Aliou-Salah of Liberté — one of the four journalists that lost to 
                                                
15 Bedjaoui, Kepel, Hafez and Kalyvas largely ignore these methodological questions. Kalyvas 
(1999:245-6) admits that the accounts of foreign journalists are ‘fragmentary and incomplete’ and 
‘the conditions of their investigation were far from ideal’, but he argues that his ‘theoretical lens’ 
will ‘help make sense of this tragic story’.  
16 Given Algeria’s post-conflict ‘amnesia consensus’ (see chapter eight), it has not been generally 
possible to generate new data on the massacres, notable exceptions being Moussaoui (2006) and 
Belaala (2008). That contemporary press accounts remain the primary source for most of the 
writing on the Algerian massacres is well evidenced in recent works such as Evans and Phillips 
(2008). 
17 Committee to Protect Journalists, ‘60 Journalists Killed in Algeria since 1992’,  
http://cpj.org/killed/mideast/algeria/, accessed September 2010; and ‘Allaoua Ait M'barak’, 
http://cpj.org/killed/1996/allaoua-ait-mbarak.php, accessed September 2010. 
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murder — was reportedly more afraid of the government than the Islamists who 
supposedly killed him.18 A 1997 Reporters Without Borders report (see RSF et al. 1997: 9-
45) charged, ‘Many professional journalists admit in private that the government is behind 
certain assassinations, but all say they fear for their lives if they make their knowledge 
public’.19 If true, such threats would certainly constitute a pervasive incentive to engage in 
self-censorship when it came to reporting on the government. 
 
More overtly, the Algerian government took steps to control reporting on the armed 
conflict: seizing individual editions, suspending publications, placing steep financial 
burdens on newspapers through institutional controls, fining and imprisoning journalists 
and editors (Human Rights Watch 1997b: 26-33). Control was also possible because the 
near monopoly over domestic television and radio news broadcasts, as well as ownership 
of all the printing presses and paper supplies. From 1996 to 1998, state censors (‘reading 
committees’) were placed inside all the printing rooms to vet papers prior to publication. 
With respect to the unfolding massacres, a 1997 report from Human Rights Watch (ibid.: 
29) found, 
 
[Algerian reporters] are permitted to cover killings and massacres of civilians attributed 
by authorities to armed Islamist extremists, although the press has at different times 
been instructed either to play up or play down this sort of news and has been prevented 
from conducting independent investigations into massacres and reporting on its 
findings.  
 
In some cases, the Algerian government seemingly refused to acknowledge ongoing 
massacre activity, making it difficult for the journalists to report on it.20 
 
                                                
18 Spelled ‘Zineddine Allian’ in Ian Black, ‘Algerian violence: Press holed up in no man's land’, 
Guardian, 23 January 1998: 13; see Labter 2005: 133. 
19 Quoted in Lara Marlowe, ‘Government may have ordered journalists’ murders, says report’, Irish 
Times, 19 March 1997: 13. 
20 Between the AIS ceasefire and the beginning of Ramadan at the end of 1997, there had been at 
least two-dozen reports of massacre, but there was no official government acknowledgement 
(Associated Press, ‘Attackers kill 59 people in Algeria, government says’, 24 December 1997). 
Unlike Bentalha and Raïs, none had obtained the casualty mark of one hundred; most figured 
below fifty. The final week of 1997 saw some 250 Algerians reportedly killed in acts of political 
violence (AFP, ‘Algeria’s bloody week: more than 30 murdered each day’, 29 December 1997). 
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Beyond the systemic bias such conditions might create, there is also the question of 
ideological bias at the level of individual journalists and outlets. For example, the 
journalist with the most bylines in Kalyvas’ bibliography is Hassane Zerrouky of 
L’Humanité. Zerrouky was also a journalist with the now defunct Matin d’Alger, a paper, 
like L’Humanité, with links to Leftist or (post-) Communist politics, and a staunch pro-
secular, anti-Islamist (‘erradicateur’) editorial stance through the conflict.21 Hafez (2004) 
uses Al-Hayat extensively without offering any consideration as to whether or not such 
dependency might actually undermine his goals of obtaining a clear picture of the 
massacres. On a number of occasions, the Algerian government and press singled out Al-
Hayat for its allegedly erroneous reports. In terms of this chapter’s scope, the most 
interesting case is the disputed Batna-M’sila faux barrage massacre of over sixty persons 
in August 1996 (see below) though other examples also exist.22 
 
Given the environment of fear and terror generated by the assassinations of journalists and 
foreigners in the early years of the conflict, very few press agencies or major international 
outlets had a permanent presence in Algiers as the massacres were unfolding. Significant 
articles on the massacres in Le Monde and the New York Times, for example, were written 
in Paris, culling together bits and pieces from write reports, Algerian papers on sale in 
France and telephone interviews. Agence France Presse, Associated Press, Reuters and 
Deutsche Presse Agentur kept their Algiers bureaus open long after most other European 
press outlets had left.23 These reporters, especially those working for AFP and AP, 
provided the bulk of international coverage of the conflict. However, operating from 
Algiers required walking a fine line between the government’s ‘red lines’ and the foreign 
                                                
21 Mina Kaci, also identified as a ‘left wing’ journalist (Evans and Phillips 2008: 169) with 
L’Humanité, is frequently cited in Kalyvas’ paper as well. 
22 The claims that a bomb had been placed at the Algiers airport targeting then French Foreign 
Minister Hervé de Charette during a visit (AFP, ‘Rumours of de Charette attack were 
disinformation: Algiers’, 3 August 1996); reports that the Algerian military had been placed on 
‘high alert’ after Raïs (AFP, ‘Over 127 Islamists killed by Algeria's armed forces: Press’, 9 
September 1997); 
23 A notable absence from this list is major Arabic papers (e.g., Al-Hayat and Al-Sharq al-Awsat) 
that had steady coverage of the Algerian conflict. Mainly these sources are not addressed because 
they have not been widely deployed except in Hafez, who assumes insurgent culpability as a given. 
And, as noted above, Hafez does not reach this conclusion based upon a preponderance of the 
evidence but rather assumes it and simply refuses to take the Qui tue? debate seriously. 
Nevertheless, some of the general constraints on basic newspaper reporting likely applies to the 
Arabic press as well as the Anglo-French coverage, if not the Spanish and German press as well. 
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appetite for information on the killing. Foreign journalists making ad hoc visits to Algeria 
would not have to worry as much about the repercussions of their reports unless there was 
a need to consider future visits, whether or the journalist, the outlet or the international 
press generally. For example, the Algerian government granted a large number of media 
visas for the October 1997 local elections and allowed supervised tours of some massacre 
sites; this period saw a number of reports accuse the government of direct or indirect 
complicity in the massacres. Wire services based in Algiers, however, would have to take 
into consideration possible government sanction for unflattering coverage, particularly 
those agencies with Algerian nationals on staff. Such was exercised against AFP in the 
case of the famous Bentalha ‘Madonna’ photo, though AFP had little control over the 
controversy generated by ways in which the image was received, circulated and re-
presented internationally (see chapter seven and Doy 2002: 215-8). 
 
Even more direct constrains on foreign reports also needs to be considered. Much of the 
on-the-ground international reporting on the Algerian massacres took place in October 
1997 in the lead up to that month’s local elections, when foreign journalists ostensibly 
covering the polls were granted access to several major massacre sites (e.g., Bentalha and 
Raïs). During these visits, members of Algeria’s Interior Ministry and security services 
flanked foreign reporters as they recorded witness testimonies. One journalist quipped, ‘It 
is not easy reporting when surrounded by 20 armed guards’.24 Even months before then, 
another admitted, ‘a tour of the “triangle of death” [Mitidja massacre sites] requested by 
Western journalists requires movement in a bulletproof armored vehicle, in convoy with 
three others packed with rifle-toting soldiers’.25  The effects of this were apparent to 
Anthony Lloyd of the London Times: ‘In no other zone of conflict have I seen people so 
afraid to speak their minds to a foreigner. This fear is not eased by the constant presence of 
armed plainclothes “minders” who shadow almost every move of foreign journalists’.26 
The late veteran war correspondent Peter Stranberg claimed that similar government 
minders later questioned the people he had just interviewed (in Human Rights Watch 
1997b: 30). More generally, a 1997 Amnesty International (1997: 29) report concludes that 
                                                
24 Robert Moore, ‘Hands that wield Algeria’s knives’, Observer, 26 October 1997. 
25 Scott Peterson, ‘Algeria's Real War: Ending the Cycle of Violence’, Christian Science Monitor, 
24 June 1997: 1.  
26 Anthony Loyd, ‘Zeroual’s zombies cast vote’, Times, 24 October 1997. 
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‘foreign journalists were only able to gather information on killings and abuses committed 
by armed opposition groups’ because witnesses alleging government ‘killings and abuses’ 
would likely face retribution. Some journalists even claimed, the report noted, that the 
Algerian government told them access was conditioned upon favourable coverage. In early 
1998, a reporter with the London Independent was able to visit the recent Sidi Hamed 
massacre site. He claimed that survivors only began to speak critically of their government 
when ‘you manage to find privacy from the armed men who seek to listen in to every 
conversation’.27 
 
Unstable geographies of violence 
 
Just as failing to acknowledge the constraints on the source material is problematic, so is 
any claim that a consistent picture of the massacres emerges from it. The same testimonies, 
reports and archive can equally produce oppositional or ambiguous narratives. Accounts of 
the massacres’ geography are sometimes indicative of the confused and confusing nature 
of international press coverage and the way it has been re-circulated in secondary studies 
of the massacres. As noted in the previous chapter, basic distinctions between rural, urban 
and sub-urban massacre settings were often ignored or confused. Universal claims about 
the massacres, such as their alleged intimate proximity to, or extreme distance from, 
military and security installations, do not hold up. The infamous ‘triangle of death’ 
(triangle de la mort) in the Mitidja is perhaps emblematic of the gross spatial 
amalgamations and geographical caricatures within foreign press accounts of Algerian 
violence. For some, the triangle is constructed without clear limits or points; it is a 
‘zone’28, a ‘theatre’29 or ‘the Algiers region’30, if not all the farmlands of the Mitidja31 or 
the lands between Algiers and the Atlas Mountains.32 More specific renderings constructed 
                                                
27 Steve Crawshaw, ‘Algeria rejects UN help as stunned survivors tell of massacre horror’, 
Independent, 21 January 1998: 7. 
28 Scott Peterson, ‘Algeria's Real War: Ending the Cycle of Violence’, Christian Science Monitor, 
24 June 1997: 1.  
29 Sud Ouest, ‘Aucune nouvelle des ambassadeurs’, 18 July 1994. 
30 AFP, ‘Suspected Islamists kill more Algerian security officials’, 10 October 1994 
31 Newsweek, ‘Land Clashes?’, 7 July 1997: 5 
32 Martin Regg Cohn, ‘Amid carnage, Algerians find will to vote’, Toronto Star, 1 June 1997: A1.  
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the triangle as Algiers, Blida and Larbaa33, though Larbaa was also a ‘point’34, an ‘edge’35 
and the ‘heart’36 of the triangle — a designation (‘au coeur’) it shared with the massacre 
site of Raïs six kilometres away.37 
 
Even more spatially specific details of the massacre sites were given divergent 
representations. For example, support for the argument that the massacres were targeted 
often points to the apparent geographical specificity of certain attacks, such as the two 
neighbourhoods attacked in Bentalha or the ‘shantytowns’ of Béni Messous. ‘The raid 
against Laarba’, Kalyvas (1999: 254) notes, ‘targeted in fact the neighborhood of Si 
Zerrouk’. Notwithstanding the fact that simply invoking the term neighbourhood seems 
insufficient to justify a claim of precision and selection, this area Si Zerrouk variously 
described in similar and concurrent sources as a ‘hamlet’38, ‘gehucht [hamlet, township]’39, 
a  ‘village near Larba’40, ‘a settlement on the outskirts of Larbaa’41 (‘un quartier pauvre de 
                                                
33 France Info Radio (5 August 1997) in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ‘Armed groups said 
extending scope of attacks across whole country’, 6 August 1997; Mideast Mirror, ‘Perceived 
change in FIS’s discourse and Zeroual’s approach may bode well for Algeria’, 7 August 1997; 
Reuters, ‘A further 40 die in latest spate of killings’, Irish Times, 8 August 1997: 9. 
34 AFP, ‘Nouveau bilan du massacre de Larbaa’, 29 July 1997. 
35 The Economist, ‘Algeria. Mayhem’, 2 August 1997: 28. 
36 Alain Bommenel, ‘Les Algeriens elisent leur premiere Assemblee pluraliste’, AFP, 5 June 1997. 
37 AFP, ‘Tuerie de Rais: une population traumatisée, le gouvernement au pied du mur’, 30 August 
1997. 
 Another geographical mistake that is likely more embarrassing than consequential is Kalyvas’ 
references to ‘the Haï Bounab hamlet’ (258), ‘the Mitidja village of Haï Bounab’ (269) or ‘the 
Mitidja Haï Bounab hamlet’ (270). This location comes from Algerian journalist Baya Gacemi’s 
first-person retelling of the experiences of a woman she interviewed at length, ‘Nadia’, who was 
the wife of an insurgent leader. However, the name Haï Bounab is not a real place; it is a 
pseudonym used by Gacemi to protect the actual location (Gacemi 2006: 2), which Kalyvas fails to 
acknowledge. This is a minor misrepresentation that does not significantly affect the argument, 
though it is the kind of error that raises concerns about how sources are being handled.  
Additionally, the frequent use of this text (referenced nine times) highlights concerns about the 
way in which anecdotal evidence is being used to justify categorical claims. Even though Gacemi 
presents a personal account of one woman’s experience within a single suburban guerrilla cell, 
Kalyvas uses it exclusively to support substantial claims: ‘Generally, militiamen are more prone to 
commit atrocities than security forces’ (1999: 269); ‘When possible, rebel relatives fled their 
village after the massacres’ (1999: 282); and ‘many (willing or unwilling) militiamen are former 
(willing or unwilling) rebel supporters’ (1999: 266). By itself, a single woman’s testimony could 
not support such broad claims; indeed, the third claim contains no page citations, simply 
referencing the book itself.  
38 Also citing Reuters: ‘Villagers slaughtered in Algerian attack’, Guardian, 30 July 1997: 12. 
39 de Volkskrant, ‘Legeroffensief Algerije lokt bloedige wraak uit’, 31 July 1997: 20. 
40 Reuters, ‘Guerrillas slaughter villagers’, Glasgow Herald, 30 July 1997: 11. 
41 The Economist, ‘Algeria. Mayhem’, 2 August 1997: 28. 
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la périphérie de cette localité’42) and the ‘quartier Si-Zerrouk’43 (i.e., ‘district’44). Today 
one could easily find the means to see which term best describe the location but that is not 
the point. The issue at hand is the failure to disentangle the possible interpretive 
trajectories implied in such senses of space as settlement, village or hamlet over 
neighbourhood or district, particularly given that some of these could destabilise claims of 
precision and selection. The geographical logic of the massacres was also interrogated by 
two of Kalyvas’ key sources. One speculates that specific areas of Bentalha were targeted 
mainly because of their isolation and lack of defences.45 The other, contrary to the way 
Kalyvas’ (1999: 254) presents it, actually expresses scepticism towards the overall claim 
that the massacres have been highly selective and precisely targeted.46 
 
One of the larger massacres reported in Kalyvas (1999) and Aït Larbi et al. (1999) is 
indicative, though perhaps extraordinarily so, of these problems in the source material’s 
spatial representation of the killing and the available interpretations of it. The massacre of 
over sixty bus passengers on 17 August 1996 at a faux barrage between Batna and M’sila 
is not only contestable in terms of politics but is contested in terms of its existence. 
Regarding the former, it is difficult to see how a theory of insurgent massacres premised 
on highly discriminating and intimate ‘punitive’47 terrorism could account for faux barrage 
incidents when the victim population would be highly randomized, particularly on a major 
route between two regional capitals such as Batna and M’sila. More importantly, though, 
there is also reason to suspect that this event never happened. On 19 August 1996, Al-
Hayat (London) reported the massacre based on interviews with alleged witnesses. The 
identity of the attackers was not clear, only that they were armed and had ragged clothing. 
Some of Al-Hayat’s ‘Algerian sources’ even said that the objective of this attack was to 
‘provoke insurrection between tribes’.48 The Algerian government strongly denied that the 
                                                
42 Sud Ouest, ‘La loi du sang : Massacres redoublés en Algérie. Les extrémistes ne désarment pas 
et s’en prennent à la population civile’, 30 July 1997. 
43 AFP, ‘Une centaine de personnes massacrées, selon la presse’, 2 August 1997. 
44 Amer Ouali, ‘Some 100 killed in more Algeria killings’, AFP, 2 August 1997. 
45 Jean-Pierre Tuquoi, ‘Algérie, autopsie d’un massacre’, Le Monde, 11 November 1997. 
46 Indeed, it appears that Kalyvas has invented the entire quote attributed to José Garçon’s ‘Quatre 
questions sur une tragédie’, Libération, 30 August 1997. 
47 Zerrouky calls the rebel massacres ‘expéditions punitives’ (Hassane Zerrouky, ‘La barbarie 
intégriste s’abat sur le petit village de Raïs’, L’Humanité, 30 August 1997). 
48 AFP, 19 August 1996, no title. 
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massacre had taken place and Al-Hayat, which stood by its story, remained the only 
source; no Algerian papers confirmed or disproved the report. According to one account, 
some of the local sources might have simply been confusing rumours about this incident 
with a recent and similar attack. Seventeen male bus passengers had been killed in Sidi 
Ladjel, near Ain Oussera (Djelfa prefecture), on 15 August, as reported in the Algerian 
daily El Watan.49 Among the various studies under consideration here, only Aït-Larbi et al. 
(1999) records it. The inverse problem is the omission of other significant episodes. Such 
as the slaying of over forty persons in El Omaria (Médéa prefecture) the day after the 
Bougara massacre, which was reported as a possible revenge attack carried out by ‘death 
squads’ composed of civilian militia members and elements of the security forces.50 
Though widely reported (e.g., Associated Press, Agence France Press, Reuters), it is not 
mentioned by Kalyvas nor listed in his table. 
 
In addition to the confused, inconsistent and possibly erroneous depictions of the 
massacres’ geography within the primary source material, there is another concern:  
comprehensiveness. Among the three major studies that impute responsibility for the 
massacres to the Islamist insurgency (Hafez, Kalyvas and Kepel), all three focus on the 
major Mitidja massacres of 1997 to the almost total exclusion or ignorance of the 
massacres in the Ouarsenis in late December 1997 and early 1998. As noted in the 
previous chapter, and according to a recent government disclosure, the Relizane and 
                                                                                                                                              
 The following day, the Algerian Brotherhood, an Islamist organisation in France, ‘confirmed’ 
the attack and blamed it on ‘the ideological (Franco-Berber) minorities’ militias, backed by the 
intelligence service’. See BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ‘“Neutral sources in Algeria” said 
to have confirmed Batna massacre report’, 22 August 1996 (Source: Al-Hayat, London, Arabic 20 
August 1996). 
Hayat initially reported that two busses on the Batna-M’sila road were stopped and passengers 
were separated by place of residency; those from Batna were killed. While this indicates a degree 
of selectivity among the killers, it is not based upon kind of intimate relationship between 
insurgents and victims that Kalyvas’ account is based upon. See BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, ‘“Al-Hayat” cites eyewitnesses on bus massacre of Batna citizens’, 21 August 1996 
(Source: Al-Hayat, London, in Arabic 19 August 1996). 
49 Africa News, ‘Algeria Says Extremists Didn’t Massacre Civilians’, 29 August 1996. See also 
Sud Ouest, ‘Polémique sur un massacre’, 20 August 1996; Le Monde, ‘Deux massacres, imputés 
aux islamistes, auraient fait 80 morts en Algérie’, 20 August 1996. 
50 Francis David, ‘Nouveau massacre en Algérie : 42 civils tués’, Sud Ouest, 25 April 1997. 
 The Associated Press, however, reported, ‘Witnesses identified the attackers [at Omaria] as 
Muslim insurgents’, suggesting either bad reporting (on the part of AP or Sud Ouest), confused 
witnesses or both. Whatever the case, here is another instance where there is little consensus to be 
found in the ‘available evidence’ (Rachid Khiari, ‘Muslim militants reported to kill 47 in new 
massacres in Algeria’, Associated Press, 24 April 1997). 
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Tiaret-Tissemsilt massacres were as equally destructive, if not more so, as their more 
famous Mitidja counterparts. While Hafez (2000 and 2004) simply fails to even mention 
the Ouarsenis massacres, Kepel (2006: 272-3) dismisses them as mere after-effects of the 
GIA’s putative collapse and the AIS truce following the Bentalha massacre. Kepel’s claim 
that the GIA virtually disappeared in 1997 (when it seemingly fought on for several years) 
seems as uninformed as his assertion that the months of January and February 1997 (i.e., 
Ramadan) were the bloodiest of the conflict, when contemporary press accounts touted 
December 1997 and January 1998 as far bloodier.51   
 
Kalyvas (1999: 259, 253) asserts that his findings apply to a majority of the massacres in 
Algeria yet he restricts the bulk of his analysis to the allegedly ‘most puzzling’ (256) and 
most deadly massacres between July and October 1997. That these massacres were the 
most qualitatively perplexing is mere assertion. Indeed, there is a case to be made that the 
massacres in Tiaret, Tissemsilt and Relizane are the more curious because they took place 
in an economic, social, political,  and geographical milieu far removed and possibly quite 
different from Algiers and the Mitidja plain, yet they have received far less scrutiny for 
several reasons, including remoteness. While no foreign journalist ever filed a dispatch 
from the Relizane killing sites, Raïs, Bentalha and Sidi Hamed were all well visited by the 
international press. In the Ouarsenis, however, some initial accounts claimed that even the 
Algerian press was unable to visit some of the rural sites, which reportedly lack phone 
lines and roads (see chapter five). The evidence that was available then also challenges the 
claim that the July-October 1997 period was the most deadly in terms of massacre activity. 
Starting with the increasing frequency in massacres in mid December 1997 through the 
Sidi Hamed massacre of 11-12 January 1998, the Algeria Watch list and the Aït Larbi, et 
al. (1999) study both suggest that this one-month period was nearly as deadly as the three-
month period Kalyvas scrutinises.  
 
As with most treatments of the Algerian massacres, Kalyvas (1999) overwhelmingly 
focuses on Raïs and Bentalha, both mentioned roughly twenty times each in his paper. 
                                                
51 ‘Up to 600 civilians have perished during the month of Ramadan in each of the past five years’ 
(Reuters in Seattle Post-Intelligencer, ‘Algerian Massacres Continue into Ramadan’, 1 January 
1998: A10). Four weeks later: ‘More than 1,000 people have been killed in massacres and 
bombings in the past four weeks thought to the be the work of Moslem extremists’ (Deutsche 
Presse-Agentur, ‘More than 1,000 killed during Ramadan in Algeria’, 28 January 1998). 
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Other massacres, including Bougara and Béni Messous, receive one or two mentions; Sidi 
Hamed is only mentioned in a footnote; Had Chekala has two mentions, Relizane one. 
Given the range of casualty figures he presents, Raïs and Bentalha only account for six to 
fourteen percent of the deaths in Kalyvas’ study. Yet the Algeria Watch list of massacres 
details nearly double the number of episodes during the same period, suggesting that 
Kalyvas has underrepresented the scope of the activity and so further diminishing the case 
for assigning special explanatory weight to Raïs and Bentalha. There is also a case to be 
made that major massacres like Raïs and Bentalha, with their exceptionally high death 
counts, should be treated as anomalies rather than the norm. The Algeria Watch list 
suggests that less than ten percent of massacres saw more than fifty killed and only three 
percent allegedly topped the one hundred fatalities mark between November 1996 and 
December 1998. While massacre activity seems to have been heavily concentrated in the 
three prefectures that encompass the Mitidja, over a dozen others also reported massacre 
activity as well. The five major massacres in the Algiers-Blida-Larba region — Bougara, 
Raïs, Bentalha, Béni Messous, Sidi Hamed — span an arc of just thirty kilometres.  
 
This bias towards the Mitidja massacres brings us back to a point raised in chapter four 
regarding the exceptionality of this area: Was the Mitidja an exemplary or an exceptional 
space of conflict? As noted in that chapter, arguments were raised as to whether or not the 
armed conflict in Algeria could be termed a civil war based upon the notion that rebel 
groups boasted control over certain geographical areas. Where Martinez (1998) argued that 
the Algerian conflict met this criterion, Roberts (1999) argued that the sub-urban and semi-
rural periphery of Algiers was perhaps the only area where insurgents seemingly exercised 
a degree of nominal territorial control. Moreover this claim of rebel sovereignty, which 
plays an important role in Kalyvas’ explanation of the Algerian massacres, has 
questionable support. One needs to be cautious about relying on Martinez because his 
fieldwork was conducted during the initial years of the conflict and well before the 
massacre upsurge in late 1996. Indeed, by late 1995, Martinez had come to the conclusion 
that ‘In the majority of cases, we no longer know who kills who. We have the feeling of an 
immense settling of scores on a national scale’.52  
                                                
52 ‘Dans la majorité des cas, on ne sait plus qui tue qui. On a le sentiment d'un immense règlement 
de comptes, à l'échelle nationale, ajoute Luis Martinez’. Simon Catherine, ‘Vertiges meurtriers en 
Algérie’, Le Monde, 14 September 1995. 
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Kalyvas (1999: 263-4) nonetheless proposes that the reassertion of government control 
over the Mitidja, and thus the fragmentation of the rebel’s monopoly of violence, helped 
provoke the major massacres of 1997. While there is nothing wrong with this thesis, the 
examples marshalled to its cause are problematic. The very first example is a considerably 
misrepresented quote from a ‘Mitidja villager’ — actually a combination of the voice of 
the journalist and a villager — that, in a more accurate translation, is not as supportive of 
the argument as claimed.53 Another misquoted example, taken from an elderly resident of 
Bentalha, only suggests that the local guerrillas lacked arms, sometimes came at night to 
scare people but were also afraid of the local militia.54 Similarly, a ‘villager’ is quoted as 
saying that the Mitidja in 1997 was a place with a ‘government by day and an [Islamist] 
government by night’ (ibid: 264, brackets in original). However, if we go to the original 
source, we find something quite different:  
                                                
53 Kalyvas writes, ‘According to a Mitidja villager: “in 1996, the army regained control of the road. 
. . . The soldiers began to come in the village again. They came in jeeps, fired a couple of shots in 
the air and left as soon as they came. . . . Although they came less often, the guerrillas [sic] 
continued to govern us”’. Underlining the passages Kalyvas’ uses, the original reads:  
 
Au début de 1996 apparaît un nouveau maquis, les GIA, rivaux de l'AIS, arrivant de l'Est. 
«Ceux-là, on ne les connaissait pas du tout. Ils ne sont jamais entrés dans le village et aucun 
de nous n'a jamais pris les armes pour eux. Ils ont commencé à se battre avec l'AIS. Il y avait 
des accrochages très durs, on entendait tirer dans la montagne. L'AIS s’est affaibli, quelques-
uns ont même trahi pour rejoindre les GIA.» 
 
Dans le village, l’école a repris, l'armée a récupéré le contrôle de la route. «Cela s’est fait sans 
combat, les militaires se contentaient d’avancer. L’AIS ne tenait plus la position, tout occupé 
à se battre avec le GIA. Les soldats ont recommencé à entrer de temps en temps chez nous. Ils 
arrivaient en Jeep, tiraient des coups de feu en l'air et repartaient aussi vite», reprend Y. Dans 
tout le pays, des pressions des autorités tentent de convaincre les habitants de s’armer et 
d’entrer dans les «patriotes», ces groupes de civils armés par le ministère de la Défense. 
«Même s'ils venaient moins souvent, les hommes de l’AIS nous dirigeaient toujours. C’était 
plus cool», raconte D., qui se souvient comme d'un jour de fête d'avoir pu recommencer à 
fumer. (Florence Aubenas, ‘Algérie: «Nous savons que nous sommes seuls»’, Libération, 10 
February 1998) 
 
Here AIS has been exchanged with ‘guerrillas’ and the ‘they’ (‘Although they came less often 
[...]’) is not the army, as Kalyvas implies, but rather the AIS. 
54 Kalyvas (1999: 264, brackets in Kaylvas): ‘a dozen of local young men had joined the guerrillas; 
they came to the town in late afternoons and left before being seen by the patriots [the militiamen]’. 
The original reads, ‘[Outre qu’] une douzaine de jeunes du village avaient rejoint les maquis 
voisins, des “terros” venaient, certains soirs, à cinq ou six pour nous effrayer. Ils ne portaient pas 
d’armes et ne restaient pas plus d’une dizaine de minutes. Avant que les patriotes les aient repérés, 
ils étaient repartis, raconte un vieillard’ (Jean Pierre Tuquoi, ‘Algérie, autopsie d’un massacre’, Le 
Monde, 11 November 1997).  
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In 1994 and 1995, the rebels who ransacked villages would stay all night killing and 
looting. A saying went that there was a ‘government by day and an [Islamist] 
government by night.’ Now attacks rarely last more than a couple of hours, though they 
often occur within a stone's throw of police stations or militia camps — a fact that has 
puzzled observers.55 
 
As we can see, this quote is neither attributable to a particular villager nor does it refer to 
the Mitidja of the 1997 massacres but rather a period two to three years prior. 
 
The other main aspect to this argument is the premise that massacre activity is related to 
military initiatives targeting insurgent strongholds. However, this ‘correlation’ (ibid: 264) 
might be more directly causal. In the first example, it is suggested that the Bentalha 
massacre came amidst the Algerian military’s attack on the alleged GIA stronghold of 
Ouled Allel, located mid way between the Bougara and Bentalha killing sites. In reality, 
the crackdown followed the Bentalha massacre by three days (i.e., on 26 September).56 As 
the Economist editorialised, ‘Apparently stung by press criticism of their failure to stop the 
massacres, the armed forces for the first time invited the local press to the theatre of 
operations’.57 The earlier two examples seem to follow the same trend. The July 1997 
military sweep near Hattatba (Atatba/Attatba, Tipaza prefecture) also came in direct 
response to recent bombings and mass killings in that area according to contemporaneous 
press accounts.58 The early September 1997 military operations in the Chrea Mountains 
between Blida and Médèa were likewise launched just days after the Raïs massacre.59 
 
 
                                                
55 Scott Peterson, ‘Algeria's Real War: Ending the Cycle of Violence’, Christian Science Monitor, 
24 June 1997: 1, brackets in original. 
56 ‘Les tueries de dimanche et lundi [29-30 September 1997] coïncident en tout cas avec la 
poursuite de la vaste offensive lancée vendredi [i.e., 26 September 1997, 3 days after Bentalha] par 
l’armée dans les zones de Bentalha et de Beni Messous’. José Garçon, ‘Pression internationale sur 
Alger. Les demandes de commission d’enquête se multiplient’, Libération, 1 October 1997 
[Mercredi]. 
57 The Economist, ‘Algeria. A change of French tone?’, 11 October 1997: 50 
58 AFP, ‘21 killed in massacres in Algeria: press reports’, 13 July 1997; AFP, ‘Algerian security 
forces kill 60 Islamists: reports’, 19 July 1997. 
59 AFP, ‘Over 127 Islamists killed by Algeria's armed forces: Press’, 9 September 1997. 
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Representing consensus 
 
Another way to tease out the insufficiencies in our understanding of the massacres is to 
examine the way in which the Qui tue? debate is addressed. As noted in the previous 
chapter, both contemporary reports and subsequent analyses tended to underestimate the 
field of massacre hypotheses, often reducing the choice of perpetrator identities to either 
state agents or Islamist rebels. Hafez and Kepel acknowledge the contention but refuse to 
engage with its various claims. Kalyvas thus stands out, next to Bedjaoui, as one of the few 
efforts to engage the various theses of the massacres in a serious way. In his effort to 
defeat assertions that the Algerian state might have had a role in the massacres, an alleged 
consensus among survivors, witnesses, foreign governments and observers (both 
journalists and experts) is cited (Kalyvas 1999: 253). Yet when we look at the source 
material, even some of accounts cited by Kalyvas, this consensus is difficult to find. 
 
Witnesses, survivors and perpetrators 
 
To establish the identity of the agents behind the massacres, Kalyvas (1999: 253) states, 
‘The most important evidence [‘that many among the deadliest massacres have been 
perpetrated by Islamist guerrillas’] comes from testimonies of survivors who were able to 
identify local Islamists among the attackers’. The problem with this claim is that similar 
media reports — indeed, some of the very sources cited by Kalyvas — also found victims 
who either suspected the involvement of state agents in massacres or expressed doubt 
about the identity of the killers. Pre-existing accusation that all sides of the conflict were 
using the other’s uniforms and costumes60 seems to be born out in some of the witness 
accounts from massacres, such as the 12 November 1996 massacre of eighteen family 
members reportedly by ‘armed men dressed in security uniforms’.61 Similar accounts 
followed the major massacres. A survivor of the Raïs massacre initially mistook the 
attackers as security forces until he recognized a local insurgent leader (amīr) was among 
                                                
60 By 1996 Amnesty International had already expressed concerns that civilian ‘government-
backed militias’ were ‘involved in counter-insurgency operations using military and security forces 
uniforms and equipment’ (Amnesty International 1996: 1).  
61 Rachid Khiari, ‘Macabre Syndrome of Violence Gains Momentum Ahead of Referendum’, 
Associated Press, 17 November 1996. 
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them.62 Others indicated that the killers — ‘armed to the teeth’ and arriving in trucks — 
had worn what they called ‘Afghan’ dress: headscarves, tunics and long beards. There 
were also reports of women among the attackers.63 Yet another survivor of the Raïs 
massacre was able to tell the Sunday Times — shortly before Algerian security agents 
disrupted the interview — that ‘Some of the attackers wore masks. Others were bare-faced 
or they wore false beards and wigs’.64 A witness from the massacres of Béni Messous 
claimed that the attackers ‘arrived in trucks, pretending they were members of the security 
forces and wanting to inquire about security in the area’.65 Though some were bearded, two 
journalists reported witnesses as claiming that most reportedly bore jackets of the Sûreté 
nationale, the national police run by the Interior Ministry.66 Likewise at Bentalha, it was 
reported that the attackers wore both ‘Afghan costumes’ and ‘army uniforms’.67 One 
survivor of the Sidi Hamed massacre claimed the attackers had worn the same uniform as 
used by Algerian paratroopers; others identified the uniforms as those worn by the state 
armed militias.68 Another said that some of the killers had worn ‘cachabias’ (Algerian 
hooded tunics).69 Of course none of these survivor accounts rules out the possibility of 
insurgents wearing police, army or militia uniforms when carrying out massacres (or vice 
versa); rather, the point is that few of these witnesses were able to identify their attackers 
either way.  
 
Conflicting and confused witness statements also emerge within efforts to account for the 
government’s alleged failure to top any of the massacres as they were being carried out in 
                                                
62 Survivors identified him as ‘Ali Dellal’, joined by two assistants, ‘Ali Cherat and Rabah 
Bengouya’. See AFP, ‘Terrible carnage près d’Alger : entre 98 et 300 civils égorges’, 29 August 
1997 ; and Jean Pierre Tuquoi, ‘Algérie: les pires massacres en cinq ans de guerre civile’, Le 
Monde, 1 September 1997. 
63 Rachid Khiari, ‘300 killed in Algeria massacre, witnesses and hospital workers say’, Associated 
Press, 29 August 1997. 
64 John Phillips, ‘Army link to Algeria slaughter’, Sunday Times, 26 October 1997. 
65 AFP, ‘63 civilians massacred in Algeria’, 6 September 1997 . 
66 Julia Ficatier and Amine Kadi, ‘Algérie. La nouvelle bataille d’Alger’, La Croix, 10 September 
1997: 3. 
67 Lara Marlowe, ‘Families hid and listened to dying neighbours’ screams’, Irish Times, 21 October 
1997: 11. 
68 Nadim Ladki, ‘Algerian village buries massacre victims’, Reuters, 13 January 1998; Reuters, 
‘France rejects international force for Algeria’, 12 January 1998. 
See also Anthony Loyd, ‘Algeria massacre village barred to EU visitors’, The Times, 21 January 
1998. 
69 AFP, ‘“Our village is a cemetery,” says Sidi Hammed survivor’, 13 January 1998. 
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close proximity. The previous chapter noted some of the representational inconsistencies 
and geographical assumptions within this strand of the Qui tue? discourse of the 
massacres, particularly those cases where state intervention was reported and those cases, 
such as the Ouarsenis massacres, where the killing sites, unlike the Mitidja, were actually 
quite distant from military and security installations. The consensus framing of the issue as 
simply a failure of the state to intervene elicits hypotheses of (1) cynical state indifference 
to the plight of former rebel supporters (as noted in the last chapter) or (2) more developed 
theories of a strategic counter-insurgency program that unfortunately could only select 
certain populations for protection due to resource constraints (e.g., Kalyvas 1999: 270-1, 
281). The initial framing of the problem, however, fails to capture what was actually 
claimed by survivors in the international press, thus leading to awkward interpretations. It 
seems to suggest that the military was only accused of gross negligence, and so it is the 
only facet that requires explanation. In fact, the reported actions of government forced and 
militias during some of the major massacres were much more disturbing. It was not just the 
proximity of security installations to some massacre sites that was cause for concern but 
rather allegations that security forces were present, mobilised and active on the periphery 
of massacre as the killing was taking place (e.g., Bentalha).70 Amnesty International (1997: 
7-9) cited two instances where victims fleeing the massacre had been stopped by Algerian 
security elements from leaving and a militia from a neighbouring area was prevented from 
entering to stop it. A survivor of Sidi Hamed said that the military had arrived within 
fifteen minutes of being notified of the massacre but did not enter to stop the killing.71  
 
Similarly problematic is the claim that ‘Journalists working in the field have found credible 
testimonies in support of the thesis that most massacres are organized by the rebels’ 
(Kalyvas 1999: 253). Yet journalists working in the field frequently expressed uncertainty 
about the identity and motive of the attackers, even after speaking to survivors. ‘Accounts 
of the massacres remain contradictory’, concluded a writer with the Associated Press. 
                                                
70 Speaking with a resident of Bentalha who allegedly survived the massacre and then fled to 
Belgium, Libération reported this ‘Yahia’ as claming that, two to three hours into the ten-hour 
massacre, he saw the army — soldiers and several tanks — arrive at the end of the only road 
leading into the district. They did not intervene and reportedly kept police, militias and even 
ambulances from entering during the massacre. Florence Aubenas, ‘Bentalha, le récit de dix heures 
de tuerie’, Libération, 23 October 1997. 
71 Steve Crawshaw, ‘Algeria rejects UN help as stunned survivors tell of massacre horror’, 
Independent, 21 January 1998: 7. 
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‘None of the residents of Bentalha or Rais questioned during a visit Friday could describe 
with any precision how the massacres unfolded’.72 Following a visit, Alain Bommenel of 
AFP described the attackers at Bentalha as ‘unknown’.73 Lara Marlowe of the Irish Times 
similarly concluded ‘The basic facts of the massacre — who committed it and why — are 
still disputed’ in Bentalha.74 After visiting Algerian massacre sites in early 1998, celebrity 
reporter Christiane Amanpour of 60 Minutes, who won an Emmy Award for this segment, 
simply felt, ‘it's not clear just who’s doing it or why’.75  
 
Journalists in the field also recorded suspicions and accusations of complicity in the 
massacres by state and pro-government agents. In one account of the Bentalha massacre 
published in Libération (citied five times by Kalyvas), a sceptical survivor remarked how 
‘extremely organised’ the killers were, most of them ‘normally dressed’ though some were 
‘disguised in Afghan [dress], with beards and long hair’. When one of the attackers spotted 
the army on the periphery of the massacre site, another told him, according to this survivor, 
‘Do your work calmly, take your time, the soldiers will not intervene’. When directly 
asked ‘Who killed’, the survivor only replies, ‘We’re lost’, adding that he no longer 
understands anything.76  In an another article (which Kalyvas cites ten times), Le Monde’s 
Jean Pierre Tuquoi noted that some of Bentalha’s survivors underscored the 
‘professionalism’ of the attackers: ‘They behaved like the Ninjas [i.e., special anti-
terrorism squads], acting very quickly. I saw one shoot single-handed’.77 From Bentalha, 
                                                
72 Elaine Ganley, ‘Mystery, contradictions plague site of largest Algerian massacres’, Associated 
Press, 25 October 1997. 
73 Alain Bommenel, ‘Suspicion and hatred stalk the streets of massacre village’, Agence France 
Presse, 22 October 1997. 
74 Lara Marlowe, ‘Families hid and listened to dying neighbours’ screams’, Irish Times 
21 October 1997: 11. 
75 Christian Amanpour, ‘Massacre in Algeria’, 60 Minutes, CBS, 18 January 1998, transcript. 
76 Florence Aubenas, ‘Bentalha, le récit de dix heures de tuerie’, Libération, 23 October 1997. 
 For some advocating an inquiry into the massacre (e.g., Ait Larbi, et al 1999 and Mellah 2004), 
this article from Libération has cited as damning evidence of government complicity in the 
Bentalha massacre. Yet this survivor’s account could be read as providing neither definitive proof 
for or against state or insurgent complicity. 
77 ‘Les assaillants étaient-ils des militaires déguisés en terroristes? Quelques rares habitants de 
Bentalha mettent en avant le professionnalisme des assaillants. L'un d'eux raconte: Ils se 
comportaient comme des ninjas (les forces spéciales algériennes), agissaient très rapidement. J'en 
ai vu un tirer au fusil d'une seule main’ (Jean-Pierre Tuquoi, ‘Algérie, autopsie d’un massacre’, Le 
Monde, 11 November 1997). Tuquoi was initially unable to wrest a satisfactory explanation from 
Bentalha’s survivors (see Jean-Pierre Tuquoi, ‘Bentalha, ville martyre, ville fantôme d’Algérie’, Le 
Monde, 22 October 1997). 
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the Sunday Times’ John Phillips found that ‘survivors’ accounts more than intimated a 
degree of army complicity’. He added, ‘Some even claimed that soldiers — or army-
backed militiamen — had taken part’.78 An Algerian relaying a second-hand account from 
a massacre in Baraki claimed that some of attackers had been recognized as members of 
the Garde communale, a local security force.79 One of the journalists Kalyvas repeated 
cites made this observation: 
 
In this murky conflict, GIA militants have disguised themselves as policemen or 
soldiers during attacks and set up fake road blocks to kill, for example, busloads of 
schoolchildren. Security units, meanwhile, have disguised themselves as guerrillas with 
beards and infiltrated — or assisted — the terrorist groups.80  
 
A reporter with the London Independent found ‘it is clear that many in Sidi Hamad fear 
some kind of complicity’ between their attackers and the security forces that did not 
intervene.81 
 
Even when survivors pointed their fingers at the insurgency, reporters were still not always 
convinced that other interests had been vindicated. Though the New York Times’ Youssef 
Ibrahim unequivocally blamed the GIA for the Bentalha massacre, he still felt, ‘It has 
become difficult in Algeria to figure out who is doing the attacking, because Islamic 
fundamentalist groups have splintered into spin-off groups and the Government has made a 
                                                                                                                                              
 Immediately after Bentalha, Tuquoi wrote, ‘On the identity of the killers, no reliable 
information is available’, though he mentioned media accounts indicating that the killers in 
Bentalha were ‘well dressed and clean shaven’. This was ‘not the caricature of terrorists normally 
conveyed by the regime’ (Jean Pierre Tuquoi, ‘Le bras arme du FIS ordonne un arrêt des combats’, 
Le Monde, 25 September 1997). 
78 John Phillips, ‘Army link to Algeria slaughter’, Sunday Times, 26 October 1997. 
 A Bentalha survivor told Phillips, ‘There were about 35 or 40 of them [i.e., attackers]. Half of 
them were dressed in military tunics. The others wore civilian clothes. The ones in military tunics 
had automatic weapons. The others were carrying knives and axes. They shouted to us, “Open up, 
we are the military.”’ 
79 Nidam Abdi, ‘«´C'est devenu une guerre de tribus»’, Libération, 24 September 1997.  
80 Scott Peterson, ‘Algeria's Village Vigilantes Unite Against Terror’, Christian Science Monitor, 5 
November 1997: 8. 
81 Steve Crawshaw, ‘Algeria rejects UN help as stunned survivors tell of massacre horror’, 
Independent, 21 January 1998: 7. 
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policy of matching terror for terror’.82 After visiting the Bentalha massacre site and 
speaking to several survivors, the Guardian’s David Hirst still asked ‘who is behind these 
atrocities?’ Despite the fact that the witnesses he interviewed blamed the GIA, the ease 
with which the attackers carried out their killing disturbed Hirst the most.83 Often the non-
intervention of the security forces prompted accusations of indirect complicity from locals. 
A survivor of the Raïs massacre, having lost his entire family, told the Irish Times, ‘I want 
an international commission to investigate the massacres. [...] Why didn’t the army 
intervene? Why didn't they come out of their barracks?’84 Visiting several massacre sites in 
October 1997, Robert Moore of ITN found that ‘witnesses started giving disturbing 
testimony about the role of the security forces and the behaviour of local militias. [...] 
More questions followed, all of which hinted at some collusion between the attackers and 
the security forces’.85  
 
Not only has the scope of the confusion and contestation amongst witnesses and survivors 
been misrepresented, there are even problems with the ways in which Kalyvas presents 
ostensibly corroborating accounts. For example, a dialogue between a local youth and an 
AIS fighter, used to illustrate insurgent coercion against civilians, is misinterpreted. 
Supposedly, the rebel warns the youth, ‘if you take weapons from the government, the first 
bullet will be for you’ (ibid.: 271), when in fact the dialogue is the other way around:  
 
Z recalls one night in 1997, on a doorstep, where the village youth often talked with 
those in the insurgency [maquis]. ‘Will you take weapons from the government?’, an 
                                                
82 Youssef M. Ibrahim, ‘Algeria Votes, Recalling Fateful Election of 1992’, New York Times, 24 
October 1997: A8. 
 Returning to the scene of the crime, the New York Times conducted further, less supervised 
interviews with survivors in Bentalha about two months later. ‘Residents said they have no doubt 
that guerrillas belonging to the Armed Islamic Group, one of the most violent in Algeria's fractured 
Islamic movement, were responsible for the killings here’, wrote Ibrahim in a Sunday page one 
follow-up piece. Youssef M. Ibrahim, ‘As Algerian Civil War Drags On, Atrocities Grow’, New 
York Times, 28 December 1997: I1. 
83 David Hirst, ‘The mystery of Algeria’s murder squads: “This is where they shot my wife”’, 
Guardian, 20 October 1997: 1. 
84 Lara Marlowe, ‘Families hid and listened to dying neighbours’ screams’, Irish Times 
21 October 1997: 11. 
85 Robert Moore, ‘Hands that wield Algeria’s knives’, Observer, 26 October 1997: 15. 
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AIS guy asked. ‘If I do take them, the first bullet will be for you’, replied a youth. In 
the village, this is what one calls a joke.86 
 
Though the AIS fighter does threaten the youth, mainly it is for embarrassing him in front 
of the group. Another example from this step in the argument is the claim that Le Monde’s 
Dominique Le Guilledoux has ‘further confirmed’ that villagers did not want to trigger 
insurgent anger by forming local self-defence groups: ‘it “is enough for the killers to learn 
that the residents [of a village] ask for weapons to protect themselves, a sign that they trust 
them no more, for reprisals to happen”’ (ibid.: 271). The problem here is that it is not Le 
Guilledoux who is speaking but an Algerian arriving at the port of Marseille where Le 
Guilledoux is conducting interviews with people transiting to and from Algeria. Presenting 
this quote as a journalist who has ‘confirmed’ such facts suggests that it has been arrived at 
through multiple conversations, which carries more weight than a single Algerian’s 
opinion — an Algerian who is safely removed from the fighting. If we consider the full 
context of this example, it is perhaps more interesting that this Algerian actually goes on to 
express doubt that only the GIA is behind the killings and not the government.87 Le 
Guilledoux herself actually voiced the conclusion that ‘Nobody can explain the logic of the 
massacres’. As an inverse example, a ‘villager’ is quoted as saying that the years between 
1992 and 1995 were the ‘black years’ (ibid: 262). However, this villager is actually 
identified in the original source as a Dr. Bachir Ridouh, professor of psychiatry at a 
hospital in Blida.88 The context that surrounds quote implies that this is a ‘villager’, like 
other villagers quoted, living amongst the sub-urban and rural Islamist insurgency, rather 
than a highly educated elite professional working in a major city hospital. 
                                                
86 ‘Z. raconte ce soir de 1997, sur un seuil, où les jeunes du village discutaient comme souvent avec 
ceux du maquis. «Est-ce que vous avez pris les armes du gouvernement?» demande un type de 
l'AIS. «Si je les prends, la première balle sera pour toi», a répondu un jeune. Au village, c'est ce 
qu'on appelle une plaisanterie. Tout le monde a ri, mais pas le type de l'AIS. «Vous ne pouvez pas 
faire cela. En tant d'années, nous n'avons pas tué un seul d'entre vous.» Et pour blaguer à son tour, 
il manoeuvre sa kalachnikov contre la tempe du garçon et lâche: «Mais je vais commencer ce 
soir.»’ (Florence Aubenas, ‘Algérie: “Nous savons que nous sommes seuls”’, Libération, 10 
February 1998). 
87 ‘Il suffit que les tueurs apprennent que les habitants demandent des armes pour se protéger signe 
qu'ils n'ont plus confiance pour qu'il y ait des représailles, reprend Ali. Est-ce toujours le GIA? 
C’est ça qui est insupportable: le doute. Si on savait que les militaires ne s'attaquaient qu'aux 
terroristes, on serait rassuré, mais ils nous laissent dans le doute’. Dominique Le Guilledoux, 
‘Algérie, l'horreur et le doute’, Le Monde, 23 October 1997. 
88 Mina Kaci, ‘A l'hôpital psychiatrique de Blida, on s'attend « à une explosion de troubles 
névrotiques »’, L’Humanité, 6 March 1998. 
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There are other odd re-contextualisations and de-contextualisations as well. To back up his 
claim that the massacre perpetrators knew their victims, Kalyvas cites the story of a 
survivor of the Bougara massacre, who had been threatened by her former physics 
professor at a faux barrage incident ‘well before’ the massacre and then later recognised 
him as one the attackers during the massacre (ibid.: 257). While the survivor, identified as 
Hafida in the source, does talk about seeing her teacher at the faux barrage incident, she 
says nothing about seeing this man during the massacre.89 If that had been the case, this 
testimony would enhance the argument that the victims’ recognised their attackers; in 
reality, it does not. In another case the complete quote makes a world of difference:  
 
‘In rural areas this has become a tribal war. Some tribes are connected to the state, 
because someone is civil servant, policeman, or works for the military. The spiral of 
horror begins when the Islamists kill a member of this tribe. This tribe decides then to 
take ammunitions from the security services and then organizes a revenge operation 
against those who have children in the guerrilla’ (quoted in ibid: 266) 
 
Ending the quote at ‘guerrilla’ (maquis) leaves out the way in which this Algerian 
implicates the state in the reproduction of such violence: ‘In the end, the Islamists return to 
massacre the tribe in vengeance. But it never ends, because the army has managed to 
involve people who, since 1992, never wanted to take sides in this war’.90 State 
manipulation of social tensions for military gain is likewise hidden in another elided quote 
(ibid: 269): ‘one thing is certain: civilians are also the principal victims of the violence 
exercised by the paramilitary groups’. Yet the rest of the sentence, which has been omitted, 
reveals the journalist’s beliefs: ‘civilians are also the principal victims of the violence 
exercised by the paramilitary groups linked to different regime clans, violence which is as 
incontrollable as that of the killers claiming Islam’ (emphasis added).91 Rather than merely 
                                                
89 Mina Kaci, ‘Hafida : “Ce terroriste-là je le connaissais, c’était mon ancien professeur de 
physique”’, L’Humanité, 6 March 1998. 
90 Nidam Abdi, ‘«C'est devenu une guerre de tribus»’, Libération, 24 September 1997.  
91 ‘Une seule chose est sûre: les civils sont aujourd’hui les principales victimes des violences 
qu'exercent les groupes paramilitaires liés aux différents clans du pouvoir, violences qui sont aussi 
incontrôlables que celles des assassins se revendiquant de l'islam’. José Garçon, ‘Quatre questions 
sur une tragédie’, Libération, 30 August 1997. 
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a thesis of Islamist retribution and privatised violence, this survivor also feels that the 
intra-regime conflict has to be taken into account. 
 
Other Algerians 
 
Outside of witnesses and survivors, contemporary news stories also found a number of 
Algerians who seemed deeply uncertain about the identity of the massacre perpetrators. As 
the pace of massacres quickened in late 1996, Louisa Hanoune told a French paper, ‘We no 
longer know who kills who and why. You have false police, false Islamists, all kinds of 
armed groups, an Armed Islamic Group [un GIA], Armed Islamic Groups [des GIA], 
militias, real armed Islamists, real checkpoints, false checkpoints’.92 Moustafa Bouchachi, 
a leading Algerian human rights lawyer, was one of them: ‘I really don’t know much about 
what is happening. [...] It’s a mystery even for me’.93 Though exiled former president Ben 
Bella suspected a possible state role in the massacres (see chapter five), he nonetheless 
admitedd that it was ‘a situation in which no one knows who is a killer and who is not a 
killer’.94 Even in the articles Kalyvas uses, these sentiments abound. One Algerian ‘swears 
that everyone kills disguised as terrorists, Islamists as police or gendarmes, common-law 
prisoners set free as militia members’.95 The Algerian at the port of Marseille (see above) 
says, ‘That is what is unbearable: the doubt. If we knew that the military was attacking as 
terrorists, we would be reassured, but they leave us in doubt’.96 Two well-connected 
French journalists — both Kalyvas holds in high regard and frequently cites — likewise 
reflected these doubts. ‘On the identity of the killers’, Le Monde’s Jean Pierre Tuquoi 
admitted just days after Bentalaha, ‘no reliable information is available’.97 Libération’s 
José Garçon described the situation as so complex, so uncontrollable, involving such a 
‘multitude of actors’, that it prohibited a coherent reading.98  
 
                                                
92 Julia Ficatier, ‘Algérie: « On ne sait plus qui tue qui et pourquoi » Louisa Hanoune’, La Croix, 9 
October 1996: 24. 
93 John Lancaster, ‘As Algeria’s Savagery Grows, So Does Mystery Shrouding It’, Washington 
Post, 18 October 1997: A1.  
94 Quoted in AFP, ‘Ex-president decries “killing machines” in Algeria’, 16 November 1997. 
95 Nidam Abdi, ‘«C’est devenu une guerre de tribus»’, Libération, 24 September 1997. 
96 Dominique Le Guilledoux, ‘Algérie, l'horreur et le doute’, Le Monde, 23 October 1997. 
97 Jean Pierre Tuquoi, ‘Le bras arme du FIS ordonne un arrêt des combats’, Le Monde, 25 
September 1997. 
98 José Garçon, ‘Quatre questions sur une tragédie’, Libération, 30 August 1997. 
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Others Algerians outright blamed the government or other interest groups for the mass 
killing. In early 1998, an Algerian in Blida told a US reporter, ‘In 85 percent of the cases. 
[...] It is the state’.99 Several months earlier, another journalist wrote, ‘In Algiers, taxi 
drivers and human-rights lawyers alike will tell you: “Le terrorisme? C’est le pouvoir”’.100 
One Algerian blamed the violence on ‘gangsters posing as Muslim holy warriors’.101 After 
Bentalha, a Financial Times reporter wrote, ‘Even government officials admit some of the 
violence is related to banditry, rather than political motivation’.102 A teacher at the Institut 
national d’agronomie told La Tribune that the initial victims of terrorism in the Mitidja 
were union activists organising against the ‘mafia’ of business interests surrounding 
agriculture. Now, she alleged, ‘there are some agents as well as wholesalers and importers, 
mostly from the region of Blida, who sponsor the massacre of civilians’.103  
 
Alleged members of the Algerian security forced expressed similar sentiments of 
uncertainty, fear and suspicion to Western news outlets. An Algerian solider, who claimed 
that he had been recently discharged because of wounds sustained during fighting, told a 
British journalist,  
 
Sometimes we fought an element who were definitely one type of GIA, sometimes we 
fought people who were another type of GIA. They all had different agendas and the 
only thing they usually shared was a brand of Islam and hatred for the Government. 
Sometimes we fought people of no particular definition at all. It was never concrete: 
neither their agenda nor ours.104 
 
An Algerian policewoman, seeking asylum in Britain, said she was not sure who had 
murdered her husband, who was also a cop: ‘The men who did this to him were dressed as 
policemen — and they killed him because he was a policeman. They kill without 
                                                
99 Charles Trueheart, ‘Killers Spread Fear Among Algeria’s Poor’, Washington Post, 13 February 
1998: A30. 
100 John Sweeney, ‘Surviving Algeria’, The Observer, 29 June 1997: 6. 
101 Words of journalist Charles Trueheart in ‘Killers Spread Fear Among Algeria’s Poor’, 
Washington Post, 13 February 1998: A30. 
102 Roula Khalaf, ‘Panic and confusion over Algiers killings’, Financial Times, 24 September 1997: 
4. 
103 A.E., ‘Maghreb. Un terrorisme mafieux lie aux privatisations sévit en Algérie’, La Tribune, 17 
September 1997: 8. 
104 Anthony Loyd, ‘Zeroual’s zombies cast vote’, London Times, 24 October 1997. 
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reason’.105 Another police officer, also seeking asylum in Britain, told the same reporter 
his motivation for leaving Algeria: fear of being killed by special government hit squads. ‘I 
began to suspect that most of the policemen who died were being killed by the authorities 
because they were not collaborating enough with the government or because they were 
suspected of having sympathies with the opposition. Many of my friends in the police were 
killed, often at home’.106  
 
While such accounts, true or false, do not demonstrate government complicity in the 
massacres, some state agents did claim to have participated in massacres or have first hand 
knowledge of state authorship. Regardless of the veracity of these accounts (no one has 
ever conducted a thorough follow up public investigation), they have received marginal 
and almost flippant treatments in subsequent analyses of the massacres. As noted above, 
Hafez and Kepel do not even bother to engage these sources and their claims. Kalyvas is 
rhetorically dismissive of these accounts (‘a few’, ‘alleged’, ‘as many as’, ‘an army 
conspiracy’) and implies that survivors’ counter or overcome such accusations. As just 
shown, survivors were often ambiguous and conflicting, especially in that they sometimes 
pointed towards the complicity of state, paramilitary or private agents. Reporters following 
the story, including the ones Kalyvas relies upon, likewise seemed much more ambivalent 
and sceptical in their actual writings. 
 
Moreover Kalyvas does not detail the full extent of these accusations by alleged 
government participants and corroborators; he only cites two articles. One is the series of 
interviews with ‘Robert’, an asylum seeker in Britain reported in the Observer in early 
1998. Robert claimed that ‘he took part in 18 massacres, pretending that he and his fellow-
ninjas [‘paramilitary cops who sport black balaclavas’] were Muslims’.107 The other source 
Kalyvas cites is Libération, which carried an interview with ‘Omar’, a young Algerian 
conscript also seeking asylum in London. Omar claimed to have participated, albeit 
indirectly, in an army-orchestrated massacre in June 1997, where special undercover troops 
                                                
105 Robert Fisk, ‘Algeria’s Terror: Witness from the front line of a police force bent on brutality’, 
The Independent, 30 October 1997: 9. 
106 Robert Fisk, ‘Algeria’s Horror: Nightmares of torture haunt exiled witness’, Independent, 1 
November 1997: 17.  
107 John Sweeney, ‘You want a desert war? Try this one’, Observer, 8 February 1998: 27. 
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dressed as Islamists conducted the actual killing.108  But as outlined in the previous 
chapter, there were others as well. To these two we should first add the Observer’s 
November 1997 interview with ‘Joseph’/‘Yussef’, an alleged former DRS officer who 
claimed to have seen documents discussing his agency’s subversion and manipulation of 
the GIA and knowledge of special counter-intelligence ‘death squads’ that carried out 
massacres.109  Second, Le Monde’s Tuquoi — a journalist Kalyvas praises — published an 
interview with a serving DRS officer (‘Hakim’) who substantiated Joseph’s claims that, in 
some cases, the government was behind the massacres indirectly (through an infiltrated yet 
uncontrollable GIA) or directly (through its own special forces).110 Third is the January 
1998 Observer interview with ‘Robert’ and ‘Andrew’, two asylum seekers in the United 
Kingdom who, as recently as October 1997, allegedly helped elite undercover units of the 
DRS carry out massacres.111  To these we might add the accusations of former Prime 
Minister Brahimi and former diplomatic corps officer Zitout, who became proponents of 
the government complicity thesis from exile (see chapter five). 
 
                                                
108 François Sergent, ‘«Ils avaient de fausses barbes et du sang sur leurs pantalons». Un déserteur 
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1997: 9. 
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Italian sailors in Algeria in July 1994. See John Sweeney, ‘Algeria acts on massacre of Italians’, 
The Observer, 23 November 1997: 14. 
110 Jean Pierre Tuquoi, ‘Des fuites impliquent Alger dans les attentats de Paris’, Le Monde, 11 
November 1997.  
111 John Sweeney, ‘Atrocities in Algeria. We were the murderers who killed for the state’, 
Observer, 11 January 1998: 14. 
 189 
Observers 
 
Other governments 
 
Another problematic claim of consensus is the assertion that other governments and 
various foreign experts were in agreement that the insurgents were solely responsible for 
the majority of massacres. Regarding the former, we find the statement that that ‘European 
foreign ministries believe that it is Islamist guerrillas who are responsible for the 
massacres’ (Kalyvas 1999: 253). However, the choice of sources is odd, as the article deals 
mainly with the claims of ‘Robert’ (see above) and the only foreign ministry mentioned in 
the article is the British one: ‘If the Foreign Office doubts the evidence that the Algerian 
government is behind some of the massacres, it should get in touch with the Observer’.112 
In fact, the European foreign ministry widely seen as key to blocking or accelerating the 
internationalisation of the Algerian conflict, that of France, seemed to reflect the lack of 
reliable and consistent information about the massacres. After the April 1997 Bougara 
massacre, a French official stated,  
 
What's happening there is appalling, but there is no way to know for sure exactly who 
is doing what to whom [...] Some attacks on civilians are carried out by Islamic 
fundamentalists wearing army uniforms, and other times it’s Government security 
people disguised as Islamists.113  
 
Following the Bentalha massacre, Jospin seemed to indicate that his government had 
questions about the massacre. As the Economist wrote, ‘Mr Jospin's reference to state 
violence and his assertion that the situation is not clear-cut are unprecedented from a 
French official’.114 The day after Le Monde published its interview with ‘Hakim’ (see 
above) in November, Jospin’s party backed calls for an international inquiry: ‘It is the duty 
of the international community to establish what is happening in Algeria’, said an official 
                                                
112 Cited as ‘Observer, 9 February 1998 [sic]’. See John Sweeney, ‘You want a desert war? Try this 
one’, The Observer, 8 February 1998: 27. 
113 Craig R. Whitney, ‘Algeria Says Rebels Killed 93, Many Women, in Village Raid’, New York 
Times, 23 April 1997: A13. 
114 Economist, ‘Algeria. A change of French tone?’, 11 October 1997: 50. 
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with the party.115  
 
The statements of the US State Department during the massacre crisis also indicate that, at 
least officially, Washington had serious concerns about the identity of the massacre 
perpetrators. On 5 January, State Department spokesperson James Rubin said that the US 
government was encouraging the Algerian government to allow ‘international inquiries’ 
because ‘only then we can get to the bottom of some of these issues to determine the extent 
of the massacres, perhaps begin to pin more clearly the blame for them’.116 Suggesting that 
this latter phrasing was not a mistake, Rubin followed on 6 January with this statemnet: 
‘Let’s remember that the facts of many of these massacres are often unclear. The 
perpetrators are sometimes unclear’.117 Though the US government quickly toned down its 
language (see the following chapter), John Shattuck, Assistant Secretary for Human 
Rights, stated at the formal unveiling of its annual State Department human rights report, 
‘In Algeria, alarming brutality, including massacres, systematic rape and other sexual 
violence against women, continues. In light of the differing accounts about the origin of 
these abuses, the need for a credible, international fact-finding mission is clear’.118 Two 
months later, then US ambassador to the United Nations Bill Richardson told the UN 
Commission on Human Rights, ‘There were many allegations inside Algeria about the 
killings; the paramount need was for a credible, independent verification of the facts’. 119 
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Again, it is difficult to understand such appeals if there was, as Kalyvas claims, a 
consensus regarding the identity of the massacre perpetrators. Indeed, it is difficult to 
understand the international clamour for an inquiry if there was a consensus either blaming 
the insurgents or vindicating the government. 
 
Scholars and experts 
 
The suggestion that scholars and other experts were mostly in agreement on the identity of 
the massacre perpetrators (not to mention the contested politics of the atrocities) also lacks 
firm grounding. Even the two works cited as evidence (see ibid: 253) actually undermine 
this claim. One, a book review by Barbara Smith of the Economist, seems ambivalent. 
‘Islamist terrorists are almost certainly to blame for most if not all of the recent ghastly 
killings’, she writes, ‘But many mysteries remain. There is little hard evidence for the 
GIA's responsibility’. She adds, ‘There are, for now, no clear answers’.120 The other, 
Algerian scholar Lahouari Addi (1998: 44; same page cited by Kalyvas), notes the 
‘skepticism’ about the putative role of the GIA in the massacres vis-à-vis and ‘suspicions’ 
of infiltration by the government forces. While Addi places some distance between himself 
and claims of state culpability, he does the same for claims of Islamist responsibility as 
well. For Addi (1998: 49), the only way to answer question ‘What is the truth?’ of the 
massacres is an (international) inquiry, though the regime will always oppose it, he argued. 
 
As the previous chapter made clear, the scope of academic opinions on the massacres 
mirrored scope of the international public debate. Two months before Raïs, Clement 
Henry, a US scholar of, said, ‘I do give credence to some of these terrorist acts being made 
to look as though they’re by Islamists when really it’s internal security forces. [...] Some 
may well have been murdered by the government parading as Islamists’.121 After that 
massacre, Ahmed Rouadjia, a specialist in the Algerian Islamist movement, told a reporter, 
‘The state encourages or closes its eyes to massacres’. He argued, ‘If there is no complicity 
                                                
120 Barbara Smith, ‘Algeria: The Horror’, New York Review of Books 45(7), 23 April 1998. 
121 Mark Dennis and Carla Power, ‘Try, Try Again. Have 60,000 deaths taught Algeria’s leaders 
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within the state, there would not be so many massacres’.122 Far less cautious in his 
evaluation of the situation was French sociologist Etienne, who flatly blamed three-fourths 
of the massacres on the state based on logics of intra-regime struggles for control over the 
conflict and an alleged culture of violence.123 In early 1998, Dale F. Eickelman, a US 
specialist in Islam and North Africa, expressed the opinion that ‘the possibility can’t be 
ruled out of hand elements of the military, such as military intelligence, have had a hand in 
some of these atrocities’.124 Others, like Anthropologist Grandguillaume, were more 
sympathetic to the privatised violence thesis, suggesting that repressed social tensions, 
manipulation by wealthy interests, criminal activity and vendettas, some from the war of 
independence, had been catalysed and mobilized by the violence.125 British political 
historian Willis echoed several aspects of this thesis,126 to which Entelis, a US expert in 
North African affairs, included the possibility of struggles over valuable land and property 
driving the massacres.127 In early 1998, Deeb, then editor of the Middle East Journal, 
speculated that a confluence of agents and factors. ‘It’s not one particular group that is 
responsible for the massacres’, she proposed.128 Claire Spencer, a UK academic, described 
Algeria as ‘unique in its mystery’ — ‘a mysterious air which has been shrouding what has 
been going on there for the last five years’.129 
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Human rights groups 
 
One class of expertise omitted from this alleged consensus, which might otherwise be 
considered of paramount import to such questions, is human rights groups. What makes 
this exclusion even more strange is the fact that a 1997 Amnesty International report on the 
massacres is the most cited source in Kalyvas’ paper. That report (Amnesty International 
1997: 1) states unambiguously, 
 
there is growing concern, from testimonies of survivors and eyewitnesses of the 
massacres, that death squads working in collusion with, and under the protection of, 
certain units or factions of the army, security forces, and state-armed militias, may 
have been responsible for some of the massacres. 
 
Several witness accounts therein ‘add further weight to reports that armed groups who 
carried out massacres of civilians in some cases operated in conjunction with, or with the 
consent of, certain army and security forces units’ (ibid.: 9, see 7-10). A Human Rights 
Watch (1997b: 13-14) report citied by Kalyvas, but published before Raïs, noted,  
 
The identity of those carrying out the violence is difficult to establish, as the security 
forces and the armed groups often conduct themselves in similar ways: The former 
often wear civilian clothes and do not identify themselves, while the latter sometimes 
disguise themselves as security forces [....] 
 
Following the Bentalha massacre, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, Reporters 
Without Borders and the Fédération internationale des droits de l’homme issued a joint 
statement in which they expressed concerns that ‘The complex reality of violence and 
counter-violence has become increasingly confused with the clampdown on information 
and investigations’.130 These same groups later expressed similar concerns to the UN 
Commission on Human Rights in April 1998: ‘the massacres and other killings of 
civilians, the torture in security forces centres, the forced disappearances and other serious 
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crimes continue without respite and without any serious or credible Algerian government 
investigation into the facts or indictment of those responsible’.131  
 
 
Conclusion: certain violence, ambiguous identity 
 
To summarise, this chapter began by noting the ways in which the Algerian conflict, and 
the massacres in particular, were appropriated within the post-11 September 2001 
discourse on Islamism and terrorist violence, whether in the immediate aftermath (in mass 
media accounts) or in the follow years (in academic treatments). Chief among these were 
claims that the insurgency, driven by its Islamist identity, had committed the massacres. 
Situating these appropriations within the more general discourses on new identity conflicts 
and the clash of civilisations, this chapter set out to problematise efforts to situate the 
agency and logic of the massacres within a particular identity group. This problematisation 
was accomplished by demonstrating the assertive character of several leading accounts of 
the massacres, and then it undermined the empirical and argumentative bases of the most 
lauded effort to explain the massacre. What we are thus left with is a series of conflicting 
images of the massacres and the politics allegedly driving them. The point of this chapter 
was not to account for the reasons that allowed particular accounts of the massacres to 
achieve hegemony over all others. Rather, this chapter has merely sought to problematise 
understandings of the massacres that posited Islamist or insurgent agency behind the 
majority of those acts. Yet even with these problems facing the most dominant reading of 
the Algerian massacres (not to mention any other reading), it should be kept in mind that 
such readings of Algeria’s violence, warranted or not, were in play at the height of 
international efforts to address the ongoing massacres in 1997 and 1998, which will be 
analysed in the following chapter.  
 
Instead of accounting for narrative dominance, it seems more important to account for the 
need for narrative. In the case of Algerian massacres, understanding this need brings into 
question the dominant meta-narrative governing the relationship between identity and 
violence. Normally, it is identity that is given agency as the cause of violence. Violence 
                                                
131 Press Release, ‘Algeria: The Commission on Human Rights Must Act Now’, 7 April 1998. 
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stands as an effect or a product of agency. But in the case of the Algerian massacres, 
identity was often difficult to establish. Yet the massacres were a violence that begged for 
explanation. Violence, especially on a massive scale, has a power over our imaginations 
that is little understood, especially the power to demand understanding. One need only 
think of the expansive literature on the Holocaust to realise this.  For a short period in late 
1997 and early 1998, the Algerian massacres became a powerful force that mobilised the 
some of international community’s most prominent actors and bodies. The massacres also 
demanded interpretation and comprehensibility, which would eventually have to come in 
form of agency and so implicate identity. What was certain about the massacres (their 
brute, ghastly reality), called forth uncertain renderings of what was indeterminate about 
them (their agency, their rationale). If, under certain circumstances, identity produces 
violence, then it is possible for violence to interpellate identity. Here we have arrived at an 
understanding of how the major massacres of 1997-98 became Islamic. Violence wrote the 
warrant for its understanding, and many have attempted to serve it. Whether right or wrong 
in their efforts, this power of violence over our imagination has rarely been acknowledged 
or understood. Perhaps the enigma of the Algerian massacres lies not in the dictates of 
identity but in the dictates of violence.  
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7. Intervention 
 
 
 
Arming humanitarianism  
 
The state practice of military intervention for moral — rather than political or strategic — 
purpose has been narrated in recent years as a phenomenon triggered by the end of Cold 
War. One of armed humanitarian intervention’s most esteemed proponents, former 
Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans (2008: 284-8), recently reminded an audience at 
the University of Aberystwyth that the ‘quintessential peace and security problem, it will 
be remembered — before 9/11 came along to dominate everything — became not 
interstate war, but civil war and internal violence perpetrated on a massive scale’. He went 
on to suggest, ‘With the break-up of various Cold War state structures, and the removal of 
some superpower constraints, conscience-shocking situations repeatedly arose, above all in 
the former Yugoslavia and in Africa’. Author Samantha Power, a vocal US proponent for 
the use of military force for human rights ends, recently carved a possible gravestone for 
armed humanitarian intervention: Born 1991, northern Iraq — Died 2003, Iraq. By this, 
she meant to suggest that the post hoc humanitarian justifications for the 2003 Anglo-
American invasion of Iraq had sabotaged the increasingly legitimate practice of moral 
armed intervention.1 Six years before Power’s eulogy, and a year before the occupation of 
Iraq, scholar turned politician Michael Ignatieff had already lamented the death of armed 
humanitarian intervention in the pages of the New York Times. In the aftermath of the 
events of 11 September 2001, the ‘human rights movement’, as Ignatieff termed it, risked 
loosing its relevance after enjoying a decade of increasing legitimacy.2 Author Robert 
Kaplan, a journalist who had documented some of the 1990’s major conflict zones, argued 
that the end of war based upon humanitarian aims was a good thing. For the United States, 
he commented, less than a fortnight after 11 September, ‘Foreign policy must return to 
what it traditionally has been: the diplomatic aspect of national security rather than a 
                                                
1 Samantha Power, ‘Is Humanitarian Intervention Dead? History offers some sobering lessons’, 
Slate, 29 September 2008: http://www.slate.com/id/2200971, accessed 17 June 2010. 
2 Michael Ignatieff, ‘Is the human rights era ending?’ New York Times. 5 February 2002. 
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branch of Holocaust studies’.3 One does not need to entertain the pessimism of Evans, 
Power and Ignatieff, nor embrace the Hawkish realism of Kaplan, to understand the history 
they are writing, one that locates armed humanitarian intervention as a practice of that 
defined the global security landscape of the 1990s.  
 
This narrative of humanitarian intervention, which often locates its organising logic in the 
lack of bipolar constraints in the immediate post-Cold War era (not unlike the narratives of 
unprecedented civil wars in the 1990s seen in chapter four), is disputed. Some of those 
defending these practices have constructed a significant genealogy to provide armed 
humanitarian intervention with as much historical legitimacy to match its putative 
contemporary moral, legal and political legitimacy (see, e.g., Bass 2008). In 1984, legal 
scholar Michael Akenhurst (1984: 95) had already observed, ‘In the nineteenth century, 
there were no rules of international law forbidding a state to ill-treat its own nationals, but 
other states often claim a right o use force to prevent such ill-treatment’. He then noted that 
‘this right of humanitarian intervention, as it was called, was exercised on a number of 
occasion by European states, mainly to prevent Turkey ill-treating its Christian subjects’. 
The literature on humanitarian intervention even makes reference to Hugo Grotius’ 1625 
attempt to answer the question ‘whether a war for the subjects of another be just, for the 
purposes of defending them from injuries inflicted by their ruler’ (quoted in Stowell 1921: 
56). 
 
Humanitarian purpose was nonetheless invoked, either as a primary or secondary 
justification, in various interventions after World War Two. In 1947, Yugoslavia based its 
assistance to rebels in Greece on the grounds that they were defending themselves from 
persecution; Egypt claimed humanitarian purpose when its army invaded Palestine in 
1948. The 1960, 1964 and 1978 interventions in Congo/Zaire all deployed humanitarian 
claims in their warrant, particularly the objective of protecting foreign nationals amidst 
conflict. This rationale was likewise used by the United States in its 1965 invasion of the 
Dominican Republic and in 1989 in Panama. The 1983 US invasion of Grenada was 
underwritten by a request for help from the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States that 
also contained humanitarian aspects. In 1979, France had orchestrated regime change in 
                                                
3 Robert Kaplan, ‘U.S. Foreign policy, brought back home’, Washington Post, 23 September 2001: 
B05. 
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the Central African Empire (now Republic) partially on the basis of human rights 
concerns. In other post-World War Two cases of armed invasion, humanitarianism was not 
the intention but it seemed like a significant effect. India’s 1971 intervention in the conflict 
in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) seemingly curtailed conditions that were possibly 
leading towards a massive humanitarian crisis. Likewise, Vietnam’s 1978 foray into 
Cambodia at the height of the Khmer Rouge atrocities, though justified on grounds of self-
defence, nonetheless stopped the genocide and brought down the regime. A year later, 
Tanzania invaded Uganda under a more internationally recognised claim of self-defence. 
In overthrowing the Idi Amin regime, Tanzania had also brought an end to his atrocities. 
 
Though there is certainly justification for this historical debate, the practice of armed 
humanitarian intervention after the Cold War nonetheless constituted an important 
international context within which Algeria’s violence was situated, particularly at the 
apogee of the massacres starting in late 1997. As Power suggests, the story of humanitarian 
intervention after the Cold War often begins with UN attempts to protect the Kurds of 
northern Iraq after the 1991 Gulf War. This, however, ignores the August 1990 
intervention of the Economic Community of West African States into Liberia’s two-year-
old civil war. Another test for the emerging practice of armed humanitarian intervention 
also arose in 1991 with the break-up of Yugoslavia following the independence of Croatia 
and Slovenia in the summer of 1991. These events precipitated decade of conflict, 
presenting a complex of emergencies that challenged the ability of the international 
community to confront and ameliorate humanitarian catastrophes amidst mass intra-state 
violence. The subsequent secession of Bosnia and Herzegovina in October prompted 
further escalation in the fighting that eventually drew in the UN peacekeepers and, lastly, a 
NATO force. Then, in late 1992, the United States sent 20,000 troops to reinforce a United 
Nations led humanitarian mission in Somalia, only to have some of its soldiers infamously 
routed in a street battle in Mogadishu in October 1993. Still, the US government sent 
20,000 troops to restore Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Artistide in 1994. This new 
deployment of humanitarian troops coincided with the reinstatement of a UN presence in 
Rwanda in the summer of 1994 to help restore order following the genocide — the very 
genocide that had triggered an international retreat of UN peacekeepers just months prior. 
The late 1990s saw UN authorised interventions in Sierra Leone and East Timor but it was 
NATO’s March 1999 military intervention against Serbia in Kosovo — in the name of 
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protecting civilians but in lacking UN Security Council authorisation — that touched off a 
significant international debate about the question of humanitarian intervention. 
 
Within a period of six years, the international community witnessed the Battle of 
Mogadishu, the Rwandan genocide, the coerced restoration of democracy in Haiti, the 
massacre at Srebrenica and NATO’s intervention in Kosovo. While the first three 
(Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia) are often rendered failures to meet humanitarian 
obligations on the part of the international community, the intervention in Kosovo 
provoked contentious discussions as to the existence and consequences of any proposed 
right to humanitarian intervention. In September 1999, just months after NATO’s bombing 
campaign, a meeting of Foreign Ministers of the Non-Aligned Movement, representing 
113 countries, denounced armed humanitarian intervention as having no legal foundation. 
The Group of 77 — then constituted by 133 nations — followed suit, stating, ‘We reject 
the so-called “right” of humanitarian intervention, which has no legal basis in the United 
Nations Charter or in the general principles of international law’. Then UN Secretary-
General Kofi Annan (2000: 48) offered this rejoinder in his 2000 ‘Millennium Report’: 
 
But to the critics [of armed humanitarian intervention] I would pose this question: if 
humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how 
should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica — to gross and systematic violations 
of human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity?  
 
On the heels of Annan’s report, presented at the UN Millennium Summit in early 
September 2000, the Canadian government launched the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). The goal of the ICISS was scrutinise the 
practice of armed humanitarian intervention and develop recommendations for its future 
deployment. The narrative above — from World War Two to just before 11 September 
2001 — drew heavily from that project, now widely known as the ‘Responsibility to 
Protect’ findings of the ICISS (2001).4 For Evans (2008: 289), co-chair of the ICISS 
project, the idea of a ‘Responsibility to Protect’ is grounded in the hope that  
                                                
4 This introduction also makes use of the ICISS’s Supplementary Volume (Weiss & Hubert 2001), 
which synthesises the history and debates surrounding armed humanitarian intervention during the 
Cold War and the 1990s, until right before 11 September 2001. 
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when the next conscience-shocking case of large-scale killing, or ethnic cleansing, or 
other war crimes or crimes against humanity come along, as they are all too unhappily 
likely to do, the immediate reflex response of the whole international community will 
be not to ask whether action is necessary, but rather what action is required, by whom, 
when and where. 
 
The international response to the Algerian conflict of the 1990s, however, is nowhere to be 
found in the reports of the ICISS.5 As with other efforts to assess what was a dominant 
security paradigm in the 1990s, the violence in Algeria, and foreign efforts to confront it, 
almost never receives scrutiny outside the work of country or regional experts. Why is it 
that Annan did not ask, ‘How should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica, to an 
Algeria?’ For the international community, as will be seen below, the peak wave of 
massacres that struck Algeria between August 1997 and January 1998 did, indeed, amount 
‘to gross and systematic violations of human rights that offend every precept of our 
common humanity’. The violence in Algeria was frequently represented as nothing short 
of, to borrow the words of Evans, ‘war crimes or crimes against humanity’ that were, for 
many observers, regardless of political standpoint, ‘conscious-shocking’. Nor would it be 
outlandish to note that the prevailing international response to the Algerian massacres was 
indeed ‘to ask whether action is necessary’. Yet it is unlikely that Algeria — as opposed to 
Bosnia, Rwanda or Darfur — is what Evens has in mind. 
 
There is an obvious explanation for this elision — for Algeria’s absence from this history. 
There was no intervention in Algeria. For a very simple reason, the now routine narrative 
of humanitarian intervention in the 1990s (e.g., Burgess 2002: 261) leapfrogs from Liberia, 
northern Iraq, former Yugoslavia, Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, Sierra Leone, Kosovo and East 
Timor. That is because those are the sites of intervention. Similarly, the Carnegie 
Endowment’s Marina Ottaway (a noted Algeria expert) and Bethany Lacina (2003), in 
their attempt to draw ‘lessons’ from humanitarian interventions of the 1990s for the post-
                                                
5 There is one telling mention of Algeria in the report: During a meeting with French officials and 
politicians, the ICISS noted, ‘Nevertheless, participants recognized the potential for humanitarian 
fatigue and disinterest, as could be observed in the French public’s relative lack of interest in the 
Algerian crisis’ (Weiss & Hubert 2001: 380). 
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11 September world of preventative intervention, use the criterion of UN or coalition 
legitimation for the presence of armed foreign troops. But what about cases, like Algeria, 
that inhabit the margins of intervention? One could question the robustness of such lessons 
on the grounds that they do not look at instances where intervention was threatened or 
where intervention — according to the paradigm’s logic — should have happened but did 
not. Thomas Weiss (2001: 419), lead researcher for the ICISS initiative, noted in 2001, but 
just months before 11 September, ‘Precious little has actually been learned from military-
civilian interventions in humanitarian catastrophes of the last decade’. Yet the case 
selection from which he draws his conclusions, and like those in the reports of the ICISS, 
are limited to those where armed humanitarian intervention actually took place.  
 
The absence of 1990s Algeria, however, is not limited to just the literature on armed 
humanitarian intervention. While one might expect Algeria to be missing from an account 
of genocide in the twentieth century (e.g.Power 2003), it also seems to be missing from 
general studies of mass atrocities as well. French political historian Jacques Sémelin 
(2009), well known for his work on mass violence, recently offered only fleeting and 
dismissive reference to Algeria in his study of the politics of massacre violence. Genocide 
scholar Daniel Goldhagen’s (2009) massive comparative study of the international 
response to atrocities in the twentieth century does not once mention Algeria, whether 
Algeria of 1957 or Algeria of 1997. Martin Shaw’s (2003) study of ‘organized killing 
modern society’ does mention the Algerian war of independence but not the conflict and 
atrocities that followed three decades later. Conversely, area and country experts have 
rarely examined Algeria through the international context of armed humanitarian 
intervention. Whether by passive dismissal (e.g., Darbouche & Zoubir 2009) or direct 
rejection (e.g., Roberts 1998: 237; Roberts 2001) on practical or ontological grounds (or 
both), very few Algeria specialists have examined the international response to the 
Algerian massacres as a failure of humanitarian intervention to live up to its principles.  
 
This is not to suggest that alternative framings are insufficient or poorly argued; it is to 
make the simple observation, based on what will be presented below, that the Algerian 
conflict, especially during the worst of the massacres, was interpellated by the discourse of 
humanitarian intervention — a discourse, as we will see, partially structured by the 
constellation of prior and recent interventions. Various voices throughout the international 
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community explicitly drew such linkages between Algeria and other instances of recent 
mass violence where there had been, and sometimes had not been, foreign military 
intervention. The point of examining the refraction of the Algerian conflict through a 
humanitarian lens is not to engage in a revisionist history. The objective here is to 
understand, as set out in the beginning of this study, the relationship between violence and 
intervention within certain representational logics that problematised the violence in 
Algeria in various ways.  
 
In this chapter, we are specifically interested in the ways in which Algeria was, for a brief 
period, problematised as a matter of and for humanitarian intervention. Yet it is also worth 
considering why this problematisation of Algeria’s violence was short-lived and did not 
deliver on its interventionary dictates. Like all of the terms and frameworks analysed in 
this study (e.g., economic causation, terrorism, civil war), intervention is also a highly 
contested and politicised concept.  Whether or not there was an intervention in Algeria 
largely depends upon the definition of intervention brought to bear. Certainly no armed 
interventionary force — one mandated by an international body — landed on the shores of 
Algeria to stop the massacres, nor was one ever reportedly entertained by any government 
or international body in a serious way. In fact, as will be seen below, the militarisation of 
the discourse of humanitarian intervention often had the effect of ruling out humanitarian 
interference in Algeria because armed invasion was assumed to be the only option in the 
toolbox. The fact that arguments against using armed force did appear suggests the extent 
to which the conflict in Algeria had become embedded in the humanitarian intervention 
debate. More important than the question of intervention is the question of 
‘humanitarianisation’ of the conflict.  
 
As we will see shortly, the Algerian massacres were frequently viewed through this 
dominant security prism of the 1990s. The crisis generated by the seemingly inexorable 
wave of killing in late 1997 and early 1998 threatened to re-inscribe the armed conflict in 
Algeria as a predominantly humanitarian issue. The re-interpretation of violence in 
Algeria, as a ‘conscience shocking’ matter of humanitarian concern, brought with it a host 
of alternative international security discourses — knowledges and practices — readily 
associated with recent and contemporaneous crises in southeast Europe, Asia and Africa. 
The goal here is not to restore Algeria to some rightful place as a forgotten humanitarian 
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catastrophe by reconstructing a historical narrative that produces it as such. Nor is it to 
repave the well-worn paths that would likely govern such conversations vis-à-vis the 
international response to the Algerian massacres: the ‘organised hypocrisy’ of global 
interventionary politics or another failure of humanitarian will. Indeed, the only other 
study to address this apparent problem (the international community’s apparent non-
intervention against the Algerian massacres), analyses the discursive constitution of both 
the Algerian and Kosovo crises within the framework of sovereignty and intervention 
(Malmvig 2006). This chapter, however, will argue that there is another way in which to 
interpret the international reaction to the Algerian massacres. Rather than demonstrating 
the spatial contingency of sovereignty, the Algerian massacre crisis demonstrates an 
alternative way in which to understand the contingency of intervention without making 
reference to either Realist notions of sovereignty or Liberal notions of collective 
international will. 
 
 
Intertextuality of intervention: reading the Algerian massacres in an international 
context 
 
Contested framings 
 
The point at which calls for intervention into the Algerian conflict were most frequent and 
intense coincided with the major massacres in 1997 and early 1998, when the violence in 
Algeria seemed to have spiralled out of control (Spencer 1998b: 126).6 One way to 
understand the extent to which the violence in Algeria had become caught up in the 
international discourse of (armed) humanitarian intervention is to note the ease with which 
some observers, right or wrong, drew parallels with other contemporary humanitarian 
situations during this period. Such allusions were deployed to help contextualise the 
conflict for readers, often suggesting that the violence was worse by comparison. Others 
brought out such examples to suggest an equivalent or greater moral imperative for 
international action. Bosnia was one such example. On at least three occasions, the 
                                                
6 See also Barbara Smith, ‘Algeria: The Horror’, New York Review of Books 45(7), 23 April 1998, 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/1998/apr/23/algeria-the-horror, accessed September 
2010. 
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Independent’s Middle East correspondent, Robert Fisk, made direct comparisons with the 
war in former Yugoslavia. ‘The slaughter of perhaps another 400 villagers in 24 hours puts 
the Algerian war on a Bosnian scale’, Fisk wrote after Raïs, adding, ‘but nothing, it seems, 
can match Algeria for animal savagery’.7 Several weeks after Raïs, an official with the Red 
Cross suggested that the brutality of the massacres in Algeria even outstripped that of the 
Rwandan genocide: ‘In Rwanda, people were machine-gunned by the tens of thousands. 
Here, humans are being made to suffer their own slow death through dismemberment’.8 
Visiting the scene of the Bentalha massacre, Washington Post’s John Lancaster proposed 
that the violence in Algeria, given the unknown number of actors, was incomprehensible 
because it lacked the ‘logic’ characteristic of ‘ethnic wars in Bosnia or Rwanda’.9 The 
Bentalha massacre prompted the Chicago Tribune’s European correspondent, Ray 
Moseley, to categorise the violence in Algeria as ‘on a level that makes some of the 
atrocities of the Bosnian war pale by comparison’.10 One journalist speculated, ‘Sometimes 
a massacre like that in Bentalha will so shift international opinion, as perhaps Srebrenica 
did in Bosnia, that it forces changes of policy’.11 Following the disclosure of the Relizane 
massacres, a Guardian editorial, critiquing the paucity of sustained media coverage of 
Algeria, seemed to suggest the situation had passed former Yugoslavia in terms of 
atrocious violence: ‘We have reached this point much later in time than if Algeria had been 
Bosnia’.12  Following one of the worst massacres in January 1998, Robert Novak, a 
conservative US media commentator, criticised the Clinton administration for having 
‘selective outrage’, arguing that, in comparison to Haiti and Bosnia, Algeria was a far 
                                                
7 Robert Fisk, ‘Hundreds die in Algerian slaughter’, Independent, 30 August 1997: 9. 
Fisk later wrote, ‘Algeria is in the midst of a civil war of Bosnian proportions’ (‘The agony of 
Algeria’, Syndey Morning Herald, 20 September 1997: 39) and described massacre sites as 
‘Bosnian-styled ghost towns’ (‘Algeria, this autumn: a people in agony’, Independent, 22 October 
1997:1). 
8 Christopher P. Winner, ‘In Algeria, “unspeakable” horrors’, USA Today, 17 September 1997. 
The accuracy of the comparison is debateable, given the dominant impression of the Rwandan 
genocide as being carried out more by machete than bullets. 
9 John Lancaster, ‘As Algeria’s Savagery Grows, So Does Mystery Shrouding It’, Washington 
Post, 18 October 1997: A1.  
10 Reprinted in ‘Algerian killing so grisly the world won’t look’, Star-Ledger (Newark), 12 October 
1997: 11B.  
11 Martin Woollacott, ‘Harsh symphonies of slaughter and identity’, Guardian, 27 September 1997: 
21. 
12 The Guardian, ‘A much-needed start. But the EU needs strong words to wake Algiers’, 7 January 
1998: 14.  
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worse situation.13 William Schultz, director of the US branch of Amnesty International, 
arguing in favour of a more aggressive policy towards Algeria, claimed that the crisis in 
Algeria was then one of the worst facing the international community: ‘We have 80,000 
people killed. That’s more than all of those in Bosnia and Chechnya combined’.14  
 
As much as words, images of the violence were also important, especially their 
international reception. No other image of the Algerian massacres is perhaps as important 
as the photograph taken by Hocine Zaourar, an AFP photographer at the Zmirli hospital in 
the El Harrach neighbourhood of Algiers the morning of the Bentalha massacre. The 
photograph captures a mother in a moment where she appears to be succumbing to grief 
after reportedly learning that her eight children had died in the massacre.15 The following 
day, the photo, what Le Monde (26 September 1997) dubbed the ‘Madonna in Hell’, 
appeared on the front pages of several major newspapers worldwide.16 The effects are 
noticeable. ‘It was one of those photographs, like the little Vietnamese girl with her skin in 
napalmed tatters, that send reverberations round the globe’.17 ‘Just as Robert Capa’s dying 
Republican soldier epitomised the Spanish Civil War [...] Hocine’s photograph has become 
Algeria’s icon’.18 As ‘a symbol of the struggle against barbarism and for the promotion of 
                                                
13 CNN, Capital Gang, 3 January 1998, transcript. 
14 CNN, Diplomatic License, 10 January 1998, transcript.  
15 In what seemed like an act of quick retaliation, the Algerian government removed the credentials 
of AFP’s reporter in Algiers for inflating the death figures from Bentalha (Lara Marlowe, 
‘Continuing campaign of violence claims lives of 11 women teachers’, Irish Times, 30 September 
1997: 9). Then, several months later, Algerian government radio and television claimed that AFP 
had created a false image for profit and propaganda, and ‘to tarnish the image of Algeria’. The 
report cited local officials who claimed that the ‘Madonna’ woman was not a resident of Bentalha 
and her true identity could not be established. ‘The fact is’, one reporter claimed, ‘this lady was 
created by the European media for venomous propaganda campaigns against Algeria by diffusing 
false reports’ (BBC Monitoring, ‘Algerian Television slams anti-foreign media campaigns’, 11 
February 1998). The woman, Oum Saad (or Um Saad Ghendouzi), eventually emerged and sued 
AFP for defamation in 1998. She claimed that she had only lost her brother in the massacre and 
that she came under threat from her neighbours as a possible insurgent sympathiser. As a Muslim, 
she also took offence to being called a Madonna (Doy 2002: 215-8; Lara Marlowe, ‘Visitors to 
chip away at Fortress Algeria’, Irish Times, 29 July 1998).  
16 The New York Times decided to publish the photo on page three. See Roger Cohen, ‘85 Slain in 
New Attack Near Algiers, Setting Off Panic’, New York Times, 24 September 1997: A3. 
17 John Henley, ‘Political Islam’s men of violence’, Guardian, 26 September 1997: 17. 
18 Lara Marlowe, ‘“Madonna in hell” captures the grief and despair of war-torn Algeria’, Irish 
Times, 20 October 1997: 12. 
Historian Benjamin Stora (2001b) would later boil it down to this: ‘100,000 dead and one 
image’. 
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peace between men’19, the Italian magazine Rivista del Cinematografo awarded the photo 
its top prize in October, among the several it earned. These include the prestigious World 
Press Photo, considered the top prize in photojournalism, awarded to Zaourar in early 
1998.20 In the 1990s, the winners of the World Press Photo award tended to highlight 
situations where international humanitarian concerns were focused — Kosovo (1990, 
1998, 1999), Somalia (1992), Rwanda (1994) and Chechnya (1995). The award hinted that 
Algeria had become one of the defining human rights crises of the 1990s. 
 
Perceptions that the violence of the Algerian conflict was outstripping its politics also 
made a humanitarian framing possible. At the end of 1997, The Economist felt that ‘Earlier 
arguments for a negotiated settlement have been overtaken by the near-daily butchery of 
civilians’.21  Indeed, following the January 1998 massacres, the language of genocide 
could be found in representations of the conflict. The Vatican’s L’Osservatore Romano 
had no reluctance labelling the recent massacres a ‘genocide’ that the international 
community ought to confront.22 Agence France Press reported that the daily El Wantan had 
described the Relizane massacres as evidence of an Algerian  ‘genocide of its own 
people’.23 Following the Sidi Hamed massacre, the Australian headlined the Algerian 
atrocities a ‘holocaust’.24 A reporter with CNN also alluded to genocide: ‘The ongoing 
massacres in Algeria seem nauseatingly familiar, echoes of the tribal warfare that claimed 
millions of people in Rwanda, the ethnic cleansing that tore apart Bosnia, the killing fields 
of Cambodia’.25 Similarly, the Boston Globe editorialised on 22 January that the violence 
in Algeria resembled the ‘ghoulish zealotry of Pol Pot’s Cambodia’.26 The image of killing 
fields — signifying the Cambodian genocide specifically and mass atrocities generally — 
was deployed on several other occasions27 and had seen some circulation already.28 
                                                
19 AFP, ‘Un prix pour la photo de la “madone” algerienne’, 24 October 1997. 
20 AFP, ‘Le photographe de l’AFP a Alger auteur de la meilleure photo 1997’, 13 February 1998. 
21Economist, ‘Algeria. But Why?’, 13 December 1997. 
22 AFP, ‘More massacres hit Algeria as pressure mounts for inquiry’, 7 January 1998. 
23 Alain Bommenel (AFP), ‘400 slaughtered: Algeria rings to cries of genocide’, Australian, 5 
January 1998: 7. 
24 AFP, ‘Algerian terror campaign turns holocaust as massacre toll tops 400’, Australian, 14 
January 1998: 8. 
25 CNN, Worldview, 26 January 1998, transcript. 
26 Boston Globe, ‘Algeria’s unholy war’, 22 January 1998: A20. 
27 ‘[T]he killing fields of Relizane’ (Reuters, 8 January 1998); ‘Areas of the mountainous province 
of Relizane were turned into killing-fields’ (The Economist, ‘Algeria. Villages into killing-fields’, 
10 January 1998: 36); Elie Chalala, ‘In Algeria’s killing fields: A hidden governmental role?’, The 
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Allusions to genocidal political movements were not only used to make the violence 
comprehensible but also to delegitimise the insurgency and Islamism in general. As early 
as Raïs, British commentator Simon Hoggart described the GIA as ‘terrorists of the worst 
unmentionable kind, massacring entire villages in a horrendously systematic manner like 
the Nazis’.29 The day after the 17 November 1997 Luxor massacre of sixty-three tourists in 
Egypt, La Tribune, writing in the context of the Algerian massacres, noted the rise of a 
‘fascisme vert de l’ultra-islamisme’ — the colour of Islam (green) being contrasted with 
the ‘brown’ fascism of National Socialism and the ‘red’ fascism of Leninism.30 Playing 
with this idea of a ‘green fascism’, Algerian born philosopher and French media celebrity 
Bernard-Henri Lévy warned of Algeria’s ‘Khmers verts’ in Le Monde, articulating identity 
(Islam) and intolerable practice (genocide).31  
 
Comparisons, indeed, are double-edged swords. While juxtapositions with other 
humanitarian cases could provide a relative measure for the killing, help explain the 
violence, spark moral outrage and mobilise solidarity, they could as much see use in the 
effort to disable international action. That the violence in Algeria had ‘reached levels of 
brutality hard to imagine apart from the genocide in Central Africa’ led the foreign editor 
of one US paper to conclude, ‘Sometimes, you just have to stand back and let people kill 
each other. Sometimes, there just doesn’t seem to be any other choice’.32 To explain the 
lack of international interest in Algeria, one US newspaper cited Hannah Arendt’s 
Eichmann in Jerusalem, speculating that ‘sometimes the scope of evil seems too great for 
                                                                                                                                              
Humanist, March/April 1999: 5-6; The Economist, ‘Algeria: Villages into killing-fields’, 10 
January 1998: 36. 
28 In 1996, US journalist Judith Miller (1996: 169) had described the GIA as ‘Algeria’s own Khmer 
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the human mind to deal with’.33  Daniel Warner of the Graduate Institute of International 
studies in Geneva used the examples of Somalia, Haiti and central Africa (i.e., Rwanda) to 
argue in early 1998 that foreign intervention would be ineffective in Algeria. Intervention 
would not be able to interrupt the domestic logic of the conflict: ‘the Algerian civil war is 
an internal affair [...]. Since the cold war has ended, more and more conflicts have become 
purely internal, and hence beyond the control of superpowers’.34 There is also a sense in 
which humanitarian intervention was seen as synonymous with military action. Following 
Bentalha, UK foreign affairs commentator Rupert Cornwell ruled out ‘Direct foreign 
intervention’ for several reasons. For starters, ‘the return French troops as part of a 
peacekeeping mission’, Cornwell argued, ‘would be akin to German soldiers imposing 
order in the Balkans’.35 Assertions like ‘Fundamentally, nobody knows what to do’36, from 
Washington think-tank regular Andrew Pierre, or ‘We are united by our absence of 
knowledge of what to do’, from Dominique Moïsi of the Institut Français des Relations 
Internationales, were often structured by an opposition between inaction and military 
force.37 Not knowing what to do depended upon knowing what had been ruled out.  
 
Another comparison that seemingly undermined the case for intervention was attempts to 
draw distinctions between the relative stability of the Algerian government vis-à-vis other 
humanitarian catastrophes where the state had collapsed or the nation had balkanised. 
Either of these pre-conditions ranked for some as the conditio sine qua non for 
intervention. In early January 1998, both the London Independent and USA Today noted 
that, in almost the same language, the Algerian state, despite its apparent failure to protect 
its citizens from mass slaughter, remained functional. This was often contrasted with 
interventions in Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia, where state collapse had allegedly 
                                                
33 Post and Courier, Editorial, 4 September 1997: A8. 
34 Daniel Warner, ‘The deadly waiting game: The west has said it wants to help end the slaughter in 
Algeria but it is not that simple’, Financial Times, 27 January 1998: 20. 
35 Rupert Cornwell, ‘Savagery strikes at Algeria’s heart’, Independent, 28 September 1997: 11. 
36 Rachid Khiari, ‘100 Slaughtered in Algerian Attack’, Associated Press, 12 January 1998. 
 Pierre is also the co-author of two important policy-oriented works on Algeria(Pierre & Quandt 
1995; Pierre & Quandt 1996). 
37 Moïsi explicitly acknowledged that dispatching peacekeepers was impossible, rendering all other 
forms of intervention, for him, ‘symbolic’ (Sarah Chayes and Linda Wertheimer, ‘EU Mission to 
Algeria Frustrated’, All Things Considered, National Public Radio, 20 January 1998, transcript).  
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obtained.38 During the Relizane massacres, Joe Stork of Human Rights Watch, one of the 
groups leading the charge for international action, admitted that intervention would be 
difficult given that ‘unlike, say, the situation in Rwanda — essentially without a 
government for this period of genocide — the [Algerian] government is very much in 
control, particularly in the areas that count’.39 A Western diplomat suggested that, even in 
the face of allegations of state complicity in the massacres, the Algerian government had 
become more, not less, central to a solution: ‘The [Algerian] government is the only 
authority in the land that can prevent the chaos worsening’.40  
 
Internationalisation 
 
Suspending questions about whether or not these representations and comparisons of the 
violence in Algeria were accurate, they nonetheless testify to the extent to which the 
massacres had become an important matter in world affairs. The response of governments, 
likewise, speaks to this new reality. When compared to statements before August 1997, it 
is clear that, while government’s denounced the escalating violence, the warrant for 
intervention was still weak. For example, when asked by a magazine in February 1997 
about the ‘shocking silence’ of France towards the violence in Algeria and responding to 
opposition calls for a more active French policy on the issue, then Foreign Minister Hervé 
de Charette’s implied that even commenting on the conflict in Algeria was tantamount to 
interference. ‘Algeria is not France; that has to be understood and admitted once and for 
all’, he explained. ‘It is a sovereign nation. It is up to Algeria to solve its problems, and up 
to the Algerian people to decide their fate’.41 It is clear from such statements that the 
                                                
38 Independent, ‘Dialogue is the only hope in Algeria’s darkest hour’, 7 January 1998: 18; Lee 
Michael Katz and Christopher P. Winner, ‘The world’s hands are tied’, USA Today, 9 January 
1998: 9A. 
 Fisk had already made a case for intervention on the grounds that the violence represented 
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39 Bob Edwards, ‘Violence in Algeria’, Morning Edition, National Public Radio, 2 January 1998, 
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40 Quoted in Susannah Herbert, ‘United States, EU reaffirm confidence in Algerian rulers’, Calgary 
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French government was still operating under the premise that Algeria’s sovereignty is 
sacrosanct. Indeed, sovereignty featured prominently, both implicitly and explicitly, within 
the international discourse on the Algerian problem (see ibid.: chapter five). Indeed, the 
levels of violence would have to reach new depths, far below the horrors of Ramadan in 
early 1997, to heighten Algeria’s international profile. Even the Bougara massacre of over 
one hundred persons in April 1997 did not accomplish this. Days after that event, the 
Clinton administration denounced and condemned the perpetrators (simply yet 
conveniently identified as ‘genocidal terrorists’) but did not call for any clear international 
action, only for unnamed actors to end the violence.42  
 
As has been noted elsewhere in this study, the Raïs massacre, which came amidst 
increasing reports of ever mounting atrocities in Algeria, was a watershed moment in the 
internationalisation of the Algerian conflict. Following Raïs, the UN Secretariat was quick 
to express its dismay and regret at ‘the continuing loss of life’, which had surpassed a 
‘horrendous level’. Yet its statement continued to frame the issue as an internal political 
matter, one in which ‘the Algerian people’ would have to find a solution.43 The head of 
UNESCO, Fredrico Mayor, was likewise ‘horrified’44. The new French government of 
Jospin shared this attitude; as its Foreign Minister, Hubert Védrine, told Le Monde, 
‘Algerians have to find a solution to their problems themselves’.45 Even President Chirac 
ventured a comment, pronouncing his ‘indignation at these acts of barbarity’.46 The US 
State Department, while acknowledging that the massacres have ‘reached yet another 
astonishing threshold of barbarity’, towed the same line as France, placing its hopes in 
Algerian ‘political system’ so that the ‘Algerian people can work their way back towards 
some modicum of civility and of peace’. When asked if the United States would support a 
UN inquiry, the State Department spokesperson suggested that Washington would if the 
                                                                                                                                              
 At the same time, de Charette was not unaware of the increasing violence in Algeria; he 
admitted that, to the best of his understanding, some two hundred Algerians were being killed each 
week. 
42 AFP, ‘Washington condemns massacre in Algeria’, 23 April 1997. 
43 Deutsche Presse-Agentur, ‘Annan denounces massacres in Algeria’, 29 August 1997. 
44 AFP, ‘GIA commander and 46 other Islamist fighters dead: report’, 31 August 1997. 
45 Quoted in Craig R. Whitney, ‘98 Die in One of Algerian Civil War’s Worst Massacres’, New 
York Times, 30 August 1997: 3. 
46 Xinhua, France condemns atrocities by Islamic extremists’, 1 September 1997. 
 211 
Algerians agreed it.47 The Vatican, on the other hand, criticised the international 
community’s unresponsiveness to the ‘unprecedented crisis’48; Pope Jean Paul II said that 
his ‘thoughts turn to the martyred Algeria’, from where ‘news of unheard-of violence, 
which unceasingly hits so many innocent people, continues to reach us’.49  
 
Two days after the massacre, however, Kofi Annan gave reporters this off-the-cuff 
statement while attending the Venice Film Festival: 
 
It will be necessary to go beyond [rhetorical condemnation], quietly and discreetly. I 
hope we will find ways and means of encouraging the parties to cease violence. The 
killing has gone on far too long. [...] We are dealing with a situation which for a long 
time has been treated as an internal affair, and yet as the killing goes on and the 
numbers rise it is extremely difficult for all of us to pretend it is not happening, that we 
don’t know about it and we should leave the Algerian population to their lot.50 
 
The fact that Annan had intimated the need to internationalise the Algerian conflict was 
enough to elicit a strong response from the Algerian government. As had been the case 
since the first days of the violence, the Algerian government tended to reject, as 
interventionary, all forms of unsolicited help and even some commentary. Nevertheless, 
the international clamour was difficult to silence after Raïs. Le Monde51 and the New York 
Times52 both called for more international pressure to stop the killing. One proposal being 
floated abroad, an international inquiry, received backing from The Economist: ‘Behind a 
wall of silence, Algerians are being murdered in their hundreds. The West should insist on 
finding out what is happening’.53 
 
                                                
47 US Department of State, Daily Press Briefing, 3 September 1997. 
48 Deutsche Presse-Agentur, ‘Pope condemns “barbaric atrocities” in Algeria’, 31 August 1997. 
49 Charles Trueheart, ‘U.N., Vatican Condemn Massacres in Algeria; Atrocities Intensify in Six-
Year Civil War’, Washington Post, 9 September 1997: A14. 
50 AFP ‘UN leader appeals for dialogue in Algeria’, 31 August 1997; AFP, ‘UN denies Annan 
interfered on Algeria violence’, 2 September 1997. 
51 Le Monde, ‘L’horreur et l’invraisemblance’, 1 September 1997. 
52 New York Times, ‘Algeria’s Agony’, 3 September 1997: 22. 
53 The Economist, ‘Algeria’s ghastly secret’, 6 September 1997: 17. 
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Strong reactions followed the Béni Messous massacres as well. Citing a photograph from 
Algeria showing the heads of two decapitated children in a bucket, Lisbet Palme of the UN 
Children’s Emergency Fund urged the world to pay attention to the ‘bloodbath’.54  Though 
Amnesty International was not yet ready to call for an international inquiry, the rights 
group nonetheless warned, ‘With tens of thousands killed, it is high time for the Algerian 
authorities to acknowledge that human rights protection is not an internal affair and to take 
concrete measures to protect the civilian population’.55 A spokesperson for the White 
House, who apparently refused to assign blame for the killing, expressed the Presidency’s 
feelings that the latest massacres were ‘stupefying’, breaking ‘yet another astonishing 
threshold of barbarity’.56 According to reports, the outgoing US ambassador in Algiers, 
Ronald Neumann, told President Zéroual that the United States ‘support[s] military 
measures that are consistent with the rule of law to protect civilians’. This was read as a 
gentle prod from Washington telling the Algerian government to do more to stop the 
killing. As for an international initiative, an unidentified US official said, ‘Any kind of 
mediation within the international context would have to be in agreement with all the 
parties. We haven’t really gotten into this question’.57  
 
A week passed before the European Union was able to express its collective ‘shock’ at 
these new massacres, condemning the ‘terrorism and indiscriminate violence’ while 
encouraging political and economic reforms in Algeria.58 Georges Wolfhart, Foreign 
Secretary of Luxemburg, then holding the EU Presidency, expressed his ‘concern’ but 
reiterated the idea that ‘Algerians must find for themselves a solution to the serious crisis 
afflicting their country’.59 Likewise Védrine, in the context of Secretary-General’s 
statement in Venice, asserted that no foreign actor could make a useful contribution to the 
crisis in Algeria.60 (‘It takes two to tango’, Annan had already said, reinforcing the 
proposition that the international community could not act without the Algerian 
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government’s cooperation.61) Other actors within the European Union, however, were 
pressing for more engagement. The idea of an ad hoc delegation to the Algerian parliament 
surfaced in mid September. One of the key architects of the proposal, Daniel Cohn-Bendit, 
then with the German Green Party in the EU Parliament, favoured a more aggressive EU 
policy because France, in the face of allegations of Algerian government abuses, was not 
able to ‘appeler un chat un chat’, he alleged.62 French MEP André Soulier, chair of the EU 
parliament’s subcommittee on human rights, also backed the proposal but only as a means 
to ‘start down the road to peace’, contextualising the initiative within the EU-Algeria 
association agreement then under negotiation. Soulier rejected notions that this initiative 
constituted a form of intervention. Algeria should ‘avoid [...] thinking we are going to 
become involved in its internal affairs’.63 The EU parliament adopted a resolution on 19 
September backing the idea of an inter-parliamentary delegation.  
 
Less than a week later came Bentalha. Védrine was quick to express his ‘revulsion’ at the 
‘monstrous’, ‘absolutely heartrending’ massacres of 23 September. In terms of an 
international response, however, he suggested that all forms of intervention were 
unrealistic: ‘We cannot do nothing. But what can we do?’64 While the French government 
began to echo earlier US calls for civilians to be protected from the violence, it nonetheless 
would only support ‘a political solution developed by the Algerians themselves to the crisis 
in Algeria today’.65 An anonymous White House official said that the US executive was 
‘outraged by the savagery of the attack’ and supported what they called ‘national 
reconciliation’ in Algeria.66 Visiting Moscow, President Chirac, also refusing to get 
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involved, reiterated the call for ‘national reconciliation’ in Algeria.67 British Foreign Office 
minister Derek Fatchett likewise condemned the killing but refused to support anything but 
an Algerian solution.68 ‘A solution to this conflict must come from the Algerians 
themselves’, remained the position of the UK Foreign Office.69 A more active approach 
was voiced by Klaus Kinkel, German’s Foreign Minister. While he presented the problem 
as one of Islamic terrorism, he still asked ‘How long can the international community look 
away?’.70 The German opposition, however, passed a resolution calling for more 
aggressive international mediation, ideally led by France and Germany through the UN 
Security Council, citing the Algerian government’s alleged inability to resolve the crisis.71 
Cohn-Bendit mocked Franco-American calls for protection in the vocabulary of the Qui 
tue? debate: ‘No one knows who is killing whom, no one knows who is protecting 
whom’.72 An official from Human Rights Watch concurred: ‘One of the problems is that 
we don’t know’.73  
 
At the United Nations, it was announced shortly after Bentalha that then High 
Commissioner for Human Rights Mary Robinson would meet with then Algerian Foreign 
Minister Ahmed Attaf. A UN statement claimed that Annan and Robinson had ‘exercised 
their moral voice in expressing the international community’s concern’ but that ‘of course 
they hope that the parties can settle amongst themselves what is essentially an internal 
conflict’.74 Yet after the meeting, Robinson told reporters that ‘Human rights have no 
borders. [...] The situation in Algeria cannot be considered an internal matter’. Algeria 
responded with a statement that ‘deplored’ her ‘selective’ remarks.75 However, on the 
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sidelines of the General Assembly on 24 September, Védrine and then US Secretary of 
State Madeline Albright had agreed over breakfast that they should discuss a joint policy 
together.76 Two weeks after the Bentalha massacre, a journalist — prefacing a questions by 
claiming that ‘list of atrocities there is getting almost genocidal in its proportions’77 and 
citing the Clinton administration’s recent commitment to stop mass atrocities worldwide 
— asked then US State Department spokesperson James Rubin if the White House was 
going to go beyond the ‘platitudes from the podiums’. Rubin merely highlighted the 
meeting between Albright and Védrine as progress. When bluntly asked, ‘Do you have a 
current policy towards Algeria?’, Rubin said yes, ‘It will be provided for the record’ (i.e., 
delivered later in writing). Showing frustration, another question was launched: ‘Is there a 
point at which the US does intervene?’ Rubin simply answered that the United States and 
France had ‘pledged to work together’.78 
 
One European official summed up the situation in these words: ‘The EU defers to the 
French, and the French are paralyzed. [...] I don’t say that critically, because nobody 
including the United States pretends to have an idea of how to tackle the problem. We are 
all groping for answers, and there is a real paucity of ideas’.79 One such idea, a UN 
peacekeeping force, was off the table according to Bill Richardson, then US ambassador to 
the United Nations. He argued that the violence in Algeria — evoking bitter US memories 
of failed peacekeeping Somalia — was too intense for an effective international protection 
force.80 At the end of October, a meeting of EU foreign ministers stayed within the 
confines of expressing solidarity with the Algerian people while underscoring their right to 
be protected. The host of the meeting, Luxemburg’s Jacques Poos admitted, ‘Obviously, 
it’s not a declaration that will have any immediate impact. [...] All we can hope is that they 
[i.e., the Algeria government] will listen to us’.81 For several prominent rights groups, the 
proper course of action was clear. Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the 
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International Federation of Human Rights and Reporters sans frontières called on the UN 
Commission on Human Rights to hold a special meeting on Algeria and for an 
investigation ‘to ascertain the facts, examine allegations of responsibility and to make 
recommendations in respect of the massacres and other abuses by all sides in Algeria’.82  
 
Up to Bentalha and the initial weeks afterwards, international understandings of the 
massacres were generally conditioned by several widely reported facts and a number of 
constantly recirculated questions. Though the insurgency — mainly the GIA — was 
thought to be behind these mass killings, the repeated occurrence of large scale massacres 
near the capital and often reportedly within short distance from security and military 
installations had been cause for concern.83 The small number of survivor and perpetrator 
accounts combined with the restricted access of the press had only intensified the 
environment of uncertainty, contestation and confusion. On French television in early 
October, Jospin had caused some controversy by commenting on the opacity of the 
violence, adding, ‘Here we have a fanatical and violent opposition fighting against 
authorities who themselves, to a certain extent, use violence and the state power’.84 Indeed, 
the apparent ambiguity of the violence was considered a good reason not to get involved. 
‘I’m not sure outsiders can play a constructive role’, an unnamed Western diplomat in 
Algiers told Washington Post. ‘As long as the situation on the ground is so fractious and so 
murky, I mean, whose heads are we supposed to be banging together?’85  
 
Then in late October and early November 1997 the French, Irish and British press 
published a number of interviews with Algerian state agents who alleged that they had 
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either participated in massacres or had first hand knowledge of government complicity (see 
chapter five for background).  One of the most important appeared in Le Monde, the 
interview with ‘Hakim’, reportedly a serving DRS officer who corroborated claims that the 
intelligence services were responsible for some of the massacres directly (undercover) and 
indirectly (through an infiltrated and manipulated GIA). In the wake of these unverified 
revelations, the French Socialist Party backed calls for an international inquiry. ‘It is the 
duty of the international community to establish what is happening in Algeria’, said a party 
official.86 Predictably, the Algerian government strongly rejected the idea. The Arab 
League likewise refused to imagine, ‘no matter what the pretext’, any ‘intervention from 
any party, organisation or state’.87 Amnesty International, on the other hand, charged 
Algeria with intimidating its critics and called upon the United Nations to press for an 
investigation.88  In what was reported as an Algerian effort to diffuse some of this pressure, 
Attaf met with EU president Poos in Luxembourg and the EU Parliament’s Foreign Affairs 
committee in Brussels on 26 and 27 November.89 At the United Nations, Robinson 
continued to press for an inquiry into the massacres, claiming that negotiations for a 
mission were underway, though Algiers denied it and lobbied against the initiative.90 One 
of the problems facing efforts to rally support for such a mission was the relative decrease 
in massacre activity and intensities between Bentalha at the end of September and the 
Ouarsenis massacres starting in late December. As Le Monde’s Tuquoi noted, Algeria was 
no longer an international problem because it was no longer front-page news.91 That was 
about to change. 
 
Intervention 
 
Between 31 December and 6 January, new mass killings in the western prefecture of 
Relizane began to be reported internationally, with consecutive death tolls purportedly in 
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the hundreds. By the time news of a new massacre near Algiers, Sidi Hamed, emerged on 
12 January, the cumulative mortality in the past fortnight had, by several accounts, topped 
one thousand. ‘One of the most savage civil wars of modern times is intensifying’, a 
correspondent from the Chicago Tribune remarked, ‘a shocked international community 
[is] finally being roused to try to intervene to stop the slaughter’.92 Sentiments of outrage 
and condemnation from the Islamic world were just as vociferous as from Europe and the 
United States. Iran, which then supported the FIS and was also chairing the Organization 
of the Islamic Conference, criticised the ‘unjustifiable’ ‘silence of international 
organisations’ and the ‘indifference’ of fellow Muslim nations.93 The Arab League, 
supporting the Algerian government, instead asked the ‘international community to 
intensify its efforts to face terrorism’.94 In St. Peter’s Square, Pope Jean Paul II used the 
occasion of Sunday prayers (4 January) to denounce the massacres in and called on 
Algerian authorities to put an end to the violence.95 
 
Germany was one of the first governments to propose action following the first reports 
from Relizane. Decrying the international community’s ‘silent and impotent’ approach 
towards the Algerian crisis, Kinkel suggested on 4 January, ‘It is possible to imagine an 
EU troika visit on the political level to propose to the Algerian government cooperation in 
the struggle against terrorism ... and aid to victims of terror’.96 The French government had 
initially responded on 3 January with boilerplate condemnation (‘atrocious and horrible’), 
expressions of ‘solidarity’ and calls for ‘reconciliation’ in Algeria.97 France then joined 
Portugal’s support for the German proposal two days later. Védrine described the proposed 
troika as ‘very useful’.98 The British government, then holding the EU presidency, 
suggested the limited response of offering humanitarian aid to the victims in coordination 
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with the Algerian government.99 The Canadian government, whose Prime Minister, Jean 
Chrétien, similarly dispatched an envoy to Algiers to offer humanitarian assistance.100 
Secretary-General Annan’s office, not reacting until after the Sidi Hamed massacre, 
diplomatically used a passive sentence to reinforce the calls for protection.101 
 
The US government, on the other hand, stated on 5 January that it was now willing to 
support an international inquiry because the Algerian government would allow a UN 
human rights rapporteur to visit.102 Algeria not only judged France’s policy 
‘unacceptable’103, Cameron Hume, then US ambassador in Algiers, was quickly called in 
to explain Washington’s claims. Hume was reportedly ‘reminded of the categorical 
rejection by Algeria of any idea of an international commission of inquiry, no matter where 
it comes from or whatever its form or nature’, according to Algerian state news 
agencies.104 Of additional concern for Algiers was the fact that the US government 
appeared to be openly questioning the identity and politics of the perpetrators behind the 
major massacre. For example, on 5 January, Rubin had said that the point of any inquiry 
was to ‘get to the bottom of some of these issues to determine the extent of the massacres, 
perhaps begin to pin more clearly the blame for them’.105 This was followed, on 6 January, 
with, ‘Let’s remember that the facts of many of these massacres are often unclear. The 
perpetrators are sometimes unclear’.106 The following day, with Algeria the top agenda 
item during the State Department’s daily press briefing, the US government appeared to 
back away from its earlier claims of uncertainty: ‘But let’s focus first on the culprits. These 
terrorist attacks must be condemned in the strongest possible terms. The terrorists must be 
condemned by the entire international community’.107 By the end of the week, the United 
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States appeared to be playing a semantic game: ‘what we have said is that we encourage 
the visit by the UN rapporteur, but we’re not seeking an international commission of 
inquiry’.108 Algeria’s position, however, was quite clear. According to then Algerian 
ambassador to the United Nations, Abdallah Baali, ‘We have said repeatedly that the 
United Nations has no role to play in Algeria’. Robinson’s desire to have either Senegal’s 
Bacre Ndiaye, the UN expert on summary and arbitrary executions, or Nigel Rodley of 
Britain, the UN torture expert, visit Algeria was seemingly a non-starter.109  
 
An unnamed ‘European official’ offered a realpolitik assessment of the situation, 
suggesting that the Algeria state, due to its access to hydrocarbon-based revenue, ‘cannot 
be easily bullied around unless there is a concerted western pressure, perhaps even through 
oil companies, and this is very unlikely’. Saying such pressure was ‘unlikely’ was, for 
some, the same as saying it was unthinkable. ‘We don’t know what to do’, another 
European official disparaged, ‘so we might send a few ministers there and give money to 
victims, but it will not solve the problem’.110 One of Algeria’s rationales for rejecting a UN 
inquiry had already been made clear by Baali: an investigation ‘would mean there are 
                                                
108 US Department of State, Daily Press Briefing, 9 January 1997. 
 On 5 January, Rubin had said, ‘[...] we would like to see international inquiries get to the 
bottom of it’. An 8 January exchange between Rubin and reporters seemed almost facetious: 
 
QUESTION: Jamie, what exactly does a ‘rapporteur’ do? [...] 
MR. RUBIN: He reports. That’s what you do. 
QUESTION: He doesn’t investigate? 
MR. RUBIN: Well, again, I don’t want to get too deeply into the — I’ve been in New York, 
and I know what sweat and blood goes into the distinctions between different UN 
organizations and their mandates and what titles people get and all that goes with that. A UN 
special rapporteur, I can say with confidence, is a UN special rapporteur. 
 
Two critics (Waliken & Larioui 1999) would later compare this parsing to the US government’s 
reaction to the unfolding genocide in Rwanda in 1994, when the State Department had been asked, 
‘How many acts of genocide does it take to make a genocide?’ (quoted in Power 2003: 364). 
109 Philip Waller, ‘International investigators may probe Algerian human rights With EU-Algeria’, 
Associated Press, 6 January 1998. 
110 Roula Khalaf, ‘West wonders what it can do in Algeria: But Algiers wants no outside 
interference’, Financial Times, 8 January 1998: 4. 
 As to the role of foreign oil companies might play in the evolving crisis, the Economist 
Intelligence Unit claimed in early 1998 that they would be opposed to interventionary efforts: ‘for 
the first time, oil companies active in Algeria have shown concern that the conflict might be 
entering a new phase in which the international community is forced by public pressure to do 
something that might compromise investment activities in the country’ (Country Report: Algeria, 5 
March 1998: 7). 
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doubts over who is responsible for the massacres, while everyone knows who they are’.111 
Others had explicitly or implicitly recognised this major stumbling block to the inquiry 
approach. In November 1997, the Guardian’s David Hirst acknowledged that ‘any 
internationalising of the crisis must by definition focus on the state or the ruling regime, 
since by definition it will be an attempt by the international community to settle a crisis 
which the national authority no longer has the will or means to resolve’.112 
 
Other framings seemingly disabled any international action. One was the belief that only 
direct military force — implicitly excluding diplomacy and sanctions — would have any 
effect. Eric Derycke, then Foreign Minister of Belgium, dryly commented in early January, 
‘I’d like to see the first country that will send its military there’.113 The top Democrat on 
the US Senate’s Foreign Relations committee, Lee Hamilton, bluntly echoed this 
sentiment: ‘I think we all realize the limitations. [...] We’re not going to send in the 
Marines’.114  Not only had military intervention become the only means to address the 
issue, but the conditions for concerted international action were also rendered unmet in 
various ways.  Alain Richard, then France’s Minister of Defence, likewise nixed the idea 
of ‘sending “blue helmet” peacekeepers’ on the grounds that there was not ‘sufficient 
reason for an internationalisation of the conflict’. Algeria, Richard observed, still did not 
fall into that category where ‘a country is virtually without government and international 
intervention is justified’.115 Related to such failed state arguments, others noted that the 
violence in Algeria, no matter how atrocious, did not affect the security of neighbouring 
states or the wider western Mediterranean basin. A role for the UN Security Council had 
been ruled out because, according to one press account, ‘Western diplomats said that the 
situation in Algeria did not appear to threaten regional stability’.116 Claiming the exact 
opposite, Britain’s Foreign Secretary Robin Cook, arguing for a more aggressive European 
response, deployed a version of the terrorist safe haven thesis that would feature 
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prominently in post-11 September 2001 interventionary debates: ‘If you allow terrorism to 
take growth and take root in any one country it very quickly can get exported to the rest of 
the international community’.117 Austria’s Foreign Minister, Wolfgang Schuessel and 
German Foreign Minister Kinkel both warned that a weak or failed state in Algeria would 
cause regional instability through a massive exodus of Algerians fleeing for safety in 
Europe.118 
 
Whether or not one considers the visit of the EU troika an intervention, it was undoubtedly 
brief. On 8 January, Algeria had agreed to host a delegation from the European Union, but 
with the proviso that its mandate was to talk about Algeria’s ‘fight against terrorism’ 119 
and was not to be considered an ‘inquiry’. Announcing the mission on 13 January, Cook 
said that the aim of the troika was ‘to convey to the Algerian government the public 
concern felt in Europe at the massacres and to explore with them what can be done to end 
the violence, and what the EU can do’.120 Once the European Union and Algeria had 
negotiated the right diplomatic level of the delegation, three deputy foreign ministers of the 
troika — Derek Fatchett (Britain), Benita Ferrero-Waldner (Austria) and Georges Wohlfart 
(Luxembourg), respectively representing the current, future and past holders of the EU 
presidency  — set out on 19 January, joining EU Commission Vice President Manuel 
Marin in Algiers. The delegation’s itinerary only included meetings with Prime Minister 
Ouyahia and Foreign Minister Attaf, several opposition parties and newspaper editors, 
along with humanitarian and human rights bodies attached to the state. Marin hoped that 
the breadth of discussion would be ‘quite wide’, yet he stressed the troika’s need for a 
‘careful and constructive’ engagement so as not to ‘delegitimise’ Algerian authorities.121 
Walking the same tightrope, the leader of the mission, Fachett, told the BBC before 
leaving, ‘There is a need for candor. [...] That’s not pointing the finger at anybody in the 
Algerian government for responsibility. But it would help their case ... if we had a very 
clear statement and a clear understanding of the cause of these events, who’s responsible 
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for them’.122 By the end of the visit, this was downgraded to ‘improv[ing] our 
understanding of the problems faced by the Algerian Government and its people’. Securing 
Algiers’ commitment to a UN rapporteur no longer counted as a ‘key objective’.123 During 
the same period, reports claimed that thirty-three people were killed in various attacks; a 
bomb ripped apart a bus in the hills above Algiers.124 
 
The following week, a meeting of EU foreign ministers under Cook’s chair produced what 
was seen as a more strongly worded reaction to the massacres than the troika’s official 
statements. The EU had ‘demanded’ Algeria allow an inquiry, ‘regretted’ Algeria’s refusal 
to allow a UN investigators and ‘hoped’ it would allow them in the future.125 The 
Ministerial Council pressed Algeria for ‘greater transparency’ on the issue of the violence, 
but the statement explicitly blamed ‘terrorist groups’ for the ‘indiscriminate violence’ and 
‘cowardly and brutal attacks on innocent civilians’ (quoted in Hill & Smith 2000: 346-7). 
Pierre Moscovici, France’s Minister for European Affairs, even threatened that the 
European Union ‘has its limits’126 but the limits of such demands were well recognised by 
Cook: ‘Our willingness to help has to be matched by a willingness of the Algerian 
government to accept the aid’. The Algerian government’s reaction was, again, to blast 
calls for an inquiry. Then Communications Minister Habib Hamraoui Chaouki suggested 
on Al Jazeera that all such efforts aimed ‘to control Algeria’.127 
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The next EU foray into Algeria occurred two weeks later. For five days in mid February 
1998, a nine-member delegation from the EU parliament — five of them French — stayed 
in Algiers, meeting with officials, politicians and members of civil society. Though 
frequently framed in the international media as an extension of EU efforts to establish an 
inquiry (if not an outright ‘fact finding mission’128 itself), the visit was actually unrelated 
and preceded the troika’s initiative. The invitation had ostensible come from the MEP’s 
Algerian counterparts in November though, as noted above, the idea had come about in 
September in Brussels. Furthermore, the head of the delegation, Soulier, was adamant that 
it was not an investigation nor would they seek one.129 For the most of their visit, the 
MEPs were cloistered in the isolated hilltop Djenane El-Mithak state residence. The 
dozens of foreign journalists accompanying them were placed in a separate hotel. Media, 
officials, personalities and activists who met the delegation were ferried to the EU 
parliamentarians’ redoubt. Cohn-Bendit, who, in a small act of defiance, regularly absented 
himself from the daily press conferences, nevertheless refrained from acting on his threat 
to leave if the delegation was not allowed to tour massacre sites or visit Belhadj in 
prison.130 Towards the end of the mission, Soulier dramatically tore apart an unopened 
letter from the FIS in front of the Algerian and international press. It had been delivered to 
the MEPs by Ali-Yahia, head of Algeria’s main non-governmental human rights group, the 
Ligue algérienne de défense des droits de l’homme. Whether the letter was an invitation to 
meet or, as claimed by the FIS, simply an assessment of the situation in Algeria, this 
‘consensus’ act of the MEPs reportedly pleased the Algerian government as much as it 
pleased Algeria’s anti-Islamist press.131 Back in Brussels, Soulier swore, ‘We are 
supporting neither the Algerian Government nor the opposition [...] We support 
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democracy’. As for an inquiry, Soulier rejected the idea: ‘Who is killing who?’, he asked 
rhetorically. ‘Nobody, when speaking to us, pointed the finger at the army’.132 As the 
mission had departed, a string of bombs exploded in the Algiers neighbourhoods of 
Birkhadem and Bab El-Oued.133 In final two weeks of February, there were four reported 
massacres, claiming upwards of fifty lives total. 
 
Outside of Algeria, there were just a small number of governmental efforts to examine the 
massacres and the ensuing crisis. The British Parliament’s human rights group hosted a 
group of outspoken dissident Algerian exiles, including Brahimi, Zitout and Haroun on 22 
January. They variously accused the Algerian government of complicity in the 
assassination of Boudiaf, the Paris metro bombings of 1995 and the recent massacres. 
Academic Clair Spencer, then of King’s College, advised those present ‘to continue to ask 
the difficult questions’. Ann Clwyd, chair of the Parliamentary Human Rights Group, 
expressed concern that the government might be involved in the massacres.134 A far less 
provocative hearing was held on 5 February by the Subcommittee on Africa of the US 
Congress. It heard testimony from the former US ambassador to Algiers (Robert 
Neumann), the Algerian ambassador in Washington (Ramtane Lamamra), an area expert 
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(Mary Jane Deeb) and a researcher from Human Rights Watch (Eric Goldstein).135 But 
between the House representatives’ statements, the four speakers and the questions asked 
by the congress members, there was little consensus regarding the issue of international 
action. Perhaps the strongest statement supporting internationalisation came from 
Democratic Representative Robert Menendez of New Jersey, who suggested that one of 
responses to the massacres could be an ‘International War Crimes Tribunal’ for the 
perpetrators. When asked by Menendez if the United States should sponsor a resolution 
during the upcoming UN human rights commission hearings on Algeria, Neumann said, 
‘We are, at this point, focusing on trying to persuade the Algerian Government that there 
are ways of meeting the needs of transparency which would help it and which are 
consistent with its sovereignty’ (US Congress 1998: 8 and 20).136  
 
Several weeks later, Neumann, along with Martin Indyk, then Assistant Secretary of State 
for the Near East, toured the Maghrib, meeting with Attaf and Ouyahia in Algiers on 13-14 
March. The purpose of the trip was to ‘orient’ the new Assistant Secretary within regional 
affairs; it was not to address the Algerian crisis specifically. The two US diplomats carried 
a message from Clinton to Zéroual expressing the United States’ desire to have better 
relations with Algeria. Indyk reportedly told his Algerian interlocutors privately that 
allowing some kind of foreign inquiry would help disperse the clouds of doubt hanging 
over the narratives of violence in Algeria. Yet based upon Indyk’s public statements, 
Algerian state media lauded the visit as a 180-degree turnaround in US-Algerian relations 
from the low point of January.137 Back in Washington, a State Department official, briefing 
the press on the visit, said, ‘I welcomed the commitment that I received from the 
government of Algeria to a process of openness and transparency, and in particular to 
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allow American groups and journalists to visit Algeria and inquire for themselves’. But 
when pressed on what other forms of inquiry might take place, the US official admitted, 
‘They don’t want a U.N. Human Rights Commission special rapporteur to come in. All 
right?’138 
 
Indeed, if there was a definitive indication that the momentum for an inquiry had 
dissipating, it came during the fifty-fourth session of the UN Commission on Human 
Rights, running from the end March through most of April. The Commission adopted more 
than eighty resolutions during what was the semi-centennial anniversary of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. These included, for example, resolutions on Sudan, Burma, 
Rwanda, Haiti, Palestine, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iran and former 
Yugoslavia. But Algeria did not list among them. Despite strong urging from leading rights 
groups to press Algiers on its ‘in principle agreement’ to allow UN special rapporteurs in 
the country139, the situation in Algeria did not even appear on the Commission’s agenda. 
An official from Human Rights Watch lamented, ‘Algeria was the main topic in the 
hallways and the cafeterias [...] but in the meetings, it couldn’t be mentioned’. In front of 
the Commission in Geneva on 25 March, US representative Richardson cited, ‘the 
paramount need for a credible, independent verification of the facts’ in Algeria.140 If 
Algeria allowed Ndiaye, the UN special rapporteur on summary executions, to visit, that 
would be a ‘positive step for improving transparency in Algeria’, Richardson argued.141 
Robinson reportedly supported a rumoured US resolution142 but none ever materialised. 
The European Union, represented by Audrey Glover of the United Kingdom, made it clear 
that it would not sponsor a resolution, though Glover publicly noted Algeria’s refusal to 
cooperate with the Commission’s efforts to send a special rapporteur.143 As the body’s 
session came to an end on 26 April, Amnesty International strongly condemned the 
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Commission’s inaction vis-à-vis Algeria: ‘During its six week session, thousands of people 
were killed or injured in Algeria, yet the Commission did nothing. If a blind eye is turned 
to such blatant and often publicized abuses, what hope can victims not in the international 
spotlight have’.144 While the claim of ‘thousands’ was likely hyperbole, there were eight 
reported massacres in March and April claiming upwards of 170 victims; the largest being 
the slaughter of fifty people in Bouira Lahdab, Djelfa prefecture, on 27 March.145 
 
Given the outcome at the human rights Commission and the waning of international 
attention (perhaps owing in large part to the significant drop in massacre activity and 
intensity) further action from the United Nations might have seemed unexpected. But on 
29 June, Annan announced that Algeria had invited a UN ‘panel of eminent persons’ to 
‘gather information on the situation in Algeria’. It would have ‘free and complete access to 
all sources of information necessary for the panel to exercise its functions, in order to have 
a clear vision and a precise perception of the reality of the situation in all its dimensions’ 
(see United Nations 1998). As a panel designated by the UN secretariat, it fell outside of 
the UN Human Rights Committee’s upcoming periodic review of Algeria’s performance 
under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Indeed, the Committee’s 
experts met on 20 and 21 July to discuss Algeria’s periodic review, which was two years 
past due. As one news account noted, it was the first time since the cancellation of 
elections in 1992 that the Algerian government had ‘to face harsh criticisms of its rights 
record’ in an international forum.146 The Committee addressed the touchy subject of the 
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massacres and state-armed militias. Yet its findings, vigorously denounced by the Algerian 
government, were contextualised by the paucity of information available. The Committee’s 
interaction with Algeria had been a ‘dialogue of the deaf’, according to its chair, French 
jurist Christine Chanet.147 
 
Touring Algeria between 22 July and 4 August, the ad hoc UN panel, on the other hand, 
met with a wide variety of Algerian politicians, officials, personalities and members of 
civil society, families of ‘disappeared’ persons, a paramilitary self-defence group in the 
Kabylia mountains and visited the sites of the Béni Messous massacre and the recent Aïn 
Khelil (Tlemcen prefecture) massacre of 25 July (twelve casualties). Leading the mission 
was former Portugese president Mário Soares, supported by former prime ministers Inder 
Kumar Gugral of India and Abdel Karim Kabariti of Jordan, former US representative to 
the United Nations Donald McHenry, former EU president Simone Veil of France and 
Amos Wako, Kenya’s attorney general. The Panel’s report admitted that Algerian 
authorities did not permit meetings with FIS leaders, whether imprisoned (Abassi and 
Belhadj) or released (Hachani); nor were they allowed to interview members of the ‘Berber 
cultural movement’ or visit the house of the recently assassinated Kabyle singer Lounes 
Matoub.148 From the outset, the Panel acknowledged that its itinerary and authorisation 
were heavily influenced by Algiers: ‘We had neither the means nor the mandate to conduct 
investigations of our own’. The final report refrained from criticising the Algerian 
government directly. It concluded — recommendations were not allowed — that ‘efforts to 
combat terrorism must take place within the framework of legality, proportionality, and 
respect for the fundamental human rights’. Still, the Algerian government’s ‘efforts to 
combat this phenomenon’ of terrorism ‘deserves the support of the international 
community’ (ibid.). Amnesty International quickly and predictably denounced the report as 
a ‘whitewash’ (Amnesty International 1998). Soares did not agree. ‘We listed evidence of 
human rights abuses by both sides. [...] But we didn’t put them on the same level: the 
terrorists’ slitting of children’s throats is not the same as torturing detainees or holding 
                                                
147 Economist, ‘Algeria. Guilty? Us?’, 25 July 1998: 45; Associated Press, ‘U.N. committee 
laments Algeria’s “unsatisfactory responses”’, 31 July 1998. 
148 Algerian authorities said that Matoub’s house was not ‘a source of information’. 
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people in prison without charge’.149 If there was any ambiguity as to what the Panel’s 
report meant by the term ‘terrorism’, Soares’ comment should have dispelled it.150 Though 
Human Rights Watch had warned, ‘The diplomats’ visit, in any event, should not be seen 
as a substitute for an in country investigation by U.N. human rights experts’ (Human 
Rights Watch 1998: 3; see also Spencer 1998b: 129), it seems the Panel was just that in 
retrospect. 
 
 
The contingency of sovereignty or intervention? 
 
Given that the Algerian massacre crisis has been curiously omitted from most accounts of 
humanitarian intervention in the 1990s or, more broadly, histories of the international 
community’s purported failure to coherently address mass atrocities in the twentieth 
century, it should perhaps come as little surprise that the Algerian experience has mainly 
been taken up in country and area studies. As noted above, those studies have tended to 
frame the international response in terms of a political, rather than humanitarian, crisis. 
Yet, as was also underscored above, the violence in Algeria was frequently located and 
articulated within the broader international security discourses of armed humanitarian 
intervention against mass atrocities, particularly during the height of the massacres from 
August 1997 through January 1998. Only one in-depth treatment of the Algerian massacres 
has taken up the questions of sovereignty, intervention and trans-national human rights 
obligations that could be raised in an analysis of the international reading and response to 
the Algerian conflict. Helle Malmvig’s (2006) study actually begins with the observation 
that in both Algeria and Kosovo, mass atrocities were reported yet the international 
response was radically different in each case. While the effort to stop the massacres in 
Algeria in 1998 was limited to condemnation and diplomatic initiatives, a year later NATO 
launched a significant armed initiative against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) 
to stop atrocities occurring in the region of Kosovo. Malmvig’s goal, however, is not to 
detail what could be summarily dismissed or superficially understood as the moral 
                                                
149 Barry Hatton, ‘Head of U.N. team to Algeria laments president’s departure’, Associated Press, 
26 September 1998. 
150 The entire document never mentions the GIA or even the AIS; instead, there are ‘armed Islamic 
groups’, but more often, just terrorists and a phenomenon of terrorism. 
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hypocrisy of international relations. Rather, her hypothesis is that these two episodes 
demonstrate the spatiotemporal contingency of sovereignty. Previous post-structural and 
constructivist accounts of sovereignty, Malmvig (ibid: 9-21) argues, focused on the 
temporally dynamic practice of sovereignty through various epochs (i.e., Walker 1993; 
Bartelson 1995 and Weber 1995), at the expense of rendering sovereignty spatially 
homogenous during each period under examination. Malmvig instead takes the cases of 
Algeria and Kosovo to demonstrate that sovereignty can be both temporally and spatially 
contingent. Excavating the conditions of sovereignty’s spatial contingency — its disabling 
in the case of the FRY and its reaffirmation in the case of Algeria — consumes the bulk of 
Malmvig’s analysis.  
 
Even if we accept the theoretical assumptions and argumentative objective of this study, it 
nonetheless seems to fail in its ambitions. What is important to consider, with respect to 
Malmvig’s reconstruction of the discursive elements that produced Algeria sovereignty, 
particularly her attention towards legitimations of non-intervention, is whether or not she is 
as guilty of over-representing the violence as were many of her sources (a number of them 
ironically cited in this study). The key to understanding ‘how Algeria was constituted as a 
situation in which intervention was impossible’ is how the violence was represented. 
Whereas the situation in Kosovo was read as one of clear violence (genocide) necessitating 
international action, she argues (ibid.: xxii-xxiii), Algeria was simultaneously a ‘murky’ 
conflict yet the site of a sovereign subject. Charting the emergence of Algeria as a concern 
for the international community following the events of early 1992, she traces the 
formation and re-articulation of a number of representations of the conflict and 
international practices towards it (ibid chapter five). The interventionary moment, for 
Malmvig, is early 1998. However, her legitimations of non-intervention mostly come from 
Védine, France’s Foreign Minister (ibid.: 140-3). From then onwards, non-intervention is a 
fait accompli, and Malmvig cites numerous statements to that effect. But that anything has 
been demonstrated is as questionable as the approach underpinning it. That Malmvig set 
out looking for legitimations of non-intervention and found them mainly in the voice of 
French officials will likely convince neither country experts, who came to expect as much 
from France during the Algerian conflict, nor sceptics of such constructivist 
methodologies.  
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More generally we might ask whether or not these constructions of Algeria are North 
Atlantic constructions and, more importantly, one that is dominated by French 
representations. In her effort to explicate the conditions of Algeria’s non-intervenablility, 
Malmvig deploys roughly 350 citations from about eighty sources, including academic 
studies, major news outlets and official statements from governments, bodies, 
organisations and individuals. Statements of the French government and its officials are the 
most dominant source, garnering nearly a third of the citations. Of these, the statements 
Foreign Ministers Juppé, de Charette and Védrine are the majority. The opinions of US 
representatives, spokespersons and bodies are the second most consulted government 
source (ten percent of citations), followed by statements or documents from the European 
Union, the United Kingdom, the United Nations and non-governmental organizations (i.e., 
rights monitoring and pressure groups). Similarly, the single most used news source is Le 
Monde, accounting for roughly a quarter of the citations; second place goes to Washington 
Post with ten percent151 and then British sources with about five percent. In short, just over 
eighty percent of the source material comes from either French, US or UK sources, though 
sixty percent of that is from the French government or press. 
 
Highlighting this dependence upon a small number of French sources, particularly 
government voices and the pages of Le Monde, is not a powerful critique in so far as it 
could be argued that French representations, for very obvious historical and political 
reasons, played an important, if not dominant, role in international understandings of the 
violence in Algeria. It is problematic in so far as it goes unacknowledged and lacks 
context. For example, in her efforts to understand the de-legitimation of intervention into 
Algeria, Malmvig examines the construction of the Islamist insurgency as an ‘internal’ or 
‘terrorist Other’ threatening the constructions of the democratic and pluralist Algerian 
‘self’, both co-constitutive of the warrant to uphold Algeria sovereignty. Yet her major 
sources are the report of the August 1998 UN panel visit, an opinion piece by French 
politician Jack Lang, and the interventions of two French public intellectuals, Bernard-
Henri Lévy and André Glucksmann, both well known for their antipathy towards political 
Islam. Given the constraints on the UN visit placed by the Algerian government, a visit 
                                                
151 This reliance upon the Washington Times might seem curious given the New York Times, 
which is not cited at all, has the reputation of being the US ‘paper of record’ as Le Monde is for 
France.  
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that occurred months after the interventionary moment had passed (see above), it is 
unsurprising that we should find ample resources for such constructions therein. Even less 
surprising that we should such constructions within the writings of Lévy and Glucksmann, 
who were invited by the Algerian government, and possibly encouraged by French 
authorities, to visit precisely because they would provide such testimonials.152  
 
Malmvig does address the question of whether or not she has ‘hegemonized a whole 
discursive field’ by only selecting those texts that legitimize sovereignty (for Algeria) or 
de-legitimize sovereignty (for FRY). Her response is to argue that she is simply omitting 
an analysis of dominant and subordinate representations in the individual case studies so as 
to focus on her comparison of what prevailed. If her argument holds, she claims, the 
contrast between the roughly simultaneous interventionary and non-interventionary 
discourses at play in Kosovo and Algeria, respectively, will meet the task of showing 
spatial the contingency of sovereignty (see Malmvig 2006: 42-3). There are at least two 
problems with this approach. First, the reader must trust that Malmvig has mapped out, 
prior to writing, the entire discursive field and so presented us with the articulations that 
matter most. Second, this approach adopts and reaffirms, rather than disowns and 
interrogates, the logic of sovereignty and intervention.   
 
On the first point, it is highly contestable whether or not Malmvig has presented the most 
dominant or effective representations of the violence in Algeria. For example, she suggests 
that Algeria in late 1996, ‘a murky and complex civil war, which made it impossible and 
unwanted to choose sides’, became a situation in late 1997  ‘which demanded action’ given 
                                                
152 See Lévy (Le Monde, 8 and 9 January 1998) and Glucksmann (Malik Aït-Aoudia, ‘Ce que j’ai 
vu en Algérie, carnets de route d’André Glucksmann’, France 3, 6 March 1998); both came down 
on the side of the government in the Qui tue? debate. As an extension of Malmvig’s study, it might 
be worth contrasting Lévy’s stance on Algeria versus his well known agitation for intervention in 
the case of the former Yugoslavia, particularly Bosnia and Kosovo (for more background, see 
Johnstone 2000: 144-6). 
As an example of the counter-discourses that Malmvig (2006: 43) admittedly leaves out, 
historian Pierre Vidal-Naquet and publisher François Géze answered with their own page one 
counter-polemic in Le Monde (4 February 1998), prompting a response from Lévy to defend his 
‘sentiment qu’il n’y a pas d’autre choix dans le combat contre les Khmers verts’ (‘Algérie: gare au 
syndrome Timisoara’, Le Monde, 12 February 1998). Lévy’s visit to Algeria was apparently also 
facilitated by Védrine (Naylor 2000: 242-3). In mid-April, when news reports revealed that Algeria 
had arrested local officials and militia members in Relizane on charges indicating massacre-like 
activity, the Observer’s John Sweeney attacked Lévy in an ‘open letter’, suggesting Lévy ‘will be 
remembered in history as an unwitting apologist for murder’ (19 April 1998: 24). 
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the ‘reports of massacres conducted by unknown perpetrators against innocent civilians 
unprotected by the government’ (ibid.: 137). While both of these representations — 
‘murky’ in 1996 versus ‘unknown perpetrators’ and ‘unprotected’ ‘civilians’ in 1997 — 
were present and widely circulated, chapters five and six clearly demonstrate that these 
were not the only representations available nor necessarily the ones the had the most effect 
upon the international response. Additionally, the final articulation of Algerian violence 
that disabled the warrant for intervention is the bifurcation of Algerian polity into a 
democratic and secular ‘Self’ (represented by the government and worthy of foreign 
support) versus a terrorist and fundamentalist ‘Other’ (represented by the insurgency and 
worthy of foreign condemnation). Malmvig (2006: 151-3) locates this dichotomy within 
texts produced after the interventionary moment of early January 1998 had passed, notably 
the UN panel report and the writings of Lévy and Glucksmann. Yet this rendering of the 
conflict was already prevalent, and arguably dominant within French understandings of the 
conflict, three years into the conflict (see Roberts 1995). Indeed, there is a strong argument 
to be made that what is remarkable about the period of August 1997 to January 1998 is the 
exact opposite. The intensity of the violence, the foreign outrage and the internationalised 
debate over the identity of the perpetrators overcame earlier (French) renderings of the 
conflict as a contest between the forces of secular democratic modernity and the forces of 
‘intégrisme’ and ‘obscurantisme’. From the viewpoint of politiography, what is most 
unnerving about this post hoc approach is that it works backward from its conclusion (the 
spatial contingency of sovereignty) to seek the evidence that makes it reasonable (the 
conditions of possibility).  
 
This leads us to the second point. Malmvig’s thesis works within one particular yet 
contested logic of sovereignty and intervention. A critical assumption is that intervention 
indicates an absence of sovereignty. Not all conceptions of sovereignty, however, are 
based on this conceptualisation (see Krasner 1999). Malmvig’s argument is not unlike the 
claim that laws do not exist in spaces where they are broken. Though some might hold this 
view, others would argue that the rule of law, like sovereignty, exists even in spaces where 
it is contravened. Indeed, proponents of a right to humanitarian intervention or a 
responsibility to protect simply portray legitimations of intervention, whether on the basis 
of genocide or mass suffering, as new exceptions to the general prohibition against the use 
of military force against a sovereign state. This does not necessarily entail the notion that 
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sovereignty ceases to exist when certain practices of violence obtain, only that sovereignty 
does not immunise states or groups within states from intervention when they practice 
certain forms of violence like genocide. Only if we assume this contested view sovereignty 
can we accept Malmvig’s conclusion. All is not lost, though. While her main argument 
rests on a weak foundation of partial, fragmentary and predetermined representations of 
Algerian violence, as well as a contested view of sovereignty, Malmvig has accidentally 
presented us with a compelling account of the contingency of interventionary practices that 
does not make sole reference to either the interests or immorality of powerful states.  
 
 
Conclusion:  Magic words or magic worlds? 
 
The politics of naming sovereignty and intervention, in the case of Algeria, at least reveals 
that claims of both can be as politicised as claims of civil war, terrorism or Islam. More 
importantly, though, the international experience of the Algerian massacres suggests that 
humanitarian intervention is heavily, though not entirely, conditioned by the kinds of 
violence being attributed to a crisis that is ostensibly beckoning international action. To 
make this point, the example of NATO’s intervention in Kosovo is again instructive. As 
Malmvig (2006: 137) asks, ‘How could gross violations of human rights, extrajudicial 
killings and massacres be portrayed as a clear foundation for international involvement in 
terms of Kosovo and not in Algeria?’ The answer, as Malmvig eventually shows, is that 
the violence in Algeria and Kosovo was not presented on such equal footing. Key to this 
was the claim of genocide. The history of the 1990s and the first decade of the new 
millennium tells us that there are certainly no ‘magic words’ when it comes to armed 
humanitarian intervention. No single utterance that will automatically trigger an aggressive 
international response to extensive crimes against humanity. Nonetheless, it cannot be 
disputed that the term genocide has had a powerful effect in the effort to catalyse 
interventions. The vociferous debate about whether or not the term genocide applies to 
some of the violent practices witnessed in the conflict Sudan’s Darfur region since 2003, 
and thus whether or not the international community should intervene, is suggestive of the 
word’s power (see Williams & Bellamy 2005). Though the speech act of naming genocide 
is unlikely to constitute either a sufficient or necessary condition for humanitarian 
intervention, its wide deployment the case of Kosovo stands in sharp contrast to how the 
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violence in Algeria was and could be described. As noted above, there were a few claims 
that Algeria was experiencing genocide but in the broader picture such utterances were 
relatively rare.153 By comparison, a search of the period between June 1998 and May 2000, 
encompassing the two-year period of the most heightened attention surrounding Kosovo 
and the eventual NATO bombing of the FRY in 1999, produces over two hundred 
headlines where the terms Kosovo and genocide appeared together. 
 
A condition we should consider, one that serves as a pre-condition for declarations of 
genocide, is Algeria’s failure to fit into the evolving schema of intervenable atrocities. 
Despite repeated attempts by observers to juxtapose the Algerian massacres with recent 
and concurrent humanitarian catastrophes in places such as Rwanda and former 
Yugoslavia, Algeria lacked a crucial element: identity politics, defined as inter-group 
conflict, particularly ethnic divisions. The importance of constructing oppositional 
identities in the mobilisation of a discourse of genocide is vouched by assertion that their 
deconstruction is sufficient to undermine the warrant for intervention (e.g., Mamdani 
2009). Even putting aside the Qui tue? questions of perpetrators and motives behind the 
massacres, representations of Algerian violence did not easily lend themselves to the 
standard model of inter group conflict witnessed in places where international intervention 
took place, whether between nationalist groups, religious groups or ethnic groups. For the 
most part, the violence in Algeria was seen as intra-national, intra-religious and intra-
ethnic. The use of the term genocide vis-à-vis the Algerian massacres was only operational 
if it restricted its meaning to mass killing. Other important elements to a claim of genocide, 
no matter one’s position within the Qui tue? debate, were otherwise absent.  
 
In so far as identities were involved in the massacres, those identities were 
overwhelmingly framed as political identities, political in the sense that the protagonists’ 
contention centred on issues of government. This, of course, is not an all-encompassing 
account of the myriad ways in which Algeria’s violence was represented, particularly 
given the discourse on privatised violence. Indeed, the diversity of proposed logics and 
                                                
153 For example, a search of headlines for all French and English sources in the Nexis news 
database for the years 1997 and 1998 reveals only two coincides of the terms Algeria and genocide 
(Latest search performed October 2010). The two sources (both English) were the Australian (see 
above), which attributed the claim of genocide to the Algerian press, and a US wire service 
distributing articles from college newspapers. 
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agents of violence was part of the problem. The various ways in which Algerian violence 
could be and has been represented was indicative the conflict’s seeming refusal to lend 
itself to easy problematisation. Nor does this argument preclude alternative efforts to 
solidify or expand our conception of genocide (for background, see Levene 2008). But it is 
worth noting that the awkward and unpopular substitute term politicide — developed to 
account for the intra-national nature of the Cambodian genocide — rarely (if at all) reared 
its head in representations of the Algerian massacres. 
 
As will be seen in the following chapter, the debate about whether or not the violence in 
1990s Algeria was without precedent often took place on a historical terrain, and a 
particularly Algerian one at that. Yet there is a sense in which the Algerian massacres were 
another sort of violence without precedent. Another contingency guiding the intervention 
into Kosovo — one entirely lacking from Algeria — was the recent precedent in Bosnia. 
Similarly, the Rwandan genocide serves as the definitive context for the cry of ‘never 
again’ to rally support for intervention in Darfur. The importance of these precedents is 
more or less implicit in Annan’s challenge to the G77 in 2000: ‘[I]f humanitarian 
intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to 
a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica?’ But Algeria could not co-inhabit the magical world of 
Rwandas and Bosnias that structure so much of our understanding of what constitutes a 
situation in which foreign armed intervention is necessary. Embedded within the practical 
logic of humanitarian intervention is not only a criterion of moral warrant but also a 
criterion of moral narrative. Armed humanitarian intervention is a practice done on behalf 
of some group and against another: for Kurdish refugees and against the Iraqi government; 
for Somali civilians and against warlords; for the government of Haiti, against the regime; 
for Tutsis, against Hutus; for Bosnia and Kosovo, against Serbia; for East Timor, against 
Indonesia; for the Sierra Leone government, against chaos; for Darfur, against Sudan. Only 
though the constitution of a morally bifurcated, Manichean reality were recent 
instantiations of armed humanitarianism able to operationalise themselves. 
Humanitarianism historically presented itself as morality that was above politics yet now, 
in its armed interventionary form, can only act when it frames the world into good and bad, 
victims and perpetrators, evildoers and saviours. Armed humanitarianism abhors a moral 
vacuum. That a precondition for intervention — moral clarity — was the limited objective 
of interventionary initiatives for Algeria is a paradox that simultaneously enabled and 
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disabled the humanitarianisation of the conflict. For now, conscience-shocking atrocities 
are not enough. But we did not need the Algerian massacres to tell us that. 
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8. History 
 
 
 
‘History will judge’ 
 
Alongside the discourses on democracy, identity, civil war and humanitarian intervention, 
the practices of transitional justice also drew increasing attention in the 1990s. Since the 
end of World War Two, dozens of countries have carried out various national experiments 
with non-judicial, extra-judicial and formal legal proceedings to address the legacies of civil 
war, violent authoritarianism and sometimes both. Chief among these techniques has been 
the truth commission, a procedure now habitually recommended to countries emerging from 
mass armed conflict or brutally repressive governments. The genealogy of the modern truth 
commission is often traced back to Idi Amin’s 1974 Commission of Inquiry into 
Disappearances and the 1976 World Council of Churches’ attempt to document the abuses 
of Alfredo Strössner Matiauda in Paraguay. Since then, there have been roughly thirty to 
forty — depending on the definition1 — truth commissions and commissions of inquiry of 
various scopes and mandates. Perhaps more than any other effort, South Africa’s Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (1995-2000) has become synonymous with this form of 
transitional justice. Its precursors, however, were nonetheless instrumental in the evolution 
of the paradigm. Truth commissions in Argentina (1983-84) and Chile (1990-91) 
addressed each country’s ‘dirty war’; the truth commission in El Salvador (1992-3) was 
one aspect of the peace agreement signed under the auspices of the United Nations, 
inspiring a similar commission in Guatemala (1997-99) for the peace process there. Since 
the turn of the millennium, Nigeria, Peru, Uruguay, Grenada, Panama, Serbia, Ghana, 
Sierra Leone, Timor-Leste, Democratic Republic of Congo, Paraguay, Indonesia, 
Morocco, Liberia and Ecuador have all either proposed, initiated or completed 
commissions to address the legacies of violent conflict and abusive government. 
 
                                                
1 As of 2007, there have been a total of thirty-two truth commissions in twenty-eight different 
countries according to Amnesty International; the United States Institute for Peace, however, 
claims forty-one, dividing these into twenty-six bona fide truth commissions and fifteen lesser 
‘commissions of inquiry’. For definitions, see Freeman (2006: xxiii-xiv) and Hayner (1994: 604). 
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Algeria’s leaders have so far eschewed adopting similar measures, whether a domestic 
truth commission or, as proposed during the massacre crisis, an international inquiry. 
Presidents Zéroual and Bouteflika have instead simply opted for government measures 
designed to entice rebels to put down their arms in exchange for amnesty, social benefits 
and political rehabilitation. In the language of international conflict management 
professionals, these initiatives would be called DDR: demobilisation, disarmament and 
reintegration. In February 1995, Zéroual backed La loi sur la rahma (Clemency Law or 
simply al-raḥmah), which outlined the truce-for-immunity framework that has guided 
Algeria’s peacemaking efforts. Bouteflika’s 1999 Concorde civile adopted this approach 
and was endorsed in a popular referendum that September. The 2005 Charte pour la paix 
et la réconciliation nationale expanded the scope of amnesty to include insurgents who 
either ignored the Concorde or joined the Maquis after 2000. It also immunised all state 
agents (including civilian militias) from prosecution and set up punishments for those who 
publicly criticised them. Insurgents who committed crimes such as rape, assassinations, 
bombings and massacres were ostensibly exempt from amnesty but the process through 
which they were vetted, if at all, was criticised by foreign human rights organisations for 
lacking transparency (Human Rights Watch 2005; Amnesty International 2009). Victims 
of apparent state terror — the thousands of families who claimed a relative had been 
‘disappeared’ by government agents — could seek compensation but at the expense of a 
formal inquiry and accountability, as could the families of slain insurgents. The victims of 
non-state terrorism, on the other hand, have not been addressed by these measures. New 
formal inquiries into questions still surrounding the major events of the 1990s — 
assassinations of Boudiaf and Matoub, the slaying of French seven monks in 1996, the 
major massacres — have been largely dismissed. When asked in 1999 why Algeria was 
not considering a truth commission like South Africa, Bouteflika explained to El País, 
 
The situation is far more complex than it was in South Africa. [...] The Truth 
Commission would be justified in a relationship of colonizer to colonized, such as 
France to Algeria or Spain to Western Sahara. [...] And if my memory does not betray 
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me, you [i.e., Spain] have never needed a commission to achieve democratic 
transition.2 
 
Putting aside the question of the accuracy of Bouteflika’s assessment (whether of South 
African history or the history of truth commissions), another explanation for Algeria’s 
reluctance also exists. At the height of the massacre drama in late 1997, Le Monde’s 
Tuquoi put forward the simple observation that ‘There will be no international commission 
of inquiry into the massacres in Algeria. In a country where nationalism is worth more than 
the truth, it is inconceivable that a foreign team is allowed to come on site to shed light on 
the killings’.3 Additionally, the basic assumptions guiding calls for an inquiry were 
patently offensive to many Algerians: the proposition that the state had committed or 
condoned significant human rights violations and was incapable of regulating itself or 
offering the most basic security protections to its populace. Despite the recommendations 
of those who advocated for the de-internationalisation of the Algerian conflict, particularly 
the rejection of demands for humanitarian intervention (e.g., Roberts 1998), domestic and 
                                                
2 Juan Carlos Sanz, ‘Abdelaziz Buteflika, presidente de Argelia: “No soy un dictador”’, El País: 28 
July 1999: 4-5. 
 Clearly Bouteflika would not miss an opportunity to critique Spain’s policy towards its former 
colony of Western Sahara (which Madrid abandoned to Algeria’s regional adversary, Morocco, in 
1975 and whose independence Algeria continues to support) or to critique France’s refusal to 
apologise for colonialism and the war of independence in Algeria (see below and Stora 2001a: 
113). More importantly, Spain’s post-Franco ‘amnesia consensus’ might be one of the models of 
transition Bouteflika has most sought to emulate. Putting aside the debate about whether or not 
Algeria is a democracy on par with Spain, or if the transitions are even comparable, it is worth 
noting, in the context of this chapter, the cracks in Spain’s amnesia consensus. Such was vividly 
illustrated nearly ten years after this interview by the case of Judge Baltasar Garzón, an investigator 
for Spain’s National Court made famous by his effort to extradite former Chilean Dictator General 
Augusto Pinochet to Spain in 1998. Garzón’s failed efforts in 2008 to investigate crimes against 
humanity committed during the Franco era, which included examining tens of thousands of cases 
of disappearance and possible excavation of mass graves, led to his indictment in April 2010 for 
violating Spain’s 1977 amnesty laws. Though Garzón’s case is pending (as of October 2010), it 
suggests that traumas of the past do not necessarily reconcile quickly or easily under amnesty laws, 
regardless of whether or not a country is ‘democratic’. Additionally, Argentina, invoking the 
principle of universal jurisdiction that Garzón cited in the case of Pinochet, launched an 
investigation on 4 September 2010 into the crimes of the Franco regime committed during the 
years 1936-77. Such developments not only put into question the domestic stability of Spain’s 
amnesia consensus, but it international durability as well (see International Center for Transitional 
Justice, ICTJ Transitions, October 2010: 8). 
3 Jean Pierre Tuquoi, ‘Algérie, autopsie d’un massacre’, Le Monde, 11 November 1997.
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international efforts to press for a truth commission continued past 1999, though with far 
less urgency than had been felt in January 1998.4 
 
The closest Algeria has ever come to an inquiry into the events of the 1990s, particularly 
the massacres of 1997 and 1998, was a brief defamation trial held in Paris in the summer 
of 2002. Seventeen months before that, Habib Souaïdia, a former officer in the Algerian 
military had published a small book titled La sale guerre (The Dirty War). Souaïdia’s 
memoir of life in the Algerian counter-insurgency effort appeared in France on 8 February 
and quickly sold over 70,000 copies in its first three months.5 Before then, Souaïdia had 
made his allegations public several months prior in an interview with Tuquoi. Like the 
insiders who came forward at the height of the massacres in 1997 and 1998 (see chapter 
five), Souaïdia recounted witnessing torture and other possible crimes against humanity 
committed by his fellow soldiers. However, unlike the other former and serving members 
of Algeria’s security, military and intelligence forces who had appeared in the French, Irish 
and British media in 1997 and 1998, Souaïdia was willing to use his real name and show 
his face in public.6 This initially provided his claims — ‘[s]erious allegations’, in the 
words of Amnesty International7 — with an air of credibility that had otherwise been 
                                                
4 In March 2007, several non-governmental victims advocacy groups from Algeria, mainly those 
opposed to 2005 Charte, met in Brussels to discuss the creation of a ‘truth, peace and conciliation’ 
commission. In April 2010, groups generally in support of Bouteflika’s reconciliation policies held 
a meeting in Algiers to press for the claims of victims of non-state terror. 
5 The attention afforded to Souaïdia’s memoir was reportedly of such a concern that then Chief of 
Staff Major-General Lamari considered it, in the words of José Garçon, ‘une affaire d’État’. Unlike 
previous internationalised media crises related to the violence in Algeria (e.g., the massacres of 
August 1997 to January 1998), Garçon suggested that the Algerian government was not able to find 
prominent French intellectuals to come to its aid, partially as a result of the book’s ‘irreproachable’ 
foreward, written by the Italian prosecutor Ferdinando Imposimato, known for his work against 
mafias and terrorism (José Garçon, ‘L’armée algérienne veut rassurer Paris’, Libération, 25 April 
2001: 11). The day after Souaïdia’s book was published, an open letter in Le Monde argued that La 
sale guerre and Qui a tué à Bentalha provided the evidence to warrant a new push for an 
international inquiry into Algeria’s violence. Several intellectuals, including Pierre Bordieu and 
Vidal-Naquet, had signed the letter (‘M. Védrine et le bain de sang en Algérie’, Le Monde, 9 
February 2001). Algerian writers Yasmina Khadra and Rachid Boudjedra quickly attacked 
Souaïdia’s claims; 200 Algerian academics signed a letter denouncing La sale guerre (Times 
Higher Education Supplement, ‘Algiers’, 6 April 2001: 10). 
6 Jean-Pierre Tuquoi, ‘Le témoignage d’un ancien officier algérien: On était devenus des sauvages’, 
Le Monde, 3 June 2000; Lara Marlowe, ‘Europe turns blind eye to Algeria’s dirty war’, Irish 
Times, 13 February 2001: 14.  
7 Amnesty International, ‘Algeria: Habib Souaidia’s trial highlights concerns over failure to 
conduct investigations’, Press Release, AI Index MDE 28/040/2002, News Service No. 107, 28 
June 2002. 
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lacking from previous accusers, whether anonymous (former) members of the security, 
military and intelligence forces, the assertions of exiled government officials (e.g., Brahimi 
and Zitout) and the inconsistent accounts of massacre survivors reported by the 
international media.  
 
Though the violence in Algeria appeared to be subsiding in 2000 from the heights reached 
in the late 1990s, the internationalised Qui tue? debate still simmered and, in October 
2000, it received a significant boost.8 The tale of Nesroulah Yous (2000), a survivor of the 
September 1997 Bentalha massacre, provided a rich, though nonetheless contested9, 
background to what had arguably already become the most internationally dissected of the 
major massacres. As with the initial claims of some survivors that were available shortly 
after massacres like Bentalha, Yous had come to the conclusion that the Algerian security 
forces had played a role in the killing. Thus when La sale guerre hit the shelves in early 
2001, the market was primed for the kind of first-hand evidence of direct government 
complicity in the massacres Souaïdia was willing to provide (see Roberts 2001). A pivotal 
claim in Souaïdia’s narrative is an alleged 1993 massacre near Douar Ez-Zaâtria, in which 
he recalls having essentially witnessed, though not directly, Algerian military units, 
disguised as Islamist rebels, slay several civilians.10 
 
The war of words between Souaïdia and former HCE member Nezzar commenced shortly 
after the book’s publication. Expressing his willingness to testify before an international 
inquiry into the violence in Algeria, Souaïdia voiced the opinion that Algeria’s problems 
resulted from the concentration of power in the hands of ten senior military officers, 
                                                
8 The Economist, ‘Thinking the unthinkable’, 11 November 2000. 
9 See Mohamed Ghoualmi [Algeria’s ambassador to France], ‘A propos du livre Qui a tué à 
Bentalha?’, Le Monde, 21 November 2000; Salima Tlemçani, ‘Massacre de Bentalha: Un livre qui 
suscite des polémiques’, El-Watan, 30 October 2000. 
On 11 November, the Algerian government organised a press conference where several 
residents of Bentalha countered Yous’ narrative; a similar group was brought to France in January 
2001 for the same purpose.  
10 As noted in chapter five, the claims about Douar Ez-Zaâtria proved controversial not only 
because few reliable accounts of massacres had been reported as early as the year 1993 (see ibid.), 
but also because no evidence could be found when El Watan (20 February 2001) and Le Nouvel 
Observateur (29 March 2001) looked into it after La sale guerre was published. Souaïdia, 
nevertheless, stood by his account, underscoring that the massacre was in the ‘vicinity’ of that 
locale (Habib Souaïdia, ‘En Algérie, le roi est nu’, Le Monde, 17 April 2001). 
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including Nezzar, whom he collectively accused of robbing the nation of its wealth.11 
Nezzar shot back in a Le Figaro interview, accusing Souaïdia of being a convicted 
criminal, an ‘impostor’ who was never in the Algerian Special Forces and a co-conspirator 
in the Islamists’ international campaign to attack the Algerian military.12 Unfortunately for 
Nezzar, when he travelled to Paris in April 2001 to defend the actions of his armed forcers 
and publicise one of his books, it was revealed that several complaints of torture had been 
lodged against him in French courts, forcing Nezzar to leave quickly before prosecutors 
could question him.13 Undeterred, Nezzar announced his intentions to sue Souaïdia in a 
French court, reportedly after having consulted with his colleagues in the military and 
politics four months later.14 The target of Nezzar’s defamation complaint was not La sale 
guerre directly, but it seemed clear that the lawsuit intended to undermine Souaïdia’s 
account and, more generally, confront the chorus of accusations facing the Algerian state 
and army.15 The basis of the lawsuit was statements Souaïdia had made on a French 
television program, ‘Les Droits d’Auteur’, in May 2001: ‘I cannot forgive French generals 
[Jacques] Massu and [Paul] Aussaresses for their crimes as I cannot forgive General 
Nezzar (...) They are cowards who have profited’. These ‘crimes’, Souaïdia claimed, 
including the killing of ‘thousands of people for nothing’.16 Marc Tessier, president of La 
Cinquième, the French public television channel in question, was also named in the case.17 
                                                
11 AFP, ‘Habib Souaidia prêt a témoigner devant une commission d’enquête’, 13 February 2001. 
12 see AFP, ‘Les «dérapages» de l’armée algérienne ont été sanctionnes (général Nezzar)’, 21 April 
2001. 
13 Patrick Saint-Paul, ‘Algérie: L’ancien ministre de la Défense est accusé de torture par des 
Algériens’, Le Figaro, 26 April 2001.  
Nezzar eventually spoke with French police in April 2002 (Ceaux Pascal, ‘L’ancien ministre de 
la défense algérien est revenu s’expliquer devant la police à Paris’, Le Monde, 8 April 2002). As 
the Nezzar-Souaïdia trial opened in July 2002, more torture charges were filed against Nezzar in a 
French court (AFP, ‘Algerian general target of new torture allegations in French court’, 1 July 
2002). None of these cases, however, were successful.  
14 AFP, ‘Former Defence Minister sues over “Dirty War” allegations’, 23 August  2001; Jon 
Henley, ‘Algerian ex-general sues over army massacres claim: Author and French TV station 
accused of libel’, The Guardian, 24 August 2001: 12 
15 Notably, Captain Hichem Aboud, former Chief of Staff to General Mohamed Betchine (who 
briefly headed the Sécurité Militaire in the late 1980s); Aboud also became a political refugee in 
France. In June 2001, he gave a provocative interview to Le Nouvel Observateur (Farid Aïchoune 
and Jean-Baptiste Naudet, ‘Hichem Aboud rompt la loi du silence’, 14 June 2001) about the 1987 
assassination of opposition lawyer Ali Mecili and, in March 2002, he published his own polemic 
(Aboud 2002). 
16 In French, Souaïdia reportedly said, ‘Je ne peux pardonner au général Massu ou au général 
Aussaresses les crimes qu’ils ont commis comme je ne peux pardonner au général Nezzar. (...) Ce 
sont des lâches qui en profitent’ and  ‘eux qui ont fait cette guerre, tué des milliers de gens pour 
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The Nezzar-Souaïdia trial was initially set for February 2002 but was postponed to July. 
The opening of the proceedings featured the testimony of Souaïdia and Nezzar on the first 
day. Subsequent days featured testimonies from both the plaintiff’s side and the defence. 
Testifying in support of Nezzar were two members of the HCE, former Prime Minister Sid 
Ahmed Ghozali and former human rights minister Ali Haroun; two former ministers with 
intellectual backgrounds, Ahmed Djebbar and Leïla Aslaoui; Kamel Razzag-Barra, former 
head of Algeria’s human rights monitoring body; Mohammed Sifaoui, a journalist who 
was the initial co-author of La sale guerre but later denounced Souaïdia and his publisher, 
François Gèze18; author Rachid Boudjedra; a militia leader from Bentalha; the founder of a 
                                                                                                                                              
rien du tout’ (Florence Aubenas, ‘Le général algérien Nezzar débouté à Paris’, Libération, 28 
September 2002: 11, ellipses in original). 
17 In Algeria, however, La sale guerre earned Souaïdia an international arrest warrant and a twenty-
year jail sentence following his trial there in absentia (AFP, ‘Algerian soldier given 20-year jail 
term over critical book’, 30 April 2002).  
Though widely attacked in the Algerian press, the accusations of Souaïdia, along with 
Samraoui, also helped provide cover for Algerians who had held suspicions about the informal role 
of private and security interests in the violence. In December 2001, the Algerian papers Le Jeune 
Independent (4 December) and Le Quotidien d’Oran (Abed Charef, ‘Escadrons de la mort: l’aveu 
de Zeroual’, 6 December) ran stories in which Louisa Hanoune claimed that Zéroual had 
‘confirmed’ to her in 1998 the existence of ‘death squads’ in Algeria, autonomous from the 
security sectors and run by opaque ‘interest groups’. Zéroual, who has remained largely out of the 
public eye since leaving office in 1999, apparently never confirmed or denied Hanoune’s claim. 
Rumours of private, paramilitary or anti-Islamist death squads (e.g., l’Organisation des jeunes 
algériens libres, OJAL) emerged in the mid-1990s and have been an important feature within the 
Qui tue? discourse. A possible context of Zéroual’s purported claim could be the allegedly intense 
intra-regime conflict in 1998 between Zéroual and his opponents in the military leadership (Roberts 
2007: 10-1). The April 1998 Fergane affair in Relizane, for example, which included allegations of 
pro-government death squad-type activity (see chapter five), was often read an effect of fighting 
between rival camps in the elite. The late 1998 allegations of death squad activity (see Demain 
l’Algérie, 1 September 1998) were likewise read as high-level interest groups attempting to 
undermine each other. 
18 Sifaoui, apparently an early champion of Souaïdia before La sale guerre (see Garçon below), 
became one of the book’s most prominent critics following publication. He was originally 
contracted as one of the co-authors and later claimed that seventy percent of the text was his 
writing (Mohamed Sifaoui, ‘Une lettre de Mohamed Sifaoui’, Le Monde, 12 Februrary 2001). Even 
before the Nezzar-Souaïdia trial, Sifaoui had become a useful device in the Algerian government’s 
efforts to discredit La sale guerre (e.g., a letter to the editor from the Algerian embassy in 
Washington, D.C.: ‘Terrorists in Algeria’, Washington Post: 18 May 2001: A30). In his lawsuit 
against Editions La Découverte, Sifaoui also alleged that Gèze had manipulated the text, 
downplaying Souaïdia’s account of insurgent violence in order to highlight state abuses (Hervé de 
Saint-Hilaire, ‘Polémique autour d’un ouvrage’, Le Figaro, 10 February 2001). Gèze counter-sued 
Sifaoui and Marianne (which had carried an extended interview with Sifaoui). Gèze alleged that, as 
co-author, Sifaoui was the one who had attempted to manipulate the memoir, adding accounts that 
Souaïdia had not experienced. The legal proceedings in September 2001, like the Nezzar-Souaïdia 
trial that followed the next summer, essentially became a ‘political trial’ about the question of 
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pro-government civil society group; and six survivors or family members allegedly 
victimised by armed Islamist groups. Among the last group, Mohamed Daho, testified that 
his son, Ali, was not burned alive by soldiers, as recounted by Souaïdia, but killed by 
insurgents.19 Survivors Hadda Chaouche (‘Khali Aïcha’) and Hamid Bouamra, residents of 
Bentalha, seem to have been presented to refute Yous’ Qui a tué à Bentalha? rather than 
Souaïdia’s La sale guerre. 
 
Souaïdia’s corner also boasted an impressive list of personalities. It included dissident 
figures Hocine Aït-Ahmed and historian Mohammed Harbi; two former Algerian 
government officials selected to testify on the issue of finance and corruption (Ghazi 
Hidouci and Omar Benderra); journalists José Garçon, Salima Ghezali and Nicole 
Chevillard; two political refugees in Europe who served in the Algerian military, Colonel 
Mohammed Samraoui and Captain Ahmed Chouchène (Chouchane); human rights 
activists Patrick Baudouin (Fédération internationale des ligues des droits de l'Homme) and 
Nassera Dutour (Collectif des familles de disparus en Algérie and who believes her son 
was disappeared by state agents); a victim of torture; and MEP Hélèn Flautre.20 The trial 
was also attended by other civil society figures, especially activists straddling both sides of 
the Qui tue? debate. One of the attendees, Chérifa Kheddar, co-founder of Blida-based 
Djazairouna (Jazāʾirunā), an advocacy group for victims of terrorism, hoped that the 
proceedings might lead to some answers and accountability: ‘For the first time, a real trial 
is taking place about the question of who is killing whom [...]. It’s no longer an impersonal 
question from the media, but real questions by lawyers in a real jurisdiction’.21 Reviving 
the Qui tue? debate, however, was exactly the problem with the proceedings, charged 
L’Humanité’s Hassane Zerrouky. ‘But beyond the question of who is behind the massacres 
of civilians’, he argued, ‘those who testified in favour of Souaïdia have mainly sought to 
                                                                                                                                              
massacres (José Garçon, ‘«La Sale Guerre» en procès à Paris’, Libération, 7 September 2001: 9). 
And as with Nezzar, the court dismissed Gèze’s libel complaint. 
19 Hassane Zerrouky, ‘Pas de peine contre Habib Souaïdia’, L’Humanité, 7 July 2002. 
20 Reportedly, Souaïdia had also hoped that a representative of the Mouvement Algérien des 
officiers libres (MAOL), a dissident officers group composed mainly of exiles, would also testify 
in his favour (see L.D.S., ‘Les procès du général Nezzar embarrassent Paris’, Libération, 11 
October 2001: 21). This would likely have been Captain Hacine Ouguenoune (a.k.a. Captain 
Haroune), a political refugee in London who had formerly served in the Sécurité Militaire (Military 
Security, i.e., military intelligence, now called the DRS). Vidal-Naquet was also slated to speak on 
Souaïdia’s behalf but was unable to attend for reasons of personal health. 
21 Elaine Ganley, ‘Former defense minister confronts best-selling author over extremists’, 
Associated Press, 1 July 2002. 
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clear the Islamists of their crimes and their willingness to establish by any means possible 
[par tous les moyens] — something they have never hidden — an Islamic republic’.22 
 
Perhaps more than any other witnesses, Samraoui was actually in a position to verify 
Souaïdia’s most sensational claim, the one most central to the international debate 
surrounding the massacres. Had Algerian soldiers dressed as Islamists and carried out 
massacres to discredit the FIS and the rebel groups? As an officer in Algeria’s counter-
intelligence division of the DRS, Samraoui claimed that he was on the frontlines of the 
state’s efforts to monitor, penetrate and ultimately subvert the Islamist movement from 
March 1990 onward. ‘Our mission was to break the FIS, infiltrate it, disperse it 
[disloquer], attribute violent actions to the Islamists’, he testified. ‘The GIA is a creation of 
the Algerian security services’.23 Samraoui first appeared on the scene in early 2001, 
though he had lived in Germany since deserting and receiving asylum in early 1996. After 
Souaïdia’s book was published, Samraoui was interviewed on the Al Jazeera Arabic 
satellite channel, where he claimed for the first time in public that his former bosses in the 
DRS had created the GIA in the summer of 1991 — months before the cancellation of 
elections in January 1992 —  to subvert the Islamist movement.24 Though Samraoui’s 
testimony (Souaïdia et al. 2002: 229-46) and character seemed unimpeachable, his account 
suffered the same chronological problem as Souaïdia: neither were in a position to know if 
the massacres of late 1996 through early 1998 were the direct or indirect work of Algerian 
state agents. They could only conjecture based on previous state behaviour. Nor was this 
deficiency corrected by the testimony of Chouchène. A political refugee in Great Britain at 
the time of the trial, his superiors had allegedly offered him the job of helping infiltrate the 
Islamist movement to carry out high level assassinations of FIS leaders. When he 
reportedly asked why not go after GIA leader Djamel Zitouni, Chouchène claimed he was 
told that Zitouni was ‘our man’ (ibid.: 166). Shortly thereafter, Chouchène escaped to 
Europe, meaning that he was also not in a position to speak about the 1996-98 massacres 
first hand. 
 
                                                
22 H.Z., ‘Pas de peine contre Habib Souaïdia’, L’Humanité, 7 July 2002. 
23 Florence Aubenas, ‘«Le GIA est une création des services de sécurité»;  L’armee algérienne 
devant la justice française’, Libération, 4 July 2002: 11. 
24 Le Monde, ‘Algérie: le général Khaled Nezzar saisit la justice française contre l’auteur de La 
Sale Guerre’, 24 August 2001. 
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By the end of the proceedings, the French court began to realise that it was being assigned 
a much larger task than to render a simple verdict on defamation. To decide whether or not 
Souaïdia’s comments held sufficient warrant to be labelled defamatory was to tempt the 
court to write contemporary Algerian history. In her concluding statements, the public 
prosecutor, Béatrice Angelelli, argued against going down that road. ‘This week, two 
theses, two truths have clashed’, she noted, recommending that Souaïdia not ultimately 
face any punitive measures even if he was found guilty. ‘History will judge’, she 
concluded in an explicit echo of Nezzar, who had defended his actions in the early 1990s 
with the same claim, ‘L’histoire jugera’.25 Indeed, the court refused to judge history. Its 27 
September verdict found that Souaïdia’s claims were uttered in good faith and so rested 
well within the boundaries of French speech laws.26 A brief Algerian state radio broadcast 
simply noted that Nezzar’s evidence of slander had been ‘insufficient’.27 Nezzar opted not 
to pursue an appeal, claiming that the trial had served its purpose.28 Rather than 
reinvigorate internationalised efforts to establish a truth commission, the Nezzar-Souaïdia 
trial seemed only to reinforce the inveterate deadlock reached in the Qui tue? discourse at 
the height of the internationalised massacres crisis. Indeed, Samroui’s subsequent memoir 
(2003), though far more authoritative and penetrating than Souaïdia’s La sale guerre, had 
far less effect. The Paris court’s refusal to write Algerian history could be cited as a reason 
for the muted effects of the trial. Though one could also wonder whether or not the 
intervening events of 11 September 2001 played a role. Events so powerful as to 
reconfigure world politics likely had (de-)legitimising effects on particular narratives of the 
Algerian conflict as well (see chapter six).  
 
Looking beyond the failure to establish an international inquiry for Algeria, there were 
detectible layers of historical irony in the July 2002 proceedings. France, having 
dominated Algerian history for over 130 years, was being asked by the Algerian regime to 
co-author the darkest pages of its history since 1962. By coincidence, the hearings had 
ended on 5 July, forty years to the date when Algeria first celebrated independence. Nezzar 
                                                
25 Marie-Estelle Pech, ‘Fin, à Paris, du procès de Habib Souaïdia, qui avait dénoncé les 
«massacres» des militaires’, 6 July 2002. 
26 AFP, ‘French court dismisses Algerian defamation suit against author’, 27 September 2002. 
27 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ‘Algeria: Former Gen Khaled Nezzar loses “defamation 
case” before French court’, 27 September 2002. 
28 Libération, ‘Nezzar renonce à faire appel’, 10 October 2002: 9. 
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was calling upon the very state he had ‘fought’ against for independence to do what his 
state could not: effectively silence Souaïdia.29 Yet what was Souaïdia’s paramount crime? 
That he had denounced Nezzar and his high-ranking colleagues in the military command as 
corrupt, thieves, murders and cowards? Or was it the implicit comparison with Massu and 
Aussaresses, infamous in Algerian nationalist history for their use of torture during the war 
of independence? Indeed, Aussaresses had actually released an unrepentant memoir at 
roughly the same time as La sale guerre.30 As a collective of international and domestic 
actors were attempting to force Algeria to hold itself accountable for the 1990s, other 
actors were still waiting for France to hold itself accountable for the crimes it had 
committed during colonialism.31 But by hosting the Nezzar-Souaïdia trial, France was 
contributing to the slow decomposition of a nationalist narrative Nezzar and so many 
others had erected around themselves. If ever there was an exemplar of the conflicting 
meanings embedded in the term post-colonialism, the Nezzar-Souaïdia trial seemed it. 
Souaïdia, on the other hand, had become an avatar of abstract international representations 
of disillusioned Algerian youth turned cynical by their government; reared on stories of 
national glory against the French and the unquestioned good of the ALN, only to see, first 
hand, how the victims had become executioners. Yet whether or not any of this mattered to 
the majority of people in Algeria is unknown. It is suspected that several thousand had died 
in acts of armed violence between 2000 and 2002.32 As Algeria celebrated forty years of 
independence and a French prosecutor declared that only history will judge, a bomb placed 
in a pile of garbage in Larba killed some three dozen.33  
                                                
29 While Nezzar had ‘fought’ in the resistance against the French, his military career began in the 
French army. He defected to the FLN in 1958, nearly four years into the conflict, joining the 
Algerian Army of National Liberation on the borders outside of Algeria. Following independence, 
he pursued further military training in, among other places, France. 
30 The intertextual possibilities of this moment were indeed quite rich. In June 2000, a former 
female FLN guerrilla, Louisette Ighilahriz, accused Massu and others of physically and sexually 
torturing her over the course of several months (see Ighilahriz & Nivat 2001). While Massu seemed 
to have reconsidered the tactical utility of torture, Aussaresses doubled down, giving interviews 
and publishing a memoir (Aussaresses 2002) in which he defended such practices. Simultaneously 
tearing open others wounds, President Chirac asked for a national day to commemorate the French-
Algerians who had fought on the side of France during the war of independence. This request was 
apparently made two days before the publication of La sale guerre (Raphaelle Bacque, ‘Jacques 
Chirac demande une journée nationale d’hommage aux harkis’, Le Monde, 8 February 2001). The 
date was set of 25 September, which has since become an official day of rememberance (see Le 
Sueur 2005: 292-295, 318-319). 
31 Some, like Vidal-Naquet, straddled both camps.  
32 AFP, ‘Dix ans de violence en Algérie’, 9 January 2002 
33 Lara Marlowe, ‘Algeria a test case for war on terrorism’, Irish Times, 14 August 2002: 14. 
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Civil war as simulacrum 
 
History trailed closely behind the violence in 1990s Algeria. That is, attempts to 
understand the present conflict in Algeria frequently made reference to Algeria’s past. The 
problem of violence in Algeria was termed a problem of history. Algeria had become a 
victim of its history. Yet which history was holding Algeria hostage was subject to debate. 
Whether or not it could be termed ‘history’, the 1988-92 interregnum was often seen as 
holding the key to an efficient understanding the violence that followed. For others, the 
post-colonial period often functioned as the sole context in which to assemble an 
understanding of the violence. The entirety of French colonialism (1830-1962) was also a 
suspect, though older lineages — some dating back to the Ottoman presence — were also 
drawn into genealogies of Algerian violence. For others, however, it was the idiosyncrasies 
of the French-Algerian war that provided either a necessary or sufficient condition for the 
violence that came thirty years later.  
 
Possible intertextualities of the 1954-62 war and the conflict after January 1992 were not 
difficult to construct. Utterances of a ‘second Algerian war’34, a ‘new Algerian war’35 or a 
‘new battle of Algiers’36 were enough to evoke this lineage, even in its rejection, 
anticipation or ironic observation. The alleged return, appropriation and redeployment of 
Algeria’s particular vocabulary of repression and resistance could also form an initial 
                                                                                                                                              
The irony reportedly affected historian Mohamed Harbi so deeply that he had to leave the 
proceedings at one point (Simone Catherine, ‘La Mémoire Meurtrie de Mohammed Harbi’, Le 
Monde, 12 October 2002). 
34 e.g., Catherine Simon, ‘Psychose de guerre en Algérie’, Le Monde, 25 July 1994; Youssef 
Ibrahim, ‘As Toll Rises in Algeria’s War, a Dearth of News’, New York Times, 28 December 
1994: A3; Fouad Ajami, ‘France’s poisoned chalice’, US News and World Report, 9 January 1995: 
39;  Le Point, ‘Pourquoi les islamistes frappent en France’, 26 August 1995;Provost 1996; Martin 
Evans, ‘Not counter-insurgency but a full-scale war’, Independent, 25 June 1999: 7. 
35 e.g., Henri Tinq, ‘La crise algérienne et ses répercussions’, Le Monde, 10 August 1994; AFP, 
‘La presse parisienne et la nouvelle guerre d’Algérie’, 2 November 1994; Jacques de Barrin, ‘La 
guerre d’’lgérie franchit la Méditerranée’, Le Monde, 28 December 1994; Jacques Duquesne, 
‘Terrorisme: l’offensive des amateurs’, La Croix, 6 September 1995: 20; Le Point, ‘Chirac, la cote 
d’alerte’, 28 October 1995;Malti 1999. 
36 e.g., Pierre Taillefer, ‘La nouvelle «bataille d’Alger»’, AFP, 24 March 1993; Sud Ouest, ‘La 
nouvelle bataille d’Alger’, 3 June 1997; Julia Ficatier and Amine Kadi, ‘La nouvelle bataille 
d’Alger’, La Croix, 10 September 1997: 3; Étienne 1997. 
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aspect of such constructions.  The accusations and counter-accusations of torture and 
terrorism were only the tip of the iceberg allegedly linking the war of independence to 
1990s Algeria. There was the revival of the rebel maquis (underground, bush, guerrilla) 
and the government’s use of ratissage (combing operations) in urban and rural areas. 
There was new talk of the need ‘eradicate’ the armed groups, as there had been amongst 
those prosecuting the war against the FLN, coming from Algeria’s political elite and anti-
Islamist corners of the society. Insurgents allegedly expressed the inverse, characterising 
their opponents as pied noirs, a reference to the French colonials who were forced to flee 
en mass in 1962. The Moudjahidine of the FLN gave way to the Mujāhidīn of the armed 
Islamist groups. For historian Benjamin Stora, the danger of this vocabulary — the tension 
between ‘analogy’ and ‘mimicry’ — is clear enough. While there are important 
distinctions to be drawn between Algeria in 1957 and 1997, Stora (2001a: 232-3) 
nonetheless concluded that ‘The contemporaneous actors dress in theoretical garments 
borrowed from the past’. 
 
Other observers, however, felt that the relationship between Algeria’s past and present 
violence was than symbolism. The past is not merely a lexicon of contention and the 
present is not a simulation of the past; there are direct material links connecting colonial 
and post-colonial violence. For Malley (1996: 247), it was both: ‘without a doubt, the role 
of the war of national liberation is primary in this respect [i.e., ‘the ubiquity of violence in 
Algeria’s past’], as is the mythology it has spun’. For others, the relationship is one of 
simple cause and effect. As foreign governments contemplated what to do about the 
massacres in early 1998, two French intellectuals, Géze and Vidal-Naquet, argued that the 
problem in Algeria was not, as some their colleagues had suggested, Islam (e.g., Lévy and 
Glucksmann, see chapter seven), but rather ‘a long history of violence and vengeance that 
the [Algerian] military regime manipulates and maintains for its profit’. That history 
commences with the ‘unprecedented’ violence of French colonisation and carries through 
to the war of independence, where the French military’s manipulation of the insurgency 
inscribed itself into the culture of the Algerian nationalist movement. For Géze and Vidal-
Naquet, the internecine assassinations and fighting within the FLN and between the FLN 
and other groups, and the killing of thousands of Harkis in 1962 were all signs that this 
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tradition had been successfully grafted into the Algerian polity.37 Géze and Vidal-Naquet 
were not the first to propose this particular problematisation of Algeria’s violence, nor 
were they the last. This thesis — a kind of battered child (of colonialism) syndrome — 
found voice elsewhere, though other observers were not so willing to attribute the original 
sin to France alone. Even an Algerian informant backed this hypothesis of the violence, 
even if he was not willing to apportion blame as symmetrically as others. ‘Beheading and 
mutilation of women and children seem atrocious, they are atrocious’, a serving Algerian 
military officer told the London Times in late 1997, ‘but it is no more than a predictable 
evolution of violence in Algeria, seeded in our war with the French’.38  
 
Likewise rejecting the view that the problem and the solution to Algeria’s woes were 
entirely related to Islam, academic Lisa Anderson located the dynamics of violence in 
Algeria’s unique post-colonial condition: ‘The brutal tactics utilized by the Algerian 
regime and its opponents are the legacy of the singularly brutal war of independence from 
the French. Many of the techniques of modern torture and terrorism were perfected in the 
crucible of the Algerian revolution’. With the recent weakening of the Algerian state, 
Anderson argued, vendettas incurred during he war of independence were being pursued.39 
In this example, violent agency is shared by both sides — terrorism to the Algerians, 
torture to the French — but the violence itself seemingly comes from the war ex nihilio. 
Following Bentalha, a Canadian journalist argued, ‘The throat-slitting, disemboweling and 
beheading described by survivors of recent massacres have been seen before in Algeria. 
The war of independence from France in the late 1950s was marked by the same kind of 
unspeakable atrocities. And the massacre afterwards of thousands of “harkis,” or pro-
French collaborators, was also coldly barbarous’.40 Here the horror of 1990s is initially 
contextualised in an account of the French-Algerian war that lacks clear agency, though it 
is implied that, with France out of the picture, the Algerians are still capable of continuing 
the atrocities on their own.  
 
                                                
37 François Géze and Pierre Vidal-Naquet, ‘L’Algérie et les intellectuels français’, Le Monde, 4 
February 1998. 
38 Anthony Loyd, ‘Algerian terror victims plead for death by bullet’, The Times, 23 October 1997. 
39 Lisa Anderson, ‘Moderates on both sides of Algerian conflict may hold key to peace’, Boston 
Globe, 13 October 1997: A15.  
40 Aileen McCabe, ‘Algeria’s secret war leaves world feeling horrified, powerless’, Vancouver 
Sun, 26 September 1997: A12.  
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Historical allusions could frame Algeria as an exceptional space of violence where 
questions of agency were suspended in order to remark upon the continuity of practices or 
the agency of violence itself (see chapter six). Visiting Bentalha after the massacre, 
journalist Robert Fisk wrote about finding an Algerian history book in one of the 
victimised houses: ‘Several pages depicted the features of dead martyrs of the 1954-62 
independence war against France, their faces disfigured by bullets and shrapnel. How little 
Algeria’s suffering had changed’.41 Scholar and US media commentator Fouad Ajami, 
invoking Camus, summarised Algeria as a landscape of violence: the ‘second Algerian war 
has offered a vindication for Camus’s bleak vision’ from 1955 — ‘“Tomorrow Algeria will 
be a land of ruins and of corpses that no force, no power in the world, will be able to 
restore in our century”’.42 
 
A more specific problematisation of Algeria’s historical relationship to colonial violence 
proposed that the war of independence had seeded divisions and feuds that were revived in 
the turmoil of the 1990s. As noted in previous chapters, the vendetta theory of Algerian 
violence received significant attention from witnesses and participants in the killing. Chief 
among these hypotheses was the belief that much of the violence stemmed from the legacy 
of the Harkis, a term that has come to mean, generically, any French collaborator during 
the war of independence or, more specifically, native Muslim auxiliaries of the French 
army. Of the suspected 250,000 Algerians in this category, tens of thousands fled to France 
or were killed, often massacred, in 1962 as the war began to wind down (Horne 2002: 537-
8). Dormant, repressed and sublimated anger, whether harboured by Harkis and their 
children, or maintained against them by neighbours, became an alleged driver of the 
conflict in the 1990s according to some accounts. Algerian media dispatches frequently 
took note of the fact that captured or eliminated ‘terrorists’ were children of Harkis.43 In 
                                                
41 Robert Fisk, ‘Middle East: Stench of death in Algeria’s perfumed killing fields’, Independent, 23 
October 1997: 16.  
42 Fouad Ajami, ‘France’s poisoned chalice’, US News and World Report, 9 January 1995: 39. 
 See Albert Camus, ‘Lettre a un militant algérien’ (October 1955) in Actuelles III (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1958); Haddour (2000: 79-80) and Le Sueur (2005: 111-2). 
43 e.g., BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ‘Fifty-seven people arrested in Laghouat Province for 
helping “terrorist group”’, 8 May 1993 (Source: Republic of Algeria Radio, 6 May 1993);  BBC 
Summary of World Broadcasts, ‘Seventeen “terrorists” killed in central and eastern Algeria’, 6 
December 1993 (Source: Algerian TV, 4 December 1993); BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 
‘Seven “terrorists” killed; imam shot dead outside mosque’, 19 March 1994 (Source: Algerian 
radio, 17 March 1994); BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ‘Security forces “eliminate 27 
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his unsympathetic study of the Islamist rebellion, Boukra (2002: 134-5) likewise draws our 
attention to the alleged geographical coincidence between some of the most violent 
prefectures in the 1990s and those with the most Harkis participating in the insurgencies 
there. Even in cultural works this view has found expression. Mohammed Moulessehoul  
— i.e., Yasmina Khadra (1998) — provides a fictional account of a small town torn apart 
amidst the insurgency of the 1990s. This motive — a Harki family’s desire for revenge — 
is eventually exposed as an important component in the logic driving the local Islamist 
rebels to massacre their neighbours. 
 
Another framing saw the historical effects of the Harkis as more symbolic than material. 
Following the Raïs massacre, journalist José Garçon entertained the possibility that the 
mass killings were historically related to the massacres of the Harkis carried out at the end 
of the war of independence. However, the way in which these mass slaughters were 
related, Garçon speculated, was more like a reminiscence or simulation voiced through the 
appropriation of a particular vocabulary of de-legitimation deployed in the service of an 
endless cycle of revenge.44 An object or agent of violence did not necessarily have to be a 
Harki or a child of Harkis to be subject to the way in which the legacy of anti-colonial 
violence affected the Algerian nationalist imaginaire. Here Garçon seems to be borrowing 
from Grandguillaume, who, like many others, saw a more direct link between the 
massacres of 1997 and 1962: ‘Scores are being settled today whose origins lie in conflicts 
resulting from Algerian independence in 1962, such as the massacre of 60,000-100,000 
harkis that took place only months after independence’.45 Grandguillaume, however, did 
not present this as a totalising thesis of the violence; as noted chapter five, he also 
considered other possible dimensions. The lasting effects of French rule and violent 
decolonisation were only part of the story; another aspect was the fragmented (éclaté) 
nature of the Algerian nation from the times of the Ottoman Empire, a nation that could 
only express itself as the antithesis of French colonialism that had furnished its condition 
                                                                                                                                              
terrorists”’, 23 March 1994 (Source: Algerian TV, 21 March 1994); BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, ‘FLN activist assassinated in El Tarf’, 27 September 1994 (Source: Algerian radio, 25 
September 1994). 
44 José Garçon, ‘Quatre questions sur une tragédie’, Libération, 30 August 1997. 
45 Jean-Pierre Tuquoi, ‘Algeria’s horrific settling of scores’, Manchester Guardian Weekly, 14 
September 1997: 19 
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of possibility.46 The ultimate result being a society that, if not violent, is at least ‘hard’ 
(dure), in his opinion.47 As noted in previous chapters, Étienne agreed: ‘It’s more than a 
tradition. It’s an extraordinary culture of violence’. He likewise located the roots of 
Algerian violence in an epoch predating French colonisation, during the Ottoman period.48 
For British scholar George Joffé (2002: 29-30), one of Algeria’s most dedicated foreign 
observers, the important point of this ‘tradition’ is its utility maximising logic: ‘the 
development of violence after 1992 [...] is legitimised within demotic culture by a tradition 
of the use of violence as a legitimate means of acquiring economic resources that goes 
back to pre-colonial days’.  
 
In all these cases, a relationship between historical violence and contemporary violence is 
assumed to exist, and so the differences lie in, on the one hand, where violence is located 
in space and time, and, on the other, their implicit theories of agency. The kind of 
problematisation advanced by Géze and Vidal-Naquet, whether intentional or not, easily 
lends itself to an interventionary politics in which French guilt is mobilised in the name of 
addressing a historical wrong that produced atrocities. More to the point, it is not just that 
the French are morally wed to Algeria but that France is directly responsible for the 
violence that is taking place. Those arguments arguing for an older Algerian linage of 
violence, however, problematised the violence in an entirely different way, one that could 
either support a policy of apathy, non-interference or active support for the government 
and secular civil society. A more ambiguous problematisation, in terms of its practical 
consequents, arises when violent practices in Algeria are represented as a kind of country 
specific reservoir of symbolic resources or, in a more perfomative sense, ‘repertoires of 
contention’ (Tilly 2003) that constrain the limits of the think-able and do-able in Algerian 
conflict, whether as non-violent politics or violent revolution. In such a case, it might seem 
that we are tilting towards a thesis of a ‘culture of violence’; but, as seen above and will be 
seen below, the idea of an Algerian culture of violence was always demonstrated through 
the production of an Algerian history of violence. 
                                                
46 Jean-Christophe Ploquin, ‘«Alger se protège mais ne protège pas la société»’, La Croix, 2 
September 1997: 5. 
47 Jean-Pierre Tuqoi, ‘Algérie : l’histoire est partie prenante dans la violence d’aujourd’hui’, Le 
Monde, 5 September 1997. 
48 Laure Mandeville, ‘Bruno Étienne : «Ce sont les généraux qui se déchirent»’, Le Figaro, 30 août 
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Minimally, we can say that historicisation becomes problematic when it is asserted post 
hoc with no supplementation. Making the case for truth commissions and national 
reconciliation after mass violence, philosopher Tzvetan Todorov based their necessity on 
the fact that 
 
Once violence is introduced into history, it continues to exercise its malevolent effects 
for decades, and even for centuries. Hitler’s misdeeds continue to hurt people today, 
just as the cruelties of the Boer War continued to influence those of the apartheid 
regime; and the violence of the colonial war in Algeria in the 1950s explains in part the 
recent massacres in that country.49 
 
In cases such as this, a history of violence becomes the deus ex machina of Algeria’s 
conflict in the 1990s. Yet even when historicisation moves from mere speech act to actual 
argument, an important first step — explicating the vectors of historical circulation — is 
rarely taken. Scholars who have addressed this problem more seriously do cite various 
pathways of transmission. Algerian historian Hassan Remaoun (1997) is not only critical 
of the Algerian educational system’s role in the reproduction of violence, but the entire 
‘socialisation process’ in Algeria: ‘a memory of violence which, sacralized and never yet 
demystified, has been integrated through the socialization process to an extent that it 
appears to constitute part of the “habitus” of Algerians’  (Remaoun 2000: 41-2; quoted in 
McDougall 2006b: 62; see also Carlier 2002). Stora (2001a: 233) likewise portions some 
of the blame for the violence in the 1990s to the post-colonial Algerian educational system 
and its valorisation of anti-colonial violence. Algerian historian and archivist Fouad Soufi 
(1997) highlights the role of the media in the creation of these memories that helped 
provide the conditions for the violence of the 1990s. The problem with these historically 
informed accounts of Algeria’s recent violence is their failure to present us with more than 
a rhetorical tautology. In other words, the same thing (the historical roots of Algerian 
violence) has been described twice, even if the second time has been more thickly detailed 
than the first. The mere coincidence of similar patterns of behaviour and adapted 
vocabularies of contention does not prove causation as claimed.  
                                                
49 Tzvetan Todorov, ‘In Search of Lost Crime: Tribunals, apologies, reparations, and the search for 
justice’, The New Republic, 29 January 2001. 
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Violent imaginations 
 
For those supporting the view that Algerian violence was rooted in the colonial experience, 
the dominant assumption seems to be that Algerians were, individually, collectively or 
holistically, a blank slate on which the violence of French imperialism could easily imprint 
itself. The colonial subject, in this case, is the passive vessel of foreign domination. 
Certainly, if the war of independence is our year zero, then perhaps a hypothesis can be 
constructed; but if we assume that the genealogy of Algerian violence stretches two to 
several centuries into the past, then our understanding seems woefully inadequate unless 
we view Algerian violence as a material force that transcends agency and is capable of 
transmitting itself across time — what would be called, in other contexts, structural 
determinism. Culture is often conceptualised as the kind of structure that is capable of 
performing such feats of reproduction. The idea that Algerian society or culture had 
become inherently violent, for whatever historical reason, was also present within the 
explanations of the conflict and the massacres. Egyptian-American sociologist Dr Saad 
Eddin Ibrahim attempted to explain the more intense Islamist insurgency in Algeria versus 
the concurrent one in Egypt in terms of his native country’s ‘higher level of civility’. Yet 
the roots of Algeria’s violent tendencies were nonetheless located in the war of 
independence: ‘I mean we have a tradition of settling conflicts peacefully and respecting 
the rights of others’, he explained. ‘In Algeria, there is a belief stemming from the (1954-
1962) war of independence that force is a way to solve problems’.50 A former Egyptian 
ambassador to Algeria agreed. Algerians ‘are good-hearted, but even in their daily dealings 
they are harsh, tough, devoid of the softer ways of a civilised people. This is mainly 
because of the hardship they endured at the hands of the French’.51 British journalist Ian 
Aitken, recalling his visit to Algiers in 1961, warned his government that the roots of the 
‘inexplicable slaughter’ in Algeria (that the then EU presidency in London was ‘vainly 
trying to unravel’) had been seared into that nation during the war of independence. At 
                                                
50 Lara Marlowe, ‘Why once similar conflicts in Egypt and Algeria now differ’, Irish Times, 17 
March 1997: 13. 
51 Lara Marlowe, ‘Why once similar conflicts in Egypt and Algeria now differ’, Irish Times, 17 
March 1997: 13. 
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best, Aitken believed, hopeless Algeria could serve as a cautionary tale to other warring 
groups — particularly in Northern Ireland — of what their society might become.52 
European MP Cohn-Bendit was more optimistic about Algeria’s prognosis but nonetheless 
shared a similar, though somewhat more historically ambiguous, diagnosis: ‘if we want to 
stop the culture of violence, we need to replace the culture of violence with a long tradition 
in Algeria by a culture of democracy and state of law’.53 
 
Of these various attempts to historicise Algeria’s unique cultural valorisation of violence, 
Luis Martinez’s concept of an ‘imaginaire de la guerre’54 stands out as one of the most 
concerted yet controversial attempts to provide such a hypothesis. His imaginaire de la 
guerre proposes that ‘war is a method of accumulating wealth and prestige and is, for that 
reason, constantly being readapted by the participants in the conflict’ (ibid.: 9). The 
danger, as critics have alleged, is that Martinez’s concept is ‘cultural-essentialist’ (Roberts 
1999: 388-9; Werenfels 2007: 128-9). Roberts equates Martinez’s imaginaire de la guerre 
to a kind of Orientalism that sees Arabs and Muslims as harbouring higher propensities 
towards violence than other cultural or religious groups. Whether or not this is a fair 
reading of Martinez’s hypothesis (see below), there is an entirely different way in which it 
is cause for concern. The warrant Martinez constructs to summon his hypothesis of an 
imaginaire de la guerre is weak and ambiguous. 
 
In his study of the armed conflict in Algeria, mainly the years prior to the massacres, 
Martinez puts forward the imaginaire de la guerre to compensate for the alleged 
insufficiencies of alternative accounts of the war’s causes. He identifies these as 
                                                
52 Ian Aitken, ‘I’ve seen the killing game’, Guardian, 22 January 1998: 19. 
53 Sarah Chayes and Linda Wertheimer, ‘EU Mission to Algeria Frustrated’, All Things 
Considered, US National Public Radio, 20 January 1998, transcript. See chapter seven for 
background on Cohn-Bendit’s intervention into the Algerian field. 
54 In the English translation of Martinez’s study, imaginaire de la guerre has been rendered ‘war-
oriented imaginaire’. The translator suggests that imaginaire is similar to the English term world-
view or the German Weltanschauung, though the option of ‘ideology’ is not offered (Martinez 
2000a: 1). Ideology (i.e., ‘an ideology of war’), however, might be problematic because of certain 
meanings, particularly specific Cold War usages (e.g., Soviet ideology, Western ideology) that 
have clouded the term. Theorists have suggestion a neologism, ‘ideational’, to replace ideology for 
this reason and others. Certainly, Martinez is talking about something ideational but an ‘idea of 
war’ does not seem to hit the mark. As imaginaire, in its most basic sense, literally means 
imaginary in English, a ‘war imaginary’ is obviously confusing. Here I will leave the phrase in 
French though I think it is sufficient to translate it as simply ‘war imaginaire’ or ‘imaginaire of 
war’ rather than war-oriented imaginaire.  
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hypotheses that locate the conditions of violence either in the socio-economic ‘crisis’ (his 
quotes) of the 1980s or in the failure of Algeria’s imported state. In what could be seen as 
an indirect refutation of the econometric literature on civil wars discussed in chapter three, 
Martinez (2000a: 2-7) argues that economic conditions and social unrest were already 
prevalent before the 1985-6 collapse in global hydrocarbon prices or even the installation 
of Bendjedid as President in 1979. In a sense, Martinez is not just explicitly deconstructing 
the ‘myth of the Black Decade’, defined as 1979-91, but also another myth, the myth of 
Algeria’s golden age under Boumedienne in the 1970s. However, the way in which 
Martinez attempts to undermine this hypothesis is based upon a false comparison. He 
initially considers (citing only one study) a dynamic indicator: Algeria’s nearly consistent 
per capita GDP growth following independence through the mid 1980s. To refute this, 
Martinez examines a static indicator: inequality and unemployment levels at the end of the 
Boumedienne period. For Martinez, this latter observation suggests that there was as much 
reason for social crisis in 1978 as there was ten years later, and so economic factors alone 
cannot explain Islamist mobilisation and thus cannot explain the outbreak of conflict. 
Martinez, in fact, notes one of the proposed mechanisms that translate such factors into 
revolutionary crisis: a sudden reversal of mass expectations (i.e., Davies 1962). Davies’ 
hypothesis is unsupported by static indicators from the late 1970s but suggested by 
dynamic ones, like the precipitous drop in GDP after 1986, which was followed by 
significant increases in unemployment and the gutting of the Algerian middle class (see 
chapter three). Ultimately, Martinez’s attitude seems ambiguous and possibly confused; it 
is unclear whether or not he is criticising efforts to posit economic conditions as either the 
sole cause of the violence or merely a contributing factor. Of those who support a rigorous 
economic approach to the causes of civil war, very few, if any, would hypothesise poverty 
and inequality as totally sufficient conditions for mass violence; otherwise, the 
phenomenon would be a lot more prevalent globally.55 The point, however, in highlighting 
this possible contradiction in Martinez’s argument against economic determinism is mainly 
to demonstrate the weakness of the warrant Martinez has written for his imaginaire de la 
guerre in the first place. 
                                                
55 The same goes for Martinez’s approach to population growth; he claims a ‘demographic crisis’ 
but dismisses it as a sole cause without ever explicating how it could nonetheless function as a 
contributing factor (see chapter three on how demographics and intra-national armed conflict are 
often articulated). 
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A dissection of the arguments for Algeria’s failed ‘imitation’ state forms the other aspect 
of Martinez’s warrant for a new hypothesis. Here Martinez is addressing the claim that the 
armed conflict in 1990s can be understood in terms of independent Algeria’s failure to 
emulate effectively the modern European model of a nation state. Counter to the French 
academic literature on the ‘imported state’ (e.g., Badie 1992; Badie 2000), which has clear 
echoes with the work on quasi-states (Jackson 1993) and failed states (Ghani & Lockhart 
2008), the Algerian case specifically has been presented, according to Martinez, as a 
failure to overcome older modes of governance — precisely, the beylicate of the Ottoman 
period. Martinez rejects this view by claiming to the contrary that the Algerian civil war is 
a war of state building (à la Tilly 1985) rather than — to borrow from Mary Kaldor (2007) 
— a ‘war of state unmaking’. One might first dispute whether or not this observation is 
consistent with the more radical proclamations and acts attributed to the GIA, which often 
seemed particularly illiberal — that is, anti-Liberal — in their vocabulary, intent and 
execution. Secondly, and more importantly, Martinez has, once again, erected a scarecrow 
argument whose ultimate purpose is to convince us that his ideational option — the 
imaginaire de la guerre — is necessary. There were certainly many more hypotheses 
available than the two Martinez poses, and so there is actually little reason to think that we 
have arrived at the imaginaire de la guerre because we have exhausted all other options. 
  
Though he is frequently criticised for espousing a kind of essentialism, Martinez seems to 
suggest that he is arguing against a cultural reductionism that posits Islam(ism) as the 
principal or overriding condition for the violence. Martinez (2000a: 8-9) rejects the idea of 
a general Islamic imaginaire driving the armed conflict and instead opts for one that is 
specifically Algerian. The problem with his argument here is that he also establishes 
another weak and awkwardly framed foil in the voice of Grandguillaume. In early 1995, 
Grandguillaume noted that Islamism had assumed a dominant position within the debates 
surrounding Algeria’s violence. From this point, Martinez launches into his argument 
against development-based approaches by falsely claiming that Algerian Islamism is 
always framed as an effect of social, economic and political-structural factors.56 This latter 
claim is certainly not given. Some observers, irrespective or oblivious to the socio-
                                                
56 A missing step in the argument might be the claim that the socio-economic crisis provoked 
political attitudes to become more sympathetic to the program of Algerian Islamists. 
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economic and political context, were willing to blame Islam(ism) entirely; others used 
those exact socio-economic and political contexts to argue that Islam(ism) was not a salient 
factor at all. For his part, Grandguillaume’s (1995) introductory essay (see Grandguillaume 
1998) makes it quite clear that the problem is not Islamism but in thinking it is the 
problem. What is also unsettling are the shifting targets of explanation. In the original 
French version, Martinez deploys Grandguillaume’s observation in the context of 
explaining the outbreak of civil war vis-à-vis images of Algeria as a model of development 
in the 1970s and an exemplar of pluralism in the late 1980s. In the English translation, 
however, the context is revised to address the question of the 1997 Mitidja massacres.57  
 
When we take Martinez’s hypothesis seriously and unpack its assumptions, another avenue 
of critique becomes available. First of all, Martinez’s decisive factor is framed in the same 
way that he frames Algeria’s economic crisis — that is, statically. If the imaginaire de la 
guerre holds in all places and at all times in Algeria, then what factors prevented the 
outbreak of mass violence for thirty years after independence and during extended periods 
of French colonialism?58 Unfortunately, Martinez has likewise rendered socio-economic 
and political (i.e., state building) factors static and negligible respectively. There is no 
accounting for the dynamics or mechanisms that provide proximate causation apart from 
the regime’s ‘choice of civil war’, which was ‘made by the military leadership in January 
1992’ (Martinez 2000a: 16). This, however, brings us to another point: the circularity of 
the argument. Martinez (2000a: 16) then suggests, ‘The outbreak of the civil war can thus 
be seen as a socio-economic operation aimed at encouraging accumulation of wealth’. In 
attempting to understand how the violent conflict in Algeria emerged, the question is not 
so much whether people and groups see violence as a means to advance their personal or 
collective ambitions (which seems given in any armed conflict) but under what conditions 
can such an attitude flourish. For Martinez, they are one and the same. The imaginaire de 
la guerre is co-constitutive of the conditions where an imaginaire de la guerre can 
operationalise itself. Martinez, like many other observers (see chapter six), assumes that 
the general causes of the armed conflict, the conditions that perpetuated it and, ultimately, 
                                                
57 This significant revision of the text and the deletion of Martinez’s (1998: 12-6) argument in 
support of naming the Algerian conflict a civil war — another aspect of his argument that drew 
attention (see chapter four) are not explained by the translator. 
58 Quandt Quandt 1998: 98-9 raised a similar point vis-à-vis generic attempts to locate the source of 
Algerian violence in culture. 
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precipitated atrocities like the massacres are one and the same. But whether or not his 
imaginaire de la guerre can account for all acts of violence is assumed by default; it 
cannot be demonstrated by his extensive textual research and sociological fieldwork 
because it is already present a priori. As such, it is indicative of a totalising structuralism 
that sees all instances of violence as a manifestation of a single logic.  
 
Moreover, it is debateable whether or not Martinez’s imaginaire de la guerre even departs 
from prevailing theories of human behaviour regularly deployed in the social sciences 
under the rubric of rational choice theory. The imaginaire de la guerre is not all that 
different from the Machiavelli Theorem — ‘no profitable opportunity for violence would 
go unused’ (Collier et al. 2008: 3)  — that forms a central aspect to contemporary 
Neoliberal studies of civil war (see chapter three). In other words, what Martinez so 
controversially attributes to Algerian generals and GIA Amīrs specifically, other social 
scientists routinely attribute to humans generally. Rather than an expression of 
Orientalism, as Roberts maintained, Martinez’s hypothesis seems, whether intentional or 
not, Occidenalist as well. And yet, unlike rational choice, which is an abstract theory of 
generalised human behaviour, Algeria’s alleged imaginaire de la guerre seemingly only 
applies to elite (male) protagonists that choose to use violence to mediate conflicts, to 
enhance their prestige and to garner wealth. Martinez then goes looking for his imaginaire 
de la guerre amongst those whom he already assumes operate under its dictates. 
Martinez’s hypothesis not only has a tenuous warrant, but it lacks the basic scientific 
criterion of falsifiability.  
 
Lastly, it is worth considering whether or not Martinez’s reading of Algerian history is 
equally problematic. Throughout this chapter, we have been looking at various ways in 
which history has been deployed in the explanation of Algeria’s violence in the 1990s. To 
a lesser extent, culture has been another object of analysis here; yet the direct and indirect 
ways in which culture has been framed as an artefact of history (always-already) leads us 
back again to the question of historicisations of violence. Central to Algeria’s supposed 
imaginaire de la guerre is the construction of a lineage of rebellious historical figures — 
Ottoman corsairs, colonial Qāʾids, anti-colonial Moudjahidine, Islamist Amīrs of the 1990s 
insurgency — that variously form the actuating thesis, antithesis and synthesis of Algeria’s 
violent history. Yet for historian James McDougall (2005: 119), this constellation is only 
 263 
possible through a reading of Algerian history — or, more precisely, a writing of Algerian 
history — that extracts the temporally specific logics and contexts from each epoch to 
formulate continuity. Though history certainly provides sufficient discursive resources in 
the efforts to (de)legitimate rebellion and repression, particularly the war of independence 
(ibid.: 125), McDougall believes that ‘the instinctive reiteration of culturally entrenched 
patterns of political behaviour’ (ibid.: 128) is not a given in Algerian history. That is, a 
condition of possibility for the imaginaire de la guerre is its inscription into Algerian 
history first. To borrow from historian Benedict Anderson’s (1991: 205) 
thesis regarding the counter-temporal processes of national narration, the true origin of 
Algeria’s history of violence is the violence of the 1990s. Perhaps no other observation 
highlights the contingency, rather than historical inevitability, of Algeria’s recent violence.  
 
 
Conclusion: Historicisation and/as problematisation 
 
One massacre that featured within the international response to the violence in 1990s 
Algeria, but has so far not been mentioned, occurred on a small hilltop settlement on the 
southern side of the Kabylia range. Reports indicated that the victims were brutally killed 
with guns, knives and other rudimentary implements. The International Herald Tribune 
carried a dispatch from Algiers claiming that 302 had been slaughtered, almost all the men 
in the village. It also read, ‘In one house 35 bodies were piled on one another. It was the 
bloodiest single incident that observers here can ever recall in the modern history of 
Algeria’.59 Officials denounced the attack as a ‘nameless massacre’. The raid appeared to 
be the result of insurgent rivalries and the counter-mobilisation of the population into an 
armed militia by the authorities. What set this apart from the other major massacres of the 
late 1990s was the fact that it had occurred roughly forty years earlier. 
 
As the intensity and frequency of massacres increased in late 1996, the voices with the 
international gallery sometimes made reference to the late May 1957 events in Mélouza.60 
Rejecting the claim that the violence in early 1997 Algeria was unprecedented, French 
                                                
59 International Herald Tribune, ‘1957: Arabs Slaughtered’, 1 June 2007: 2. 
60 For background, see Stora (2001a: 59), Horne (2002: 221) and Ruedy (2005: 164); ‘officials’ 
quoted in Feraoun (2000: 211). 
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journalist Claude Jacquemart pointed to Mélouza as a prime example of how the ‘methods’ 
of resistance have not changed.61 In October 1997, French politician and pied noir Pierre 
Pasquini expressed the frustration others felt in the face the ongoing Algeria massacres. He 
nonetheless believed they could not feign ignorance given the Maghrib’s ‘traditional forms 
of cruelty’, as had been expressed by Algerians in such episodes as Mélouza.62 For Vidal-
Naquet and Géze, Mélouza was significant but for different reasons. Writing in early 1998, 
they felt the ‘war within the war’ of independence — fighting between the FLN and rivals 
— had been the outcome of a French tradition of violent repression coupled with the 
sowing division and strife amongst the nationalist groups. For Géze and Vidal-Naquet, the 
massacres just witnessed in Algeria, like the massacre of Mélouza and, before that, the 
massacres of Guelma and Sétif in 1945 — where hundreds, if not thousands, of Algerians 
were slaughtered by French settlers — were the natural outcome of French colonialism.63 
For scholar Omar Carlier (1998: 148), Mélouza functioned as another reminder that the 
extremes of violence attributed to the GIA went far beyond atrocities attributed to the FLN 
during the war of independence.  
 
Nearing the end of the bloody decade in Algeria, anthropologist Tassadit Yacine (1999: 
24) asked, ‘How can one study the kinds of violence that Algeria is enduring without 
taking history into account?’ Certainly, the account provided by Martinez has provoked 
justified scepticism and is in desperate need of supplementation to revive itself. And yet 
some of those who criticise Martinez’s hypothesis, or similar reductionist/essentialist 
approaches, nonetheless feel that we cannot make the mistake of ‘throwing out the baby 
with the bathwater’ (Werenfels 2007: 128). For Quandt (1998: 99), this means rejecting the 
idea ‘that Algerians have cultural values that predispose them to violence’ while accepting 
the possibility ‘that the political violence of today may have deeper and more shadowy 
roots than is often suspected’.  After all, without historical context, how can we make 
sense of Belhadj’s claim in 1989 that the 1954 jihād must continue (in Evans & Phillips 
2008: 151)? Or when the Algerian government tells Human Rights Watch that the problem 
of three thousand disappeared in the 1990s pales in comparison to the fifty thousand 
                                                
61 Claude Jacquemart, ‘Massacres en Algérie’, Le Figaro, 9 April 1997. 
62 Pierre Pasquini, ‘Des contraintes paralysent la France’, Le Figaro, 1 October 1997. 
63 François Géze and Pierre Vidal-Naquet, ‘L’Algérie et les intellectuels français’, Le Monde, 4 
February 1998. 
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Algerians that allegedly disappeared during the war of independence (see Human Rights 
Watch 2001)? Without history, how can we make sense of the striking parallels between 
torture methods used by the French during the war of independence and the torture 
methods allegedly used by the Algerian security forces during the 1990s?64 Or when 
knowledge gained during the war of independence was redeployed three decades later for 
guerrilla and counter-insurgency purposes?65 History — like identity, as Stuart Hall has 
alleged (see chapter six) — seems inherently problematic yet unavoidable and 
indispensable when addressing mass violence. 
 
In the case of Algeria in the 1990s, the role of history in the conflict has been framed in 
several ways: as context, as causality, as comparison, as prophecy. In this chapter we have 
seen the various ways in which these approaches are all insufficient. Though more than 
any other, the prophetic mode of interpreting the relationship between history and violence 
in Algeria — the ‘doomed to repeat’ school — has provoked strong reactions. ‘It is 
important to insist that the new war in Algeria was not dictated by some inflexible, 
metahistorical fate’, contends McDougall. Yet the basis on which McDougall contests this 
approach is rooted in historiography; the problem is not Algerian history or historicisation 
per se, but rather the ways in which histories have been constructed and mobilised. But 
                                                
64 The intimate links between colonial, anti-colonial and post-colonial violent practices in Algeria 
were alluded to in a 1997 interview with a former Algerian commando. Describing the ‘killing 
room’ where he tortured suspected insurgents and sympathizers, it was reported that ‘Some 
prisoners were sodomised with bottles, a method used by the French during the 1954-1962 
Algerian war of independence. The chiffon or rag, another French torture in which the victim is 
forced to swallow salty or soapy water, acid or his own urine, was also used’ (Lara Marlow, ‘Ex-
army conscript saw colleagues torturing and murdering villagers’, Irish Times, 30 October 1997: 
9). 
 Rendering the intelligibility of Algerian violence is not the sole use for Algerian history; 
recently it has also been put to good use in the enhancement of imperial capacity. As noted at the 
outset of chapter five, 11 September 2001 allowed Algeria’s conflict in the 1990s to be recast as an 
example of how to fight a ‘war on terror’ by participants in the fighting and others looking for 
precedent. And when the 2003 US occupation of Iraq went sour, we were all advised to revisit in 
Gilo Pontecorvo’s film La battaglia di Algeri (1966) and read Alistair Horne’s A Savage War of 
Peace (republished by New York Review Books in 2006). Even when construed as an academic 
study of a democracy-insurgency problematique (e.g., Merom 2003), it is difficult not to construct 
an ironic reading of the effort to derive normative imperial lessons from one of the twentieth 
century’s most infamous wars of decolonisation (Lazreg 2008; Kemp 2008). 
65 For example, a January 1998 profile of militia leader Hadj Fergane, the mayor of Relizane who 
would soon face (and be acquitted of) serious charges several months later (see chapter five), 
emphasised the fact that Fergan had not only survived the war of independence but he had put that 
knowledge to good use in his fight against the AIS and the GIA (Le Point, ‘Algérie : Voyage au 
bout de l’horreur’, 17 January 1998). 
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perhaps the problem is not that Algerian violence has been over-determined by readings 
that have accentuated its history. An allegation of over-determination implies the 
possibility of proper or adequate levels of determination. The problem, rather, is history — 
or, to be more precise, historicisation. A productive silence within the historical 
problematisations of Algeria’s violence in the 1990s has been the lack of any indication 
that this very practice is problematic in the first place.  Historicisation is never able to 
imagine a world in which it is not operating, whether in the background (in the genealogy 
of our concepts) or in the foreground (as an explicit means of understanding). The fact that 
we cannot think outside history is as much an argument for engagement with it as it is a 
case for its danger in Foucault’s (1984: 343) sense. In this way, we can begin to 
problematise historicisation — as with all problematisations discussed in this study — not 
as a process that is forever contaminated by partisanship but as a rendering that requires 
more ironic vigilance. 
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9. Conclusion 
 
 
 
History, intervention and irony 
 
My residence in Algiers was a short walk from place Addis Ababa, a roundabout midway 
between downtown and Bir Mourad Raïs. The Algerian government’s human rights 
monitoring body, the CNCPPDH, is located there in a gorgeous Moorish building bathed 
in whitewash, perched overlooking the bay of Algiers. Every Wednesday — or what 
seemed like every Wednesday — a handful of women, and sometimes a few men, would 
hold silent vigil in front of that building. Some carried sheets of paper with enlarged 
identity photos printed on them; sometimes there was a sign in Arabic or French. These are 
Algeria’s Madres de Plaza de Mayo. Yet unlike their Argentine counterparts, Algeria’s 
mothers of the disappeared, so far, have been denied the right to know what happened to 
their children. The Algerian government acknowledges that it was responsible for 
disappearing some eight thousand of them and has offered compensation.1 But for many 
other Algerians, like the victims of armed groups who seek the support services of the 
independent organisation Jazāʾirunā (‘Our Algeria’) in Blida, the government has refused 
to compensate them for their loss and suffering. Just as many Algerians feel a lack closure 
surrounding their experiences from the 1990s, I feel ambivalent concluding this study. 
Many of the issues raised here are very much live issues. Perhaps there is no stronger 
indication of this than the formal and informal efforts to censor those who wish to discuss 
them openly in Algeria and abroad.2  
 
To the many appellations affixed to the violence in Algeria since 1992, the title guerre 
sans fin is perhaps as fitting as any other. Not solely because of the persistence of violence, 
though that is part of the argument, but given the lack of any event signalling a formal end 
                                                
1 Adlène Meddi, ‘Gouvernement - familles des disparus : La rupture’, El Watan, 26 March 2010: 
available at http://www.algeria-watch.org/fr/mrv/mrvdisp/gouvernement_familles_rupture.htm, 
accessed October 2010. 
2 This includes the ‘amnesia’ provisions in the 2005 Charte (i.e., the provisions barring critical 
discussion of state actions during the ‘national tragedy’) and even more recent examples (e.g., the 
11 August 2010 demonstration of Algeria’s mothers of the disappeared was violently disrupted by 
government security forces). 
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to hostilities. No comprehensive peace agreement, no United Nations supervised 
handshake between rebels and incumbents with the diplomatic corps looking on, no 
proposals to share power under a signed treaty, no symbolic burning of arms, no 
monuments to the losses on either side, no days of remembrance. Just as chapter three 
explored the slow and ambiguous evolution of armed fighting, chapter eight noted the 
tortuous denouement of violence in Algeria over the past decade. Perhaps such is the 
nature of mass violence though. Is it ever concluded definitively? Even the best efforts to 
end decades of suffering and strife have produced mixed results. South Africa’s Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission was by far the most thorough, transparent, robust and 
participatory experiment in transitional justice the world has ever seen. Yet whether or not 
it has succeeded in its goal of ‘restoring’ the nation is still up for grabs. Though Apartheid 
no longer exists on paper, social inequality, along with other disturbing social and 
economic indicators (e.g., rates of HIV infection), is amongst the worst in the world. Some 
critics of South Africa’s experiment with national reconciliation allege that the 
Commission and its revered legacy have only served to mask a transition from de jure to 
de facto Apartheid (see Klein 2007: 194-217). The effects of Algeria’s experiments with 
national reconciliation — the 1999 Concorde and the 2005 Charte — have likewise proven 
difficult to read. While the killing has sharply decreased since January 1998, the impact of 
the government’s formal peacemaking efforts seems equivocal, given the persistence of 
lower levels of armed violence and the return to a political situation that has been 
interpreted as a virtual status quo ante (Roberts 2007). The parallel decline in violence and 
the increase in global hydrocarbon prices is only one hint among many that Algeria’s 
formal reconciliation measures might not deserve too much credit. 
 
Within the scope of this study, the idea of a guerre sans fin is also provocative when we 
consider the extent to which wars continue to be waged on different terrains once the 
violence stops. Ending this study on the theme of history served a dual purpose. It was not 
intended to stand as an act of closure, to say that politiography should now be handed off 
to historiography. If we accept Foucault’s ‘inversion’ of Clausewitz  (i.e., politics is war by 
other means), then history also becomes recruited into, as it was from the beginning, 
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Algeria’s guerre sans fin.3 The primary objective of chapter eight was to highlight the 
problematic features of efforts to ground the logic of Algeria’s violence in either 
representations of Algeria’s history or the putative cultural effects of past violence. The 
secondary object was to underscore the extent to which history, and not just politics, will 
become an important terrain of struggle in the efforts to come to terms with the violence 
that tore apart Algeria in the 1990s while pushing the intellectual and moral capacities of 
the international community beyond their apparent limits. Of course politics does not 
instantly yield to history once the fighting stops, nor is it ever clear that the distinction 
between the two is salient. The intersection and interplay of politics and history in post-
conflict environments is evident enough in the continuing efforts to hold accountable key 
actors long after the violence has subsided. As I am writing this conclusion, it has recently 
been reported that Argentina began prosecuting its former dictators Jorge Rafael Videla 
and Reynaldo Bignone and has just sentenced eleven prison officials for crimes (including 
torture and murder) committed during the 1973-83 dictatorship. Brazil’s Minister of 
Human Rights recently voiced support for the repeal of a 1979 amnesty law covering state 
abuses during the 1964-85 dictatorship (including torture and disappearance) and the 
country’s top federal prosecutor asked the government to offer an official apology for the 
crimes it committed during that period. A special Cambodian court indicted four leading 
officials of the Khmer Rouge regime for crimes against humanity and increased the 
sentenced for one official to life imprisonment for his actions during the genocide (1975-
79). South Africa began considering an additional 149 cases of pardon for crimes 
committed during Apartheid (1948-94) not addressed by the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission. And, as noted in the previous chapter, internal and external investigations 
have been launched into crimes committed during the Franco regime in a direct challenge 
to Spain’s 1977 amnesty laws.4 This is not to suggest that justice will necessarily catch up 
with those Algerian state agents, insurgents and private actors who committed grave 
crimes against humanity in the 1990s. It is simply to note that, when it comes to mass 
                                                
3 Foucault (2003: 47-8) actually claimed that Calusewitz’s dictum (‘war is no more than a 
continuation of politics’) was itself a conscious inversion of ‘a sort of thesis [‘Politics is the 
continuation of war by other means’] that had been in circulation since the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries and which was both diffuse and specific’. 
4 See International Center for Transitional Justice, ICTJ Transitions, October 2010: 4-7; 
International Center for Transitional Justice, ICTJ Transitions, November 2010: 4-6. 
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atrocities and trauma, the historical arc of national reconciliation is often more oblique than 
contemporary political developments in Algeria otherwise suggest. 
 
The nexus of history and politics, as chapter eight suggested, is vividly illustrated in the 
legacy of French colonialism and the war of independence, both a source for strong 
feelings on either side of the Atlantic to date. Which is to say that the interchange of 
history and politics vis-à-vis the violence of the 1990s is now complicated by its 
interlocking relationship to similar yet older demands for recognition stemming from 
French colonialism and the war of independence.5 Such was clear in the words of the 
Algerian official noted in chapter eight, the one who dismissed Human Rights Watch’s 
concern about the disappeared of the 1990s given the fact that those unaccounted for after 
the war of independence figure an order of magnitude higher. Or when Bouteflika alleged 
‘The Truth Commission would be justified in a relationship of colonizer to colonized, such 
as France to Algeria’. Putting aside the cynicism such official juxtapositions might 
provoke, there is an important point being raised in all these assertions. In more nuanced 
terms, McDougall (2010: 47) has observed, 
 
In the making of social memory [...], ‘history’ is a register of concurrent claims to 
legitimacy and denunciation. Hence the narration of the crisis of the 1990s, and its 
significance in the longer span of Algerian history, especially, of course, relative to the 
war of independence and its fragmented inheritances, plays out a reiterated 
preoccupation with (private or partisan) guarding or preserving and (publicly) 
proclaiming the ‘truth of history,’ on the one hand, and simultaneously an incessant 
evocation of the betrayal, forgetting or irremediable absence of historical truth, on the 
other.  
 
Those who would seek to make an intervention into Algerian politics in the name of truth, 
reconciliation and justice would do themselves a favour by first appreciating the politics of 
history McDougall is outlining. For all of the criticisms of Algeria’s national reconciliation 
                                                
5 This notion of interlocking, and thus mutually enabling/disabling, concurrent claims to history in 
the context of ongoing political struggle is also instantiated in the case of Israel and the 
Palestinians. Witness the present-day entanglement of Anglo-French colonialism in the Levant, the 
Holocaust, the founding of Israel, the displacements of the Palestinians in 1947-48 (al-Nakbah) and 
1967, and the continuing violence related to the contest between Israel and Palestinian nationalists. 
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measures, few have taken the time to note the similar measures adopted by the French 
government following its departure from Algeria, particularly the 1974 blanket amnesty 
for all crimes committed during the French-Algerian war and the 1982 law that even 
pardoned the perpetrators of the 1961 coup d’état against French President Charles de 
Gaulle. Adding insult to injury (from a certain Algerian nationalist points of view), the 
conservative-dominated French parliament passed a law in 2005 insisting that schools and 
textbooks highlight the ‘positive’ effects of French colonialism, particularly in North 
Africa. At the time that the law was passed, Algeria was about to commemorate the 
sixtieth anniversary of the 1945 Sétif massacres. And only several years prior, as noted in 
chapter eight, post-colonial tensions had resurfaced around the memoirs of Ighilahriz and 
Aussaresses, the response of Massu, and the creation of a holiday in France to celebrate the 
role of Algerians who helped Paris in the fight against the nationalist insurgency. While 
French President Nicolas Sarkozy was willing to admit that French colonialism had been 
‘profoundly unjust’ during a November 2007 state visit to Algeria, it was not the formal 
apology some in Algeria have long waited to hear. Further compounding these interlocking 
claims of injustice and ‘amnesia’, both historical and contemporary, is the extent to which 
Algerian on Algerian violence during the war of independence and its immediate aftermath 
should likewise factor into our thinking about this problem. 
 
The problem, to make it clear, is that history has not only been an important terrain of the 
Algerian civil war, history is also space for, and means of, outside intervention. As chapter 
eight made clear, the historical context and future historiography of the violence has 
already become a site of struggle and a pathway of foreign involvement. Regarding the 
latter, the final chapter of this study fixated on the theme of history because of the 
possibility that foreign actors, whether of their own volition or responding to invitations, 
will make rhetorical and practical interventions into Algeria’s post-conflict environment, 
especially under the banner of transitional justice and national reconciliation. That history 
is, and increasingly will become, an important domestic and international terrain of 
political struggle over late Algerian violence, whether in terms of representation or 
intervention, reveals the convergence of the political and historical. In this respect, future 
politiography and historiography of Algerian violence would do well to see their work as 
intimately intertwined. But this insight also functions as a warning. As McDougall 
suggested above (see also McDougall 2006a: 1-2), history, like territory, is often 
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constituted a sovereign, sacrosanct and thus inviolable terrain of Algerian nationalism(s), 
though it is also one that has been subject to harrowing contestation.6 Given this 
recognition of the convergence of the political and historical, and so politiography and 
historiography, future efforts to represent the violence in Algeria must acknowledge that 
their interventions are as much political as they are politiographic. The politics of naming 
violence is not only given by inaccurate inscriptions or hypocritical readings, it is 
constituted by the act it self. To name is to politicise.  
 
When it comes to questions of the politics of mass violence, national trauma and the 
tension between claims to memory (both public and private), historiography certainly 
seems better positioned to offer resources for thinking our way through this impasse in the 
politics and politiography of the recent conflict in Algeria (as a starting point Torpey 2003; 
Olick 2007), though this is not to suggest that history, as opposed to other disciplines (e.g., 
Stover & Weinstein 2004), has a monopoly over these subjects. Yet it seems that both 
politiography (as established in this study) and historiography have yet to adequately 
address the phenomena of mass violence. Historical theorist Dominick LaCapra, whose 
long career has included an extensive engagement with questions of memory7, 
representation and atrocity, recently attempted to develop a critique of violence by offering 
a wide-ranging discussion of several famous interlocutors on the subject.8 From his 
readings, LaCapra concluded, 
 
[...] a key problem for contemporary critical thinking is to attend to various forms, 
modalities, and constructions of violence as well as to the forces in history that may 
help limit if not avert the occurrence and to counteract the effects of at least certain 
forms of violence, notably those involving sacralizing or redemptive valorization, the 
establishment of oppressive power differentials, and attendant forms of victimization. 
(LaCapra 2009: 122)  
                                                
6 In the midst of the international debate surrounding the massacres, Tuquoi recognised in 
November 1997, ‘There will be no international commission of inquiry into the massacres in 
Algeria. In a country where nationalism is worth more than the truth, it is inconceivable that a 
foreign team is allowed to come on site to shed light on the killings’ (Jean Pierre Tuquoi, ‘Algérie, 
autopsie d’un massacre’, Le Monde, 11 November 1997). 
7 See (LaCapra 1996; LaCapra 1998; LaCapra 2001). 
8 Including Émile Durkheim, Marcel Mauss, Walter Benjamin, Hannah Arendt, Frantz Fanon, 
Jacques Derrida and Slavoj Žižek. 
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After surveying a century of thought, LaCapra is basically admitting that we have yet to 
develop the intellectual resources to represent violence in an ameliorative way. One can 
imagine the obvious critiques that would quickly launch from the civil war and 
intervention theorists and researchers discussed in chapters three, four, six and seven. Their 
first claim being that LaCapra is reading the wrong texts and their second being that they 
have already done all this work, albeit in a far different vocabulary. It is the conclusions of 
this study, however, that, at least in the case of Algeria, the ways in which politiographers 
understood the ‘forms’ and ‘modalities’ of the violence, as well as the ‘forces in history’ 
that enabled it and could disable it, were all problematic, some calling for outright 
rejection. 
 
If we accept the premise — hopefully vindicated by this study somewhat — that all 
representations are problematic (i.e., dangerous in Foucault’s sense), then the task of 
politiography cannot be guided simply by the search for more descriptive accuracy, more 
historical coherency, more theoretical robustness, more articulate models and better 
empirical methods. One response to Nietzsche’s (1992: 516) warning (‘only that which has 
no history is definable’) is William James’ (1995: 53) call for an ironic attitude towards 
impasses of thought: ‘Make the distinction, and there is no occasion for further dispute’. 
While the consequent is certainly questionable, the antecedent is important to consider — 
or, rather, the grounds upon which we make distinctions when confronting impasses of 
thought. The discourse surrounding the definition of the term civil war and the new war 
debate described in chapter four are perfect examples. The exclusive historico-ontological 
framework guiding the discussion has provided the conditions, as Nietzsche would have 
predicted, for its interminable reproduction and recirculation. Meanwhile, ‘All these 
theories yet the bodies keep piling up’.9 For all of the work poured into studying mass 
international violence in the past decade, not once has it been suggested that this prolific 
discourse is converging on a series of tools to prevent or disrupt civil wars. 
 
                                                
9 The phrase is attributed to a sign in Nicholas Wheeler’s office (Zalewski 1996: 353); Wheeler is 
the author of an important work on humanitarian intervention (Wheeler 2000). Zalewski (1996: 
352), who invoked this phrase to trouble her colleagues in International Relations and their 
quibbling over theory, nonetheless limits her intervention’s final words to a call for a ‘need to re-
think the discipline’. 
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Following Rorty’s ethical enhancement of James’ insight, our approach should begin with 
the political and abandon what amounts to a faith that understandings of ontology and 
history alone will provide such tools for political action. For Rorty (1989) likens the effort 
to ground knowledge in a ‘nonlinguistic’ reality to efforts to ground political legitimacy in 
‘nonhuman authority’. The natural corrective for both, he argues, is democracy. If we are 
serious about confronting episodes of mass violence and not just documenting them, then 
we should adopt a politically informed rather than a self-proclaimed apolitical scientific 
attitude towards politiography and historiography. This entails the explicit 
acknowledgement that we are making distinctions for political reasons; political in the 
sense that we do them despite history rather than because of history. Politics, after all, is 
already embedded within, for example, representations of atrocity, designations of identity, 
definitions of war and practices of intervention. Pragmatism only reveals what was already 
there and then demands that we take responsibility for it. This is not to say that politics is a 
less contested or less difficult terrain than history; it is to say that the practice of politics, 
rather than of history, is ostensibly a field in which questions of human needs are supposed 
to be directly addressed. Whether we choose to reject, embrace or reformulate concepts 
such as civil war or humanitarianism, our justifications should not be based only on claims 
of alleged coherence with particular representations of history or the robustness of 
empirical findings from large number surveys. Rather, such concepts should also be judged 
in terms of their ability to address the very phenomena they seek to ameliorate. 
 
 
Politiography in the face of atrocity 
 
Concluding this study is also difficult because it has painstakingly, though not always 
successfully, avoided the generation of new privileged representations, findings to support 
existing research agendas or normative insights amenable to either Machiavellian or 
Grotian knowledges — to raise questions without the assumption that there are always 
answers. Tying up loose ends is difficult when you have gone to great lengths to unravel 
everything. To a large degree, unlearning — a notion put forward by Raymond Williams 
that partially motivated Said’s Orientalism — is an important aspect of this study. ‘We 
react to danger by attempting to take control’, Williams believed (1983[1958]: 336), ‘yet 
still we have to unlearn, as the price of survival, the inherent dominative mode’. Yet it still 
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seems that much has yet to be unlearned thirty years after Orientalism given recent 
international developments, such as the humanitarianisation of the discourse surrounding 
the conflict in Sudan’s Darfur region, the lack of any effort to rally a similar 
interventionary force to stop the mass rape and killing in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (even after five million reported deaths), the post hoc humanitarianisation of the US 
interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as the brutal civil war precipitated by the 
latter. If the reader feels uneasy at this point, then at least one worthwhile effect of this 
study has been attained.  
 
Leaving Algeria in the summer of 2008, I felt very much unsettled by my experience and 
that is something I hoped to convey in this study. The Algeria I experienced for several 
months had, just ten years prior, been in the midst of violence that is unbelievable in its 
sheer terror and scope, but now seems totally effaced from the physical and, increasingly, 
political environment. Traces of the horror have been stashed away. One administrator 
with an Algerian newspaper showed me a portfolio assembled by the Algerian interior 
ministry in the mid 1990s, which he kept hidden in his desk. The cover read in Arabic and 
French 
 
waḥshiyyah al-taṭarruf fī al-Jazāʾir 
1995 
La barbarie de l’extremisme en Algerie [sic] 
1995 
 
What followed were photos of severed heads, decapitated or dismembered bodies, gaping 
throat wounds, charred remains, bloated corpses and matching case details. Men, women, 
children, infants. The purpose of this folder, I was told, had been to help convince Algerian 
and foreign journalists that the armed groups were truly immoral.10 And yet the violence in 
Algeria would soon reach new depths in the years immediately after those photos were 
assembled. The spectacular numerical horror of the Mitidja and Relizane massacres, whose 
visual, aural, nasal and tactile horror was mostly hidden from the outside world, was so 
                                                
10 Fisk reports being shown this folder too (Robert Fisk, ‘Scenes from an unholy war’, Independent, 
16 April 1995: 4). 
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disturbing that it briefly brought Algeria to the centre stage of international affairs. 
Civilians had been literally slaughtered within walking distance from my residence in 
Algiers; I was a short bus ride from the Mitidja’s ‘triangle of death’ and some of the most 
famous massacre sites. But by all accounts and by my own experience, Algeria is now a 
much safer and more stable country than it was ten or twenty years prior. The state does 
not seem on the verge of collapse (if it ever was) and society is not violently at war with 
itself; though ostensibly political violence persists, it seems that civilian massacres are a 
thing of the past for now. Forever, we hope.  
 
That the violence in Algeria has abated despite either a coherent politiography of it or an 
identifiable, resolute and coordinated international effort to stop it — two observations that 
occasion this study — could serve as a vague call for better science and clearer rules for 
international intervention. This, however, would only compound the error. If there is any 
lesson to be distilled from the international representations and experiences of the last two 
decades violence in Algeria, it is minimally that utility of abstract models and norms 
cannot be guaranteed. The politiography of Algerian violence examined in this study 
suggest that theories of mass violence and algorithms of intervention are not problematised 
by merely constructing the Algerian case as an outlier, an aberration or uniquely opaque. 
At every moment possible, this study sought to establish the ways in which the case of 
Algerian, as produced within the logic of particular discourses on security, elucidated the 
ways in which various representations of Algerian violence were self-deconstructing. It 
was not the goal of this study to show the ways in which Algeria empirically challenged 
particular theories but to show how constructions of Algeria actually challenge the very 
regimes that produced them.  
 
Realising, however, that we cannot make our way in the world — never mind advance a 
politics — without engaging in the always-already problematic act of representation, we 
are faced with the choice of either ignoring the problematics of representation or 
acknowledging them. As the latter is the more intellectually honest and inter-subjectively 
accountable option, we then have to ask ourselves this: What would an intentionally 
pragmatic, ironic or self-aware onto-political account of mass intra-national violence look 
like? The first danger lies in the initial act of categorisation itself, especially the tendency 
to reify hypothetical assumptions into ontological realities. Chapter three highlighted this 
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in the case of rebel agency, chapter four in the case of naming civil wars, chapter five in 
the case of designating massacre thresholds, chapter seven in the case of drawing the 
sovereignty/intervention barrier and chapter eight in the case of drawing a priori 
distinctions between historical and political causes (not to mention economic, social, 
cultural, etc.).  
 
But it is also important to keep in mind the politics of naming inherent in processes of 
schematisation. Both realisations suggest that vocabulary is key. Not because the right 
vocabulary can cure these problems but because we must be conscious of the power of 
vocabularies to elucidate, produce and address the politics of naming within acts of 
naming. Prevailing Neoliberal approaches to understanding civil wars, as witnessed in 
chapters three and four, failed to recognise the historical contingency, political effects and 
politiographic over-determinations of their own nomenclature, particularly in the uncritical 
adoption of the term civil war. A critical debate in the future politiography of mass 
violence will be the interrogation of the term civil war. Chapter four has perhaps made the 
strongest case for, minimally, a more ironic attitude towards the historical contingency of 
our use of the term civil war or, better yet, the need to abandon its use. 
 
The problems facing the use of new terminology, on the other hand, were made quite clear 
in the case of New Wars thinking at the end of chapter four. To borrow a phrase from 
Žižek, the thesis of New Wars advanced by Kaldor was the right step but in the wrong 
direction. It acknowledged the need for a new lexicon to guide the politiography of recent 
mass violence but then justified the case for its adoption on empirical rather than pragmatic 
grounds. This justificatory framing, in so far as it worked within the vocabulary of 
prevailing civil war studies, provided Neoliberal critics of New War thinking with ample 
means to de-legitimate its warrant, predictably on historical and empirical grounds. 
Instead, New War thinking should have justified its intervention into the politiography of 
mass violence by demonstrating the simple fact that the theories of war and civil war that 
we have inherited have yet to provide us with tools to combat these phenomena. Rather 
than claiming a new ontology of organised violence, New War thinking should have 
advanced a new vocabulary of violence. That is, rather than proclaiming the arrival New 
Wars, it would be to herald a new way to speak and think about war. The warrant for this 
should rest on the grounds that the international community has intellectually and 
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politically failed to confront the conditions of mass violence since the end of the Cold War 
and some of its most ugly manifestations, Algeria included.  
 
Throwing out the baby with the bathwater also needs to be avoided. While the study has 
problematised various discursive interpellations of the violence in Algeria, the purpose was 
to excavate the politics hidden within them and not to undermine their legitimacy entirely. 
There has been good research done on civil wars, yet it has so far failed to recognise the 
politics in which it is embedded and the politics embedded within it. An ironic approach, 
which would actively embrace rather than passively evade the problematics of 
representation, would shift the initial terrain of debate to questions of ethics and politics. 
This, however, should not be understood as a call for the ‘politicisation’ of research on 
civil wars and humanitarian intervention, in the sense that governments and international 
bodies should take control of research agendas or that academic freedom should be 
curtailed for the sake of a more technocratic elite. This study has striven to demonstrate 
that politiography is already politicised whether we like it or not, but only so as to 
encourage politiographers to recognise and take control of the politics of their work. What 
irony demands is an approach that is simultaneously aware of its politically contingent 
nature, explicit in terms of its intervention and unequivocal in the ethical basis for it. 
 
 
International politics in the face of atrocity 
 
The ethical basis for the study of mass intra-national violence, ironic or not, should be 
clear enough to those already engaged in the politiography of it. At the outset and 
conclusion of chapter four, some of most disturbing trends in recent civil wars were 
underscored, such as their increasing proliferation, length and ferocity. In terms of the total 
cost to humanity, one estimate suggests that at least sixteen million people have died in 
such conflicts since the end of the Cold War (Regan 2009). Most of the victims appear to 
be non-combatants and children, such conflicts further impoverish nations and, once a 
country has experienced internal war, its chances of escaping violence or experiencing 
repeated episodes are greatly enhanced (see Stern 2002). And yet such statistics and 
findings often do not capture the complete toll wreaked by other forms of mass intra-
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national violence (Hironaka 2005: 3) and, of course, the continuing devastation within the 
post-conflict environment (Ghobarah et al. 2003). 
 
As noted in chapter seven, the most concerted effort to advance a new international 
paradigm against the perpetration of mass atrocities has been the efforts of the 
‘Responsibility to Protect’ school. Emerging at the end of the interstice between the Cold 
War and 11 September 2001, proponents of the Responsibility to Protect have attempted a 
deontological reframing of the debate surrounding humanitarian intervention. Their 
rhetorical move — from a right to intervene to a responsibility to protect — is a vivid case 
study in the uses of naming, one that reveals, as good as any, the intimate relationship 
between language and politics. In practical terms, the idea is to establish a normative 
framework that operates as kind of checklist for intervention to stop certain forms of mass 
violence. Unlike the implicit attack upon notions of sovereignty embedded within 
professions of a right of humanitarian intervention, the Responsibility to Protect cleverly 
begins with an affirmation of the sovereignty of all states and places the onus of protecting 
civilians upon the government that claims them. When states fail to protect their citizens, it 
then becomes incumbent upon international actors to take a series of steps to secure 
civilians from organised violence, beginning with cooperative efforts to help the 
government in question meet its obligations. Military confrontation, on the other hand, 
should be treated as the option of last resort. 
 
The Responsibility to Protect emerges out of a decade of failed or faulty international 
interventions into various kinds of conflict environments and humanitarian emergencies. 
Yet as chapter seven established, it is not informed by an analysis of the international 
response to the massacres in Algeria. Putting aside the Qui tue? debate of the massacre, 
this striking absence from the preparatory work that went into constructing the historical 
mandate for the Responsibility to Protect is rather conspicuous when we remember that 
much of the international consternation was driven by the Algerian government’s allegedly 
systematic failure to protect thousands of its citizens from mass slaughter. A provocative 
thought experiment might consider whether or not the provisions of the Responsibility to 
Protect regime would have been able to compensate for the international community’s 
apparent failure to affect overtly the violence in Algeria. However, it is not the purpose of 
this conclusion or this study to refract representations of Algerian violence through the lens 
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of the Responsibility to Protect. Rather, as was noted in chapter seven, Algeria revealed 
some of the problems of taking this kind of route. Even before the formulation of the 
Responsibility to Protect, David Campbell (1998b: 500-1) noted the oddness that would 
manifest in the deployment of abstract ‘normative frameworks’ to ‘resolve political 
questions’ at the concrete level: ‘That a recognition of the complex and politicised nature 
of disasters gives rise to highly simplified codes, principles, and values as the means to 
address the politicisation of humanitarianism is more than a little paradoxical’. That 
Algeria demonstrates the need to appreciate the contingency of such complex phenomena 
as mass violence — and the international response to it — has hopefully been well 
demonstrated in this study. To a certain extent, the uneven response of the international 
community to mass atrocities and humanitarian disasters might already suggest a kind of 
passive or unconscious sensitivity to the contingency of each episode. Rather than make 
excuses for it, denounce it as organised hypocrisy or describe it as the effect of discursive 
forces competing for representational hegemony, an ironic politiography might commence 
from the premise that contingency is to be expected given the contingency of 
representation. 
 
If it seems that I am avoiding the question of ethics (i.e., what are the foundations for 
ethical action after the linguistic turn?), then I have not made the point clear enough. The 
purpose of an ironic politiography is not to assume that ethics comes before or after 
representation, whether in the form of philosophical foundations or practical applications. 
Ethical concerns are central to the kind of politiography I am proposing. The foundation 
and application of ethical representation should constitute the primary terrain of debate 
within politiography. Not because ethics or politics guarantees consensus but because the 
tyranny of representation cannot be fought with counter-representations alone. The 
representation of politics, like political representation, must be grounded in struggle to 
expand the scope of democracy. 
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